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SUMURY 
Passing of property between the seller and the buyer in C*I*P9 
and F*O*Bo contracts is a matter of significance in the event of 
the insolvency of either party, and the liability to capture, and 
seizure on the outbreak of war* 
This problem has been left for solution according to the 
domestic laws, despite the international characteristics of C,, I*Po 
& F*O#B. contracts. The domestic laws have presented different 
solutions, and therefore different consequences may result* 
This thesis is an attempt to deal with the problem comparatively 
in the light of the Sale of Goods Act, 18939 Old Soots Law, Iraqi Law 
(and Egyptian Law), and Rrench Law* : Lt consists of an introductory 
chapter (documents affecting passing of property in C*I*Fe & FeOeBe 
contracts) and a supplementary chapter (passing of the risk). The 
Problem itself has been dealt with in Chapter Two. 
The first chapter is devoted to describing the functions of the 
bill of lading and its characteristics as a document of title, In 
the light of these characteristics the Received for shipment bill of 
lading and the ship's delivery order are documents of title, whereas 
the Through bill of lading is not, because it does not entitle the 
consignee to claim delivery of the goods from the last oarriere 
The container revolution has had a tremendous effect on the 
classic rules of bills of ladingg therefore a compromise has been 
presented by establishing an international matitime organization., 
Chapter Two is concerned with. the passing of propertys The 
research has followed the process of passing of the property in 
home market sales and the effect of that process on ColeFe & FoOsBo 
contractso The problem has been discussed in four sectioneq each 
devoted to a particular legal system. At the conclusion of this 
chapter, the research has classified the legal thoughts into two 
main theories: The objective theory and the subjectivel which are 
both seen to be illfitted to modern practice* The correspondence 
idea can be a good substitute because it has the advantages of both 
the theories. 
Passing of the risk, and whether the risk should be attached to 
the property or the delivery of the goodal is the subject of Chapter 
Three. In this chapter the problem concerning home market sales has 
been presented separately in each legal system. But in ColeF4, & FoO. B. 
contracts, it is internationally accepted that the risk should pass to 
the buyer on shipment* The research has sought to ascertain the exact 
moment of shipment, and analyses the different aspects of this 
international rule, 
TlqTRODUCTICU 
C*I*F* and P*O*Bo contracts are well known in international 
trade. They have been in praotice for a long time. In this 
introduction we wish to point out their main features as followse. 
C*I*F* Contracts 
"The initials indicate that the price is to include costo 
insurance and freight. * It is a type of contract which is more 
widely and more frequently in use than any other contract used 
for the purpose of sea-borne commeroeo An enormous Mmber Of 
transactions, in value amounting to -untold sumal are ca2vied Out 
every year under ColoP4, contractse" 
The authorities have established the main features of this 
contract by which "***the vendor in the absence of any special 
provision to the contrary is bound by his contract to do six things. 
First to make oat an invoice of the'goods sold. Second, to ship at 
In Prencht Cd4t, assurance, fret a C. A. F. This type of sale 
appeared in France after the war of 1870., Georges Ripert, 
M)roit maritime*" Tome 11 1952 at page 794. In Britain the 
CoTA, torm evolved, though, as the first oases decided in 
i862t Tregelles v. Sewell 7 H- IT- 5740 and in 1872 t' Ireland 
v. Livingston L. R- 5 H- Lo; 395* 
(I)- Per Lord Wright. in RQss To Smyth A Co. Ltd. v, TeDe Bailey-a- 
Son & 9.09 L1940J 3 All E* Ro 60* 
It has be said that the reason which made O*I*F* contracts 
very popular in international trade to the fact that the 
Americenev since 1914, did not want to bear therisk of their 
shipments, az& they also, wanted to. - help the, Frob*j B61Cj&*s:,, 
aiA thelfttish in finding the ps whichý" c. arry the cargo and 
tho- Ansurom" 
- *oxpa4;, P4, -- 1, Professot-Rone Rodiere, "Droit-maritiuePýftb tiv, # IW4 Ot, 
- 11 '156. PrGoin-Dall6so 
the porL of shipment goods of the description contained in the 
contracte* Third, to procure a contract of affreightment under 
which the goods will be delivered at the destination contemplated 
by the contract, Fourth, to arrange for an insurance upon the 
terms current in the trade which will be available for the benefit 
of the buyer. Fifthly 9 with all reasonable despatch to send 
forward and tender to the buyer these shipping documents, namely 
the invoice, bill of lading and polieT of assurance, ** delivery 
of which to the buyer is symbolical of delivery of the goods 
PtLrohasedq placing the same at the buy ergs risk and entitling the 
seller to payment of their price. These authorities are Ireland v. 
"in 1) per Blackburn J; Biddell Brose vo- E. Clemens. Horat 
Co. 
(2) 
; on appeal E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Bidd 
3), 
MA 
0, SharDe & Co. v. Nosawa Co. 
(4) 
These oases also establish that 
if no place be named in the C*IvF* contract for the tender of the 
shipping documents they must prima facts be lendered ai 'the 
III-I (g' 
residenoe or place of business of the buyers"""' 
-'Within the time named In the contraott per Scratton J. in 
Landover & Co. v. Craven & 82! eding Bros. [1912) 2 K. B. 94 
** 
(I) 
(2) 
at Page 105o 
This was first said by Lord Isher in Sandra v. WeLean (1883) 
3)-X6Fo 1955 at pw 425- G. Ripert IlDroit maritime, at page 
793 v, 2. R, Rodier Mroit maritimet at PW 356, Inootezus 1953* 
'The obligations of the seller in 04,1*Po coMr~ , /over 
e deeiäiorl'of 7Tribunal de oomeroe'dt' la Seinel In 24-3-19544, 
Rmason v. - 
Hamel &- Roan Lt.. dL Ll 922J., 9 ), *C* 36* 
-- at nare 1550 bee aloof 
11 Q-B-D- 327 at Pme 337o 
(1872) L. R. 5 R*L- 3959 406- 
&IJ I K*B. 934t 962. 
[1: 912] ALoCe-18a 
Fi9l7'j 2 K*Bo 814* 
Per Lord-Atkinson in JolMaga v*-TMI*r Bros. [1920] AoCo 144- 
The main features of CeI*F* contracts have been the subject, 'as 
weill of many informal and formal agreements among those engaged 
in international trading* Certain rules have been aooepted to 
clarify the main features of C. I. Fe and other contracts 1d8ed in 
international sales. 
The first of such agreements was arranged by 'The International 
Law Association' which devised the : Rules for C*I9P* Contracts 
(Warsaw-Orford Rules) 1928 - 1932.0) 
The second attempt was made by the 'International Chamber of 
ý* which Issued in 1936 the 'International rules Commerce F1 C 
for the interpretation of trade terms'** which included the terms 
CoI. Fe, FsOeBeq FeAeSol Co&*Fo and the like. Those rules were 
[Inceterms 195_ amended in 1953 arA they are well known as 
Q3 
* 
(2) 
(5) cont"d. 
In this respect, it has to be mentioned that J. Heenen has said 
that the origin of C*I*P* contracts is a sale called 'La vente 
sons voilet - sale under a sail - which appeared in Belgium. at 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The main features of that 
sale were : l- The risk of maritime transport was on the buyer, 
and 2- The seller had to transfer the docauents (Bill of lading, 
insurance policy) to the Imyer. 
Vents at Commerce Maritime, at P-132. Bruxelles, 1952. 
This kind of sale has disappeared from international trade in 
modern practice, and we do not have many details of its procedure 
judgements. Therefore a comparison cannot be made to refer the 
origin of modern C*I*F4, to that, of "La vente sous v6ilet. 
(1) ( R; gles de Varsovie et d1oxford ) R4gles relatives aux contracts 
COAOFO 
The Nnglish text of th6se rules in published in v5 2rAL ed,,: *f tb* 
'British Shipping Laust at ppe 1402-1409- 
Chamber de Commerce International (CCI) 
IR41es International pour l"JuterpretiticM des'. terms, commerejaw& 
(2) Incaterms 1953 Is Published Ill 'Churterir*-! afid, obiWrt. *-ý~ý-tr 
J., Pon- 5th ed-, L011dont 1960 at PP 247-264. 
It must be mentioned that Warsaw and Oxford rules and Incoterms 
are not obligatory rules unless they are expreesely incorporated 
by the parties into their contract* There is, also, the attempt 
to formulate a standard C9I9F* contract. This has been done by 
'The London Corn Trade Associationt and 'Chanbre arbitrale et de 
conciliation de graine et de graines dtanverst. In these standard 
contracts the main terms are printed, and spaces in between are 
left to be filled up by the contracting parties concerning the 
description of the goods and the price@ Finallyq there are the 
conventions namely ULIS 
(1) 
and UMS 
(2) 
1 which provide a code of laws 
of general application to all international sales contracts* 
However, the main features of C. I. Me contracts had been construed 
in a very restricted way toontrat de droit strict' 
(3), 
but the 
modern tendency or the judiciary is to oonatrme Cel*F* tome in a 
more flexible manner to imit modern requirements. This flexibility 
means i 
I- If the contracting parties evince-no olbar intention to vitiate 
the preoise and definite meazdug of C*T*Fol their obligations 
should be carried out according tothe principles governed by 
C*IeAm contracts* 
(1) toonvgMion relating to a Uniform law on the International Sale 
of Goodst. The-UsK., instrument of ratification was deposited On 
31 August 19679 and -the Convention entered into-foree on $8 kWet 
1972. -Trexty Series Ito. 74 (197ý). 
(2) 'Corrention relating to a Uniform I&w an the, Formation of 99#r&OtB 
for the international Sale of Goods"... _ 
The VoKe, inxtroept 
ratifloation, was deposited on. . 31 Augait 1'967 ý and ýtbq 
gonvention 
out" into force on 23 August 1972, 
(3) 04, RiVOrt tDroit maritime* v2 at P498. 
2- If the contracting parties have incorporated in their contract, 
a repugnant stipulation 'to that stipulation should be 
applied, and consequently, contracts containing such terms are 
prima facie not C*T*Po contracts. 
(') 
3- The circumstances of the case, sometimes, indicate that despite 
the fact that the contract contains terms repugnant to 091*Pol 
but the real intention of the contracting parties is to apply 
C*I*F* rules regardless of those apparently repugnant 
stipulations, 
(2) 
or their real intention is to apply C*T*Fo rules 
(1) The Parchim a9183 AeCe 157* 
The Julia 949ý A. Co 293- 
D, 14F, 1960 at p. 245* 
D*XPF* 1959 at p. 627- 
(2) For example t The following terms`are considered to be in harmony 
with C*I*F* I 
Onet landing weightel 
Ishould the goods or my portion thereof not arrive from loss of 
vessel either before or after declaration this 00ritra(Yt for such 
Portion to be void' 
"Payment cash (before delivery if, reqared) against documents or 
delivery ordert 
see Denbi h. Cowan & Co.. v. -Atcherley 
& Co. (1921) 90 L, Z, X, B, 
836 kC*A*) 
In A. Delaurter & Co, v, V*J* Wyllie &-Others (1889) 17 R (Ot. 
of Sees*) 167, The CeIeFo contract provided that insurance to be 
at the sellers' risko The clause holdto imply that the sellers 
had undertaken to obtain cover and had guaranteed to effect the 
necessary insurance, 
In France i The following terms are in accordance with WeFe t 
AClause d"agre'age all 
D; N*F, o 1960 at Pe 50o 
OClause some Palan arrivget 
tPrix payable poids delivr. fi* 
DoX. P. 1963 at ro 3479 
Moreover the law of 3rd Jan* 1969 has made it clear in article 41 
that the above mentioned clauses or similar do not change the 
nature of C*IeF* contraciý, * Article 41 states I 'La mmle 
insertion dans le contrat: des clauses (Ppide, reocnamA Warrivie) 
(potdo -delivT6 au. port d'arriv6s) ou-natre, olausex'soublables ata, 
pasPour offet do. modifier la, nature do la vente C*A@Pel,, 
Sedtipi'201 - first pareoaph, ITaqui JALw of Comeroe NO*60 YW 
19431 (now repeald) 
as long as the oircumstances envisaged by the repugnant stipulation 
are not realized* 
The nature of C*I. Fs contracts 
This subjeat has been a matter of controversy for a long time* 
In the following paragraphs we are discussing the theories said on 
this point I 
I- CeI*F* contract is a sale of documents: 
According to this theory "Col*F* sale is not a sale of goods, 
but a sale of documents relating to goods, It is not a contract 
that goods shall arrive, but a contract to ship goods complying 
with the contract of sale, to obtain, unless the contract 
otherwise provides, the ordinary contract of carriage to the 
Place of destinationg end the ordinary contract of insurance of 
the goods on that voynge, and to tender these documents against 
Payment of the contract price. The buyer then has the right to 
claim the ftlfilment of the oontract-of'oarriageg ort if the 
goods are lost or damaged, such indemnity for the lose as he 
can claim under the contract of Jusuz-anae. He buys the 
documents, not the goods, and it may be that mAer the term of 
the contracts of inmmnee and affreightment he buys no indemnity 
for the damage -that has happened to the goods* This depefits on 
what domments he is wAitled. to under -the coutrant'of ftle, 0(2) 
y . ariniee. jiranies & Co. v. William P,, ? kleolm &. yU 
(1926) 
2SLlo Le Repo 26 
p. 166o The Gabbimo 09.40 
(2) Per Samtton J. 
_! n 
Arnhold &&ber MA Co. v. 'B3. y! t 
Joumdain & Coiý L19151 2 X-Be 379ýii-D. 
Ta ftance , IL pferre CkAret has 
- adopted - and defended. tbis th*03W 
over 
It is obvious that this theory depends on the important role of 
the documents (Bill of lading, insurance policy, etc. ) in C*1*F* 
contracts. There is no doubt that those documents are vital in 
this kind of contractf but the buyer's main concern is to got the 
documents as well as the goods and not the documents only. 
Moreover, this theory does not appear to be acceptablet if justified, 
it would mean that -the buyer would not be able to make any claim 
(if the goods do not comply with the contraot of sale) when thel 
documents in his possession are in conformity with the stipulations 
of the contracto In fact, these days, it is a well established 
principle that the acceptance of documents does not deprive the 
buyer of the right to reject the goods, at their arrival, if they 
are not in conformity with the contract descriptionse 
0) 
(2) Cont I d. 
in his thesis, titled tLe contrat do vents Colwkt Asewmnce, Fret 
Ventel C*A*Fo tq submitted toPAris University in 1925- X. Godret 
statedt tl& vents C,, A*P, appaxvýt done oammeroialement comma une 
vents de document regalierst. He reliedt in supporting this theory, 
on I- The decision rendered by ITribunal do commerce do la Seine# 
In 73 -I- 1922 which stated "... ltaoheteur ach'e'te an realit6 deý 
doomentst iN pe dans ces conditions otil set, soucieux de see intýfets A ltuniqtte p eoccupation de ltachatenr dolt Wtrs do no prandre qtxe des 
documents rigoureusement conformse a= accords passes, paisque 
lorequtil sera eirtre an possession de ces pieces at qtL'il aura pays 
le prix convaim, la vents sera riplt6e r4alis6o". This decision 
iras confirmed by tCour 4Appol do Parist in 22 -V- 1922.9 
2- The decision-randered 1ýy. *L&, Cour do Casextiont in 21412 - 1922, ; hich stated t vents caf constitue on do 
docwmmts an prettier rang deWols figare ja po1jo*, 4t%s1MTanc48'** 
Pierre 09dret at ppe Ill 129 13o 
(1) Paul Chaavwm *Traiti do Droit 3kritimet at p, 61ýw 
MA, rwei Tok-Choo v* Bxý Traders 
4*33o 459* 
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2- C*I*Fo contract is a sale of goods to be performed by delivery 
of documentst 
This theory was presented by Bankes and Warrington L. JJ in the 
Court of Appeal as a reaction against the previous theoryt and 
in the same case*(') Banks L*J* statedt "I an not able to agree 
with that view of the contractt that it is a sale of documents, 
relating to goods. I prefer to look upon it an a contract for 
the sale of-moods to be . cuments, -performed 
ýZ the deliv= of do 
and what those documents are must depend upon the terms of the 
(2) 
oo? rtraot itself" 0 
This theory was adopted by the Belgian Cassation Court in 
their decision dated 15 October 1925- 
(3) 
In fact this theory in more persuasive than the first one, 
btrt it can be criticized in that it may lead to a result that 
the property in C. I. F. contract passes to a bayer by thO 
delivery of documents* Thus NoCardie Jog after describing the 
difference between the two theories as "one of phrase only", -* 
(1) Arnhold Karbere & Co. v. B14'ho. Green. -igglML& 
Coo [1913 
1 K. B- 4195e 
(2) rbid at p. 510e 
Wo. rringt(m Lolm agreed with Baukee at V* 514* 
(3) "1& cour do cassation, dans son arx4t du 15 Octalire 1,925, dit 
que la vents n9eat pas une vents de doowmdst mit . uw *ento do mutchanclinowl qwA doit Otre realiage par la d6livranee des 
doowments A Ifachotear", Go Winkeloolon at,. p, t3, * 
With r0speat the differeinceb6tWeen this tfieM SUd- jh6 fjM 
to not "one of phrase only"* We have seen that acoor&ing to the 
first theory the buyer. is not able u rojimot ý, tb* gooo ýevw Ar. 
at their arrival -, ithw are nvt in confousity- t1l, * aw%jact doisoriptioul. wherese-occording to tbig, theory, the buyw to &1)2e 
to reject (a thw gromA th" 0. *I. op* in o3d; in4-ly a "is of goods* 
-11- 
said "*. * the obligation of the vendor is to deliver documents 
rather than goods - to--transfersymboll; ather thin thl a 
PropertZ rei3resented thereby 
0) 
This result is not always the 
case in C@I*P* contract. 
C*I*F* contract is a sale of goods and documents: 
This is another theory which has been suggested to explain the 
nature of Col*F,, contract. It says that C*1*F. is a sale of 
goods and documents at the same timej 
(2) 
on the ground that the 
seller is bound to deliver goods and documents. 
0) 
The result of this theory is that C*I@F* contract has two 
subjeot-matters, the goods and the documents. Therefore the 
passing of property in the goods and the delivery of the goods 
are distinct from transfer of rights in property or by delivery 
of the doementst(4) 
This result is a mootpoin'tt because the doonmerAs-t-114meelves do 
not have any property to be paissed to a buyer. The bill of lading 
(1) Menbre SaocharinwCo. v. Corn. Pr2Luctq, Co*, [19193 1 K*Bo 198 
at pe 203- 
(2) Go WIMIMDLE99 has adopted amA defwAad this theory in his book 
'Lee principes do I& vente CoI*F*fBruxellee 1926o He has stated 
at P-141 "La vente Col*Po nfest done pan seulement une vente de 
marchazAises et de doc=ents; et lea trois 6*16ments qui composent 
son'prixt le cdh-', la-prime at le fret; representent la valour 
des trois choses our lea quelles elle portes la, marglWime. I& 
Palloo 21- 20 ggwAjss2mPntj. " 
(3) R11 ya done#-4&m la vente CoT. Po dtune part, vente at 
d-elivrance do marchandises, d'antre partt dfilivrance deldoomentsoO 
lbid at pa. 14- 
1.1 y auraft un transfort do proprifiti, 4.. ivx ; iso ot =0 W '' M documts izidgpizAante du transfert do la'pMriete at eU, 
dolivrance des marchandises elles - meMGsOw 
J9 Heenan "Vente at cornmeros, maritime' at P. 137. 
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represents the possession of the goods and not their property, 
besidesq it does not have any property In itself to be acquired 
by a buyer. 
ColoPe is a sale of goods: 
In Del=er v. &llie(l) the Lord Ordinary (Tray ner) stated: 
(2) 
"In short, a contract coisfe is not to be read as imparting any 
obligation or right which it does not express* Such a contract 
binds the seller to pay something which otherwise would fall on 
the buyer; but except in so far as it shifts the obligation to 
pay# it-remains a contract of sale. subject to the ordinm rules 
of law which rejMlate the rights and obliRations to which that 
contract sives rise. " 
It can be inferred from the statement above mentioned that the 
nature of 0*109 contract is merely a "sale of goodsN This was 
said an well by #Tribunal do commerce do Narsoillel in their 
decision dated 2-12-1946,, * 
This theory in very general, as all the contracts, in field of 
sale of goods, are in the nature of sale of goodse Moreover, this 
theory does not specify the important role of the doouments in 
ColeFe contracts and their relationship with the goods. 
4 
(1) Sookion Cases 1889-90o 17R at ppo 167-M, 
(2) Ibid at pe Me 
It statedt "Qae la, vents C*A*Po demewe lion une vents do 
marchandises X ltembarquement obligeant Is VwAour a no livr1jr 
son acheteur qtte des marchand. ises conforloes aux 
-13- 
5 CoTeFe contract is a sale of goods which are protected by 
document s: 
The theories above discussed did not mention the main principle 
which governs sale of goods contracts. These contracts are 
governed by a principle called 'Protection of property". This 
principle simply meanst conserving the property of both seller 
and buyer* Tn other words, as far as sale of goods contracts 
are concerned, tprotection of property' principle keeps the 
balance between what we give and what we take. Consequently, 
most of the rules of sale of goods contraots have been set up 
according to that principle* 
We have seen that the previous theories did not comply 
completely with the true nature of CoTeVe contract, The reason 
for that is the difficulty of defining the relationship between 
the goods and the documents, i. e. whether they are distinct or 
non-dietinato In this respect Col,, F* contract cannot be 
conceived without documents, or a CoT*Po contract without goodso 
Therefore the goods and the documents are ineeparableo The link 
between the two is the idea of protection* Tu other words, the 
do(mments are simply instruments to protect the property in the 
goodso The buyer wants the goods to be in accordance with the 
contract description and the seller wwts to reoejv* thsprjosý- 
Therefore, it in thought, *bat the cal. elpe, oontr&crt, Ig e, jw2w, 0 
goods wbich =-a pratected I)y doctments. ftis meams l'bat Colo? * 
contract 'in originally a sale of goodsq =A the doommuts am 
Its instrmmen 8 to protect 'the property both of the seller and 
of the buyer* 
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This protection requires: 
The seller must put on board at the port of shipment goods 
in conformity with the contract description, and he must also 
send forward documents, and those documents must comply with 
the contract* 
(I) 
2 In the absence of special terms, the Imyer must M the price 
against presentation of shipping docamentse 
(2) 
payment of the 
price does not deprive the buyer of his right to reject the 
goodel on arrival, if they are not in conformity with the 
contract descriptiono(3) 
P, PO*Bo- Contracts t 
'Free on boardt, according to the classic 86nset Means I 
The seller, at hi s own expensel is to deliver goods on board 
a sMp nominxted by the buyer, and mbsGqXLWA exPOns6s, Mainly 
freig, tt arA jnsýrwoej are -to 'be borne by the Imyere 'In other 
words : the buyerve duty is to nominate 'the shiPs and the seller's 
to put the goods on board for acooun+. of the buyer aild ProOure & 
per Devlin -jo in. Mlet Tgk Chao v-o British Trad=, " SMMgjEj Idd E95] 2 Q*B* 459 at P. 450-, 
(1924) 30 Cm* (2) Per Scrutton L*JP ROIS Evans & Cc* 
Cas. M at Po Mal 
Udi (3) Yw eIT 0-k- To, St. EWE= 
pp*, 460 - 442*ý 
In prencht Pranoo, bord, (Att Franco borde 
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bill of lading in terms usual in the trade, 
O) 
This classic P*O. Be is not the only one in the international 
(2) 
trade* The F*O*B. contract has become a 'flexible instrumenttl 
Therefore the seller, in modern P*O, B, l can agree also to pay for 
the freight and insurance of the goods. These C, I, P, features 
(3) 
are not necessarily inconsistent with the FoO. B. term. 
Despite the fact that this interpretation of P*O*Bo has been 
internationally acceptedt it seems that there is another point 
of view, which states that the seller in F*O*Be contract is 
bound to bring the goods in front of the ship "devant le bord 
du navire.. 
M 
This latter interpretation is more consistent 
with F*A*S* contracts (Free along side)* and not to F*O*Bo where 
the seller is bound to put the goods actually on board ship, 
(1) Stack vo Inglis (1884) 12 Q*B*D* 564, affirmed by Helft in 
0685) 10 App. Cas. 263. 
Wimble. Sons & Coo Ltd. v. Rosenberg & Sons [19131 3 K*Bo 743- 
Je Raymond Wilson I Co. Ltd. v, N. Soratgt2Ld. Ltdo (1944) 77 71. L. Rep- 373- 
Incaterms Art 2-3* 
Art 35 of the French Law No*2 
. year 
1969 
Art 230-1- of the Tunisian Maritime Law 1962 which statest 
"La vents dit (FoOsBo) (Free on board) est une vents a 
ltembarquement dans la quells le vendeur slengage a livrer la 
marchandise livre do tomtes charges 44 bord du navire". 
Section 143 Iraqi 14w of Commerce No- 149 Year 1970- 
(2) Devlin Js in P ffrene Cc* Ltdo v., Scindia Waviption Co. Ltd. 
Ll Y>4j z 14*24 4UW *, 
Carlof, IW%MLI al & Co. 'SOI6 To awlep T%dia & Co. 
LlYNJ I LIOYU'G NON Z4U* 
HYMASI xr*, -, Jo, smite vi Englisk LUcl- L1957J I Ll- UP-* 517o---Th-a Boller has aareedi to 
secure the Mippint,, 
(4)Ripert-, MDroit Yburitime " xt ps. 829 v*2,, This xttitude was 
followed by 'the French Cassation Court in their decision dated 
27-11-1957 which stateds "La, vente P, O*B, stanalyve, an me veake 
a livror au port dtembarqtt=! mtt no compartant pour I* vAn&mr *W 
2tob2igation d"amener-a son frais at risqtLes I& marabasAiss f"mO 
devant le bord du a4ne" D., X*P* 1958 at Pe 1469 
* Valor F*A*S* contract, the seller wAortakes to deliver 40064 
&I sa ship provided by Us bVw* 
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At aW r&teq this attitude is not very popular in 
Moreover, Article 35 of the law no,, 9 year 1969 has made it 
clear that the seller under P*O*Bq contract its bound to 
deliver the goods on board ships 
(2) 
In other occasion the French Cassation Court rejected this attitude 
in their decision dated 27-4-1957 which statedl wbien q0en 
principe la responsibilit'O du vendear on FOO, B,, prerms foi lore 
de la J-me k bod d, 1, ygr 
p. 269, 
mdus.. " 3)*X*Po 1958 at 
(2) Article 35 states, "Toute clause (francc.. bord) oblige le VmAeur 
I 11wer & bord ft navireg" 
CIMPTER 1 
DOCUNENTS AFFECTIM PROPERTY 
in 
colore & F*00BOCONTRACTS 
Bill of Lading 
"Received" for Shipment Bill of lading 
Through Bill of Lading 
Delivery Order 
Mat et 8 Receipt 
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I THE BILL OF LAMXG * 
Definition: 
U*K* (Scotland and England .ji 
There is no definition of the bill of lading either In the 
Bills of Wing Act 1855, or in any other of the varione Acts of 
Parliament in which the phrase to used. 
(') 
Bat Lord Blackburn 
sWs: "A bill of lading is a writing signed on behalf of the Omer 
of the ship in which goods are embarkedy aakmowledging the receipt 
of the goods, and undertaking to deliver then at the and of the 
voyageq subject to such conditions as may be mentioned in the bill 
of ladIng. 
J2) 
In other words, a bill of lading is a doeument which 
is signed by the shipowner or his agent acknowledging that goods 
haVe been shipped on bo=4 a particalar vessel which to boand for a 
Particular destination and stating the term on which the goods so 
received are to be carried, 
O) 
These definitions have omitted an 
important elemwrtq namely the condition of the goodet as the normal 
For a hiertorio perspective of bill of ladIngt 
V. B. Copp, "The bill-of lading as a docament. of title"o ; I*X6 thesis* 
London School of"Zoonomiost 1952 at pp,, I an 6* 
Sq Yankabadi, "The Dmosels Bills of TAM Conventiont Deficiencies 
and Suggested Reforms" Ph*D thesiso London University, 197109' at PIP*7-8* 
X*L* Hermaml "Lesvmtox a 1.1embarqttement an droit Allemand ot an 
droi, t Francais st lee conditions requisex du connaissement"* PSAW 
1963 at PP* 1-11 4o 
Ro Rodeere '"Trait' 6ý1 do Droit Nwitime" p&rjq 19681. Vol*2 
-at ppe 53--56* 
(1) Scratton oft'dbart'OrPartiw(t 17th ad* at 
(2) BjackVuiii', oxi im 
' 
ae (Ixt, ýode) P& 215; 
' ch61sere S ''aa Ia or Goob I JL*tt 
18939 i4ili 4d* at p, 216* 
Ie4&. C. Z. F. 
sevoll V-2 lkxrdigký 
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oase of the bill of lading is to state that the gocds have been 
shipped in apparent good order and condition* 
Tag: 
It can be inferred from Section 36 of the Iraqi Yoxitime Law 
* 
that the bill of lading is merely a receipt issued by the carrier, 
acknowledging that the goods have been shipped* It providesi 
"He [the carrier] to responsible for the goods which he receives 
and he must issue a bill called a bill of lovding"o(l) 
This definition is out of date, as the bill of lading is not 
simply a receipt for the goods shipped, Its ftmotions have been 
developed and it is becoming more important in international trade* 
The judiciary and jurisprudence have accepted the new functions of 
the bill of lading as they are set up in Brussels convention which make 
this definition read strangely ard needs tobe modified* 
Mmn6e: 
Article 33 of the Law dated 31-12-1966 providest 
I The 'bill of lading is delivex4 after receiving the 6odeq 
it contains Us Inscriptions specifýing the Identity of the Wtiest 
the goods tolbe -tramported, the elements of the journey to lob madel 
and the freigbt to be Pajda"(2) 
This Iew is officially called "Ottoman Yaritime Commerce law". 
Hwever this Law willbe repealed when the now draft of Iraqi 
3kritime Law comes into force* 
(1) The same definition can be inferred from Section 36 of the 
Saptian MILritime JAWO 6 
(2) The French text B&T81 "Le oonnaisomeM Got d4liv" 0" r*0001491 
des morchandinese 11 porte lea ineoripiJons propros a Itantifter, loo 
parties, lea marchandises a -tronsporter, Iso elements ft vapp 4 
effectsur at Is fret a payer"* 
-20- 
This article can be criticised as follows: 
I- It does not specifically define the bill of lading, because 
. 
it states that the bill of lading is delivered after receiving 
the goods., This Includes *Received' bill of lading also* 
2- It has defined bill of lading through its contents without 
mentioning its nature whather. it is document or receipt* 
Professor Rodi6re has avoided those two okiticisms when he 
states that the bill of lading is a receipt of defined goods shipped 
on board a shipp and contains certain conditions to identify exactly the 
cargo azA the ship. 
(') 
RMSVOrq the definition given by Professor Walker(2) seems -the 
urdblO Ones He states: "A bill of lading is a document j usually favoul d 
in Printed fOrmi Completed in writing, stating that goods described 
therein have been shipped in good order and condition in a particular 
ship and -setting out 'the -term on which they bare been AelAmwed . -to 
and accepted by tbe Wdpse 
(1) o4, o eirt un requ do mrobarAison definies embarVees a bord dtun 
nsvire, dome, requ qai so preBente comme tel at qui Spond "a 
certaines conlitions premettaut dtidentifier exactement I& 
Wgaison at le navire, Somvmtg lti*rimO our lequel il ont 
r&igiý se presents ouvertment come un "cormissament" cm un 
"bill of ladizW", 
Traits g4ý dAk Drait. ftri-time. v*2* 44 PP* 53 
(2) Principles of Soottish Private Uw* Vol I at pp, 828 - 829 
2nd ede 1975. 
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The Contentst 
The Brussels Convention has stated the contents of the bill 
of lading in Article 3-3 as followsi 
After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier or the 
master or agent of the carrier shall, on demand of the shipper, 
ismie to the shipper a bill of lading showing among other things" 
(a) the leading marks necessary for identification of the goods 
as the same are furnished in writing by the shipper 'before the 
loading of such goods starts, provided such marks are stamped or 
otherwise shown clearly upon the goods if uncoveredl or on the 
oases or coverings in which such goods are containedt in such a 
manner as should ordinarily remain legible until the end of the 
voyage 
(b) Either the vamber of pacim4ges or piecong or the quantityl,.: or 
weightt an the moo may be, as furnished in wrkting by the, abippero 
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods* 
As a matter of fact these oontmts hare been aocepted *&A 
incorporated in the standard bills of lading all over the world. 
Moreover, this Article hasbeen adopted by$ 
I- Carriage of goods by sea Act* 1924* Article 111-3- 
The draft COMMeutiOn On the Carriage. Of Goods by Seaq adopted by 
the Urdted Nations Commlseloftý on Inter lonal Tradeý tbi `` 
(uNcITRAL) has stated the contents of bill of lading in Artiole 
15- see the te"t in *aoufnal of Yariti" Law and COmOrOO 
v*8. No. 2 Javaary, 1977 pp* 267 - 279. 
Showing among other things means the naus of the shipper, the 
ship, the consignee, etco and list of 'excepted perils' &Md 
EOW other things* 
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2- Carriage of goodeby sea Act 1971, Article 111-7-. 
3- French Law Decret, 31 Dece 1966 Article 35- 
(2) 
4- Iraqi maritime law, section 101.0) 
In this respect it must be mentioned thatq although this 
section has omitted to mention the apparent order and condition of 
the goods as a contents in the bill of lading, but the form of the 
bill of lading which is used by Iraqi maritime transport company 
has mentioned thate Therefore the lacana in the law is avoided in 
practiceo(4) Moreover the new Iraqi maritime law 
[which has not 
yet come into foroej has specified that the apparent order and 
condition of the goods is to be mentioned in the bill of lading 
(Section 185). 
(5) 
(1) Commencement 23rd of June, 1977* 
(2). The Xrench text "yet "Entre, autrest le oonualseeftent d0i't 
indiquer: 
% (a) Los marques PrIncipales dentinq6e, sVidedificatift, den 
marcbmAisee telles qmfelleg sont fournier par e"'crit par 
le chargeur avant qme le obArgewen*de *Go MAroh#Mdi8e8 
utait commence; lee marq%es doivent Ure auffisantes poor 
Videntifloation des marcharAteewet Ure aPPOffees do manie*'re 
) 
qtL'f)lles restent normalement lisibler jusqmfaý la fin du voyage*, (10 Suivant lee cang le nombre, den colis st objets (m lour quentite, 
On lear poids, tele quOile scat foarnis par ecrit par Ie, 
char (0) PAM at le conditionnement apparents des marebandisese 
(3) Egyptian Wri-time Low Section (99)e 
(4) In RaPtt Ible lxbk ban '00 Justified by 'the fact 'that tbiG 
oovxtry has ratified the Brassels convention by the law Xo*18 
year 1940* 
360tiOn (180) of fte now draft of the Egyptian Nwitime Lwe 
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Functions of the Bill of Ladi 
The bill of lading has five functionse It is a document of 
title, it is evidence of the goods, it is evidence of the contract 
of carriage, it is -the contract of carriage and it is. an Instrument 
to protect the property* These functions are discussed in the 
following paragraphs: 
(1) The bill of lading is a document of title? 
Aefinition: 
In Lickbarrow v. Mason(') -the court recognised a custom of 
merchants that a bill of lading by which goods were stated to have 
been shipped by any person or persons to be delivered to order or 
assigns enabled the holder, 'by transferring the- bill, to transfer 
the property in the goods to the transferee. 
(2) 
Similarly? a pledge 
(3) 
of the bill can operate as a pledge of the goodse Therefore a 
bill of lading as stated above to a document of title-to thegooAs 
enabling the consignee to dispose of U6 goods by indorifement and 
(4) 
delivery of the bill of ladingp thetransfer of which operates 
as a transfer ofthe constructive possession of the goodeq and may 
operate as a -transfer of the property in them. Thus the bill of 
lading as a docament. of title can be defined as followst 
"It symb9lises the possession of-the goods in a form which enables 
(1) (17802,124* 63'(1794) 5'T*R* 6830 
(2) If 'that to the. intention of parties to the contmot Se-w-411- ZL 
Sial AsstiMee 9; roant (3) roantil! k biß 3-2-6 Iraqi law 
ArpM "Trod*#, - fth 
the holder to dispose of the goods during their transit and 
gives him the right to receive the goods from the carriero" 
This idea is internationally accepted, and this definition 
in in accordance with the commercial practiceo But the statutory 
definition of "documents of title to goods" does not always meet 
the commercial practices This point can be explained an followel 
U*IC. 
-(Scotland and 
bigland) 
Documents of title are defined in the FaatOrs Acti 1889 Sole(4) 
as d6cuments "used in the ordinary course of business as Proof Of 
the possession or control of goods, or authorising or purporting to 
authoriseq either by endorsement or by delivery, the possessor of the 
document to transfer or receive goods thereby representede" This 
definition includes not only bills of lading bat also delivery orders 
and warrantst which are not documents of title in thevommm law 
smixeg bat in modem meroantile praatice the tendency in to dexV 
this quality to then (delivery orders, warrantst stoo) and Possession 
aPPeare only to be, transforred under them when the bailey attorns or 
0) 
Intimates to the transfersee 
Es"t 
Section 954 of the F4mftian Civil Code provides i 
"I- The delivery of the d664moutel, which are given for the goods 
In the possession of the carrier or the warehousemen, is do ad to 
AOCOPts andL &O"10diM, ý01dil4thO goods for the new awner* 
do i SI. 9 A*C* 2-93 311 
eter Eagnil & 2&* Ltd* ve ! Iamau i'i V*L*Ro 
8"0817* d Min 14 
J6R* 337* W WýLdul & Co. Ltd* 
2 HoLe Case 3099 -S" p0o 
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be a delivery of the goods themselves. "(') 
According to this section the bill of lading arxi the delivery 
or-der pass the possession of the goods to the buyer. The delivery 
of these documents seems to be a delivery of the goods themselves 
entitling the buyer to take actual delivery of the goods and to 
dispose of them* But the judiciar7 in Egypt, particularly in 
Alexandriat does not accept the idea of making all kinds of delivery 
order have the same power of the bill of lading in transferring the 
possession of the goods. The only kind of delivery order which is 
oonsiderecl to be a document of title is that one which is signed by 
the carrier or his agent* 
(2) 
This argument in supported by 
section 191 of the now Egyptian. Yaritime Lawo 
(3) 
Iracrt 
According to section 150 of the Iraqi Law of Comm&ce Wo, 60 
year 43 'the delivery of the Ull of lading was considered Jo be the 
delivery of -the goods themselves. This was -in aocerdaws with 
commercial practice, but section 194, -(2) of that law stated that 
if the ship arrived before the documents, -the seller was bound to 
procure a proper document enabling the buyer -to receive the goodse 
Itseew that section 194 (2) was a strange one, as it did not 
specifýr what kind of document the seller was bound to procurev 
Tt mast be mentioned 'that it is beyond the scope of this 
research to discuss the matters coneernitig-lbe, delivery in 
CoIoP* and IFoOoBo ocutrapt it, and whwther it : takes pls*e an 
shipment or 4 the time-w1mm the. bmyer. receives. tbe, ýill 
of Win& 
(2) Alo2andria, Appes, 116A 1-1921 - 3334-6 
Almeandria, Apýý: 1ý-12-1927ý R40-neý"' 
(3) see post at po 10 - 
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whether it was a delivery order or something else. At any rate 
that law was repealed, and section 197 of the new Iraqi Maritime 
law has recognised the delivery order which is issued by the 
carrier to be a docoment of titlee(l) 
Francei 
This problem does not appear in France* According to 
jurisprudence. documents of title are those whibh represent the 
goods during the maritime voyage, and the possession of which in 
the possession of the goods themselvese 
(2) 
This definition is in 
accordance with section (92) palmgraph 2 of the French Commercial 
Law which has considered the creditor to have the Possession of the 
goodev and therefore he am dispose of the goodst by the bill of 
lading, while they are in a warehouse, a shiPt in OUGtOnst or a 
public storee 
(3) 
T13me the Low and jurisprudence are in the same direction and 
documents of title, in this context, do not include vM others than 
bills of lading and those documents which might acquire the 
charamteristics of bills of lading. 
(1) see Post at P. 
(2) "Un doc=ent represeMe la marchalldise lorsque durent embarquie 
le voyage maritime, 1m; possession do as doement as confMA avoc 
cello do la, marchandiso ell 
J, A, )L U90nie "lo'CoMit8solmout A I& lot-tre do voiture 
swritime" PPO 
Z* Iffeenon "'Voirte at oomerce marittlao" &t IT" 
(3) Searkidn 92-2- stat, 861 : "Le ar*majer owt,, r6poe amair, bw,, 
mambsWises on+ ma "Omm" ionv I*rmpl-eU*s sont I sa 
disrOsition dans son m9asine ou navirerg la Domam ou dans 
Pdb I licý#- Ou Id &Vant qttt ellem - sojent arriv4s 11 On *Vt said-- Var un FV1,1 -'M I ImInt Ou W =e lettre do volftme"o 
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It is clear now that, apart from France, the statutory 
definition of "documents of title to goods" has a much broader 
sense than the commercial practice senset and this b roader sense 
is restricted either by the law itself or by practice to make it 
in accordance with the definition stated above*(') 
Conditions: 
In the light of that definitiont three conditions are required 
to make the bill of lading a doc=ent of title' 
A, A bill of lading mist symbolise the goodst 
A doement of title symbolises the goods to which it refers, 
(2) 
and, as we have seent(3) the bill of lading contains a fmll 
description of the goods. Therefore, possession of a bill of 
lading is equivalent to possession of the goods, 
(4) 
and transfer 
of the bill transfers oonstrttcrtive possession of the gootle which 
places the good 
.a 
at the diMmeal' of the trmsfereeo(5) 
(1) See Airtb at P. VS- t-+* 
(2) Sanders Bros. v. McLean (1883) 11 Q*]B*D- 327,341. 
TLe Prinz Adalbert C1917) AeCe 586,589* 
Ba; fber ve Y47erstein (1870) L*R* 4 H9L* 317e 
(3) See Airte at pp. J_k - t. L- 
(4) Walkerg Principles of Scottish Private Law* Vol*2 at V, 1687* 
(5) A480tion 150 of the Ira# Law of Commerce No, 60-1943* 
Meation 954 ofthe P47ptian civil code, 
C-Artiole 92 of French ecomercial law, 
D. X%Aer sale of goods Act 1893, the transfer of the bill of 
lading Is merely deemed to operate am a symbolical transfer 
, of possession of the goods,, bcrt not necessarily, an a traftrar 
of the property, 
_ 
In them, whether the pr*perty -in: t-- dependis an the Intention ofthe Oartilse 
Sewall vo- Dmrdick, 1884) 10 APP case 74 
ýý V. Dmn4 (1845) 14 IT & Wo 403o 
Section 17 Sale of Goods Ad 1893* 
201-9 vo New* Bank (1075) LqRq 10 C*P* 345,, 
How does the bill Of lading transfer the possession of the goods? 
In this respect two theories can be advanced to answer this question, 
The first depends on the intention of the parties. The second 
depends on the idea of unification between the right of possessing 
the goods and the bill of lading. These are discussed in the 
following paragraphs: 
I The intentional theory: 
According to this theory, the intention of the parties in the 
major factor in this matter-, it either passes the possession of 
the goods only or the possession and the property togethero 
This theory is in accordance with section 17 of Sale of Goods 
Act 1893* It explains this ftnotion of bill of lading according 
to the intention of the parties. Thereforeq the transfer of the 
bill of lading passes such rights in the goods a& the Parties 
intend to pass& Thus where the consignee Or IndOrs0s Of the bill 
is the agent of the shipper at the port of destination, it is 
evident that the partiest by transferring the bill Of lading, 
intend only to pass the right to claim delivery of the goods 
from the shipowner upon arrival of the goods, but not the 
property In them.. And where the consignee or indorsee is a 
banker who advances money on the seaLrity of the goods 
represented by the billl the parties are likely to intendt 1by 
B-On the other band the transfer of -the 'bill -to the transferee 
was considered to lhe-'-a constructive delivery wAer Old Soots 
Law which passed the property in the goods, and not Only 
their possession, to -the buier, 
Bogle v*_ Dumore &. Loo Roes L, C* 582, See post 
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the transfer of the bill, the creation of a charge oi pledge on 
the goods in favour of the Unker, but not the transfer of 
property in them to him*(') 
2 The unification theory: 
In the light of this theory the right of possessing the goods 
and the bill of lading have become united and ciumot be 
separated. Therefore the theory that the bill of lading is the 
goods themselves enables the transferee to receive the goods 
and -to dispose of them while they are at sea@ 
This theory has been inferred from section 92-2- of the Fý-enoh 
Commercial Law which has made the possession of the bill of lading 
equivalent to the 
. 
possession, but not the PrOPertY9 of the goodso, 
(2) 
This theory can fit, to a certain extent, those legal systems 
which are based on Roman lax (old Soots Lew and C; erman IW)0(3) 
In these laws the property passes with the delivery of the goods., 
This means the possession of the bill of lading is the possession 
of the goods themselves, as the bill of lading symbolises the 
goods* Therefore, the delivery of the bill of lading is the 
delivery of the goods, as, the possession of the goods is united 
with the bill, of ladinge ftis unitybetween -the possession of 
the goods ancl the bill of lading given the latter the ability to, 
sebadtthoffl the Export ... 
Trade fthsed*mt ps 327* 
(2) on comprend 1 1, quo Itartiple 92"dit code'dir comberos ait pm peper, 
le principe qae la POssession du conrudesAmunt, A 
posegesion do la wrohandisselle-meme. 
(3) see Post - ck"Pt"" two ,f C"*; O6" 
two. 
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pass the property under Old Soots TALv and German Lmw* But it 
mast be mentioned that the bill of lading passes the property 
as a result of passing the possession of the goods. It does 
not pass the propertyby itself. Thus the property is not 
united with the bill of lading, but passes as a result of 
passing the possession* 
B-A person holding a bill of lading is entitled to claim delivery 
of the goods from the carrier: 
Uelfo 
-(Scotland 
and England) 
In the normal case the carrier will only deliver the goods to 
the person in possession of the bill and will not be bound to 
deliver the goods except on production of the bill* 
0) 
Ifh, 
carrier will be liable to the holder of the bill if he 
wrongfully delivers the goods to another personP) Tbus Lord 
Deming said: 
(3) 
"It in perfectly clear that a shipmmer who delivers without 
(i) Short vo S wean 1866) L*R* I CePe 248 
IkLrber v., Y4, Te-rstein, (1870) L*R* 4 16L* 317* 
cies L]2 All ER*982o Trucks & SRares Ltd. v. Yaritime Amen. td, 
[1951: 
Barclave Bank Ltd. v. 2S9319sioners of 21stoms and Excise. r196D r7laoyd's Repo 819 69* 
(2) Bristol &V- Co., Ci891 * of EnrU34 Bank v. Wdland ft 
]2 Q*3*653o 
ze -- a 
d, vo Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd* 1195 A*C, 576, 
ý2LM Mills & Coo ve Es & Wo India Dock C& ) 
NYP 
Cas*5919 S_J1652 The holder of the bill of lading was not entitled to the goods, 
tut the shilxwner was discharged as he delivered the goods in 
good faith and without notice of any defeat in the holderIG titlOo 
SSAI ýM y "_&+ (3) 0 po 
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production of thebill of lading does so at his peril. The 
contract is to deliver, on production of the bill of lading, 
to the person entitled under the bill of lading, " 
In practice, shipowners rigorously insist on the production of 
a bill of lading, but, where the bill is produced and the 
identity of the consignee is in doubt, they sometimes deliver 
the goods against letters of indemnity which in some instancest 
have to be provided by a banks 
(1) 
The reason which entitles the person holding the bill of lading 
to claim delivery of the goods from the carrier is that the 
carrier is deemed to be the agent of the buyers In other words 
he is the agent of the holder of the bill of lading* Thus 
section 32 of the Act providesl 
"I-where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller to 
anthorised. or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery 
of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, 
for the pu2-posq of trmwlission to the buyer is prima facie 
deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyere" Therefore 
the agent must deliver the goods to the prinoipal when the latter 
identifies himself by presenting the bill of lading. 
Sobmi-ttboff at Ps 328* - *- -. '- 
2gibm. va WhOmmol-1,915 soce, 616w 
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I. raj and rgMa 
The jurisprudence in Iraq and Fgypt has reached this rule 
through the idea of possession* The bill of lading represents the 
goods, therefore it passes their possession to the buyer. This 
means that the buyer is the real possessor of -the goods and the 
carrier is only an ostensible possessor* Consequently he 
(the 
carrier) mast follow the orders of the real possessor and 
nust be liable for any damage caused to the goods by hime Thus 
when the carrier delivers the goods to the buyert he iev in fact, 
fulfilling his obligation towards the real possessor*() 
This rule is settled in seotion 188-2- of the new : Craqi 
Writime Law which providest ".. *the 'bill of lading gives the 
legal holder the right of receiving the goods and disposing of them.. " 
FI=cml 
This principle is clearlY established in prlmoe.. 
(2) 
A number 
of theories have been said to juvtjfýr the legal basis of this 
principleo(3) The most acceptable theory. is the (me which depends 
(1) Rueni, J* Thp Maritime Sales at P- 45o 
A2.0gailie The bill of lading at py, 193 and 249. 
(2) "Is function do legitimMion du comajesomout impliqa* qtLa I, * 
porteur du titre uta, pas besoin do prouver son droit XtLr 1,98 
merdhand4son von* obtanir lour delivrence au lx)rt do dextinatIon 
ot quo le papitaine no droit dolivrer I& marchandise qtLoun 
. 
porteur legiýiud'*" 1490nie at P133. 
(3) "Stira&*iOn Pmr autrui" Bald bY ITOn. Caen st Ronmjtj v95, 
Pam 750& 
Mk uan"V --said by Ripert v*2 pam 15869, said by Silvio Bmtlorq in his thesig 
w1hUar PrObant a ft Comai sament" v P&Tig j t, 933i ZAt P* 46* 
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on the fact that the legal holder of the bill of lading has the 
symbolic possession of the goods which gives him the right to 
claim delivery from the carrier himself. 
(') - 
E. " lu at i on 
Neither the theory which says that the carrier is the agent 
of the buyer, nox that one which says the carrier is the ostensible 
possessor of the goods can interpret the position of the Carrier 
internationally. The first one is based on the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893, and the second one is based on Iraqi and Egyptian Laws. 
Moreover, both of these two theories are not in accordance with 
commercial practice, 
The first theory can be criticized as follows: 
I In the case of buyer's insolvency the seller is entitled to 
eXercise his right of Istoppage in t ransitut while the goods are 
still in the carrierse possession. In that event the seller 
Changes the chal4kater of the carrierte custody from that of 
agent of the buyer to that as agen It for himself and therefore 
the carrier is not the agent of the buyers If the carrier 
were the agent of the buyer, the seller would not be able to 
change his character. 
2- The carrier is not the agent of the buyer, as he Cannot i4ute 
what in wriften in -the bill of lading., The bill of lading to 
(1) Possession symboliqueoe* "Elle donne vm droit & la djjivranoe 
do la marthandise par I& capi-baine, qmj-ne doij -steftý, -dogStWr 
clutun profit du porteurow 
Traite de Droit )britine at 
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conclusive evidence in the relationship between the carrier 
and the buyer* Therefore if the carrier was the agent of the 
buyer, he would be able to rebut the bill of lading in his 
relationship with his principal [The buyer] . 
Concerning the second theory, the bill of lading 
represents the goods as it contains a full description of the 
goods* Therefore possession of the bill is the possession of 
the goods themselves enabling the buyer to claim delivery from 
the ostensible possessor [The carrier] e 
This theory cannot interpret this rule properly because 
the delivery order, which is signed either by the seller or by 
the buyerg contains a full description of the goods andq 
oonsequently, it represents the goods, butit does not entitle 
the holder to claim delivery from the oarriero Therefore this 
interpretation is not cplite right., 
Unilateral Undertakinits 
The carrier to neither the agent of the Imyer nor the 
ostensible possessor of the goods* ReAs, simply, a carrier 
who undertakes, by his own will, to take the goods rrom the 
seller arA deliver them to the holder of the bill of lading, 
This unilateral undertaking in shcvm by the oarriereg signstute 
an thebill of lading, The obligation'of the carrier, in 
literal (littefrale) "and indepwident (antonome), 14teral beasase 
it to defined by the terms mentionedin the bill of ladingt and 
con sequspýl*, the oerrie* It 'prevented ý firm d4liveringý'-6ther 
goods than those stated in the bill of lading* Independent 
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because the bona-fide third party (indorsee) is not affected 
by the relationship between the carrier and the shippert and 
consequently the carrier cannot prove contrary to the bill of 
lading. 
(') 
Therefore the right of the holder can be interpreted 
through the obligation of the carrier by stating that the 
carrier obliges himself by his signature to deliver the goods 
to the holder of that document which is signed by him, and to 
accept any responsibility for any damages caused to the goods 
by his negligence during their transit* 
It seems that the (UNCITRAL) draft convention on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea has adopted this theory., Thus 
Article 1-6 providest 
"Bill of lading means ... , and by which the carrier undertakes 
to deliver the goods against surrender of the documents A 
provision in the document that the goods are to be delivered 
to the order of a named person, or to arderl or to bearer, 
constitutes such an undertaking... " 
A bill or lading must beg to a certain extertl negotiable: 
Bills of lading can perform their principal function of enabling 
a person to dispose of goods which are no longer in his- 
possession only If they are, at least to some extent, negotiables 
(1) Silvio Balter, ' "Valeur Probante Da Comajiggemnta thefte 
Pu4st 1933 ai PP* 44--45* 
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U. K, 
-(Scotland and 
EWand) 
Goods shipped under a bill of lading may be made deliverable 
to a named person, or to a name left blank, or tto bearer', 
and in the first two cases may or may not be made deliverable 
to 'order or assigns'. Bills of lading making goods 
deliverable 'to order' or tto order or assigns* are by 
mercantile custom, to certain extent, negotiable inirtrumentg. 
0) 
Thus the bill of lading must make the goods deliverable to 
bearer, or to a named consignee "or order or assignst, or 
simply to Oorder or assignst. If the bill of lading makes the 
goods deliverable to a named person, without adding *or order 
or assignst, it is not a negotiitble instrament, therefore it 
is not a document of title in the common Law sense. 
(2) 
- Indorsemeut in the way to accomplish the transferral. of the 
bill of lading. 
(3) 
Indorsement in effected either by the 
shipper or consignee writing his name on the back of the bill of 
lading, which is called an lindoreement in blankI or by big 
writing "Deliver to I or order I" which is called an 
"indoreamezrt in full". So long as the goods are deliverable to 
a name left blank, or to bearer, or the indorsemwft in in blamkq 
the bill of lading my pass from hand to hand by more delivery, 
(i) Scration 180'st. at p. 181. - 
(2) 4LeRLe; lg!. n &-Coe Vo The Comptoir dlesPOMvte do ftris (1873) ^ ose -% 
LIOJEO 7 rovo 
Sopnoma S P*A. v. Jkrine & Animal ME: Lroducts CorD, 
I Lloyd' 9 Rep. 367 9"3 
(3) Or by an undertaking to indoreat Dick v. Learide-a (1793) P*QM I. SaA A% 
rAmer v&. 2aux 
.. 
ae 
. 
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or'may be delivered without any indorsement to the original 
holder, so as to affect the property inthe goods. 
(') 
A bill of lading is negotiable in a popular, and not in a 
technical sense. 
(2) 
The word *negotiable' was not used in the 
sense in which it is Ased as applicable to a bill of exohangeg 
but as passing the property in goods only, 
(3) 
In two respects, the negotiability of bille. of lading is 
less developed than that of bills of exchange* First while a 
bill of exchange is negotiable unless its negotiability in 
expressly excluded, a bill of lading is only negotiable if made 
*negotiable* by the shipper. Therefore the rules governing the 
consideration for the transfer of a bill of exchange do not 
apply to the transfer of a bill of ladinge - SecOndl. T. the 
transferee of a bill of ladingg as a general rule, only amMires 
such intereft as the transferor had, and does not take free from 
defects In the transferorts title* That is to say the indorsee 
(4) 
does not got a better title than his assignor. Thus the 
bill of lading is not a truly negotiable instrument as is the 
(1) Scrutton. at po 181o 
(2) Num v. Wak Tait Bank C1971] I Ljoydto Reps 439 at p. 446* 
(3) UomiDson ve DgMLM (1845) 14N & We 4039 408. 
(4) Gurney vo- Wmend (1854) 3 Zo i 13- 622o 
And if the'transferot has no titlet, no Utle will be trwwfirreC, 
Barber ve erst! jp,, (1,5ý70 L*R* 4 HoLs 317, 
- Gilbert vo Gaignoft (1,72) 8 Cb, App. 16, 
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bill of exchange*(')* 
In two exceptional cases, however, statutory provisions 
enable the bona fide indorsee of a bill of lading to acquire, 
upon certain carefully defined conditions, a 'better title than 
his predecessor possessed. The Factors Act, 1889, S, 2 (1), 
protects an indorsee who takes a bill from a factor acting in 
excess of his authority, an& the Sale of Goods Act, 18931 S-47f 
provides that the unpaid seller's right of stoppage in transitu 
is defeated by a previous transfer of a bill from the buyer to 
an indorsee who takes the bill in good faith and for valuable 
(1) Waring v. Cox (1808) 1 Camp. 369,370* - 
Dracachi v. Tmglo-Exmtian Navigation (1868) L*R- 3 C-P. 
190,1929 
-ee 1938] A*C`* 429,449. WiRpon Tusen Kalsba vo Ramliban Scraw. 
Bateman v, Green (1667) 1 Re 2 C*L9 166l 
47. 
Senjamin at pe 4* 
It was said under Old Soots Law that "A bill of lading is a 
negotiable instrument like a bill of exchange, and assignment 
of it to an onerous indorsee opera-tee as a complete transfer 
of the property described in it" Rose LeCe at P- 580 v-II 
This idea was rejected on the grounds that the effect of the 
endorsement of the bill of lading was to assign "A right to 
receive the goods, and to discharge the shipmaster as having 
Performed his undertaking*", John NoLaren on Bill9a Com, v, J 
at p* 215 N-13- 
The true tiew can be stated an follows: 
The bill of exchange and the bill of lading had similar effect 
in transferring the property, but they worked on different 
basest The bill of exchange represented mony and passed, by 
itself, the property in money, whereas the bill of lading 
represented goods and passed -the property in them an a result 
of passing their possession, an the property in the goods 
passed with delivery under the Old Scots Law, CSee post 
Chapter two and onto at ppo tf-30 The unification tbecry:. 3 
Therefore the watt erftL'ý concerning the bon&'fido Ind6rsoe Mst 
not affect -the -nature of the bill of I lading* , These--Ugftsrs 
are solved vader a different category, of rIllog* 
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consideratione 
Tracr 
In the light of section 101 of the Iraqi Maritime Law, the 
bill of lading mast be issued in the named person or his. order or 
'to bearer'. 
(2) 
The transfer of the bill of lading depends on its form, 
Therefore if the bill of lading is made deliverable to a named 
person, it cannot be transferred by endorsement but by following 
the procedure of tAssignment of right' 0(3) 
The form which makes the goods deliverable to a named person 
or order is transferred by mere endorsement 
(4) 
which is effected by 
the endorsor writing his signature on the billvilading, 
(5) 
whereas the form which makes the goods deliverable *to I)earerl or 
to a name left blank, can be transferred by mere delivery from 
hand to h&zA* 
(I) 
Alsot 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Fuentes v. Ibntis (1868) D-R- 3 C*P* 268 at p. 276. 
Leduc ve Ward (1888) 20 QeB*DZI475 ýn S*S* Coo v. Tate & jZle ' 936) 41 Com- Cas* 350* 
Pease ve Gloakee 0 66) L*R* I PC* 219, 
Section 99 FgYptian Maritime Law* 
Sections 362-374 Iraqi Civil Code* Sections 3031-305 EaPtian 
Section 189-3, The now Iraqi Maritime Law (drwft). Civil Code. 
Section 429 Iraqi Law of Commercee 
Section 189-4 Iraqi Maritime Laws 
In Rgypt the endorsement is considered to be a new Janie 
of the bill of lading# therefore the mere signature of the 
endarner is not sufficient to Pass the rights incorporated 
in the bill of lading to the endorses. The erAorser anst 
put h1stiamag the name of the *vAors6e, or Or4*rtU_g sip"W9, 
-the date of his signature and all other obligatory items 
mentioned in Section 134 (Raptian Commercial Law)-, Tbas in 
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It seem now that the bill of lading which makes goods 
deliverable 'to ordert or tto bearert or to a name. left blank 
is negotiable according to Iraqi law, 
(1) 
This negotiability, according to Jurisprudence 
(2) 
is not 
quite similar to that of a bill of exchange, On one side the 
bill of lading purges the defects in the transferorts title and 
the bona fide transferee acquires a better title than the 
transferor himself, 
O) 
On the other side the rule of the bill of 
exchange, namely, "Solidair Garantiell is not applied to the bill 
of lading. I 
According to the new Iracfi Maritime Law, this negotiability 
is quite similar to that of the bill of exchange on the ground 
that the rule "Solidair Garantie" is applied to the bill of lading 
which makes the goods deliverable 9to order', unless it is excluded 
coirt Id 
the lack of any or these obligatory items the bill of lading to 
not a d6cument of title (Section 135 Egyptian Commercial Law), 
As a result the form which makes the goods deliverable to a name left blank is not a document of title according to Egyptian Law. 
This argumetit him been criticised by Egyptian Jurisprudence on the ground that the custom has recognised the form Ito ardert to 
pass the rights by more signature of the endorsor. 
Taha No, 299, Sharkewi No- 327- 
(1) so it is In Egyptian Law except for that form Which makes the 
goods deliverable to a name left blank* This form is not _ considered to be a document of title according to the lawl-'but 
in practice it is considered to be each and can be iransfWed 
by endorsement only* As a matter of fact the forms *to bearer' 
or Ito a name left blank$, are rarely. used in practille. 43M, to, 
the danger of loss* 
(2) Hasni at Pe 40* 
Al-Ugaili at p- 3629 
Mejp*Aing on geotion, W2, of the LebameseNcritiale L@w. 
41- 
by the partiese(l) 
FTancel 
Bills of lading which make the goods deliverable to a named 
person are not documents of title, whereas those which make the 
goods deliverablIto bearer* or $a name left blank' or 'Ito ordert 
are documents of title* Documents of title are transferrable 
either by mere delivery 
Eo bearer to a name left blank: 1 or by 
indorsement (to orde]O The indorsement is effected by the holder 
writing his signature at the back of the bill* The negotiability 
of the bill of lading is very much the same as that of .& bill of 
exchange except for the rale "garantie solidair" which does not 
seen to be applied on bills of lading* 
(2) 
An a matter of fact, the nature of the bill of lading is 
different from that of the bill of exchange, and there is no need 
to apply the rules of the latter to the former* The bill of lading 
mast be understood as an instrument to pass the possession of the 
goods and may pass the property. Therefore its rules must be 
arranged according to commercial needs and protection of propertjr,, 
Consequently the rule which says that the bill of lading passes 
better title to a bona fide indorsee than the indorsor has himself 
to an acceptable rule cm the ground that +, he- bona, fide indcrgge 
must not be bound by the relationship', between the carrier & the nd 
awltioned shippert and xmt. not be bound by somnihing wbich is no+ 
Section 189-5 of the now Iraqi Maritime law. (draft) 
seotion 182-6 of the now EgYPtilm Maritime l4w, (draft) 
(2) Ripert, Vol,. 2 at pp- 758-762o 
1* Rodier, Vol. 2 at ppe 111-113o 
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in the bill of lading. This rulev of course, must be subject to 
the rules of forgery. 
(2)- The bill of lading is evidence for the goods. - 
Bills of lading usually contain a statement as to the 
description, quantity, nature, marks and packing of the goodog 
and similar matters., These statements may confer important rights 
on third parties who, in reliance on the statements, take up and 
pay for the bills of lading under contracts of purchase or pledge. 
Therefore, a bill of lading is evidence that the goods are 
shipped. p 
(1) 
the date of sh, ipment, 
(2) 
the quantity of the goods, 
and the condition of t he goods at the time of shipment& 
(3) 
-In this 
respect, a brief account mast be given of these functions of the 
bill of lading in the following paragraphst 
U*K* (Scotland and England) 
(1) The Comon Iawt 
A* As evidence of shipmentt 
The bill of lading is prima facie evidence that the goods have 
Ibeen shipped, and burden of disproving 
- it lies on the shipowners(4) 
(1) Smith v. Bedogin Stgo Xav tion Cgo 18963 Aoc, 70- 
(2) Jo Aron 
-&'do* ve 
Comvtoir Wegluorit [ig2l] 3 X*B* 435* 
(3) The Peter der Grosse (1875) 1 P*Do 414o, 
(4) Smith ve Bedouln C1806 -(-C- 70. Thrrowing ve Katz (189); 4 10 T#L, Ro 400; 896 
1 
lmwý -13 
AoC* 73 
Bemett a? A-TY(-nm F, v*-ýcon (1897) 2 Cam. 
t. 
107. 
Att., Geno of CSXlon v* Scindia 1,06g AoCo 60 (P*Co) v 
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(I) t In Grant v. Worwav, it was held that the master had no 
authority to give a bill of lading for goods which had not 
been shippedv therefore the transferee of the bill of lading 
had no claim against the shipowner* 
(2) 
But a bill of lading 
stating that a cargo which is not in fact on board has been 
shipped may become valid by subsequent shipment. 
0) 
It is true that -the, 'received' bill of lading(4) does not 
provide the buyer with the actual date of shipment, but it-- 
does not leave him. ignorant of the date of ishipmeritv because 
the goods must be shipped within the contemplated period of 
the contracto(5) Thus the tRaceivedl bill of lading Is prima 
facie evidence that the goods will be shipped within a certain 
time* 
(1) (1851) 20 L*. T*CeP. 931 10 CoB, 665- 
(2) Alsot 
Coleman ve Riches ý1855) 16 C. B. 104- 
The Emilien Mari; 
M75) 
44 LoJ. Adm. 9. 
Heskell ve C Ina"tal E=ss (1950) 83 Ll*L*Ro 438. 
DMhOlm v- Halmoe (1887) H- 152o So* LeRe 112. 
Hubbersty v. Ward 22 LoJeEic, 1139 1159 8 Ezo 330. 
Coventry x: G*Eo Ry, (1883) 11 Q*B*D- 776. 
Thorman v& Dart (1886) 54 LoT. 3491 5 Asp. X*C* 563. 
Thill vo LiXIMooll etc* SoNe Coo (1901) 18 T*L*Ro 226. 
(3) Gattir. 00 I-MMMIS (1862) 12 C*B. (NoS-) 560o 
(4) See POIA &t P- S It - 
(5) 12lLv# 599k YlachadO ! I. -d- 
[1952] 1 Lloyd'Is Rep. 1839 1929 
33. As evidence of quantity: 
The bill of lading is conclusive evidence of the statement of 
quantity mentioned in it9 if the master or other person signing 
-the bill of lading on behalf of the carrier is acting within 
the scope of his authorityg on the ground that the master is 
only authorised to sign for goods which he receives. 
(') 
Thus 
-the master of the ship has no authority to sign a bill of 
lading for a greater quantity of goods than is actually put on 
boardl and the shipowners can prove that the whole or some part 
of it is in fact not shipped by very satisfactory evidence. 
(2) 
Lord Chelmsford in McLean v* Remi43) said: "The master is 
the agent of the shipowner in every contract made in the usual 
course of employment of the ship.. And though he has no 
authority to sign bills of lading for a greater quantity of 
goods than is actually put on board, yet9 as it is not to be 
presumed that he has exoseded his duty, his signature to the 
bills of lading to sufficient evidence of the truth of their 
contents to throw upon the shipowner the onae of falsifying 
them, and proving thathe received a lesser quantity of goods 
(j) Ro UM & Mwe V. plemiM, (1871) 9 No (114s) 38o 
'4'n S. S& CO* Vo jerdman & MoDOUMI 0922) 11 Ll*L*R* 566 (2) 
vo Walford -LAms 
ý1922) 12 Ll*LeRo 139s 
Sanday vo Strath SS- Coo 19; 0), 26 Can, Chm. 163. (H*Lo) 
S+, = YSMLP 
. 
I. &On C (1895) 2-3, R; Smith & Coo ve TL* 
(3) SuPra ILt P. 44o 
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to carry than is thus acknowledged by his agente 
* 
If such statements can be shown to be false, the buyer will 
normally have his remedy against the seller; and he may also 
have a remedy againatthe person who signed the bill of ladingg 
or the person in whose name and with whose authority it has 
been signedl(l) under seation, 3 
(2) 
of the Bills of Lading Act 
(3) 
18559 or for breach of warranty of authority* 
Sometimes the shipowner is bound by the statement of crdantity 
in the bill of ladi if o agreed: 
LiBhman v. Christig 
1; 
887)619 Q*B*D* 333- 
Ir 
Fisher v. Calder (T896) 1 Come Case 06. 
Orossfield v, Lyle Shi-opinr, Co Oltl 2 KoBe 885- 
P, Man ve Burt 0 884) 1 Cab a& E- 11 e -907 * Mediterranean SS Co. v. MacKay E9011 I KeDo 297- Mes he can show fraud: 
Su r Commission v* Flartlepools SS Co, 1 27] 2 K@B* 419. 
ro=v*-Dr2Xfus, (1937) 59 la. L. R. 110, 
P17o 
And it may be a valid document even though the quantity of 
goods shipped is left blank, and later correctly inserted by 
the shippers 
Cowdenbeath Coal Co*-Iitd. vk-Clvdesdale b& Ltd (1895) 22 R-687* 
(I) ve Powell Coal Co- (1875) L. Re 10 CoPe 5621 568. 
Parr-one v* New Zealaad Shimine Co. IIA K*B* 548- 
Contrast Lord Esher XeRe in, Thorman e Burt (1886) 54 LeTe 349, 350* 
(2) S. 32 "Every bill of lading in the hand of a consignee or 
indorsee for valuable consideration representing goods to have 
been shipped on board a vessel shall be conclusive evidence of 
such shipment as against the mapter or other person signir4. the same, notwithstanding that such goods or some part thereof 
my not have been so shippedl unless such holder of the bill 
of lading shall have had actual notice at the time of receiving the s=9 that the goods had not been In fact laden on board; 
provided that the master or other person so signing my, exonerate himself in respect of Inch -misrepreseoftation by showing that it 
was caused withowt-apy default an his part, and wholly lyy the 
fraud of the shipper, or of 'the holder, Or some person under 
whom the holder clalm*" 
See alierev (1866) LeR. I CoPo 382o 
(3) Parsons v. New Zealand Shiming Co. rigoll '' -QoBo 548- 
v/o Rasnoil2ort ve Guthrie & Cojw Ltd. 11 9W I la"40 a Ripi, i" 
Ummn1da- HA L-O-R- INQ (1QA71- 2W T! - v 
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This remedy against the master, however, may be of little 
practical value since most masters of ships are comparatively 
poor people*(') 
It seems very clear now that the bill of lading, in this 
respect, is not conclusive as between the signer and the 
shipper; nor between the shipowner and the holder for value, 
unless the owner signed the bill personally or through a 
servant who is acting within the scope of his authority. 
Ce As evidence of condition: 
It is necessary to distinguish between the "quality" of the 
goods, which, in so far as it is not apparent to an unskilled 
person, it is not the master's business to know, and their 
"condition", which means their apparent or external condition, 
which he is bound to notice. That means the word "quality" 
has been taken to refer to the inherent character of the cargo 
and the word "condition" to the outward appearance, 
(4) 
and this 
10 
seems the more reasonable view. --', '. 
(1) Shipping Law, Chorley & Giles at p, 167- 
(2) Neyer v. Drisser (1864) 16 C, B, (W, S, ) 646o 
(3) "rhe person signing " does not mean only the person who 
actually affixes the signature* It includes a person for whom 
a clerk or servant signs in a purely ministerial capacity; it 
does not Include a person-on Aose behalf an agent with 
discretionary powers, such as a master or broker, signs the 
bill* 
Thorman vo -B=4 
(1886) 54 L*T* 349o 
(4) compagnia Waviera VascMg1da vo - Churchill & Sim [19036 1 K. B* 237, 
245* 
National Petroleum o ve - helvis, punt (1934) 39 com. Caso 227* 
I er v. Ocean SS Co. 19321 1 IC. B- 4169 
lno"29PWia of IN 113 of Scotland v, III, 1927 at pe 49- 
(5) Chorley & Oiles at pe 163s 
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It must be mentioned that the English Law is different from 
Soots Law, as followst 
In England: 
The master does not, generally, bind the shipowner by a 
description in the bill of lading of the quality of the goods, 
(1) 
But where the bill of lading states that the cargo was "shipped 
in apparent good order and conditiorift, the shipowner is estopped. 
as against an indorsee for value of the bill 
(2) 
and against a 
person rightfully presenting the bill of lading and taking 
delivery therounder(3) from proving that they were not in 
apparent good order and condition, unless it was clearly known 
to the indorsee or person presenting the bill that the statement 
was untrue or it is proved that he did not aWupon the faith of 
the statement. 
(4) - 
In Sootlandt 
A statement in the bill of lading that the cargo was shipped in 
good order and condition did &gj estopthe owner from denying 
this in a question with an indorsee of the bill who W become 
an indorsee for value on the faith of the statement* A strong 
illustration of the application of the rule is afforded by the 
(1) ccm v. Bruce (1886) 18 Q*B*Do 147-m- 
gads, v. Churail (2) CoomPania Vascan -11, 
Supra. 
ir-he Tromp C19213 P-337. 
The SkarD [19353 P-1349 
(3) Br_andt v- Liverpool, [1924] 1 X-B- 5759 
(4) '[19353 P-1349 
-AA +W 
oase of Craig & Rose v. Del2jgý') where oil was shipped in 
leaky casks for which a clean bill of lading was granted, with 
the result that a great part of the cargo had been lost before 
the vessel arrived, The shipowner was held not responsible 
for this leakage, he having proved that the casks were in bad 
oondition when shipped. 
(2) 
. 
(2, ) 
-Carriage of Gocds by Sea Act 1971 
Article III Rule 3 of that Act provides: 
"After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier or the 
master or agent of the carrier shallg on demand of the shipper, 
issue to the shipper a bill of lading showing anong other thingst 
(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods 
as the same are furnished in writing by the shipper before 
the loading of such goods starts, provided such marks are 
stamped or otherwise shown clearly upon the goods if 
uncovered, or on the cases or coverings in which such goods 
are oontainedl in such a manner as should ordinarily remain 
legible until the endo of the voyage. 
(b) Either the number of packages or pieceel or the qtxantity, 
orweight, as the case may beg as furnished inwriting by 
the shipper, 
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods. 
Provided that no carrier, master or agent of the carrier shall 
be bourA to state or show in the bill of lading amy Marks, 
(1) 1879 6 Re 1269, 
(2) Encyclopaedia of-the Law of Scotland V, 117 at p, 49, 
Contrast Walker vol at p. 832, 
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number, quantity, or weight which he has reasonable ground 
for suspecting not accurately to represent the goods actually 
receivedt or which he has had no reasonable means of checking* 
Such a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the 
receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described in 
accordance with paragraphs 3 (a), (b) and (c). However, 
proof to the contrary shall not be admissible when the bill 
of lading has been transferred to a third art actinR i 
good faith. )) 
The additional words in Article 1119 Rule 4 make an important 
-change in the law. In cases governed by the Amended Rulesq 
the principle of Grant v. Worwav(1) does not applyl and the 
carrier is estopped, as against a transferee of the bill, from 
denying shipment of the quantity or number of goods described 
in the bill* That is to say, the bill of lading in the hands. 
of a consignee or indorsee becomeag prima faciet evidence of 
the truth of the statements made in it as against the others 
(shipowner, master of the ship and the shipper)* Therefore 
the transferee in in a substancially stronger position under 
the Amended Bales, than he would be at Common Law. 
(1) (1851) 10 C. Be 665o 
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Ekmt . 
Egypt has ratified the Brussels convention relating to bills 
of lading by the law No. 18-1940-, 
* Article 3-4- of that 
convention providesi 
"Such a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the 
receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described in 
accordance with paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (o)*"(') 
And Article 3-5 states: 
"The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier 
the accuracy at the time of shipment of the markst namber, 
quantity and weight, as furnished by him, and the shipper shall 
indemnify the carrier against all lose, damages and expenses 
arising or resulting from inaccuracies in such particulars. 
The right of the carrier to such indemnity shall in no w; &. v 
11mit his responsibilitZ and liability under the-contract of 
glMiasce to LiM person other than the ship-per. " 
According to that law, the rules of-the convention must be 
applied to those maritime contracts which contain a foreign 
element, and since we are dealing with C. IsFe and P*O*B,, 
contracts as international sales: therefore we are excluding 
those contracts which do not contain a foreign element. Those 
contracts are subject to section 101 of the Egyptian JILritime 
Law which makes the bill of lading a mere evidence liable to be 
refutted by contrary evidence, This situation has been critioised. by jurisprudence, andthis seetion will be repealed by section 188 
of the now Egyptian Maritime Law which makes the bill of lading 
conolusive. evidence In the relationship between the carrier and 
the Consignee* 
(1) See Ante at pAI 
- I- 
.5 
It is obvious that the final words of this Article make the 
bill of lading conclusive evidence of the relationship between 
the carrier and the consigneeg whereas it is not so in the 
relationship between the carrier and the shipper. This 
interpretation has been adopted in a famous decision of 
Egyptian Cassation Court. It was stated: 
"In the relationship between the carrier and the shipper, it is 
allowed for each of them to prove contrary to the bill of lading, 
but, in the relationship between the carrier or the shipper and 
the consignee, it is riot allowed for the formers to prove 
contrary to the bill of lading against the latter, This is the 
aim of the convention*"(') 
Iracm 
According to section 103 of the Iraqi Naritime Law, the bill of 
lading is considered to be evidence of the goods, but it is not 
clear whether it is conclusive evidence or liable to be rebutted 
by contrary evidence* moreover there is no reported case on 
this subject. 
It seems that the bill of lading in not conclusive evidence 
according to Iraqi T&ritime Law on the groundst 
Section 102 of that Law has stated that the bill of lading is to 
be issued In four copies for the shipper, the consignee, the 
captain andL the shipovner. This means. that these four people I 
are the parties to the bill of ladingg theiýfore any'of' I them 
(1) 14-12-1965, The collecrtim year 16 at p* 1249, 
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can prove contrary to that bill against any of the other 
three., 
2- The effect of the other Arabic Laws: 
Ae In the light of section 199-6- of the Lebanese Yaritime 
Law the bill of lading is not Conclusive evidence for the 
goods* 
B* According to section 101 of the Egyptian Maritime Law, and 
apart from the convention, the carrier and the shipper are 
entitled to prove contrary to the bill of lading in their 
relationship with the consigneee 
This positiong however, is going to be changed when the now 
Iraqi Maritime Law comes into force. Section 194 of that law 
providest 
"I-The bill of lading is evidence for its contents in the 
relationship between the carrier, the shipper and the other, 
2-1t is allowed, In the relationship between the carrier and 
the shipper. to prove contrary to the bill of lading, In the 
relationship between the other and the carrierl, the other 
only in allowed to prove contrary to the bill of ladinge" 
3-) The bill of lading as evidence of contract of carriaget 
Is the bill of lading a conclusive statement of the contract 
- between the shipper and shipownerl or is it only one piece of 
evidence wbi0h. assiste 
I 
with others to show what that contract, 
jej and so subject to be contradicted, or varied or added to, 
by verbal or Mer evidenow, "to show the agreement betweejiýý the 
parties? 
-53- 
It is often said that a bill of lading is not itself a contract 
of carriage, for that has been made before the bill of lading 
was signed and delivered, but it is excellent evidence of the 
terms of the contract. 
(') 
Lush J. said in Crooks v. Allan: 
(2) 
"A bill of lading is not the contract, but only the evidence 
of the contract; and it does not follow that a person who 
accepts the bill of lading which the shipowner hands him 
necesearilyg and without regard to circumstancesq binds himself 
to abide by all its stipulations* If a shipper of goods is not 
aware when he ships them, or is not informed in the course of 
the shipment, that the bill of lading which will be tendered 
to him will contain such a clausel he has a right to suppose 
that his goods are received on the usual termag and to require 
a bill of lading which shall express those termso"(3) 
Thus the bill of lading is only evidence of the contract of 
carriage, and in a number of senses this is no doubt true, but 
It is liable to be rebutted by contrary evidence* Therefore 
it in open to the shipper to show eveh oraly that the true 
terms of the contract are not those mentioned in the bill of 
lading, but are to be gathered from the ms: tes receipt, 
(4) 
(1) POr L=ýL 21'mwell in Slewell v- %rdick (1884) 10 APP-cas-74 at p. 105. 
Reskell vo Continental ef's, 0950) 83 Ll, L*Ro 438 at P*449#4539455- 
Thw-Arden-nesC1951ZO X*B- 55- 
Pyrene v. Saindi 
, 
WwrimationE1954] 2 Q, B- 402 at P*419v424* 
(2) (079) 5 Q-3*14-389 409, 
(3) Alsol Jones v. Hough, (1879) 5. Ex. D. 115,124- 
(4) De Clermont v. General Steam'Nav. Co. 0891) 7T-L-11- 187* 
shipping cards, 
() 
placardal handbills, 
(2) 
announcing the 
sailing of the ship, advice-notes, freight-notea, 
(3) 
or 
undertakings or warranties by the brokerg or other agent of 
the carriero(4) 
Bat if the bill of lading is handed over after the making of 
the contract of carriage and contains an exemption clause not 
originally Weed on, that clause might not form part of the 
contra, 
A5Llesa 
the original contract was made "subject to the 
exceptions of our bills of lading"(O) or unless the clause'was 
incorporated by a course of dealing between the parties. 
The shipper must be aware of the terms of the chartert therefore 
he cannut be required to accept bills of lading in accordance 
with the charter, if such charter contains unusual terms of 
which he was ignorant*('. 
) 
(1) Peel v. Price (1815) 4 Camp- 243. 
(2) Phillips ve Sdwards 0858) 3 No& Wo 813 
Anglo-Continental Wolidffs ve T. Ypaldoe 
ýines F19673 2 LloydIs 
Repo 61o 
(3) Liplon ve Jesoott Steamers (1895) 1 Com-Cas- 32* 
(4) Runemisty. 
-Ditohell 
(1800) 3 ESP- 64o 
Sortrtton at P- 53o 
(5) Ollery v, WrlUrough Court Md* [1: 949] 1 K*B- 532. 
(6) Armour & Cc* Md* v. L92Rold tajgA (Iondon) Mdo 
[192JI 31-ID-473- 
(7) Peck (1871) LoRA2 Eq-378s 
The Stornow-w (1882 51 LoJoAdmo, 279, 
V&ItkiTw_V, 
_ 
Rvmill ( '883) 10 Q-B-D- 178o 
fh-arsis Su1pbur Coo ve Cullitord (1873) 22 W. R. 46, 
The Dr4lign Xhrie, (1875 L*J*Mm, 9, 
Armstrong vo Allan, (1892) 8 ToLoRo 613* 
Contrast: Halli v. Paddindon SoSo Co,, (1900) 5 Com- Can- 174# 
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(4-) 
When the charterer himself ships the goods, these bills of 
lading have been held to operate as receipts for them* But 
they have not, as between the ship(mner and the chartel-erg 
been held to operate as new contracts, 
(') 
or as modifying the 
contract in the charterparty. 
(2 ) 
The bill of lading is not 
in auch a case a subsequent contract varying the charterpartyo(3) 
The bill of lading as a contract of o&rriaget 
In the relationship between the carrier and the indorsee of 
the bill, the position appears to be that between these parties 
the bill of lading is the contract of carriage and not merely 
(1) Rodocanachi v. Milburn (1886) 17 Q. BO- 316; 18 Q. B. 67- 
Wagstaff v. Anderso7nTI880) 5 C*P, De Mt 177o 
2_=r v. Wallace 1 80) 5 Q-B- 163,166. 
The San Roman (1872) L*R- 5 P. C. 301; LeR. 3 A* & E. 583o 
stanes v. Allen (1852) 12 C*B* 202* 
Sugar Commission v. Hartlepools S'So Coo [: 1927 2 K-Bo 419,42ge 
Delaurier v. ýbrilie (1889) 17 Sess- C&O- (#Pseries) 167* 
(2) Zp 
, Mp. erley 
SS Co. ve Swth 190512 K*B- 791,802. 
LdM rv* . 
1hel T. Eyvan Ship Coo [19071 AoCo 2729 278- 
Contrastt Rederiaktiebolamet TransatlWtic vo- Board of Trade 
(1924) 30 Com. Cas. 1179 1260 
Gullischen vo sLewart (1884) 13 Q*B*Do 317* 
Hill SS Co. vo-Stinnos 1941 S*C* 324,3351 340v 354,355- 
(3) Sewell vo Aoick., ý1884) 10 App. Cas. 74,105. 
0 k1k3W) 20 Q*B,, D* 4759 479* Tazart. Be on I Co, ve James Fisher & Sons 
[19033 1 K*B* 391, #,, 
Moltheg. R,, A-* v. Ellerma . 
160 n's- Wilson Line Ltd* L1927: ) I X-139 710#7 
ELesident of India vo-Matealfe Ship2ing Co. Ltd. (The Dunelmia) 
0970: 11 We -2899 305,30do, 
Ardgmei- r, 19513 1 K&B* 559 60, 
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evidence of its terms*(') Where a bill of lading has been 
held to be the contract it was so either by reason of 
section (1) 
(2) 
of the Bills of lading Act 1855, or the 
parties appear to have agreed that it should be 190.0) Thus- 
in the hands of a buyer to whom a bill of lading has been 
transferred by the seller the bill of lading will normally be 
(1) Fr7 ve-Chartered Mercantile Bank of India (1866) L*R, ICP, 689, 
(2) Section (1) provides: 
"Every consignee of goods named in a bill of lading, and every 
indorsee of a bill of lading to whom the property in the goods 
therein mentioned shall pass, upon or by reason of such 
consignment or indorsementg shall have transferred to and vested 
in him all rights of suit, and be subject to the same liabilities 
in respect of such goods as if the contract contained in the bill 
of lading has been made with himself. " 
"dee the effect of the clause incorporating the charter-party is 
to make the indorsee (or consignee as the case may be) indirectly 
responsible for claims of demurrage arising at the port of 
loading, or of dead freight, even although he had no notice of 
tbo existence of-such claims.. The effect of omitting the 
clause Incorporating the conditions of the charter-party is that 
the bill of lading, as between the shipowner and the indorsee, 
contains the whole contract of oarriageg except in special 
circumstances where the indorsee has notice of the terms of the 
charter-partys" rThe Encyclopaedia vJII at PP- 51-55-3 
Bmt this to no longer true. Professor Walker has stated rTh 
Principles vel at P-833.: ] "Even where there is also a charter. 
partyq the bill of lading is prima facie, as between shipowner 
and 6ndorsee, the contract of carriage, Particularly when the 
endorsee is ignorant of the -terms of tho c1tarter-party. and 
possibly even if he knows of its terms. " 
(3) Fraser ve-TeleM h ConstrmctiM... Cýoq (1872) LoR- 7 Q*B, 566. 
both parties signed the bill of ladingo 
Chartered Bank vo Netherlands Tndia SoXo_Co, (1883) 10 Q-Bo 5219 
528d, the contract was reduced into the form' of a bill of lading 
by the consent of the parties* 
Armo_ur I*. Walf or& C1 921-13 KoBo 4734o 
! he parties agreedt by the booking slip, tbat the gvodfj Pould- I* 
shipped urAer the bill, of lading in question, 
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the contract of carriageo(l) That Jig to say, third parties 
such as consignees or their assigneel3t who acquire rights by 
way of indorsement of the bills of lading are entitled to 
assume that it contains all the terms of -the contract, 
* 
Therefore the contract assigned by the indorsement is that 
which is expressed in the bill of ladingi una ct ed by any 
alterations which may have been agreed upon between the 
shippers and the shipowners Thus, in Leduc v. Ward(2) it WM13 
hold that no understanding with the shippers could affect the 
right of the indorsee to have the goods carried as shown in 
the bill of lading* 
Tract . 
There in a little confusion in Iraqi and POTtian JuriBMdencej 
in dealing with this problem caused by -their method of dealing 
with the bill of lading as evidence* They divide this aubject 
into two partst 
I. - The bill of lading as evidence of Its isubjeorts wA 
2- The bill of lading as evidence between its parties. 
In the first part they do not distinguish between the items 
(i) BenJazin at P- 693* 
It can be said that the bill Of lading MMY contain a reference 
Io other dOcMMents'wher9 such terms may be found, : Ef that is 
so, it mast be done with the consent Of the indorsee a3A those documents mast be accomManted by the 'bill of lading in order to 
make the irKlorsee exare of them, otherwise that reference WMA 
be voide 
ýý) 20 Q*'B 
(2) (IM *Do 475o 
which relate to the goods and those which relate to the 
contract of carriage. In the second part they deal with the 
shippert the carrier and the indorseee As a result of this 
method, some of them have come up with a conclusion that the 
bill of lading in all its contents (goods and contract of 
carriage) is not conclusive evidence and it is open to any 
of its parties to prove contrary to that bill. 
(1) 
On the contrary some of them have reached the opposite view 
13y stating that the bill of lading is conclusive evidence in 
the relationship with the indorseee 
(2) 
As a matter of fact this problem = be solved from a different 
point of view depending on the legal provisions of the laws. 
We have seen(3) that section 103 of the 'Iraqi Maritime law(4) 
makes the indorsee a party to the bill of lading together with 
the shipper, the carrier and the shipmastere Thereftre the 
bill of lading is not a conclusive evidence concerning the 
items of the goodev an they are a matter of fact which make 
any of the parties to tho'bill of lading able to prove contrary 
to that bill according to Law of evidence., On the other hazA, 
the bill of Wing is conclusive evidence concerning the terms 
of the contract of carriage in the relationship with the 
indorseet as they are not a matter of fact, azA since the 
(1) Amin Bader Ticket of shipment at p. 20* 
(2) Al-Ugaili at Pe 644*. 
(3) Ante at P- 51 and lf*Bo* at P. 
(4) Sildlar 'tc, section 101 of the Eaptiez Nu-mine Law. 
-59- 
Indorsee is a party to the bill of lading, he is bound by 
that bill which cannot be varied by the agreement between the 
shipper and the carrier* Therefore if the bill of lading 
stipulates that the arbitration is to take place in London, 
and the charter-party stipulates New York, in this case 
London is the right place* 
(1) 
This situation, however, will be altered when the. new Iraqi 
and the Fgyptian Maritime Laws come into force* The bill of 
lading will be conclusive evidence of its contents in the 
relationship with the indorseee 
(2) 
Rranceo. 
According to Article 283 (now repealed) of the French 
Commerci&l Law, the bill of lading was an (evidence) between 
-the parties concerned with freight (shipment) and the insurers, 
O) 
This Article was a controversial one concerning the precise 
meaning of the parties concerned with. freighte 
It is obvious that shippers, carriers and their agents are 
within the meaning of "the parties concerned with freight". 
A question was raised about the indorsee and if he was within 
"the parties concerned with freight" or not., Three answers 
were givew 
The indorsee shocad. l)e within "the Part i 68'conoerne'd" an 
(1) 17-. 6-1965 Feyptian Cassation Court. The collection year 16 
&I pe 778. 
(2) Section 194 of the New Iraqi Maritime Law. 
Section 188 of the new F47prtian Maritime Lew, 
(3) "Le oomainsement rýdigeo' demo I& tome at-deswa* prescrile ftit, 
fai mtre toates lea Parties iMjftZr, e.. ssees au gbWMRWtf at out" 
*Iles at lea assureurse" 
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grounds that he is an agent for the shipper. 
(') 
b. The indorsee is sometimes within "the parties concerned" 
and sometimes he is not depending on the circumstancese 
(2) 
c. The indorsee is not within "the parties concerned". 
(3) 
However, Article 287 of the French Commercial Law was 
repealed by Article 19 of law dated 18-. 6-1966 which hai made 
the bill of lading a conclusive evidence in the relationship 
between the shipper and the carrier on one sideq and the 
indorsee on the other side* 
(4) 
Therefore the carrier, in his 
relationship with the indoreeel cannot prove contrary to the 
items written in the bill of lading. Moreover Article 37 
(I 
the law dated 31-12-1966 has stated that the bill of lading 
should be issued in two copiest one for the shipper arA one 
for the carrierg which meant excluding the indorsee from being 
a party to the bill of lading* 
(1) Bonnecase, Droit Commerciall parao 570e 
(2) Lyon - Caen at Renaultv V-5 Para 708* 
(3) Balter at P. 37 
Bellot Para 174- 
Heenen at PP* 73-74- 
(4) Article 19 states: 
""le chargeur est garant 
do l1exactitude des mentions relatives 
a la wrohandise inscrite sur ses declarations au connaissemento 
Touto inexactitude oommise par lui engage sa, responsibinte"a 
104gard du transporteure Celui-ci ne Pjairt efen pr4valoir 
SR! & 196". rd du chmmmr. " 
(5) Article 37 statest 
"Chaque connaissement eat kabli en duez origin&= au moins, 
un pour le chargeur et ltautre pour le capitainseee" 
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5ý The bill of lading as an instr=ezrt to protect the property: 
A bill of lading operates to protect the propertyq not only 
in favour of an indorsee who has purchased the goods, but 
also in favour of the seller* 
The bill of lading protects the property of the buyer by being 
"clean". "Clean bill of lading" is one that does not contain 
any reservation as to the apparent good order or condition of 
the goods, or the packing. 
(1) 
That is to say, if there is no 
clause or notation in the bill of lading modifying or 
qualifying the statement that the goods were "shipped in good 
order amd condition" the bill is known as a "clean bill of 
lading"* 
(2 ) 
Thereforeq where the marks inserted in the bill 
of lading convey a meaning as to the character of the goods, 
and are therefore essential to the identity of the goods, and 
it is on the faith of these marks that an indorsee takes up 
the bill of lading under a contract of sale, the person signing 
the bill will be estopped by section 3 from proving that goods 
(1) British Imex Tndustries Ltd* vo Wdland Bank Ltd* 
[1,958 IQ, B*5429 
Incoterms 1953 Article 7-1,2-, The Unifo;; =1eA Rules Art* 1 -1970- Section 159-2- of the ýraqi Law of Commerce* 
Franoet "Narohandises a bord sane reserver en oe qui concerne 
leur istat et conditionnement apparent*" 
Le oormaissement "clean on board" Paul Bertrand De La Grassiere 
DeXeFe 1953 at pe 188. 
Hermann at Po 72-73. German Lwo 
. Ladila 
Steamehigs (2) 22aLdian Coo ve. gan ] A*C* 469 54o 1947 
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with those marks were not shipped under the bill. 
(') 
The 
insertion of such marks in the bill of lading is prima facie 
evidence of the shipment of goods so marked, and prima facie, 
the shipowner will be liable if he fails to deliver goods 130 
marked. 
(2) 
Moreover, the clausetweight, bontents and value unknown" 
does not destroy the effect of the words "in good order, etc. "(3) 
as an admission that the goods are in good order on shipment. 
Such an admission makes the indorsee, on the faith of that 
admission, pay the price. 
According to Brussels Convention(4) ft... no carrierp master or 
agent of the carrier shall be bound to state or show in the 
bill of lading any marks, number, quantityt or weight which he 
has reasonable ground for suspecting not accurately to represent 
the goods actually receivedt or which he has had no reasonable 
means of checking.,, 
(5) 
(1) Parsons v. New Zealand Shippin Co. 
E90-11 I K. B- 5489 565- 
. 
9oumpa, Rnia Importadora y P. & 0.1927) 28 LleLeR. 639 68. 
(2) P2m2agnia Importadora, y P*&*O* Su _pra 
63- 
(3) The Peter der Grosse (1876) 1 P*D-414; 3 Asp. M-C- 195- 
The_Tro 1-W1 J -pý--337 
The Skarp 
' 
IL93OP-134- 
Craig Line y N. B. Storage Co. 1921 SoCo 114- 
France: 
Lorsque le port de charge est mmi de tous engins de pesage 
utiles, lea reserves portees our le connaissement par le 
capitaine en cer terms poids et qualite' inconrmaq sont 
inoperantes comme non preceises et ne peuvent pas plus paralyser 
une reclamation pour manquants que Justifier une r9tention 
dlexcAente 
Cour dtAppel dtAix, D*Wo 1961 at p. 21. 
(4) Article 3-3-a 
(5) Caxriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924,1971, Article 3-3* Wench 
Law Article 36* Decr. 31 deco 1966* 
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On the other hwAj, the bill of lading protects the seller's 
property by being a good representative for the goods, the 
possession of -the bill operates as the possession of the 
goods themselves, and its transfer may pass the property in 
the goods to the -transferee., Thus the seller can keep the 
bill of lading until the buyer tenders the price, 
-64- 
"RECEIVED" BILL OF LADING 
The older form of a bill of lading always began "shipped on 
board the . #e" This form of the bill of lading was in widespread 
use towards the close of the sixteenth century, and invariably 
acknowledged that the goods were actually shipped on board a 
particular vessel*(') But for many years, sinee the nineteenth 
century when commercial practice changed, a form beginning 
"Received for shipment on board the ... " has been employed. 
Such bills acknowledged that the goods had been "received for 
shipment" to be put on board a particular vessel, or such other 
vessels as might be indicated. The difference between these forms 
of bills may be seen from the following exampleal 
"shipped in apparent good order and condition by oe. on board the 
steam or motor vessel" 
and 
"Received in apparent good order and condition from ... for 
shipment on board the ship ..... or other ship or ships either 
belonging to this line or to other persons, " 
Where the shipowner issues a "shipped" bill, he acknowledges 
that the goods are loaded on board shipj where he issues a "received 
for shipment" billq he merely confirnis that the goods are delivered 
into his custody; in that case the goods might be stored in a ship 
WcCardie T. In DjamorA 'Alkali Export 26riDne ve rls Bwarg 1 921 3 K. Be 443 at P- 449o 
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or warehouse under his control* 
The "received" bill is, thus, less valuable than the "shipped" 
bill because it does not confirm that the shipment has already 
begune(l) 
U. K. (Scotland and %Rland) 
The problem arises whether the later form "received for 
shipment" is a bill of lading within a ColeFe contract or not. 
In this respect, there are three attitudes, the first is the 
2 (3) 
practical attituAj4he second is the conservative one and 
thirdly is Kennedlls view. 
(4) 
In the following paragraphs we will 
see the arguments of each attitude followed by the solution which 
can be inferred from the Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts 1924 and 1971. 
A, The arguments of the Bractical attitudel 
This attitude has considered "Received for shipment" bill of 
lading as a proper bill of lading within a C*I*P* contract, on the 
grounds: 
le It is a matter of commercial notoriety that shipping 
instruments which are called bills of lading, and known in the 
, ive commercial world as such, are a6metimes 
framed in -the alternat 
form "received for shipment" instead of "shipped on board",. and 
(j)scbmjtthoffq%The Erport Tradeq 6th ed. at P- 314- 
(2)The MarlborgB& Hill ve Alex. Cowan & Sons Ltd* C192giA. C-444 
is v. Produce Brokers Co. (1921) 70 Ll LR, 211, 
Unit 
- 
Baltic CgM* v. BargOt & Newsom ? i; 2el3 8 Ll, L, Rep*190* 
S_U&uki & Coo ve j3urgett & Newsom k1922) 10 Ll. L. Ren. 221. 
(3 Diamond Alkali E=Ort COM-o ve Flo 1ým-rReojs r482 U., 
j3 3 XP3,43 
(4)lemnedY'B C-I, -P,, contrauts, 3rd. ed. at pp 60t 61. 
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further, with the alternative contract to carry or procure 
some other vessel (possibly with some limitations as to the 
choice of the other vessel) to earryt instead of the original 
ship, 
P) 
Therefore in Weir & Co. vo Produce Brokers Co. 
(2) 
Bankes L*J* said about "received" bill Of lading "oeo we are 
told is quite usual in the trade - not universal but quite 
usual. It is the usual form adopted by the owners of this 
vessel, the Polyphemue, and it is in a form which has come 
into use of recent years, and It states that the goods are 
shipped or delivered for shipment in apparent good order and 
condition*" 
2. There can be no difference in principle between the owner, master, 
3. 
or agent acknowledging that he has received the goods onwharf, 
or allotted portion of the quay, or his storehouse awaiting 
shipment, and his acknowledging that the goods have been actually 
pat over the ship's rail. 
(3) 
As regards the obligation to carry either by the named ship or 
by some other vessel, it is a contract which both parties may 
well find it convenient to enter into and accept. The liberty 
to tranship is ancient and well established, and does not 
derogate from the nature of a bill of lading; and if the 
contract begins when the goods are received on the wharf, 
substitution does not differ in principle for transhipment, 
(4) 
ý(1) The Narlborough Hill, OuPra P-. 451-453. 
(2) (1921) 7 Llel, *Rqý* 212* 
(3) The- Narlbormigh Hill, impra 
(4) lbido P-451-453o' 
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B. The argq=ents of the conservative attitudet 
This attitude has not considered "Received for shipment" 
bill of lading as a proper bill of lading within a C., I. F9 
contract, on the grounds: 
lo The phrase "bill of lading" in the practical attitude permits 
of a broad interpretation. The phrase "bill of lading" as used 
with respect to a C. I. F. contract meant a bill of lading in the 
established senseq that is to say, a document which acknowledged 
actual shipment on board the particular vessel, and that, as by 
the document in question the buyer was left in doubt as to 
actual shipment and the actual ship. 
(') 
2. There is aprofound difference between the owner, master, or 
agent, both from a legal and business point of view- If the 
view of the practical attitude is carried to its logical 
conclusion, a mere receipt for goods at a dock warehouse for 
future shipment migýjwile called a bill of lading* 
(2) 
3* The substitution and the right of transhipment are distinct 
things, and rest on differeni principles. The third argument of 
, the practical attitude has no application at all to a 0,19P. 
(3) 
contract which provides for a specific date of shipment. 
Wardle J. In Ditimond Alkalilbrport Cgr ve 
71. Bourgeois 09213 3 K*Bo 443ý 452, 
Ln. 
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Ken=Axls view: 
Kennedy J. tried to find a solution to this problem, 
(') 
His 
view stands between the two attitudes stated above. He said: 
But is not the question one of fact rather than of law? Is not 
the test to be applied whether it is or is not the usage or 
practice in the trade concerned to accept a bill of lading in the 
particular form in question and is such usage or practice well 
known and acted upon? 
The true view., is that in each case it is a question of fact whether 
the form of the bill of lading tendered is a form usual in the 
trade; if it is not, the buyer is not bound to accept it. But where 
the contract specifies a date for shipmentj it means actual shipment, 
and the seller does not perform his obligation by producing a 
document which shows that the goods were "received for shipment" on 
the contract date. In Suzuki & Co. v. BurRett & Newsam 
(2) 
the 
contract was for a December/January shipmente The bill of lading 
describing th e goods as "shipped or received for shipment" was 
dated JanuarY 31, but it was proved that the goods were not actually 
shipped until February, The buyers, wh6 had taken up the documents 
and paid the priest were held to be entitled, on dii3covery of -the 
-true fact as to shipment, to recover the price paid, 
This view is quite similar to that one which is expressed 'br 
the "Rules for C*I*Po contracts" (Wars0w--Ojcford rules). * 
(1) Kermedyte 0,1., F, Contracts 3rd ede 609 61. 
(2) (1922) 10 la. L. Rep. 223. 
Adopted by the Oxford Conference Of Augmet 12q 1932* 
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Warsaw-Oxford rules recognise "received" bills of lading if the 
contract of sale or the usage of the particular trade so allows* Thus 
Rule 7 (11) provides: 
"Where the contract of sale or the usage of the particular trade so 
allows, the contract of carriage may, subject to the provisions and 
qualifications hereinafter contained, be evidenced by a "received 
for shipment" bill of lading or similar documents, as the case may 
be, in good merchantable order, issued by the shipowner or his 
official agent, or pursuant to a charter-partyg and in such 
circumstances such "received for shipment" bill of lading or. 
similar document shall for all purposes be deemed to be a valid 
bill of lading, and may be tendered by the seller accordingly... " 
D. CarriaRe of-Goods by Sea Acts 1924 and 1971. 
It can be inferred from Article 3-3 of Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Acts 1924 and 1971 that "Received" bill of lading is eqaivalent 
to "Shipped" bill of lading on the grounds that the Article statest 
"After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier *.. iSIMe to 
the shipper a bill of lading eoe" withoat stating *,, * after the 
goods are loaded. 
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Tracr: 
Received bill of lading has not been mentioned at all In the 
existing Iraqi Maritime Law* The reason isthat the Received bill 
of lading does not have the same characteristics as the bill of 
lading, As we have seen, the bill of lading is considered to be 
a document of title under three conditions: 
1. To symbolise the goods*() 
2& To entitle its holder to claim delivery from the carriere 
(2) 
3* To be, to a certain extent, negotiablee 
(3) 
The Received bill of lading has all the characteristics of the 
bill of lading except for that of the date of shipment which makes 
it unable to symbolise the goods while they are in transit* 
This fact does not deny that the Received bill of lading can 
be a proper bill of lading if the parties to the contract so agreed 
or if the custom of the port so provides, on the ground that the 
commercial matters, according to section 2, are governed by the 
expressed agreement in the contract and the custom of the trade 
as well as the lswo(4) Therefore the judgement of Rule (7)(11) of 
the Warsow-Oxford(5) rules can be applied ea 
. 
stly to any case 
involving a Received bill of lading. As a result, if there is no 
special agreement and there is to local ca9tom which allows the 
Received bill of lading to be used, the problem seems to be difficult 
the same in the Fgyptian Naritime law. 
(I)Seo Ante at P.. 
(2)Se'e Arite M 'P. 
.3 
ID " 
(3)seo- Ante M p* 
Mo 
(5*49 Auto 'at 
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as there is no law, no agreement and no custom make that kind of 
bill of lading as good as "shipped" bill of lading. In this case, 
we thinkt the problem can be solved under the rules of evidence by 
considering the Received bill of lading as a mere commercial 
document liable to be rebutted by contrary evidence quite apart 
from the rules governing the problem if there was a shipped bill 
of lading involved. 
On the other hand, section 1930) of the new Iraqi Maritime 
Law(draft)providese. 
"The carrier must give the shipper a receipt for receiving the 
goods before their shipment* This receipt can be exchanged by a 
bill of lading after the goods are loaded if the shipper so demands. 
This receipt is the same as the bill of lading if it contains the 
terms which are stated in section 185 and the word "shipped" is 
mentioned in ite" 
If we study this section carefully, we will see: 
I- "Received" bill of lading has been reoognised and it is called 
a "rec6ipt for receiving the goodso" 
2- This receipt is not as good tender as the "shipped" bill of 
lading unless it contains the terms of shipped bill of lading 
stated in section 1185' mentioning the word "shipped" in ito 
Obviously these terms will turn that "receipt for receiving 
Section 187 of the now F47ptian Maritime Law (draf+. )* 
it oould be said that the law means by this expression "Reoet#t 
for reoeiving the goods" the mate's reoeipt, arA w6, -, -"RqOejvvr bill Of l8dingo 
This 
, 
interpretation cannot be adopted as this reasipt, am 
replaoe the shipped bill Of Wing where"i the matO w zwiftW 
wlet be exchanged for a bill of ladipgo , 
Thorotowtba IW 
maw, the '"Roceived" biU of lWng. *rA, ýmj %", ~ 
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the goods" into a proper "shipped" bill of lading, 
The net result of these two observations is that -the received 
bill of lading is not considered to be a document of title either 
in Iraq or FMte 
France: 
The question of "received" bill of lading and whether it is 
a document of title or not, divided French jurisprudence into two 
groups: 
The first group(') rejected the idea of equalizing "Received" bill 
of lading with "Shipped" bill of lading on the grounds that the 
first one did not identify the goods properlyq. 
(2) 
and therefore its 
delivery did not imply any delivery of the goodal and oonsequently 
the buyer was entitled to reject it and not to pay the price, 
O) 
The second group opposed this idea on ground that "Received" bill 
of lading could idazrtifýr the gxmde when it contained the qwantity, 
-the qualityq the marks, the numbers of the goods and therefore 
"Received" bill of lading was as good tender as "Shipped" bill of 
ladings But this type of bill of lading could not identify the 
goods in bulk shipment and therefore it was not, in such a case, 
(1) G* Ripert, "Droit Waritime" T*: E: l Parage 1859 and 19.32o 
(2) "Los comnaissement rqýlier spo'cialise lee marchandices . 'et lee 
met sms la. garde du capitainef le reyn pottr embarqtteoient ile A pent jamor un tel, role*" 
lbid at P- 757- 
"La remise des doomerits no sort pas soulement altireammitre 
S llacque"rour la 04'cialination dots msrchandises; alle a do plus 
-Pwrojýjst do le mettre en possession dos amwcbandisog p= I& 
delivrance du titre qui constate cette poSsossion gt repr " 
tAtchazidisdoo 14 pidemaht -tilt stipale"' achtre domamts, OV Ma"m6rattr qui. no r"t pas A es doemsute p4pajors U1104 pw 
Ibid att ppe 8184190 
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a docament of title. 
(') 
The division in the French jurisprudence Is over now, 
The Law of 31-12-66 has adopted the second solution when defined 
bill of lading in Article 33 as follows: 
"The bill of lading is delivered after receiving the goods 
without mentioning "after the goods are loaded*" This definition 
implies that "Received" bill of lading is as good tender as the 
"Shipped" bill of lading if it contains the terms mentioned in 
(2) 
Articles 35 and 36 . 
Our Idea: 
I- General Survey: 
The bill of lading was created 'by the merchants themselves 
and came into use in the sixteenth centurye A book* on meroantile 
law, published in 1686 stated already that "bills of lading are 
/ -! h ) 
commonly to be had inprint in all places and several langmages* 
The law has reoognised the bill of lading in the sense in which the 
merchants first used itq vize 'IShipped" bill of lading*(4) 
(I)Ligonie at PP* 57-58- 
Rodier at P-57, V24, 
Heenen para 74o 
(2)"ApAs hesitations, otest an favour do cefte sooonde 'Fjojution qtjq v stest amýtee I& r4forme do 1966* Warticle 33 du dO'CrOt du .4 #4 
31 ýecembre 1966 ports on-effet "Le mmaissoment eart d6livre 
apres reception des marchandises ooo" et ne parle pas de sa miss 
a bordo 11 faut-en conclure que la rýglementatjon du comuillsementl 
toile qatelle set presorite par Is deor6t de 1966, concerns aussi 
bien is ponnaiasement reSu pour embarquement que Is oommissament 
efflibnVus', lfun at ifautre doivent repondre w= crigences des 
artiolOg 35 ot: 36 du ddozwt*" 
Rodier at Pe 58o 
. nes. 
iAx Naroatoria 3rde ede 16869 p. 97. 
ý3)Scbmitthoffi The REPOrt Trade at P*309* 
4AIddemomm v- Nason (1794) 5 T*Rp 683e 
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In the nineteenth century another form of bill of lading 
was created by the merchants which is tervied the "Received for 
shipment" bill of lading. This form has come into use for the 
practical reason that "Received for shipment" is the proper 
phrase for the practical business as where parcels of cargo are 
placed on a general ship which will be lying alongside the wharf 
taldng in cargo for several days, and whose proper StOWage will 
require that certain bulkier or heavier parcels shall be placed on 
board first, while others, though they have arrived earlierg wait 
for the convenient place and time of stowage* 
(1) 
The international convention for the unification of certain 
rules of law relating to bi3lsof lading has recognised the 
"Received" bill of lading as a proper bill of lading* Thus Article 
3-3 providest 
"After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier Or the EMStOr 
or agent of the carrier shaill on demand of the 13hipPerl i8SIA6 to 
the shipper a bill of lading 004, 
(2) 
And Article 3-4 provides: 
leSuch a bill of lading sha. 11 be prima facie evidence of the receipt 
by the carrier of the goods **0" 
The provisions of Articles 3-3 and 3-4 refer to the state of the 
goods before they are loaded* So the bill of lading which is 
issuedl by the carrier must be the "received" bill of lading and 
(1) The Marlborm-r-h Hill, ImPra Pe 452* ý 
Biped at Brussels., on Augmet 25t 1924., 
(2) Compwe Article III. Rule Carriage of Goods Iýy Sea A0,1 
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not the "shipped" bill of lading. 
This inference can be supported by Article 3o-7 which states: 
"After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by the 
carrier, master or agent of the carrier, to the shipper, if the 
shipper so demands, be a "shipped" bill of lading, provided that if 
the shipper shall have previously taken up wW doc=errt of title 
to such goods, he shall surrender the same as against the issue 
of the "shipped" bill of lading 
It is quite clear now that the Brussels Convention recognised 
the "Received" bill of lading as a proper bill of ladingv and the 
shipper, if he so demands, is able to exchange it with the "shipped" 
bill of ladingg after the goods are loaded* 
2- The Writer's View: 
In rq humble view, if we want to consider the "Received" bill 
of lading as a proper bill of lading, we must take into account the 
characteristics of bill of lading as a document of title and the 
Principle 'Trotection of property"o 
As we have seen, three conditions are requiredl to make bill 
of lading a document of title: 
lo It must symbolioe the goods, 
2'* It must give the holder a right to claim delivery of the goods 
from the carrier* 
3, It must be 4W to a certain extent - negotiable, 
"Received" 'bill of lading acquires these conditional it "mboUses 
the goodog as it ý states the natwft of the goods, +, b*1rzumOM*-'AmU*X 
or the likeo Tt gives the holder-s. right toýcjsft, delivery frm the 
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carrier, as it is signed by the carrier or his agent* It is - 
to a certain extent - negotiable, as it makes the goods deliverable 
to bearerg or to a name left blankg or to order. 
"Received" bill of lading does not state the exact date of shipment, 
but this fact should not prevent it from being a document of title 
as long as it contains the conditions above mentioned. 
As far as the principle "Protection of property" is concernedl 
the seller retains some interests in the goods at least by way of 
security until he has received, or been adequately assured of 
receiving, payment* On the other hand, the buyer does not want to 
pay for goods which he has not yet received, until he has acquired 
an interest in the goods on which he can rely in the event of the 
sellerts insolvency before actual delivery of the goodSo 
In this context the principle trprotection of Property" requires: 
1- The preshipment risk must be securede 
2- The goods must be shipped within the contract period* 
These are discussed as follows: 
I- The preshipment, riski 
A loss or damage might happen to the goods while they are in 
the custody of the carriert waiting for shipment!, Who beare 
the risk from the time when the carrier receives the goodsin 
his custody until they are loaded on board ship? The shippev 
is not the only one to decide the moment at which the risk in 
transferred to the buyer; the buyer b; A some interests in the 
goods too. When the shipper makes the contract of carriage 
with the oarrierl he must comply with the provisions in the 
o&, jgjml, cprAract between himelf and ihe buyer* 
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In the light of Warsaw and oxford rules 
(1) 
and Brussels 
convention, 
(2) 
the preshipment risk is subject to a special 
arrangemento Accordingly the risk passes to the buyer when 
the goods are actually put on board ship, whether the bill of 
lading is "Received" or "Shipped" bill of lading. The 
preshipment risk is subject -to a special arrangement between 
the carrier, the shipper and the buyer which may be either 
explicit or implicito 
2- Shipment of the goods: 
The buyer wants the goods to be shipped within 'the specified 
time in the oontract, as. he may calculate his business according 
to that date* Therefore it is, sometimes, very important to 
state -the date of shipment or the name of the ship in the bill 
of lading. The seller can put the name of the ship carrying 
the goods and the date of shipment in the "Received" bill of 
lading* In the light of Brussels Conventiong the effect of 
this nomination is to change the "Received" bill of lading into 
a "Shipped" bill of lading* Thus the last paragraph of 
Article 3-7 provides: 
but at the option of the carrier such document of title 
iwky be noted at the port of shipment by the carrier, master, 
or agent with the name or names of the ship or ships upon which 
the goods have been shipped and the date or dates of shipmentt 
and when so noted; If it shows the particulars mentioned in 
(1) Rule 5- 
(2) Article 
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paragraph 3 of Article 3, shall for the purpose of this article be 
deemed to constitute a "shipped" bill of lading, But in the light 
of the Warsaw-Oxford Rules, that nomination makes the t%ceived" 
bill of lading equivalent to a "shipped" bill of lading* Thus 
the last paragraph of the Rules 7-(11) Provides: 
", oe moreoverv in all cases where such a document has been duly 
noted with the name of the ship and the date of shipment, it 
shall be deemed in all respects equivalent to a "shipped" bill 
of lading. " 
The later solution seems more reasonable than the former one, 
because -the former solution makes the "Received" bill of lading 
less important than the "Shipped" bill of ladingo The net 
result is that the "Received" bill of lading is a good tender 
within CoI&Fe and FoOoBo oontraots on two conditions% 
I- The risk of the goodst from the time they are received by the 
carrier in his custody urrtil they are loaded on board shipj murrt 
be subject to special agreement, explicit or implicit. 
2- The goods mast be shipped within the contract periodo 
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III THROUGH BILI. S OF LADING 
Definition: 
"Through bill of lading" is an expression loosely used to 
mean a docament containing a contract for the carriage of goods 
from one place to another in separate stagesq of which at least one 
stage is a conventional sea transit. The sea transit may itself be 
divided into separate stages to be performed by different shipowners 
by a process of transhipment, The sea transit is often coupled with 
a stage of transit by some other means, e. g. by roadt rail or air, 
in which case the through bill of lading is sometimes called a 
"Combined transport bill of lading"* 
The necessity for a through bill arises, eogo where goods have 
to be carried from the United Kingdom to such places as Baghdad. 
Formst 
Through bills of lading can take various formt 
1- The first carrier Or the agent Of the Ocean-going steamer may 
sign a through bill of lading undertaking to carry the goods to 
their ultimate destination by himself and other carrier. this 
case the carrier signs as agent on behalf of the other carrier, 
who may or may not be named, in the bill, 
(2) 
This means, where 
(i) Somtton I. Sth ad. at P*37lo 
(2) 13, 
-vo- 
AmchAirt ar Bx. Oe 1873 -Re 8 Q. B* 186. 
ý -Worth 
Co. (1875) L*R* 10 Qjje'43je' 
Barrat'-ve Great Forthi6m Rjr. Co-, (1904) 20 T*L*Ro 175- 
ltoa4er v, BoutbmýEoRstern & Chatham RV, (1921) -VToLeRe Wjjs2n v, Darling Islo; A Stevedoring 0, [1ý5ý3i MW49a Rep. 
-N A Ir -. A. - 
12 C -7 
3AW etb po -?;; I* 
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the company concerned issues a throughbill of lading, itwill 
be responsible for the whole journeyq whereas other comaphies 
concerned are usually to be treated as sub-contractors to that 
companyq and not as parties to the through bill of lading. 
(') 
In this respect it must be mentioned that in exceptional 
circumstances the companies concerned may be jointly liable 
for the whole transit, 
(2) 
but it is not uncommon for them to 
be severally liable and jointly*(3) 
2- The carrier who receives the goods undertakes to carry them to 
the port of transhipment and there to arrange for the goods to 
be forwarded to the ultimate destinationo(4) 
Is a through bill of lading a document of title? 
This question should be dealt with as followst 
U*Xo 
-(Sc6tland and 
! Dngland) 
The difficulties spring largely from the fact that a through 
bill of lading is not within the omstom as found in 1794 in 
Mckbarrow v. Mason, 
(5) 
by which bills of lading first became 
Judicially recognised as transferable documents of title. And it 
was not in common use at the time that the Bills of Lading Act 1855 
wair passed* Dat it is submitted that there would now be little 
(1) Briertol and Pketer Rr. ve- Collins (1859) 7 HoLOC* 194, 
(2) ! %yes yo-So Wales Ry. -Co, 
(1859) 9 Ir CoLeRs 474. 
(3) The Hibernian [1: 9073 P*2779 
Crawford & Law v. Allan Line S*So Coo [19123 AqC. 130. Va'401"k"jr v. Dover N2ýjýtioýn; Cog Ltd, 0950) 83 IA. LJt* 84', ý 
(4) Sa f-. ( v* It- 11-t 'P- IN 
(5) 0794) 5 T*R* 683. 
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difficulty in establishing that a through bill of lading is by 
custom treated as a transferable document of title and within the 
meaning of the expression "bill of lading" as used in the Bills of 
Lading Act 1855, 
P) 
The law relating to through bills of lading is expressed in 
four cases, 
(2) 
and from these it would seem to be the rule that a 
through bill of lading is to be issued whenever it is usual and 
astomaryl in the particular trade to do 800(3) 
In IT*.. Vj ILe:, yer 2. Annel, Branson J. in the course Of his 
judgement, said: 
(4) 
"Cases such as Hansson v. Hamel & Horley Ltd* and Landauer v. Craven 
& Speeding Brothers have laid down as a matter of law the essential 
characteristics which a bill of lading must possess if it is to be 
good tender under a C,, I*P,, contract* It must have been procured on 
shipment or not long aftemards, it must cover the contract goods, 
and non other, from shipment to the port of destination, and it must 
show shipment within the contract time If in any particular 
trade, there is a custom that bills of lading should have other 
characteristics in addition to, or in substitution for, those 
generally required by the custom of merchants, then, in that trade, 
bills of lading to be good tendert need only conform to that custom*" 
With respectl if the through bill of lading is usual and 
(1) Scrutton 18th ode at P*377- 
(2) Cox, NoDgen & Co. v. Malcolm 12123 2'K. B. at p. 1070 
Hansson v. Hamel & Horle Ltd. 192Q 2 A*C- 3 1 ýaýuer & Co. v. Graven & SpeTing Bros. D12 2 K*Bo 94* 
W*lr* Me-y r v*. Aurie ff 939.3 3 All E*R* 16a. 
(3) Kemedy's CoI*F* Contracts 3rd ode at pe 62o 
(4) Supra at pg. 172o 
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customary in the particular trade, that will never make it a 
document of titlef it may make it a good tender if there is an 
expressed agreement* A through bill of lading, in order to be a 
document of title, must possess the characteristics of the bill of 
lading by which the buyer will be entitled to take delivery of the 
goods from the last carrier at their arrival*(') Through bill of 
lading does not give such right to the consignee, as each carrier 
is individually responsible, and he delivers the goods at the 
presentation of the bill of lading issued by himself* 
(2) 
. 
Iracr-. 
Although the through bill of lading is unknown to the existing 
Iraqi Maritime Law, provision is made for its operation by section 
212 of the new Iraqi ftritime Law. 
(3) This section provides: 
(1) On this point see LandLuer & Co. v. Craven & Speeding Bros. 
supra at p. 106. Ii.. * The buyer wants-Vh-e bill of lading 
for 
two purposes - first, to take delivery oe,, " and Hansson v. Hamel 
& Horlev Ltd. in the Court of Appeal (1920) 26 Com. Cas. at p. 239* 
Is eee a right to receive the goods. " 
(2) Each successive carrier may be estopped by statements in the 
through bill of lading, or iii the ocean bills of lading 
incorporated in the bill of lading, or by receipts issued by it 
to the previous carrier, or by failure to notify damage or 
shortages to the previous caxTierq from denying that he received 
the goods from the previous carrier in apparent good order and 
condition. 
Crawford-& Iaw v. alga Line S*SS. Co., 191a A*C, * 130. 
(3) Section 203 of the new Fýffptian Maritime Law, 
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"I- The carrier can issue a through bill of lading by which he 
undertakes to carry the goods from certain place in subsequent 
stages. In this case he is responsible for all the obligation 
arising from the bill until the transport is ended, and he is 
responsible for the actions of the subsequent carriers who 
receive the goods. 
2- The subsequent carriers are responsible for the damage caused 
to the goods when they are in their possession*'t 
This section is based on the custom and the cases decided by the 
courts*(') 
According to that section the main carrier is the one who is 
responsible for the whole journey. The subsequent carriers are 
responsible for any damage caused to the goods when they are in 
their possession only, In other words, the main carrier is the 
agent of subsequent carriers, responsible for their actions and any 
damages caused to the goods during their transit. Therefore the 
through bill of lading gives the holder a direct right of action 
against the main carrier, and the main carrier can sue any of the 
subsequent carriers who caused the damage; according to the rules 
of agency* 
The subsequent carrier, in order to specify his responsibility, 
must issue a bill of lading as soon as he receives the goods from 
the former carrier, stating the conditions of the goods, obliging 
himself to deliver them to the legal holder of -that bill of lading, 
(1) Iraqi Cassation Court 5-io-1969. 
00: " 30-10-1969. 
Sykian " 28-4-1970- 
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Thus the subsequent carrier is bound to deliver the goods as 
they are stated in the bill of lading issued by himself. 
If the goods have to be carried from Glasgow to Baghdad via 
Syria, they will be carried first by sea from Glasgow to Syria, 
and second by land or air from Syria to Baghdad. In this case 
when the subsequent carrier receives the goods from the former one 
he issuea a 'bill of lading stating the condition of the goods at 
that time, and that bill of lading Must be sent to the buyer in 
Baghdad in order to enable him to claim delivery* 
The consequence of this process can be stated as follows: 
I- The buyer can only claim delivery from the subsequent carrier 
if he presents the bill of lading signed by that carriers 
2- If the goods are stated damaged in the bill of ladingg the 
buyer cannot sue the subsequent carrier for that particular 
damage, but he must go directly to the principle carrier, as the 
subsequent carrier does not cause that damage to the goods, and 
he has specified his responsibility by mentioning the condition 
of the goods in the bill of lading issued by him when he received 
the goods* 
It is obvious that the first consequence prevents the through 
13111 of lading from being a document of title as it does not entitle 
the holder to claim deliveTy from the last aorrier unless he presents 
a bill of lading signed by that qarrier. As we have seen, three 
conditions are required to make the bill Of lading a document of 
titlet 
i- To symbolize the godLe, 
2. To -entitle the holdeaý to ol'ilm delivery f2.0mthe'- 
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3- To bet to a certain extent, negotiable. 
The through bill of lading has the characteristics of the 
first and the third conditions but it does not have the 
characteristic of the second one, therefore it is not a document 
of titlee 
On the other hand it can be saidt under the rules of Iraqi 
Law, that the holder of the through bill of lading can claim 
delivery from the last carrier without need of a bill of lading 
according to the rules of agency, This argument cannot make the 
through bill of lading a document of title under Iraqi and 
Egyptian Laws because the holder will claim delivery from the 
carrier on the rules of agency and not on the through bill of 
lading. 
France: 
When the shipper contracts separately with different carriers 
to transport the goods, there will be no problem concerning through 
bill of lading, as each bill covers one period of the voyage and 
the responsibility of each carrier is to be decided separately 
(la responsibilite'' de chaque transporteur doit etre appre"cie"a 
Ir separement)o On the other hand, when the first carrier undertakes 
to arrange for the whole journey his responsibility will be 
different from that of the subsequent carrier as follows: 
I- The responsibility of the firit carrier: 
The first carrier is responsible as a carrier and as an agent 
for the subsequent carrier, This means that the first carrier 
is liable for arW damW which say happen to the goods during 
their transit, whether that damage has happened while the 
goods are in his possession or in the Possession of any 
subsequent carrier, and he cannot escape liability unless 
he proves Force Majeure-o 
It must not be forgotten that the first carrier should take 
from each subsequent carrier a bill of lbAing stating the 
name of the consignee in order to enable the latter to claim 
delivery of the goods at their arrival. 
(') 
2- The responsibility of the subsequent carrier: 
This carrier is responsible only for any damage which may happen 
to the goods while they are in his possessione In other words, 
his responsibility is limited by the bill of lading which he 
himself issued. Therefore the consignee cannot sue the last 
carrier for any damage caused by the previous one* 
(2) 
The net result is that the through bill of lading is a document 
of title while the goods are in the possession of the first 
carrier only, as the holder of a through bill of lading cannot 
claim delivery of the goods from the last carrier unless he 
(1) "Le premier transporteurt celui a qui la marchandise a ýte 
confiee, encourt une responsabilite certaine* 11 eat garant 
de son fait personnel comma transporteur, at il est garant, 
comma commissionairev du fait des transporteurs post4r erieurs... Le premier transporteur est libere Vil 'btablit qua la 
marchandise a peri par force majeur.,, " 
Ripert at pp*900-901. j v*11o 
(2) "*go il ne repond, qua de son fait personnel at dans les lindtoo A de connaissement qulil a lui-meme delivre, Trx ntest pas 
responsable du fait de co= qui Pont pr' A' at il nvest I" ec a memo 
pas presume avoir repu la marchandise an bon ekwt Ibid at pp. 901-902, 
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presents the bill of lading signed by that carrier, 
(') 
After this journey through different legal systems we must 
return to our question: Is a through bill of lading a document 
of title? In other words, how far does a through bill of 
lading possess the same legal characteristics as a conventional 
bill of lading? 
A through bill of lading can represent the goods by stating 
their nature, their apparent order and condition, etc. 
It can, also, be - to a certain extent - negotiable by making 
the goods deliverable to "bearer" or to "a name left blank" or 
to "order". %t it does not give the holder a right to claim 
delivery of the goods from the last carrier* 
(1) 04 1 "PerAant le, premier parcourst la marchandies eat representee, 
par le connaissement, direat nats le porteur nta p&s O(Mrtro 
lee transporteure subse"quents led e . roit 
de d'livrance puisque 
coo transporteurs n2ont pas signe le connaissement et quvile 
nvont pas dlobligation onvers le portsur. " 
Legonie at Pe 42* 
IV ý THE DELIVERY ORDER 
The splitting up of a consignment shipped under one bill of 
lading into smaller parcels sold to different buyers can further 
be achieved by the use of delivery orders relating to specified 
portions of the whole consignment#(') Thus where the buyer is 
receiving only part of a parcel of goods shipped under a single 
bill of lading, it will not be ptacticable to transfer to him the 
bill of lading in respect of the whole parcel. In such a case the 
contract would normally provide that the seller should perform his 
obligations by delivering to the buyer a delivery order for the part 
sold rather than a bill of lading. 
(2) 
T-y y Orden pes of-Deliver 
There are various kinds of delivery order which are illustrated 
. as followst 
I- A delivery order can be issued by an owner of goods to a person 
in possession of themv eoge as carrier or warehousemang directing 
the latter to deliver the goods to the person named in the order, 
2- A delivery order can be issued by a person in Possession of the 
goods stating that he will deliver the goods to a named 'person, 
or to the holder. 
A delivery order can be issued by a seller of goods given to 
his agent at the port of destinaticnt directing the agent to 
(1) Sobetthoff, -The Bzp6rt Trade, 16th ed- at Po 321ý 
(2) Kennedyte Col*F* Contracts 3rd ed. P- 51-52. 
deliver the goods, when they arrive, or to cause them to be 
delivered, to some person there, usually to the buyer*(1) 
It can be added to another kind of delivery order issued by 
the bank which holds the bill of lading and the other doc=entse 
The delivery order in the meaning of noo 1-3 and 4 do not give the 
holder any right againErt the carrier* 
(2) 
But the I'shipts delivery 
order"t which is in the nature of meaning no. 92t is of a higher 
legal quality than delivery orders in the meaning of no* 1,3 and 4 
in so far as it gives the holder in certain circumstances a direct 
right of action against the carrier. 
(3) 
The delivery order in the meaning of no. 1-3 and 4 do not acquire 
the three conditions of the bill of lading to make them document 
of title* They may symbolise the goods and they may be negotiable, 
(1) Benjamin at P-706. 
Ligonie at pp* 42-43* 
Heenen at pp. 112-1279 
Lhe Julia, [1ý949-1 A9C* 293* 
(2) Despite the fact that delivery order is a "warrant or order for 
the delivery of goods" within the statutory definition of 
"document of title" in section 1(4) of the Factors Act 1889, 
which applies for the purpose of the Sale of Goods Act 1893- 
Bat this in no way affects the principle that, as between buyer 
and seller, constructive possession of goods in the actual 
possession of a third party will not be transferred by -the 
issue or transfer of a delivery order, but only by attornment- 
acknowledgement of the third party - rThis is in England* ] In Scorland "A delivery note to a See Banjamin at P-710. 
purchaser is not negoRaSle like a bill of lading .... ; and 
unless the sale be intimated to the actual oustodier of the 
goods, no change in the ownership will be held to have taken 
place*" 
NoPwan ve Smith (1849) 2 H. L. Co 309. 
Roi-stv"Leading Cases v. 11 at P-591- 
(3) Colin & Shields v. Wo' Xeddel & Co. 
[195] 1 All BeRO 1021t 
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but they do not give the holder a direct right against the carrier, 
whereas the "ship's delivery order" acquires the same characteristics 
of the bill of lading. It symbolises the goods as their quantity, 
quality and conditions are stated in its It gives the holder a 
direct right against the carrier as it is signed by him. it can 
be - to a certain extent - negotiable when it makes the goods 
deliverable to order or assignee or to bearer or -to a name left 
blank* Therefore the 11shipts delivery order" has been internationally 
recognised as a document of title*(') 
The 'IshipIs delivery order" might mean a docament issued by 
the shipowner promising to deliver goods from the ship to a named 
person or to the holder of such order. 
(2) 
Ira, cr* 
Section (197) of the new : Eraqj Maritime Law (draft) providesý3) 
"The person who is entitled to receive the goods according to the 
bill of lading can get a delivery order from the carrier if he so 
demands and if that is stated on the contracte 
The delivery orders can be issued to a named person or to his 
order or to bearero At any rate they must be signed by the carrier 
and demandero" 
01 (j) "Lesdelivery-orders signes par un representaut de llamement 
representent, les m chandises dans la mle"me mesure quo le 
Connaissement quIlils remplacente" 
Reenen at pe 118o 
Ligonie at po 43., 
Ripert, v. 11 at P. 484. ' 
(2) yarmrine Union Go? 4B*H,. vo CambgZ Pringe SS, Co, Ltd,, [1191a 
i-Q*Bo 219,231o 
(3) Section i5l Of the 116w FWIPtian Nwitime Low (drart)e 
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According to this section the "shipts delivery order" is 
considered to be a document of title on two conditions: 
I- There must be an expressed agreement in the contracte 
2- It must be signed by the carrier and the person who has 
demanded it. 
We think these two conditions are beside the point, and there is 
no need to state them The 11shipts delivery order" aocplires the 
characteristics of the bill of ladingg therefore it is a document 
of title by its nature without any need to add unusual stipulations. 
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v THE MATEIS RECETPT 
On delivery of goods by a shipper to the shipowner or his 
agent, the shipper will obtain a doc=ent known as a I'matel's 
receipt".. It acknowledges receipt of the goods and states their 
CluantitY and conditiong and states the name of the shipper or 
owner of the goodso As a general rule the person in possession 
of the mate's receipt is the person entitled to bills of lading, 
which should be given in exchange for that receipt, and he can 
sue for wrongful dealing with the goodr. *(') 
Is the mateva receipt a doc=ent of title? 
2) L 'Ord Wri t In jaMon Yusen Kaisha v. Ranjiban Sero", e gh 
statede. 
0) 
"rhe matets receipt in not a document of title to the goods shipped. 
Its transfer does not pass property in the goodst nor is its 
possession equivalent to possession of the goods* It is not 
conclusive, and its statements-, do not bind the shipowner as do the 
statements in a bill of lading signed within the mastees authority* 
t' *94, unl ess there are special customs of the port to the 
contrary. Tn the Port of London, for instance, the shipper 
receives a matets receipt only if waterborne goods are delivered 
alongside the ship. Where goods are sent to the docks by landl 
they are stored in & shed of the Port of London Authority which 
issues a whrfinger's note or dock receipt and later receives the 
matets receipt when placing the goods on board ship. Tn some 
foreign ports,, matelareceipte are issued for all cargo whother 
received by water or larlde" Schmitthoff, The Export Trad*0 at 
P-295. (1) Scrutton at P- 172o 
(2) ff9383 A*Co 429* 
(3) Ibid at p* 445-6* 
(4) Biddulph v- BipAam, (1874) 30 L*T* 30* 
-93- 
It is, hwever, prima facie evidence of the quantity and condition 
of the goods receivedt and prima facie it is the recipient or 
possessor who is entitled to have the bill of lading issued to 
him eee" 
It is obvious now that the mate's receiprt is not a document 
of title, 
(') 
it is not even a contract of carriage, 
(2) 
it is 
merely evidence that goods have be-on received by the shipowner(3) 
subject to the conditions and exemptions of his usual bill of 
ladinge 
(4) 
As a matter of fact, the function of this document is to 
acknowledge receiving the goods by the carrier, in order to 
facilitate the procedure of issuing the bill of lading later on. 
Therefore it is not originally issued to replace the bill of ladingg 
but just to entitle the holder to exchange it with the proper bill 
of lading* Moreover, it is not as negotiable as the bill of lading 
because it, generally, makes the goods deliverable to a named person. 
* 
(1)HatheriM ve Laing (1873) LoR 0 17 Eq- 929 105- F*E* Ifa]2ier v, Dexters Ltd. (1926) 26 LI. L*R. 184,189. 
(2)A*Re Brown. McFarlane & Co, ve Ce Shaw Lovell& Sons and ter 
Lotts 1921) 7 Ll.; L., R- 36v 37- 
WKUM v- Wah Tat Bank Mde, [10 
. 97D 
I Ll. L*R- 439o 
WDe Clermont imd Donner ve General Steam Ea LvIgzation Co. (1891) 
7 T*L*Ro 1674, 
For these reasonsq neither the Iraqi and the Egyptian lawas not, the jurisprudence have recognised this document to be as a 
document of title* 
In Prance, mate's receipt is not a document Of title either. "Le reý qx du oapitaine ou I'matets receipt" et la note d9exp4ditiOn 
on "sailing's bill" sont des titres nominatifs qui ne peuveirt dono .1 pas representer la marchandise. " 
Ligonie at P- 43* 
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A question can be raised now: If the mate's receipt has made the 
goods deliverable to "order" or to "a name left blank" or to 
a "bearer", will that change its nature to beAdocument of title? 
This question is of some importance because the mate's receipt will 
acquire the same characteristics of the bill of lading. 
It has been said that the mate's receipt is not a document of 
title unless a oustom giving it this effect can be proved. 
(') 
Bat 
one thing has to be taken into consideration, wb=h is the fact that 
the matels receipt is not intended to replace the bill of lading, 
it is only an evidence that the goods have been received, and to be 
exchanged by bill of lading later on. On the other hand, if a 
mate's receipt acquires the characteristics of a proper bill of 
lading and the parties concerned have intended that mate's receipt 
has to replace bill of ladingt in this respect, we think, matess 
reoeipt should be treated sm a document of titlee 
(1) K= v. Wah Tat Bank Ltd.. supra. 
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vi THE EFTTM OF THE CONTAIXERS ON THE 
CLASSIC RULES OF BTLIS OF LADING 
One of the most important technological developments in the 
transportation of goods by sea since steam replaced sail is the 
recent advent of the 'container revolution's 
This radically novel concept of transferringo handling, 
stowing, discharging and delivering hundreds of packages 
simultaneously and mechanically by means of large reuBableg 
permanent metal containers, containerships, special container 
handling equipment and container terminals is so efficient a 
labour-saving device that it has already, to a large extentj altered 
conventional methods of shipping large numbers of packages individually. 
In short, containerization has rendered shipping 1ýa whole new 
kal 
Llý ie 
A container is a permanent reusable article of transport 
equipment - not packaging of goods - durably, 'made of metal, and 
equipped with doors for easy access to the goods and for repeated 
uses It is designed to facilitate the handling, loading, stowage 
aboard shipt carriage, discharge from ship, movement and transfer 
of large numbers of packages simultaneously by mechanical means to 
minimize the cost and risks of manually processing each package 
individually* It functions primarily as shipts gear for cargo 
handling, and is usually provided by the carriere 
(2) 
(1) Seymour Simon "The Law of Shipping Containers" Part I 
Jourml of Maritime Law and Commerce Vol-5, No*3, Apri1,, 1974* 
at Po 507 9, 
(2) rbid at pe 513- 
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The tremendous growth in the use of international containers 
over the past several years is a matter of common knowledge. It 
has been estimated that all bulk cargo and 80 per cent of all 
general cargo shipments in foreign trade are containerizablee 
Similarly a rapidly increasing volume of air cargo is being 
transported in containers in jet freighter aircraft* Many of the 
advantages of containerization such as cost savings, reduced damage 
and lossesq and simplification of trade already have been realized. 
(') 
The containerized transportation is of three basic types: 
The first is a container loaded and sealed at the shipper"s factory 
and delivered intact to the consigneels warehouse or other place of 
business. This it; termed a "door-to-door" container shipment* The 
jseoand type of shipment is a container loaded by a freight consolidator 
at an inland point and transported to an inland point overseael where 
the container then is broken open and the contents distributed. This 
is termed a "point-to-poi? rt" shipment, Thirdly, the movement of a 
container consolidated at a port or air terminal and shipped to an 
overseas port or air terminal where the contents then are sorted for 
distribution, is termed a "port-to-port" or "ait terminal-to-terminal" 
shipment * 
(2) 
It seems now thats 
I. The container Involves a combined transport operation, land, sea, 
and air* 
2, Each carrier isq ummlly, w2aware of what the container containag 
(1) E. Schmelizer &. Re Peary "Prospects and Problems of the 
Oontainer Revolution" J*X*L*C. V0191 No*2 January 1970 at P*204* 
(2) IWd at p, 206* 
and therefore he states "said to contain" in the bill of 
* 
lading. 
3- The bill of lading is, normally? issued before shipment, 
These facts do not comply with the classic rules of bills of 
lading* As we have seen, the bill of lading is a document of 
title because: 
1- It represents the goods. This implies that the nature and the 
condition of the goods must be stated in the bill of lading, 
in order to enable the banks to pay the seller when the 
commercial letter of credit is involvedP) 
2- The holder of the bill of lading is entitled to claim delivery 
of the goods from the carrier., 
(2) 
3- The bill of lading must be - to a certain extent- negotiable 
by making the goods deliverable to bearerg or to a named 
consignee "or order or assigns"l or simply to "order or assigns", 
(3) 
As far aa representing the goods is concernedl the long standing practice 
of the ocean carrier industry has been to charge a higher or ad 
valorem rate in all eases where the shipper exercises his option under 
the "unless clause" of Article 4(5) - 11ague Rules - and declares -the 
nature and value of the goods before shipment inserting such a 
declaration in his bill of lading* Therefore, the higher or ad 
valorem rates charged by ocean carriers have been so high that they 
have discouraged shippers from declaring the nature and value of their 
This is If the carrier has had no reasonable means of checking* 
And in the case where the 'carrier himself or his agent receives 
the goods and packs then into the container, he must statethe 
nature and the condition of thd goods, 
I ýAnt e at p. Z. 7. 
2 Ante at p* 30- 
(3). 4rtte at t*. IS. 
goods in the bill of ladingp(l) and instead they ask the carrier 
to state "said to contain" in the bill of lading. 
Thus the bill of lading will be a receipt for the number of 
containers, not for the number of bales or cartons they are "said 
to contaie by the shipper. A purchaser of such a bill of lading 
cannot rely on the "said to contain" quantity for the representation 
is made by the shipper, not the carrier. 
(2) 
Moreover, banks will 
not accept such a bill of lading where payment is arranged through 
a documentary letter of credit, 
As far as the combined transport is concernedg thebill of 
lading issued by the first carrier is considered tobe a document 
of title as long as the goods are still in the possession of that 
carriere As soon as the goods are transferred to another carrier, the 
first bill of lading is no longer a document of title* 
(3) 
Therefore, 
* 
since the container transport involves a combined transport operation, 
the bill of lading issued by the first carrier will not be a 
document of title covering the whole journey. This implies that the 
holder of such a1ill of lading in not entitled to claim delivery 
from the last carrier as the holder must present a bill of lading 
(1) John DeGurse "The Container Clause" in Article 4(5) of the 1968 
Protocol to the Hague Rules" J*X*L*Co at pe 133-135 v2, Noel 
Oct - 70- 
(2) 34 DeOrchis "The Container and-the Package Limitation" at P-951 
v5, X*2 Jan-74- 
(3) Ante at p. 91 7. 
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issued by that last carriero 
As far as the negotiability of the bill of lading is concerned, 
some of the maritime transport companies have started using a 
computer in issuing the bill of lading 
[Atlantic Container Line Mý]*. 
This type of bill of lading cannot be considered as a negotiable document 
unless it makes the goods deliverable to a named person or order or to 
a bearer or to a name left blank* 
It is obvious now that the practice of container traffic does not 
comply with the classic rules of bills of lading which satisfy the 
interests of all of the participants in the transaction. 
** 
The great difficulty with container traffic is its inability to 
accommodate a document such as the ocean bill of lading. Because 
the goods are placed in a box at the point of origin, never to be 
seen again until'they are unpacked at the final point of destination, 
and moreover, since the container more likely than not is to be 
stowed on rather than under deck, it is virtually impossible to 
obtain either an "on board" or a "clean" bill of lading from the 
Article 14-3 of UNCIMAL has recognised the use of mechanical or 
electronic means as a method of signing the bill of lading. it 
states: "The signature on the bill of lading may be in handwriting, 
printed in facsimile, perforated, stamped, in symbols, or made by 
any other mechanical or electronic meanst if-not inconsistent with 
the law of the country where the bill of lading is issued. t, 
**The seller relies on it to show that he has complied with his 
0,1, ro contract and that the goods have been delivered to the 
ocean carrier in apparent good Order and conditioný the banker, 
-to obtain security for any money advanced 6n the goods-, the 
buyer, to obtain possession at destination-, the insurert to 
claim whatever benefits are available under the contract of 
carriage after satisfying any claims which he has underwrittenj 
and the carrier, to protect himself against any unfomAed claims 
by relying On the terms stated therein or demarAing-i-ts *jrrender 
prior to release of the goods* 
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shipowner in respect of the package in question@ In other wordst 
where the consignment consists of less than an entire container 
load, the shipper will not be able to receive a satisfactory bill 
of lading wherein the ship(nmer acknowledges receipt of his 
individual pack-age in apparent good order and condition undertaking 
to carry it under deck, and any other document will not satisfy his 
obligations under a CeI. F., contract. As stated by Sohmitthoff: 
"The seller of one of the packages included in the container cannot 
tender the buyer a bill of lading relating to that package, and, if 
the contract is a C. I*P* contractf thereby perform his contract* 
Moreover, the seller cannot retain his property in the package by 
retaining the bill of ladinge., *"(') 
A solution to the problem is desparately needed* Thus many 
efforts have been made to solve this problem: 
I Professor David 14 Sassoon 
(2) 
after stating the difficulties, said: 
"What then is the remedy, and what is required to take advantage 
of the container revolution?. A Rartiki, aw1wer would e- to shift 
the point-of deliv= under the contract of sale from the 13ort 
of shipment- to the -point of 
final destArwtion - in other words, 
to replace the traditional pattern of international trade by 
moving from "shipment" to "destination" terms. Th-ael it is 
quite possible that one of the flirst felt effects of the 
container revolution will be in this field and that "free 
delivered" or "ex terminal point" transactions will begin 
(1) David Sassoon "Trade Terms and the Container Revolutim" 
1969f jourral of mari+ Jae Law & ýCommeroe Vol*l I WOO octoberp 
pp. 81.. 82 
(2) hi& pp- 8241o 
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replacing the traditional FeO*Bo. and C, I,, F, terms, 
This solution, as Professor Sassoon stated, would satisfy the 
buyer, since he would not assume any risk for the goods until the 
container was unpacked and inspection of their condition at 
destination was possible. Bat it would not alleviate the problems 
of the other interests involved. 
In particular, the seller and banker would still be exposed and 
forced to face the difficulty of establishing the locus of liability 
andl lacking such a determination, the marine underwriter would not 
be boundo Facing this uncertainty, they would not feel secure in 
relying on a container-through bill of lading which (craite apart 
from the problems of its negotiablility or title attributes or the 
lack thereof) applied different limits of liability to the various 
segments of a multi-segment international shipment* This is 
provided for in most through bills of lading under which container 
business is presently conducted, sometimesbeing coupled with a 
Presumption that if it cannot be established in whose custody the 
goods were when loss or damage occurred,, it shall be presumed to have 
occurred during the sea voyage, But to what avail? Surely such a 
fiction is useless unless the marine underwriter agrees to be bound 
by it and also to undertake the risk of any "on dock" stowage. 
Howeverg this solution does not, seem to solve the problem properly* 
Another effort was made in "Draft Convention ott the International 
Combined Transport of Goods"(TeCoN. Convention) Geneve 1972p ty 
establishing a "combined Transport Operator - C. T. O. 
(1) Article 1-4(b) 
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undertakes to perform, or in his own name to procure the 
performance of the entire transport from the place at which 
the goods are taken in charge to the place designated for 
delivery in the C*T, Documentt * including all services which 
are necessary to such transport throughout the whole of the 
time that the goods are taken in charge nntil the moment of 
their delivery, 
(') 
"and he ECT9 11 . shall be responsible for 
the acts and omissions of any person of whose services he 
makes use for the performance of the contract evidenced by the 
C*T* Document". 
(2) 
In order to perform his part the C*T*O* issues a C*T* Document 
when he receives the goods* 
C*T* Document means a document bearing either the heading 
1%egotiable Combined Transport Document governed by the T*C*Mo 
convention" or wHork-Negotiable Combined Transport Document governed 
by the T9C*M* Convention! ' and evidencing a contract for the carriage 
of goods by at least two different modes of transport I such as 
transport by seaq inland waterway, air, rail or road, provided that 
the place at which the goods are taken in charge and the place 
designated for delivery are situated in two states. 
Data recorded by a computer or other electronic or antomatic 
data processing systems are equivalent pari passu to the document 
referred to in the paragraphs above*(3) 
* Combined Transport Document see p. 
(I)Artiole 2-1(a)e 
(2)Artiole 2-2, 
WArtiole 1.2* 
Where the CeTe Document is issued in negotiable form: 
(a) it shall be made out to order or to bearer; 
(b) if made out to order, it shall be transferrable by endorsement; 
(0) it shall indicate the number of originals Lssued; 
(d) each copy shall be marked IrNon-negotiable copy"I 
(e) delivery of the goods may be demanded only from the C*T,, Oo 
or his representative and against surrender of CT# Documento 
Therefore the CoToO. undertakes to perform all necessary acts to 
ensure delivery to the person designated in the CoTe Document or to 
the bearer of that document, duly endorsed as appropriate*" 
(2) 
A CoTo Document may contain such particulars as the parties 
agreeo 
(3) 
If the C*T* Document contains particulars concerning the 
description, marks, number, quantity or weight of the goods which 
the C*ToOo has reasonable grounds for suspecting not to represent 
accurately the goods actually recbivedg or which he has no reasonable 
means of checking, the C*T*O* shall be entitled to enter his 
reservations in the CeTe Documente 
(4) 
The C*T* Document shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt 
by the C*T*O* of the goods as therein described in conformity with 
Article 3* 
(5) 
(1) Article 6-1. 
(2) Article 2-1(c)* 
(3) Article 3-1- 
(4) Article 3-2- 
(5) Article 5-1. 
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However, proof to the contrary shall not 'be admissible when 
the CeTo Document is negotiable and has been transferred to a 
third party acting in good faith. 
(') 
The idea presented by (T*C*Mo Convention) sounds attractive 
as it seems a good solution to the problemo On the other hand, 
this idea was rejected by the developing countries on the grounds 
that C*Te Operator might monopolize the maritime transport industryl 
which leads to a total destruction of the small commercial fleets 
belonging to those countries* 
The developing countries were right to fear such a body as the 
ToCeMo Convention did not illustrate the structure of that 'body. 
Therefore this fear could be negatived by building up the structure 
of that body in such a way as to prevent the big companies from 
monopolizing the maritime transport. This could happen. by estab3ishing 
an international organization, which must have branches all over the 
worldg undertakes to arrange the maritime transport through its 
memberso The members must be all the transport companies in the 
. worldo 
Therefore if A in Glasgow wants to get certain goods 
transported to B in Baghdad, he should first go to the branch of that 
organization in Glasgow, The organization, theng arranges for 
transporting the goods through its members by contracting with any 
shipping company and Iraqi rail. And when that is complete the 
organizationg after receiving the goods, issues a bill of transport 
stating the description of the goods, the companies involved in: Ahe 
transport operationLI the approximate time of the arrival of the 
(1) Article 5-2, 
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goods to their destination, the conditions of the contracts of 
carriagel and many other things which the parties agreed upone 
This bill should be given to the seller who in turn endorses it 
to the buyer. The holder of that bill is entitled to claim delivery 
of the goods from the branch of that organization in Baghdad. 
This arrangement means: 
1- The seller and the buyer deal directly with the international 
organization as well as the carriers. In other words, there 
no 
will be direct dealing between the seller and the buyer on one 
hand and the carriers on another. Therefore the organization 
as an intermediate body undertakes to arrange and facilitate 
the transporting of the goods. 
2- The bill of transport acquires the same characteristics as the 
bill of lading: 
A. It represents the goods, as their description stated in the bill: 
When the representative of the organization receives the goods, 
he obviously knows the nature and the apparent order and 
condition of those goods, and, therefore he is bound to state 
the description of the goods in the bill of transport, 
* 
Practically speaking, the representative may issueg when he 
receives the goods, a preliminary receipt stating the fact that 
certain goods (nature and apparent order and condition) have 
been delivered to him by - to be transported to 0 
And when he completes contracting with the transport companies 
I assume that the container is owned by the organization, and the 
goods have to be packed in the container by the representativel 
and. then the container in to be delivered *, a -the carrier* 
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and packing the goods properly, he then issues the bill of 
transport stating all the necessary terms required in that 
bill. This practice will defeat that one of "said to contain"* 
Moreover the fact that the goods have to be transported by 
different carriers, does not affect the bill of transport as 
a document of title representing the possession of the goods 
because it is issued, not by an individual carrier, but by the 
organization which controlsl not one part of the journey, but 
the whole of it. 
Bo It entitles the holder to claim delivery of the goods from the 
representative: 
Since there is no direct dealing between the seller-buyer and the 
carrier, the holder of the bill of transport will be entitled to 
claim delivery of the goods stated in the bill from the 
representative of the organization at the place of destination* 
The organization shall be liable, before the holderl for any 
loss or damages caused to the goods* At the same time the 
carrier shall be 1*4ble, before the organizations for any lose; 
or dam s caused to the goods by his action. In this respectl 
it must be mentioned that the limitation of the carrier's 
liability is beyond the scope of this research* 
0. It is - to a certain extent - negotiable by making the goods 
deliverable to bearer, or to a named consignee "or order or 
assignee"jor to "order or assigns". 
The results of establishing an international orgudsation 
will be: 
Replacing the bill of lading by the bill of tranpyort Web 
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aegairee the same characteristics as the bill of lading. 
2- Solving the problem of combined transport operation in such 
a way as to make the bill of transport unaffected by the 
number of carriers* 
3- Accepting the modern technology and practice "container" 
which is very necessary for human progress, 
4- Preventing the big companies from monopolizing the maritime 
transport industry by arranging the transport between all the 
companies involved. 
The idea of establishing an international organization is 
different from that one presented in (T*CoM* Convention) in 
two ways: 
1- The structure of this oragnization is devised so as to prevent 
the big companies monopolizing the transport industry, whereas 
the C*T*Oeg presented by TeCeMe Convention might lead to that 
2- The organization has more power than the C*T*Ool by which the 
modern technology and practice is accepted and the small fleets 
are protected* Moreover, this organization is different from 
the . "Freight Forwarder" as the latter cannot really issue ary 
document of title, he is merely the agent of his client, and 
not the agent of the carrier or one himself. 
Finallyl the possibility of establishing an international 
organization which undertakes to arrange the combined -transport 
operation and to accept the modern practicel cannot be realised 
"freight Forwarders" by D*Je Hill, London 1972, at p* 185. 
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unless it is approved by an international conference at which 
all the parties concerned 11carriersv shipperst bankers, etc*" 
should participate. Therefore we would like to call an 
international conference to adopt the idea of establishing an 
international organization taking into consideration the 
classic rules of bills of lading and modern technology and 
practice, seeking the interests of all the parties concerned 
in the transport world. As a matter of factt that conference 
could also amend the T*C. M* Convention in such a way to avoid 
the negative results which might occur by establishing CeT, O* 
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SECTION 1 
PASSING OF PROPERTY IN C. T. F, AND F*O*B, CONTRACTS 
'UNDER OLD SCOTS LAW 
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I The General Rule: 
The property of the object sold was not considered by the law 
of Scotland - before Ist January 1894 - to have passed to the buyer 
by the completion of the agreement, and, till delivery, it continued 
to be attachable by the creditors-of the sellers(') It was said: 
(2) 
"The principle of the law of Scotland as to the contract of sale 
admits of no doubt, vize that while the obligations of the contract 
are constituted by consent alone, yet if delivery is to be made at 
a future period the property is not transferredq but remains with 
the seller until delivery, This is the leading principle of our 
lawt as it was of the civil law and of the general jurisprudence 
originally of Europe. " 
Therefore, it was not within the power of the contracting 
Parties to transfer the property before deliverye 
The reason behind that rule was that the concept of "property 
imported"dominiumt - the entire and exclusive dominoin over the 
thing spoken of - the proprietor being the dominust and having the 
sole disposal of it Therefore the term "property" was usedl in 
Sootlandq in one uniform and unvaried sense, importing the right of 
exclusive Possession and uncontrolled disposal. 
(1) Je Lorimer, A. Ehnd Book of the Law of Scotland, 6th edo, 
Elinbargh 1894.,, at p*24-7., 
(2) Per Lord JustIce Clerk In Boak Ze ftget Rose Leading Cases* 
V ý11 at P. 554* ol. 
(3) Bell, Comm. Voll at p* 177- 
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Exception 
As a matter of fact, it was open to the parties, by selling 
under a suspensive conditiong to reserve to the seller the property 
in the thing even after it had been delivered*(') 
Effect of paymeyrt 
It can be inferred from the general rule, above mentioned, 
that the payment or nonpayment of the price has nothing to do with 
tradition as the criterion of the transference of the property, 
though, of course, it is essential in question as to stoppage. Thus 
Lord Stair stated: "Sale being perfected, and the thing delivered, 
the property therefore becomes the buyer's, if it was the sellerta, 
and there is no dependence of it till the price*be paid or secured, 
as was in the civil law, neither hypothecation of it for the pricee 
(2) 
Effect of appropriation 
The effect of an appropriation and acceptance by the contracting 
parties is to- perfect the contract of salel and to give the 
parchaser a personal right to demand delivery of the goods from the 
sellere 
(3) 
01 macartney v. Macredists Crokitors W99 No Appe Sale No. 2 
)krdoQh v.. Creig (1889) 1.6 R-396, * 
(2) Xp. Brom "rrestise on the. law of salt" F41nbmr*i 1621 at p. 394* 
(3) Hansen ve CMI-9 (1659) 21 D 4% 
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The Concept of DeliveT7: 
Since the property passed, in Scots law, to the buyer by 
delivery, it is necessary to understand the concept of delivery 
as a criterion of passing the property and how it worked before 
1st January 1894- In this respect, it can be said that there were 
two concepts of delivery striving for mastery in the old Soots law. 
The first one had a wide meaning declared by Professor Bell, 
O) 
and 
a few other judges in different cases. 
(2 ) 
The second one had a 
narrower meaning established by the judiciary* In between those 
two attitudes, the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Acts 1856 
came to solve the problem. These matters are discussed in the 
following paragraphs: 
1. Bells- Conenti 
Professor Bellq in explaining his attitude, concentrated on the 
distinction between actual delivery and constructive deliveryq and 
paid most attention to the case of constructive delivery* His 
attitude can be illustrated as followst 
A. Actual deliveryt 
0 
. xemplified in purchasing a book in a shops The simple act is e 
(1) Principles of the law of Scotland Val*II at pp. 204-214- 
Commentaries on the law of Scotland Volel at PP-176-Me di I A- 
(2) In Gibson v. Forbes 1833)11,3; A6illY five Judges out of 
thirteen agreed with this ooncept, 
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and bringing it away; delivery into the buyerfs cart, or 
warehouse, or shop, delivery into the buyerts ship, or into 
a ship hired on times and entirely at his command; delivery 
into a bonded warehouse for the buyer, and at his own risk; - 
delivery into the warehouse of a public warehouseman, used by 
the buyer as his own, or to a carrierts warehouse to be there 
at the buyerts order; delivery of the key of a warehouse or 
cellar in which the goods are placed; delivery to a third 
person (servantj clerk, wharfinger) for behoof of the buyer, 
and to abide the buyerfs orders for their future destiny, is 
a complete delivery to all purposes. 
In all these examples the delivery is held to be actual and 
completes effectually to transfer the property beyond recall 
or Stoppage. 
0) 
Be Construotive delivery: 
This kind of delivery may Ibe effected in many other wa I ý ye 
I- Where standing trees are bought they cannot be instantly out 
down and removedl and -the pracYtice jig to mark them for the 
buyer* Such marking is good construotive deliveryo(2) 
2- In the imae of cattle, the practice to extremely common to 
mark them with the buyer"s markq and leave them for gralging 
Where the commodity is not a single article, but, like a cargo 
of graing requir66 repeated acts, "azA a long protracted course 
of deliveryq circumstances may fall out so critically an to 
make it of importance to draw the line between what is actually 
delivered and what $p, aot yet delivered* In such a oaseq even 
where the price has been paid, -the delivery cannot on strict 
principle be held complete, so as to prevent the oreditorB Of 
thp seller, from taking the undelivered part, leaving the boyer 
to claim a dividend on the price* 
B611, comm, VoLl at p*183. 
(1) Bell, Prin. Vol-II at PAW* 
Wi. comm. Vol. i. pp. 183-184-185-186-2i6. 
(2) Bell, Com. Vol, I at P*187@, 
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in the enclosure of the seller, the buyer paying rente 
This seems to be effectual delivery. 
0) 
In selling a farm-stock of sheep, it is often difficult to 
deliver them to the buyer, for they are scattered over many 
miles of pasture hills, and cannot be collected, The 
delivery is in parcels; the shepherd alone knows when they 
have gone through the whole; and the sheep cannot 
advantageously be removed from their native farm. Usage 
seems to give the only rule where the question turns on 
the completion of the transit, 
(2) 
Whatever changes the custodyq and makes him who originally 
held for the seller continue his possession for the buyer, 
alters the property as effectually as it eouldbe altered 
by actual delivery. The change of custody may be proved in 
many wayst as by a notice to the oustodierg a transfer in 
the book, and acceptance of the order by the custodier 
(intimating a delivery order to a third party) . 
0) 
5- Where goods already in the hands of a manufacturer are sold, 
and notice of sale givent with an order of delivery addressed 
to the manufacturer, he will be heldl like any other oustodier 
as the servant of the vandeeg to hold the goods for the 
lmyero(4) 
(1) Bell Com- Vol-1- at P-187- 
(2)Bell Comm. Volal at P*187- 
(3) Ibid pp-194-195a 
(4) Tbid at P-197 
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It should be mentioned that where anything remains to be 
done by the sellers in the way of ascertaining the price or 
quantity of the commodity sold, or in order to put it in a 
deliverable state, the transfer is not completed by a delivery 
note given to the buyer, addressed to the keeper of the goods, 
with notice to the custodier, or even by a transfer in the custodierts 
'books, Till the commodity is weighed, or till the other act, 
whatever it may be, shall be performed, which remains to be done in 
order to put the commodity in a deliverable state, the property. is 
not transferred. 
(1) 
Notes on Bellts Concept: 
It is obvious that most attention is paid by Bell to the case of 
constructive deliveryl that Isq delivery which takes the form of an 
order to'a third party to hold for the transferee instead of for the 
transferore This means: 
I- The meaning of delivery, in Bell's concept, is based on the idea 
of "control" as a criterion to pass the property* The delivery 
which passes the property to the buyer can be defined as follows: 
Transfer of possession by which the commodity is placed in the 
power of the buyer, and beyond the power of the seller, provided 
this be done either at the sellerts instance or with his consent* 
2- This seems a developmerA of the principle implicit in D-46.3*799 
that there is delivery by jiving instructions which put the 
thing out of the control of the present Possessor and into -the 
(1) Bell, Comm. Vol-I at P097, 
Constructive delivery is mentioned also in 
Bell, Prin. V61911 at p*808. 
control of the acquirerP) 
This concept of delivery is quite similar to that of the 
Rrench Civil Code. This similarity can be shown by stating 
the Arts concerning "la delivranoell in the Mrench Civil Codes 
Art, 1604: 
If "La delivrance est le transport de la chose vendre en la 
puissance et possession de ltacheteur,. " 
'Melivery is the transfer of the thing sold into the power 
and possession of the buyero" 
Art. 1605: 
"Llobligation. de deliver les immeubles est remplie de la part 
du vendeur lorequtil. a remis lee clefs, stil stagt d'un 
A* it batiment, ou lorsqnlil a remis lee titres de propriefte* 
The seller has perfomrd his duty to deliver immovable property 
when he has surrendered the keys, if a building is in question, 
or when he has surrendered the documents of title* 
Art, 1606: 
'o, 
A 
"La delivranoe dets effets mobiliers slopere: 
on par la, tradition reellet 
ou par la remise des clefs des batiments qui lee contiennentv 
A 
ou meme par le seul oonsentemeýt des parties, si le transport 
no peut pas slen faire au moment de la Vente, ou si Ifachete= 
les avait deja en son pouvoir a un autre titre, " 
Delivery of m(weables is affectede. 
either by actual handing over, 
Gordon at p, 2179 ' 
-ii 8-. 
or by surrender of the keys of the buildings containing the 
thingsp 
or by mere agreement of the parties, where transportation of 
the things is impracticable at the moment of sale, or where 
the buyer already had the things under his power. by another 
title, 
Art. 16o7-. 
'Ila tradition des droits incorparels se faitl ou par lalremise 
des titres, ou par llusage cpxe l9acquereur en fait du 
consentemerrt clu vendeuroft 
Delivery of incorporeal rights is affected either by s=ender 
of the documents of title, or by the buyer making use of the 
rights with the sellerts oonsent*- 
Thereforeq it might be suggested that Professor Bell tri*d'tO 
LOO SOOts, I&W as usarlY &B P"Sttl* in line vith the'Wenah 
Civil Cod*, 'Imit- he 440sified, the delivery tof the keýrý-ao actual 
delivery,, whereas it, is "-, 'n6t - olassified, as such, ill 11'rewh civil 
CCKI9*- In other W02de, he t'rJ4-jo i#fo' an infamil 
to scois low, 
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2. The Judicial Concep_t: 
In the light of this concept, it is not enoughq in tranferring 
moveables, to give symbolical delivery, or delivery by an instrument 
of possessiono If the things themselves remain in possession of the 
person transferring the instrument will avail nothing. This concept 
is fully discussed in Boak ve Megget(l) when Lord J*C* Hope stated: 
(2) 
"I allude to the security of parties dealing onerously with the 
ostensible owner in cases where the property has not been transferred 
by actual delivery. This is really the main benefit of the rule of 
our law, which you cannot consistently obtaing without of course 
adopting the principle, that although the obligation of the contract 
of sale is perfected by consent, yet delivery is necessary to transfer 
the property* **. it is important to remember that constructive 
delivery, when possession remains with the seller, is in the general 
case wholly unavailing. It is not enough to say that such and such 
circumstances amount to constructive delivery as between seller and 
buyer, Against third parties and creditors, constructive delivery 
is in the abstract of no effect at all in law. And in the limited 
class of cases in which the property has not actually 'been removed 
from the sellert yet the article deemed to belong to another, the 
delivery was truly not held-tobe constructive merelyt but to I)a 
complete, and the separation of the property effectually made according 
to the nature of the case, so as to avoid false credit to the seller 
(1) (1844) Ross ) Leading Cases V61.11 pp. 547-567-, 
(2) lbid at PP-554-560* 
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from possession, 
The exceptions from the general rule are of this class - viz, 
cases where the possession of the party is not really looked to, 
in the usage and from the nature of his trade, as necessarily 
proving that the stock apparently on hand is his, and not considered as 
creating such a presumption in the'lactual business of that trade* 
Por instance, goods in a printfield, a ship in the building dock, 
goods in working artificers, or even grain in a granary, if the 
granary is what is aelled a public store or warehouse, the mere 
possession in these cases, from the nature of the tradep does not 
necessarily import or impress the public with the conviction that 
the stock is all the property of the party in whose hands the 
articles are* 
When it is said that the cases are illustrations of the effect 
of constructive delivery, I think the use of this term somewhat 
misleads the mind, and directs attention from the true state of the 
facts* In these cases, I think'the pri, nciple really at the 
foundation of the exceptions is as I have stated, viz. that the 
possession does not, in the particular and notorious facts of the 
trades and in the opinion of the public, and of creditors who are 
to be protectedg import that the goods or stock are really the 
property of the party in whose harAs they are seen; and therefOre,, 
that to exclude proof of the actual fact, would give the publio & 
benefit Whicht in dealing with the party, they did not truly believe 
they We 
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In many oasesq entries in the books can be of no avail, and 
it'is unnecessary for the decision of the present case to say 
whether entries in the tannerts books would have been sufficient to 
protect the purchaser. An entry in books, in most cases, really is 
no proof of delivery of any kind, constructive of symbolical. It 
chiefly goes to make the evidence of the sale more patent. And if 
a party has reason to know that the actual possession, in the 
particular trade, does not import property in the ostensible owner, 
and is called on to inquire before he gives credit, as in the case of 
a printfield, then the entry in the books is to be taken as such 
evidence of sale as avoids false credit. It seems to me to bear 
little on the point of delivery. " 
In the light of this concept the followin g cases were decided: 
Broughton v. AiitchjEon 15th Nov. 1809*(') 
In this case a quantity of wheat, of which the price had been paidt 
was allowed to remain in therepositories of the vendort bat this 
wheat, upon the vendorts bankruptcy, was held by the majority of the 
Court to have been so far delivered to the purchaser by an order of 
delivery upon the vendorts servant, that he was hold entitled to 
enforce the delivery against the vendor"s other creditors, Bat 
this judgment was strongly opposed by Lord President Blair, who held 
it to be clear law that, though the price had been paid, yet, as 
the goods had been allowed to remain in the possession of the, vendor 
at the time of his bankruptcy, the purchaser was merely 4 personal 
creditor for the value of these goodso 
(1) Rosis 'r Leading Cases Vol-11 pp. 486-498. 
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In the course of his judgment, he said: 
(') 
in the prenent case, the wheat was not in the hands of a 
consignee, or depository or third party. It was in the actual and 
natural possession of the sellers; in their own lofts, or in lofts 
rented by them, which was the same thing* This could hot be called 
constructive or civil possession. It war. as clear, absolute, 
unequivocal, and actual possession, as could be had, without holding 
it themselves, or putting it in their pockets. It was the same 
possession which every man had of the furniture in his house, and 
every tradesman of the goods in his shop. It was the only possession 
which merchants could have of the immense subjects of commerce. That- 
in the present case, this possession never was transferredv and no 
ostensible change of possession ever was accomplished., " 
Gibson v, Forbes 9th July, 1833. 
(2) 
In this case, a pipe of port wine having been purchsed-and paid for, 
had been bottled and placed in one of the vendor's binns for the 
behoof of the purchaser, and one question, which was much agitated in 
this case, was whether, as the wine had been laid aside in the binn, 
and marked as the property of the purchaser, it was to be held as so 
far delivered to him that he could claim this wine in a question with 
the veiAor's other creditors? Bat though that question was fully 
discussedl it did not properly arise in this easel because the wine 
had been taken out of the vendorts cellars, and act-dally delivered 
into those of the purchaser several days before the bankruptcyo It 
was maintained that this operated as a preference in favour of the 
(1), rbib at P! 1.4,96. (2), Ross. "Apeading C&GeS Vol-11 pp*320-547. 
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purchaser, and fell within the provisions of the Act 1696, the 
delivery having taken place within sixty days of the bankruptcy* 
Put the plain answer to this was, that the wine was not delivered 
in security or satisfaction of any other debt, to which alone the 
Act 1696 applies, but merely in fulfilment and discharge of the 
original contract of sale, If it. had been delivered the day before 
the bankruptcy, it is difficult to see how that proper discharge 
of the obligation incumbent on the vendor couldv by any construction 
of the Act 1696, have fallen either within its letter or spirit* 
It was like a payment in money of a debt actually due, which does 
not fall within the purview of this statute. The decisiong therefore? 
determines nothing as to the right of a purchaser to claim deliveryl 
after the bankruptcy of the vendor, of goods which. have bean allowed 
to remain possession. 
* 
Notes on the Judicial concevtt 
It can be inferred now, that this concept is based on the rule 
of law that in the case of corporeal moveables possession creates a 
presumption of ownership, 
(') 
and the test of passing the property is 
the knowledge of the third party, 
(2) 
whether it isq or ought to be, 
clear to third parties that there has been a change of ownership, 
despite the fact that there is no change in the physical situation 
of the goods* 
(3) 
See also Lang v. Bruce July 7,1832. 
RoselLeading Cases vol, ri PP-498-590. 
(I)Gordont "Studies in the Transfer of Property by TjvAjtjw, jý, * 218 
(2)", ** on what third parties might agoertai n" Per Lord J*Ce in Boak ve-Megget (suPra) at P- 558* 
(3)Gordon, at p*218* 
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The meaning of delivery, in this concept , which passes the 
property to the buyer can be defined as follows: 
"Transfer of possession by which the third party knows that the 
ownership passes to a new person. " 
On this ground the intimation of a delivery order to the 
custodier of goods sold when in the hands of a third party, is 
recognised in Soots law as superseding the'necessity of an actual 
delivery to the vendee. In other words, constructive delivery, by 
means of delivery order, can only take place where there are three 
independent persons - the vendor, the vendee, and the custodier of 
the goods; and if the custodier of the goods Jr. identified with the 
vendor, e. g. if he is the keeper of a warehouse belonging to the 
vendorg in which goods are stored belonging to the vendor and to' 
others, there is no independent third person who can becomeq on 
intimation of the delivery ordert oustodier for the vendee. 
(1) 
Consequences of the judicial approach: * 
The most important practical results of the general rule that 
the propertfin the goods sold could not pass until they were 
delivereilýwere the followings 
(a) Tn the event of the bankruptcy of the seller before delivery 
the buyers though he might have paid the price, could not obtain 
(1) Wie v. MagKinja Ross'OLeading Cases Vol-11 PP-568-575- 
Anderson ve 14--Call , 
i866v 4 X- 765- 
Mathison v. Alison 1854t. 17 D. 274- 
This paragraph in cited from the book "Introduction to the 
Law of Scotland" b. v Gloag and Henderson. 6th ed.. at P. 159* 
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the article sold. It was still the property of the sellert 
and passed, with the rest of his propertyg to the trustee in 
his sequestration. The buyer had merely a claim for damages 
for the non-fulfilment of the contract, his right being to rank 
for a dividend on that claim with the other personal creditors of 
the seller. 
(') 
(b) The seller, being still undivested owner, could, in a question 
with the purchaser or in his bankruptcy, retain the thing sold 
in security of any debt which might be due to him by the 
purchaser. 
(2) 
(0) The seller had a similar right in a question with a sub-purchaser. 
He was still the owner of the goods, the sub-purchaser had merely 
a personiLl right to delivery, and that personal right was postponed 
to the sellerts right to retain his position as owner, and 
therefore to withhold delivery of the goodeq until he had received 
payment, not only of the pricat(3) butýof any general balance 
which might be due to him by the original purchaser., 
(4) 
These results can be criticised as followss 
I. They are inconsistent with the principle "protection of property", 
According to this principle the property passes to the buyer as 
soon as the seller makes sure that he will receive the right price, 
and the buyer makes sure that he will receive the right, goods 
(in conformity with the contract description) regardless of . 
payment of the price or delivery of the goods, Therefere the 
(1) Mathison vO Alison (1854) 17 D. 2749 
(2) ýUer ve HaWeX, (1861) 23 D. 606o 
(3) NcEwan v. Smith (1849) 6 Bellts APP- 340o 
(4) Wslrciiie v, Hastle (1851) 13 D. 880j, 
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results of the judicial concept of transfer seem to be 
inconsistent with equity,, 
2- This attitude is impractical* The modern practice of trade 
provides certain modes of dealings by which the property must 
be recognised as passed to the buyer although the goods remain 
in the possession of the sellerg e. g. notice in the book and 
so on* 
Mercantile IAw Amendment Act, 1856. 
We have seen that 11traditio" is seen as involving a physical delivery 
and obvious change of possession, so that possession and ownership 
coincide. Thus in the conflict between the rule that possession 
presumes property and the refined forms of traditiol it is scarcely 
surprising that decisions favouring the conjunction of property and 
possession should result, especially when the circumstances are such 
that it is difficult for third parties to tell whether possession is 
held as owner or on a "subordinate title"*(') 
This Mercantile Law Amendment Act introduced an important 
qualification of the doctrine of delivery which was clearly settled 
in the law of Sootland and inconsistent with eqaityo 
Section 1 provides: 
"From and after the passing of this Act, where goods have been sold, 
but the same have not been delivered to the purchaser, and have been 
allowed to remain in the custody of the seller, it shall not be 
competent for any creditor of such seller, after the date of such 
sale, to attach such gpods as belonging to the seller'by any diligence 
(i) Gordon, at po 220* 
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or process of law, including sequestration, to the effect of 
preventing the purchaser or others in his right from enforcing 
delivery of the same; and the right of the purchaser to demand 
delivery of such goods shall from and after the date of such sale 
be attachable by or transferable to the creditors of the purchaser. " 
It had been said that the rule of the common lawl that the 
undelivered Goods remain the property of the seller, is not altered 
by this section. Its effect is only to exclude the diligence of the 
seller's creditors in competition with the buyer enforcing his 
contract; and being intended to assimilate the law to that of 
England, it applies only to the sale of a definite existing article 
or quantity of goods (bargain and sale), and not to an executory 
agreement, for a salee(l) 
(1) Bell Prince by We Gathrie Vol. 11 gth ed. pp. 805-806, 
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1IIIj Passing-of Property in CeleFe and FoOeBe Cortracts 
In Scotland, as we have seeni no property passed to the buyerg 
before 1ste Jano 1894, by the mere contract or by appropriation 
without delivery as a result of following the Roman Lawo 
How was this applied on matters involving sea transport? 
In order to have a good answer, a distinct-ion must be made between 
two cases: 
1- Where the goods are represented by bill of ladingt 
2- Where the goods are not represented by bill of ladinge 
Where the goods are represented by a bill of lading* 
Boots law went beyond the old civil rule in recognising a true 
symbolical delivery In the case of bills of lading, delivery bf which 
is equivalent to delivery of goods, and in the more complete 
development of the so-called constructive deliverys. Bille of lading 
are the only examples of "traditio instrumentorue having the effect 
of transfer of property by common law. 
(') 
In 17659 Dunlopq in Virginia, consigned some tobacco to Hastie 
and Jamieson, the proceeds to be applied in payment of the price of 
goods which Dunlop had received from theme This bill of lading, was' 
to R. & Jo and their assigns. The ship arrived, and the cargo was 
arrested by a creditor of Dunlopq the oonsignor. The consignees 
pleaded that the property was-transferredl and founded on, the 
mercantile practioe of Holland, Britain andl America. The Lord 
(1) Gordon, at p, 2159 
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Ordinary and the Court of Session found, 'That there appears no 
sufficient evidence that the said Archibald Dunlop was divested 
of the property of the cargo in favour of Hastie & Jainieson, and 
consequently that the same was liable to be affected by the 
diligence of his creditors. ' Bat in the House of Lords the 
judgment was reversed, and it was declared that the appellants 
Hastie and Jamieson have a special property in the cargo, preferable 
to the respondentts arrestments, 
(1) 
In another case, 
(2) 
Monteith was consignee of a parcel of sugars, 
and had a blank endorsed bill of lading. He sold the goods to Bogle 
while they lay on board in the harbour of Greenockl and gave over to 
him the bill of lading blank endorsed* Bogle gave an obligation to 
Dunmore & Co., the shipowners, for payment of the-freight; and 
Monteith having become bankrupt, Dunmore & Co., as creditors of 
Monteith on-another accountq unshipped the goods, put them into their 
own warehouset azA refused to deliver them up till Ibnteithts debt 
was paid* There were two TLestions: t. wherthert supposing the 
property not to be transferred to Bogle by the transference of the 
bill of ladingg Dunmore & Co. could claim a lion or retention for a 
former debt? And 2. whether there was a transference of the property 
or not? "A majority of the Court was of the opinion that the proper 
possession of the goods was held. 9 not by -the shipmaster or owner, 
but througb them by the shipperv and then by the endorsee to the 
bill of lading animo; delivery of possession being, made in an 
(1) hClburxo Hastie Nor- 14209oloss I Leading Cases vol, 11 pp. 580.. 5829 
(2) Bor-le v* ore & So* Nor- 14216, Ross-vLeading Cases Vol&27 
PP*562--555- 
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effectual manner, and such alone as the case was capable of and 
therefore they sustained Boglets claim for the goods as legally 
transferred to him. " 
Therefore the property in the goodsq represented by a 'bill of 
lading is transferred by endorsing and sending the bill of lading 
to the buyer (or his agent) even if the seller has taken the bill 
of lading in the name of the buyer or his agent at the time of 
shipment. 
Professor Bell said: 
(') 
"Where the goods are delivered to the shipmaster of a general ship, 
on a bill of lading taken in name of the seller or consignor, and 
afterwards endorsed to the biiver; or on a bill of lading to the 
bearer, which is afterwards delivered to the ; or on a bill of, 
lading to the buyer by-namev the goods are effectually delivered to 
pass the property*" 
It can be inferred from the phrase or on a bill of lading 
to the buyer by name" that the property in the goods, represented 
by a Dill of lading, passes to the buyer on shipment if the seller 
has taken the bill of lading in the name of the buyer at the time 
of shipment, 6n the ground that Professor Bell did not add "and 
afterwards delivered to the buyer" after the above mentioned phrases 
I do not agree with this interpretation, as it is not in harmony 
with the basic principles of Scats law, This is demonstrated by the 
fact that the property in the goods passes to the buyer by deliveryt 
since the bill'of lading reprosýs the possession of the goqdvV-A3A 
(1) Bell Com. Volel pp. 219-2209 
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therefore the property passes to the buyer by the bill of lading 
being endorsed and delivered to him as a result of passing the 
possession, whether or not that bill of lading has been taken 
originally in the name of the buyer or in the name of the seller*(I) 
Bill of Ladi-nr,, and Bulk Shiýment 
By the Roman Law, when the thing sold was a commodity which is 
usually sold by weight, number, or measure, and when the sale was 
made with reference to the weight, ruzbert or measurementj and not 
of the commodity in the mass, or per aversionemp the contract was 
not perfected until the operation of weighingg countingg or measuring 
was performede 
(2) 
With regard to the law of Scotland upon this mat-ter, said Brown 
(3) 
I am not aware that the rule of the Roman Law above quoted has ever 
been adopted into our lawl and there in yet no au-thori-ty'for holding 
the rules established In the English oases to be applied heree 
The question being thus open, it may be mentioned that in the 
modern law of FTance, a middle oourse has been followed, and the 
rule isq "Lorsque des marchandises no sont pas vendues en bloe, 
mais au poids, au compteg ou'a la, mesure, la vwAe ntest point 
parfaite, en ce sene qua lee choose vendues sont a= risques du 
%I 
vendurej jusqufa ce quVelles evient pesees, ý- comptees (YtL metureeel 
min Itacheteur pewt en clemmder ca la delivmnoe, an des dumo«itj' 
(1) & Delaurier & Co. V, l 1ý- Wvllie & Others (1889) 17 R. at p. 167o 
(2)Brown "Law of Sale" Edinburgh 1821,4t p. 44. 
(3) Thid at P*53o 
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et intere/tsg stil ya lica, en cas dfinexecution de ltengagemerrts 
Cod- NaP- No- 1585-" 
The adoption of such a rule would have been inconsistent with 
the principles of the law of England, in cases where the thing sold 
is a portion of a mass which is to be separated by weighing or 
measuring* The effect of the completion of the contract there, 
being to vest the property in the vendeeq the contract cannot be 
held as complete while it is not yet known to what Particular 
portion of the mass the vendeets right of property is to att0he 
But there is no such difficulty or inconsistency in our law, in 
holding the contract in each a case to be completedg according to 
the general rule by consent of partiesoes" 
It can be inferred from the paragraph, above mentionedg that 
the bill of lading is capable of passing the property in the bulk 
shipment, as the contract is complete and there is no need for the 
goods to be separated by weighing or measuring. This attitude is 
practical and important to todaytsýtrade., 
Bill of Lading and Stoppage In Transita. 0.00 
Stoppage in transitu is a mode whereby a seller who has lost 
his lien may at his own hand revive it,, 
(') 
Therefore, stoppage in 
transitu and Lien are crai-te distinot rights* Lien is a right 
enjoyed by the vendor in security of the pricet when the vendee fails, 
while the goods remain in the vendor's possession. 
(1) T. J. Gow, "The Mercantile, and Industrial Law of SiootlarAW, 
1964 at P. 193. 
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Stoppage in transitu arises when there is an interval of time 
between the act by which the vendor loses the possession, and the 
act by which the vendee acquires it. 
(') 
The principle of stoppage in transitu is thus stated by Lord 
President Inglis in 1867: 
"No law, either in England or Scotlandt gives any real countenance 
to the idea that the state of transitus to which the equitable 
remedy of stoppage applies, is anything but an actual state of 
transit from the seller to the buyer soe The equitable remedy of 
stoppage is applicable only to goods which are either In the hands 
of a carrier, or of some person - such as a wharfinger - who is 
doing something to render complete the contract of carriage. To 
put goods in a-state of transitus the seller must have parted with 
the possession of the goods and pat them into the hands of some 
person who is to carry, or procure them to be carried and delivered 
to the buyerl and the buyer must be in the position of not having 
received the goods. Unless the seller has parted with the possession 
his remedy is not stoppage in transitu, bmt in Sootlandt retention, 
and in England, an exercise of the seller's right of lien. " 
(2) 
In the light of this principle it was decided: 
I- The master either of a general shipt or of a ship chartered 
- wholly by the vendee, is a carrier in whose hands goods may be 
stopped after having been pat on board for the purpose of being 
(1) X. P* Brown, . "A Treatise on the Law of Sale" Im 466,1821. 
(2) Black v. -Incorporation of 
Bakers (1867) 6 N. 136 at P-1409 
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transported to the vendee. 
(') 
The facts of the case were thus stated by Mr, Justice Lawrence 
in delivering the judgment of the court. 
"Crane the bankrupt, a merchant in London, entered into an 
agreement with Usherwood, the master of a ship, for that ship 
going to Petersbargh, and there receiving from the factors of 
the bankrupt, a quantity of merchandise of various descriptions, 
and proceeding from thence to London, in consideration of 
certain freight to be paid per ton, half on the unloading, and 
the remainder in three months; for which goods the master was to 
sign the usual bills of lading, and Crane was fully to load the 
ship* In consequence of this agreement, the ship sailed to 
Petersburgh, and was loaded by Bohtlingk and Co. (the plaintiffs) 
on the account and risk of Cranal and one part of the bill'of 
ladingg directing the goods to be delivered to Crane or his 
assigns, was sent to him; the other part, in conseqUence Of the 
plaintiffs having information Of Cranets insolvencT9 was 
afterwards sent to Mr. Schneider, their agentq with directions 
not to deliver that part to Crane, unless he gave sufficient 
security for the amount of the goods. And the plaintiffs, at 
the same time that they sent this part of the bill of lading to 
Schneider, informed Craneýof their having so done, azA required 
him, in case he did not. give the security, to deliver to 
Schneider the bill of lading that had been sent to himl, emneo 
In faot, Crane had become a bankrupt before the goodivvvre- 
(I) BOLt lins* v- Ingli s93 -East 9 381 - 
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delivered on board -the ship in Russia; but after their 
purchase, and on the arrival of the ship in the Thames, 
Schneider demanded the goods of the master, who refused to. 
deliver them to him, and delivered them to the defendentse 
For the benefit of trade, a rule has been introduced into the 
common law, enabling the consIgnorl in case of the solvency of 
the consignee, to stop the goods consigned before they come into 
the possession of the consignee; which possession, Mr. Justice 
Bullerg in Ellis v. Hurt,, 
(1) 
says9 means an actual possession; 
that the possession of a carrier is not such a possessiong has 
been repeatedly determined-9 and the question now is, whether 
the possession of the master be anything more than the possession 
of a carrier, and not the actual possession of the bankrupt? 
As to this, it appears that Usherwood the master contracted with 
the bankrupt to proceed from hence to Petereburgh, and to bring 
in his ship a cargo of goods, which Crane engaged should amount 
to the tonnage of the shipj which does not differ from a similar 
contract entered into by the consignor by the directions of the 
consignee at the loading port, for the conveyance of the goods 
from him to the vendee, in which case it would hardly be 
contendedt that a delivery by the consignor to the master of the 
ship for thepurpose of carriage, would be such a delivery to 
the vendee as to prevent the right of stopping in transitue 
In each came the freight would be to be paid by the consignee; 
in each ease the ship irould be hired byý him, and there' would""bi 
(1) 1 R*R* 7439 747 (3 TeRe 464)o 
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no differenceg except that, in this case, the ship, in 
consequence of the agreement goes from England to fetch the 
cargo; in the other case, the vessel would bring it immediately 
from the loading port, Both in the one case and in the other? 
the contract is with the master for the carriage of goods from 
one place to another, and until the arrival of the goods at 
their port of destination and delivery to the consigneev they 
are in their passage or transit from the consignor to the 
consignee. If a man contracts with the owner of a general ship 
to take goods which are equal to half the tonnage of the shipj 
and the master completes the loading of his ship with the goods 
of others, there would be no question but that there might be 
such a stoppage; and surely, it will not be saidl that the right 
of stoppage depends on the quantity of the goods consigned*" 
2- Where a ship had beon hired by the consignee for a term of years, 
and was fitted out9 victualledgand manned by him# and goods 
were put on board thereof, to be sent by-him an a mercantile 
adventure, for which he had bought them, It was held that the 
consignor could not stop them; the consignee being in that case 
the owner of the ship pro temporep and the delivery of the goods 
on board therefore being equivaient to adelivery into ei warehouse 
belonging to hime 
This doctrine was delivered in, a case which is not separately 
reported, but of which the following account is given by 
]Mbr. Justice Lawrence in BohtliMk 'The baz*xU 
'ptst 
Htmter and Company, were in possession of a ship let to them for 
a term of three years at f-52 108* per month, they finding stcýk 
(I)3 East , 396. 
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and provisions for the shipq and paying the master, during 
wbich time they were to have the entire disposition of the 
ship, and the complete control over her. The ship had been 
one voyage to Alexandriag and had the goods put on board her 
to carry them on another voyage to the place, not for the 
Purpose of conveying them from the plaintiffs 
(vendors) to the 
bankrupts (vendees) but that they might be sent by the bankrupts 
upon a mercantile adventureq for which they had bought them. 
There the delivery was complete*" 
When the goods are sent by seaq and a bill of lading indorsed 
has been transmitted to the vendee, the vendor loses his right 
of stopping in transitu, if the bill of lading has been assigned, 
before he exercises this right, to a bona fide onerous assignee, 
although the goods are still. on their voyage and have not arrived 
at their destination* This rule was established after solemn 
argument and deliberation in the case of Lickbarrow V- WSOn-(1) 
The assignee of a bill of lading, in order to be secure agaiiast 
the claim of the original vendor, must not only have given a 
valuable consideration for it, but must also have acted with 
fairness and honesty. If, therefore, at the time when he takes 
the assignation, he knows that the vendee is in Insolvent , 
circumstances, and has either accepted no bill for the, price, 
or that a bill which has been accepted is not likely tobe paid, 
the interposition of himself in that,. case between this vWdor M'j 
vendee, in order to assist the latter to disappoint the just 
ToRo 63 1 ReBo 357* 
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rights and expectations of the formerv would be an act done 
in fraud of the vendor's right to stop in transitug and would 
not be available to the asBignee. 
(1) 
In the following case 
(2) 
it was held that a bill of lading, 
which has been signed before the goods are actually on board, 
was not such a document as could be assigned to the effect of 
transferring the goods even to a bona fide onerous indorsee, 
and of barring the original vendor"s right of stoppage,, the 
granting of such a bill of lading being an act of a fraudulent 
nature. 
The action was trover to recover 150 puncheons of rum, The 
defendants being possessed of the ram in questiong which was at 
the time in the West India docks, sold it to Meredith, who 
directed it to'be shipped on board the Zealous, which he had 
chartered. Having obtained a bill of lading from the captain 
prior to the loading of the goods, Meredith indorsed it over to 
the plaintiffs, who gave him'a cheque an their bankers for the 
price, which was duly paid-, but the'defendants, the original 
vendors, not being paid by Meredith, and suspecting his solvency, 
stop the goods of which a part were by this time on boardl and 
a part still undeliverede The bill of lading was dated 28th 
itovembert which was previous to the shipment of any part of the 
goods. Burroughq Je said: 
wUnder the circumstances of the case, I think the bill 'of lading 
(1) per Lorel Ellenborough, C*Jo in Cuming vo Brown 9 Fiastt We 
compare S-olomons v., Nissen 2 T*R- 674 D'"Ptionj 
(2) Oseg v.. Gardnert Holtj 405s 
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transferred no property to the plaintiffs. Can a bill of' 
lading be considered to be made bona fide when no goods are 
on board at the time that the captain signs it? Is not such 
an instrument fraudulent? - Upon some of the Jury expressing 
an opinion that they thought the bill of lading fraudulent on 
that groundl the plaintiffs consented to be non-suited, " 
Second: Where goods are not represented by a bill of lading 
In this respectl it can be inferred from the doctrine of 
"stoppage in tranBitu" in Scots lawo that the property in the goodsq 
which are not represented by a bill of 1PAing, passes -to the buyer 
on shipment in two cases: 
1- Where a buyer sends his own ship for the goods, or a ship 
chartered by him. for a definite period, and. entirely at his 
own command, delivery into such ship is effectual to all intents 
and purposes* In the former case, it is his own repository in 
which the goods are placed; in the latter, the possession of the ship 
being with his hired servants, not for a mere voyagel but for such 
destination as he may choose to give, delivery into such vessel 
i. s delivery into the hands of the buyero 
2- But where a ship is on general freight only for a particular 
voyageq and in order to bring home to the freighter those 
particular goods from abroad, the freighter having no control 
over the ship, the delivery, though not held as made into the 
buyerve repositoryq is effectual to pass the property, the price 
being paid, And in sucli a case it makes no difference whether 
this aff'reightment is made by the buyer, the ship being sent frft 
-1 4C6- 
Britain, or by the seller, freieut being got abroad; the 
eneaging of the entire vessel not differing essentially from 
engaging a part of a general ship. 
(1) 
In the first case, -the property passes to the buyer on shipment 
without being subject to the right 'stoppage in transitut, 
In the second case, the property also passes to the buyer on 
shipment, but the vendor can exercise his right of Ostoppage in 
trans itul if the price has not been paid yet. 
(2) 
Conditions ard the Contracts FC. I. P. ard F. O. *B. 
] 
Old Scots law recognised. what have been called suspensive 
conditions and resolutive conditions*(3) The vendor, after 
delivering the article sold to the purchaser, couldq by means of 
such conditions, enjoy the benefit of a conventional hypotheo over 
it for the payment of the stipulated price., 
(4) 
The different nature of these two sorts of conditions, arA the 
effect of each on the contraot of sale, is Ous noticed by Lord 
Stair, "If such conditions or resolutive clauses do stop the 
transmission of property, and be so meant and expressed, then the 
bargain is pendent, and the property not transmittedt and the seller- 
remains the proprietore But,, if by the contract and clause, the 
buyer became once-the prdprietor, and the condition is adjected, 
(1) Bell, comm., Vol-I 8-9 at P-185- 
(2) Ante IT 
(3) Ante 
(4) Weantney v, Nacredie (Supra)o 
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that he shall cease to be proprietor in such a case, this is but 
personal, for property or dominion passes not 'by conditions or 
provisions, but by tradition and other ways prescribed in law, so 
that these conditions, however expressed, are only the foundation 
on which the property might pass from the buyer, if the thing 
bought remained his. "(') 
According to this doctrine, if goods have been sold on the 
condition of the price being paidg the vendor would be entitled to 
reclaim them, even in a question with the creditors of the vendee, 
if the condition should be violated. 
In Bordie v, Todd& Coo 
(2) 
Arnott of Leith agreed to purchase from 
Todd & Coof Hall a quantity of clover seed, to be paid In London by 
acceptance of their draft upon him at three months. The vendorsq in 
transmitting the bill of lading, wrote "We liquidated the annexed 
account by oar draft on you at three months from this day, payable 
in London, which please return in course* The vendee received this 
letter on 24th April, but did not return the acceptance till the 26th, 
The vendors, who should have received the answer on the 26th, if it 
had been sent in course, relanded the goods from the vesselt which 
had not yet sailed. The court held first, that "it was a condition 
of the bargain that Arnott should return the draft accepted in course 
of post"I secondly, "That course of post meant the next post after 
receipt of the letter*" 
As a resultt this doctrine was an exception to the rmle that 
'-(I) stair, 133 vide Prek- 3-3-ol-1. 
Brown, at P-33. 
(2) 2fth. *rg. 1814*-, 
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property passed to the buyer by delivery or by bill of lading, 
enabling -the seller to postpone the moment of passing of the 
Property until payment of the price regardless of delivery of the 
goods or delivery of the bill of lading. 
Rejection of the Goods: 
FInally it must be mentioned that if the article turns out, 
within due time and after proper trialq not to be the article which 
the purchaser had contracted to buy, not to be the article with 
which it was intended he should be invested* He is in that event, 
entitled to divest himself and to reinvest the seller with the 
property. 
(') 
(1) lord Young in Kinnear v. Brodie, (1901) 3 P-540. at pe 543e 
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Col"MM7=S 
We have seen that there were two concepts of delivery'in the 
old Scots law (before ist. Jan. 1894). The first one - Bellts 
concept - tried to inforce an unfamiliar meaning of delivery on 
the legal tradition of Scots Law. The second one (judicial 
concept) had a very narrow meaning of delivery uhich was 
impractical and inconsistent with the principle "protection of 
property". In between those two attitudesq the Mercantile Law 
Amendment Act 1856 came to rectify the situation 'by making the 
judiciary concept more practical and consistent with equity. 
2- Strictly speaking, Old Soots Lawt in this respect, did not 
follow completely the Roman law* 
On the one hand, neither the traditio longs, manat nor the 
deliveryq which, in the Romkn Law, was supposed to have taken 
place when the seller kept possession of the thing sold on the 
title of liferent or lease, have ever been received in Scottish 
practice@ 
On the'other hand, certain acts of constructive deljveT! 3ý, Which 
were not known In the Roman Lawl wererecognised in the Old 
Soots Lawl eeg., the intimation of a delivery order to a third 
party* Admitting of &, bill of lading having the effect of 
passing the property by Common Law. 
(1) 
3- it was decided, in the Old Scots,, Law, that the property in the 
goods, which are represented by a bill ý ofladingo pas#3bd',, 40ý141j§ 
(1) Brown, at. P-392-393* 
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buyer by transferring the bill of lading to the buyer. This 
attitude is similar to that of Warsa-w-Oxford Rules and German 
Laws 
Ae Rule 6 of Wareaw-Oxford Rules(') providest 
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 20 (11)9 
(2) 
the time of the 
passing of the property in the goods shall be the moment when 
the seller delivers the documents into the possession of the 
buyer. It 
B. In the German Law, neither the sole obligation, nor the 
individualisation of the goods, sufficient to pass the property 
to the buyer (433 du B*G*B*), But, in this respect, the goods 
must be delivered (929 BoGeBe), The delivery of the goods 
themselves being impossible during their transPorto it is done 
by the tradition of the bills of lading. The essential form 
governing this function of the bill of lading is contained in 
section 650 (HoG*B*) which has been in force since 1861. 
According to this section*. 
"The delivery of the bill of lading to the one who is qualified 
by this document to take delivery has the same effect with 
respect to the acquisition of the rights upon the merchandiees*" 
Several vivid discussions ocurred concerning this function of 
the bill of lading* However, those debates lost their substance 
(1) Rules for C9IeF* contracts (Warsaw-Oxford Rules) adopted by -the 
Oxford conference of August 12,1932* 
(2) This rule provides: Nothing contained in these Rules shall affect 
any right of lien or retention or stoppage in transitu -to which 
the seller may 
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since the theory of representation of Otto von Gierke 
imposed itself definitively. 
According to this theoryý the bill of lading represents the 
goods in the process of passing the property during the voyage, 
as long as the carrier is the possessor of the goods in the 
name of the legitimate holder of the bill of lading. In the 
light of the prevailing concept in jurispradencel the carrier 
has a "direct possession" which he detains in the name of the 
vendee of the bill of lading, who himself has only an 
"irdirect possepsion"* And the captain, who is the employee of 
the carrier, and who receives the goods on board9 is not the 
possessor of the goods himself, but he is only the"servant of 
the possession'le The transfer of the bill of lading leads to 
simultaneously to transfer of the "direct possession" but by 
virtue of section 650 of the HoGeB., the effects of the 
"direct possession" are similar to those of the "indirect 
pOBS8BSiontt. 
(1) 
This attitude is influenced by the legal thoughts of the 
Roman Law, mixing the transfer of possessionwith the transfer 
of propertyg whereas they are quite distinct things. The 
modern modes of trade require new rules which must be just and 
flexible* The Roman Law and the civil code cannot supply such 
rules, These rules must be derived from the principle 
"protection of property"o 
(1) Les Ventes a L"embarquement en Droit Allemand et en I)roi+.. 
Franp. ais et lea Conditions Requises du Cormissement, 
Par: Karl-Ludwig Hermann, Paris 1963, at P-37-38. 
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PASqTI%TG OF PROPERTY TN TBE HO'1-2 MARKET SAIM 
Legal Provisions: 
Before the Sale of Goods Act 1893, Bovill, C*Jo, stated in 
Heilbutt v. Hickson(') in relation to the passing of property: 
(2) 
"unless from other circumstances it can be collected that the 
intention was that the property should not at once vest in the 
purchaser. Such an intention is generally shown by the fact of 
some further act being first required to be done; suchl for instance, 
in most cases, as delivery - in some cases actual payment of the 
price - and in other cases weighing or measuring in order to 
ascertain the price, or making, packing, cooperingg filling up the 
casks or the like. " 
In Seath v. Moore(3) Lord Blackburn is purporting to state the 
relevant principles of English Law in general terms* He stated in 
relation to the passing of propertyi 
(4) 
"It is essential that the article should be specific and ascertained 
in a manner binding on both parties', for unless that be go, it 
cannot be construed as a contract to pass the property in that 
article. And in general, if there are things remaining to be done 
by the seller to the article before it is in the state in which it 
is to be finally delivered to the purchaser, the contract will not 
(1) (1872) L, Ro 7 C-Po 458. 
(2) lbid at P. 449. 
(3) (1886) 11 APP. Cas. 350. 
(4) lbid at P. 370. 
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be construed to be one to pass the property till those things are 
doneo 
But it is competent to parties to agree for valuable consideration 
that a specific article shall be sold, and become the property of the 
purchaser as soon as it has attained a certain stage: though if it is 
part of the bargain that more work shall be done on the article after 
it has reached that stage, it affords a strong prima facie presumption 
against it being the intention of the parties that the property should 
then pass* I do not examine the various English authorities cited during 
the argument. It Is, I think, a question of the construction of the 
contract in each case at what stage the property shall pass; and a 
question of fact in each case whether that stage has been reached. " 
After the Sale of Goods Act 1893, Lord Hanworth, M. Re summarized 
the question of passing of the property in Kursell-ve Timber-ODeratore 
& Contractors. Ltd. 
(') 
when he said: 
(2) 
"It depneds first upon whether it is 'specific or ascertained goodst 
within S. 17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, and next if it be such, 
whether the parties intended the property in it to be transferred. 
Furtherg by sub-S (2) "for the parpose of ascertaining the intention 
of the parties regard shall be had to the terms of the contractv the 
conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. " 
In this respect, the law as stated in the Code is similar to 
the proposition as to the passing of the property in specific and 
ascertained goods laid down in the authorities before the Act* 
(1) (1926)l 135 "Tý, 223. 
(2) Jbidl at po 225- 
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The Sale of Goods Act 1893 provides in 
section 16. Goods mist be ascertained* 
Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods 
no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless 
and until the goods are ascertained. 
section 17- Property passes when intended to pass. 
(I)Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained 
goods the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such 
time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. 
(2)For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties 
regard shall be had to the terms of the contractj the conduct 
of the parties, and the circumstances of the came. 
section 18. Rules for ascertaining intention. 
Unless a different intention appears, the following are rules 
for ascertaining the Intention of the parties as to the time 
at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer, 
Rule 1, Where there Is an unconditional contract for the sale of 
specific goods, In a deliverable state, the property in the 
goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is 
Immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery, 
or both be postponed. 
Rule 2, Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods 
and the seller isbowA to do something to the goods, for'ýthe 
purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the property 
does not pass until such thing be donet arA the buyer has 
notice thereof* 
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Rule 3. Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods 
in a deliverable state, but the seller is bound to weigh, 
measure, test, or do some other act or thing with reference 
to the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price, the 
property does not pass until such act or thing be done, and 
the buyer has notice thereof. 
Rule 4- When the goods ar e delivered to the buyer on approval 
or "on sale or return" or 6ther similar terms the property 
therein passes to the buyer: 
(a) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller 
or does any other act adopting the transaction., 
(b) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the 
seller but retains the goods without giving notice of 
rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return 
of the goods, on the expiration of such time, andq if no 
time has been fixedq on the expiration of-a reasonable time. 
What is a reasonable time is a question of fact* 
Rule 5-0) Where there is a contract for the sale of unaseartained 
or future goods by desorip-tiont and goods of that description 
and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to 
the contracit either by the seller with the assent of the 
buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the 
property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer. Such 
assent may be express or implied, WA may be given eithet', 
before or after the appropriation in made, 
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(2) Whereq in pursuance of the contract, the seller delivers 
the goods to the buyer or to a carrier or other bailee 
E 
custodier] (whether naned by the buyer or not) for the 
purpose of transmission to the buyer, and does not reserve 
the right of disposall he is deemed to have unconditionally 
appropriated the goods to the contract, 
section 19& Reservation of right of disposale 
(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods 
or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the 
contract, the seller may, by the terms of the contract 
or appropriationg reserve the right of disposal of the 
goods until certain conditions are fulfilled* In such 
case, notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to the 
buyerg or to a carrier or other bailee 
[or- 
custodierj 
for the purpose of transmission to the buyerl the property 
in the goods does not pass to the buyer until the conditions 
imposed by the seller are fulfilled. 
(2) Where goods are shippedg and by the bill of lading the goods 
are deliverable to the order of the seller or his agent, 
the seller is prima facie deemed to reserve the right of disposal* 
(3) Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer for the price, 
and transmits the bill of exchange and bill of lading to 
the buyerg together to secure acceptance or paymeit of the 
bill of exchange, the buyer is bound to return the bill of 
lading if he does not honour the bill of exchangeq &TA if 
he wroy4fully retains the bill of lading the property in 
the goods does not pass to him, 
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It is quite clear now that there is a very strong link between 
the past and the present concerning the passing of property, The 
two fundamental rules on this subject are thesee. 
I* No property can pass in unascertained. goods (s. 16). 
2* Property in ascertained goods passes when the parties intend 
it to pass (S-17) and since the parties may have had no 
Intentiong or expressed no intention, in this respectl a number 
of presumptions have been evolved by the Sale of Goods Act 1893 
(s*18*19) which must be applied unless a different intention 
appeared, 
We can now pass on to examine the circumstances in which this 
peculiar concept, the property9 passes under the contract, keeping 
in mind that the moment at which the property passes is entirely a 
question of intention to be gathered from the terms of the contract, 
the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case* 
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E The Meaning-of Tntentione. 
I* In the Contract: 
For there to be a contract between the parties it must be 
shown that they intended to enter into a relationship with 
legal consequences, and not one binding only in honour. 
(1) 
In Rose 8-. Frank Co. v. J. R* Crompton & Bros. Ltd* 
(2) 
BankesL*J. 
said. -M "There is, I think, no doubt that it is essential to 
the creation of a contractl using that word in its legal sense, 
that the parties to an agreement shall not only be ad idem as 
to the terms of their agreement, but that -they shall have 
intended that it shall have legal consequences and be legally 
enforceable., " ThtLs it can be inferred that the meaning of 
intention in the field of contract is that the parties to the 
contract must 'be willing and serious in creating legal 
relationship within the concept of "contraot"* 
2* Tn the Sale of Goods: 
There is not much assistance in the authorities as to the meaning 
of interrtion in the field of sale of goods, But it can be said 
that intention is a state of mindin which the parties to the 
contract decide to lot the property in the goods pass to -the 
buyer at a certain momente This state of mind can be shown by 
their own will which can be either expressed or implied. 
(i) In this respect: 
Balfour ve Balfýur 91 2 K*B*571* 1ý VW*L*R'*286op 
Parker ve Clark LQ03 
(2) [1-9243 All E. 'R. ReVo 245* 
(3) nidi -at p, 2484, -" 
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The Intention and the Nature of the Goods 
Ascertained and specific goods must be distinguished from 
unat3certained goods. "Specific" goods means goods identified and 
agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is made*() 
"Ascertained" probably means identified in accordance with 
the agreement after the time a contract of sale is made. 
(2) 
"Uhascertained goods" are not so identified but referred to 
by the parties by description only. Thus where there is a contract 
for the sale of specific goods, the seller would not fulfil his 
contract by delivering any other goods than those agreed upon* 
Where there is a contract for unascertained goods the seller fulfils 
his contract by delivering at the appointed time any goods which 
answer to the description in the contract. : Et is clear that 
"fa-ture goodall, even though particularly describedl do not come 
within the definition of specific goods, bmt for most ýurposes 
(3) 
would be subject, to the same consideration as unasoertained goods. 
Therefore a distinction must be made between the passing 'of property 
in ascertained goods, and the passing of property in unascertained 
goodse 
nrst*. Ascertained Goods, 
Owl". 6--mm 
The transfer of property In ascertainedl amd specific goods 
depends completely an the intention of the parties to the oor4tract 
(1) Seation 62 S*G. A* 1893o 
(2) Per Akin LqJo in Re Wýjt r19271 I Ch*6069 6309 
Wý 043w Sale of Goods I 176t-h e*'dao at pjV% 
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which can be either expressed or implied: 
1. The cxDressed intention: 
The most common condition is paymerrt -to the seller shall be 
madet and where the contract provides that the property does not 
pass until the goods have been paid for or credit given to the 
buyer, the normal indication is that property does not pass until 
the condition as to payment is satisfiedP) 
The expressed intention must be in the contract before the 
passiri, g of property# 
By s*58(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, "in the case of a 
sale by auction, a sale by auction is complete when -the auetioneer 
armounces its completion 'by the fall of the hamero**" 
Property 
in the goods passes at that moment to the buyer unless a different 
intention appearse Therefore when the auctioneer knocks down to 
the highest bidder the property passes to -the buyer on the fall of 
'the hammere The auctioneer, after that momýrtj cannot stiptaate 
that the property is not to pass until a cheque is paid. 
(2) 
2. The IMlied intentiont- 
A great deal of attention is paid -to extracting the real 
intention of the parties to the contract. 6. The Judges look- 
carefully at the -transaction before them, then therstart -to', 
awayse the terms of the oontract taking in-to consideration the 
oorAuct of the parties and the cireum*tances of the case in order 
(1) Weiner v. - 
Smith 
[1904-7] 
All E*Ro ReP- 773o 
(2) Dermard v* Skinner & Colloml 
[1948] 2 All E*R* 29* 
[1948j-2 10*- 164* 
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to got the real intention which is called the implied intention* 
The best illuattration in this respect is Re Anchor Line 
(Henderson Brothers td. 
0) 
which facts can be summarized as -) 
L 
foll(NIS: 
The anchor Line, Ltd., signed an agreement with the Ocean S*S& Coo 
Ltdo, for the purchase of an electric crane at a deferred purchase 
price of 94,000. Annual payments in respect of "interest" and 
"depreciation" viere to be made. The ar-ount paid for "depreciation" 
was to be deduated from the purchase price on completion of the 
purchase* In the meantime the Anchor Line Ltd., was to "have entire 
charge of and responsibility for" the crane@ Payments in respect of 
"interest" and "depreciation" were made regularly for some years by 
the Anchor Line Ud* but it went into liquidations One of the 
issues which arose was whether the property in the crane had Passed 
to the Anchor Line Ude 
Held, by the Court of Appealq that it had not passed* The 
terms of the contract shorwed an intention that it was not 'to pass 
until the purchase was completed. 
Lord Wright . X*R. said: 
(2) 
"The transaction, as I understand it, was simply this. The orsngl 
being on the berth occapied by the Anchor 74ne, was in their 
oompatione They wanted to use it in the course of their ordinary 
businesse It was, I say, in their "occupation"; It was a chattel 
and not a fixture to the realtyl but I use the word voccupatiW 
(1) E930 2 All EoRe 941 o 
[1: 937] 1 Che 1 CoAt, 
sýt p. 945o 
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for convenience, in the sense that they were possessing and using 
it* They wanted to possess and use it* They were not, however, 
prepared there and then to pay the price for the craneq namely, 
C41000o They entered, therefore, into this agreement, which was 
to operatel according to its language "in the meantime", that is 
to sayq to tide them over their immediate financial difficulties* 
They were not to pay the purchase price at the moment or in one 
sum, but it was to be paid by the arrangement which is specified: 
E350 per annum was to be paid for the first two yearr-, C450 per 
annum for the second two years, and C400 per a=mm thereafter* Of 
those sums, I take itq C350 is the starting amount., The aum of 
C2409 which was 6 per cent of the purchase price of the crane, was 
to be regarded as depreciation* That I understarA to mean thist. 
the carne, being treated as the property of the Ocean Steamship 
Compamy, was year by year depreciatingg andq according to business 
practice, they would write off, on the footing that it was their 
property, a aum for depreciation year by yearg and that would have 
appeared in their books as a debit. Bat tbatý amount year by year 
was to be paid over to them, and paid in that way by the Anchor Line. 
The amount of the purchase price was to be reduced proportionately, 
just as the crane in-cluestion was being reduced year by year in 
value* That explains, I thinkv the provision as to the payment of 
depreciation*. 
On the other hand, the payment appropriated to intereetwas on 
a different footingo The word "interest" might seem to indicate 
that there was a debt for the whole purchase price arýfcr tikk 
balance e&oh year of the purchase price,, the p4qWen*.. 0f,, -whjWLýwW 
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foreborne at interest., If thatWere its meaning, then it would 
be rather consistent with the view that the debt of C41000 was due 
and outstanding from beginning to end* Bat I do not so regard it, 
I think the word "interest" is used here somewhat loosely an 
indicating a payment year by year in the n&uure of rent, or for use 
and occupation of the crane, As that was paid on that footing, it 
was not to go in reduotion of the C4,0001 because the Anchor Idne 
were getting value in return - namely, the use of the crane in the 
meantime* 
There is a further provision which to my mind is Only consistent 
'with the view that the property in the orane was still vested in the 
sellers: that is the clause "in meantime you" - that is the Anchor 
Line - "will have entire charge of and responsibility 
for the crane 
in every aspecte" I think that indicates that the Anchor Line did 
not become owners of the crane but were merely baileesp andv as 
bailees, were responsible for its safety and its preservation. to 
the bailors, who were the owners - namely, the Ocean Companye 
Finallyl I attach very great importance to the language 
"completion of the purchase"l read with the remaining words* The 
first clause states the agreement as one for "a deferred purchase 
price of 49000". Now, a deferred purchase price might be construed 
as meaning a price for a deferred purchase, or a price for a purchase 
which was to become complete at once, though the payment of the 
price was deferred* In that. state of ambiguity I attach importance 
as solving the ambiguity, to. the words immediately following. "IMtil 
the completion of the purchase" and to the similar words "balmoe 
actually to be paid by you on completion of the purqh%oa2, xhen~ 
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that may take place". T agree that these words are not conclusive, 
'but, read in -the context in which -they are, they support the view 
which T otherwise arrive at: that wbat we have here is a contract, 
the intention of which is that there should be an agreement to 
purchaseq but that that agreement should not be completed or 
carried out until some time "whenever that may take place" - the 
time, it is implied in the contractq when the balance of the 
purchase price is paid; and then, and then onlyq the property in 
the crane is to vest in the Anchor Lines That certainly agrees 
'with the business probabilities, It is always dangerous to rely 
on business probabilities in corstraing any contract2 because it 
does not necessarily follow that the parties have contemplated all 
that might happen. 3: refer, thereforeq to rest BY judgment on the 
construction which I attach to the terms of the contractq whicht 
to my mindt show an intention within the meaning of 9,17 as to the 
time at which the property is to be transferredo"(1 
The Presumptions: 
In order to assist in ascertaining the intention of the parties, 
the Act lays down certain presumptions in sections 18 and 19 which 
govern the passing of property in specific goods unless a different 
intention appears* These presumptions can'ý"be shown as followst , 
(A) When there is nothing remaining to be done. 
Uhder section (18-1) the property in the goods passes to the buyer 
(1) See also: Heap v. kotorists' Advisorr-Agena Ltd* 119 
1 K*B* 577-591 - 
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when the contract is madel where there is an unconditional contract 
for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, and it is 
immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of deliveryt or 
both, be postponed* 
This rule gives rise to a number of perplexing questions: 
"Unconditional contract" 
By section (1) sub-section (2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893: 
"A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional#" 
As the'oontraot of sale is consensual, it follows that it may 
be either absolute or conditional, as the parties may please* The 
more natural interpretation for the word "unconditional" is that 
unconditional means not subject to any condition suspensive of the 
passing of the property. It is submitted that this interpretation is 
the correct one. 
(1) 
"In many sales of specific articles to be deliveredt the 
property passes on the making of the contract, A man may select 
and agree to buy a hat and the shopman may agree to deliver it at 
the buyerts house. There, notwithetanding. the obligation to deliver 
the hatq the property passes at the time of. the contract*" 
(2) 
The division of conditions into those which are suspensive and 
those which are resolutive is convenient, because those terms mark 
clearly the distinction between an agreement for sale which is to 
become an actual sale on the fulfilment of a partimlar conditim, 
Benjamin at p*149* 
(2) Per Bankes L*J* in Underwood Ltd* v. Burgh Castle Brick and 
SyrAicate at P. 517 C19213A11 E*R* 
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and on actual sale passing the property to the buyert but subject 
to defeasance on the happening of some specified event. 
(') 
The 
trouble arose largely from section 11 (1)(c)(2) of the Act whicht 
in its original form, deprived the buyer of the right to reject 
goods for breach of conditiong "where the contract ia for specific 
goodst the property in which has passed to the buyer. " Tf the term 
"unconditional contract" in Rule I was given its natural meaning the 
result appeared to be that in the vast majority of sales of specific 
goods there was no real right to reject for breach of condition at 
all* The juages tried to avoid this result by giving a forced 
interpretation to the words "unconditional contract", eoge when an 
essential stipulation is broken by the sellerv the property in 
specific goods passes to the buyer only if and when he accepts the 
goods. 
(3) 
Fortunately, these difficulties in England now seem to be a 
matter of past history* The Misrepresentation Actt 19679 Section 4, 
has replaced the words "where the contract is for specific goods the 
property in which has passed to the buyer. ", Therefore, the buyer is 
not deprived of his right to reject the goods* 
1152ecific- Goods" 
Under section 62(l) of the Actf specific goods means goods 
identified and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is made, 
(1) Chalmers, Sale of Goods, 17th ed, at p, 80g 
(2) This section is not applied to Sootland, 
Leaf 
- 
v. International Galleries C1950] 2K. B_*. 
Varley v., --Whi 
f19003 1QoB- 513-517- 
-0-- . 
P. 2 %. - 
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In Kursell v. Timber 02erators & Contractors Ltd. 
(1) 
the seller 
agreed to sell to the buyers all the "merchantable timber" growing 
in the forest in Latvia on Aug-ixst, In October the whole of the 
forest became state property as a result of a law passed by the 
Latvian Government, and all private rights in it were annulled. 
It was held that the property in the timber had not passed 
to the buyers on the ground that a. 18t R. 1t did not constitute a 
sale of specific goods, for the sale of "merchantable-timber" as defined 
above, which could only be determined and identified from time to 
time as the trees grew. 
(2) 
Deliverable Stato 
Under section 61(4) of the Act "goods are in a deliverable 
state when they are in such a state that the buyer would under the 
contract be bound to take delivery of them"* Bat in practice the 
definition has received a more restrictive interpretation* Thus, 
Bankes L*J, in Underwoocl Ltd. v. Ruýh Castle trick and Cement 
Svndicatet(3) said: 
"A tdeliverable statet does not depend upon the mere completeness 
of the oubject-uatter in all its parts, but on the actual state of 
the goods at the date of the contract and the state in which they 
(J) (1926) 135 LeTe 223. [1927] 1 K. B. 298. 
"Merchantable timber" vas defined as "all trunks and branches 
of trees but not seedlirWs and young trees of less tbAI4 si* 
inches in diameter at a height of four feet from-the 
(2) See alsov Morison v, Lockhart (1912 S. C., 1017)- 
(3) [1921] All E. R. Rep- 515- 
[1922) 1 K*B* 343 C. A* 
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are to be delivered by the terms of the contract. " 
There is no doubt that the rule that property passes when 
the contract is made does not fit easily into the pattern of 
consumer sale. On a sale in a supermarketv for example, property 
does not pass until the price is paid. Thus in Lacis v. Cashmarts,, 
(') 
Lord ParkeNaid: "In my judgment when one is dealing with a case 
such as thisq particularly a shop of the superinarket variety or the 
cash and carry variety, as this was, the intention of the parties 
quite clearly as it seems to me is that the property shall not pass 
until the price is paid* That as it seems to me is in accordance 
with the reality and in accordance with commercial practice. " 
It has been saidv to avoid that result, that the property in 
English Law may pass by the contract itselfg if such be the intention 
of the parties. 
(3) 
But such a conclusion is in practice most unlikely as the 
parties will hardly even intend the property-to pass at the timeo(4) 
Therefore "in modern times very little is needed to give rise to 
the inference that the property in specific goods is to pass only 
on delivery or payment. "(5) 
(1) C1969] 2 WoLeR. 329* 
12969J 2. Q. B- 400-411. 
(2) lbid at p. 333-41 and at Po 407. 
(3) Dixon v. Yates (1833) 5 BA Ad. 313 at P-340- 
(4) 'Benjamin at p. 878* 
(5) Per Lord Diplock L*J. in Ro v, Ward ltd. v. Bigmall 
C19673 
I QeBe 534-551 at P*545- 
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B. When There is Something Remal-ning to be Done 
Sometimes either the seller or the buyer is bound to do 
something to the goods* Therefore, we will see firsti 
lo When the seller is bound to do something to the goods: 
ao to put the goods into a deliverable statee 
In this case the property does not pass until such thing be 
done, and the buyer has notice thereof. The term "deliverable 
state" has been already discussed. 
(') 
Here it is sufficient to 
point out that this rule is based on the common law prevailing 
before the Act, 
(2 ) 
and was applied by the Court of Appeal in 
Underwood Ltd. v. Burgh Castle Brick. 
(3) 
The engine, in this case, 
was not in a deliverable state, because it needed two or three 
weekst work by the sellers before it could be put on rail. The 
sellers had to detach it and take it to pieces; both the expense 
and the new work were to be provided by theme It is a well known 
rule, now embodied in s. 18, v. 2 of the Act. 
(4) 
The final words "and the 'buyer has notioe thereof" were added 
in Committee on a suggestion from Bootland that-it wall unfair that 
the risk should be tranefdrred to the buyer without notioe*(5) 
It is submitted that "notioe" means "knowledge% 
(6) 
(1) Ante - 16 1- 
(2) Rugg va Mnett (18,09) il P.? xt 210, 
Acraman va Morrice (1849) 8'C'-"13- 449- 
(3) [1922] 1 K*Bo 343- Suprao, 
(4) Per Scruttont-LJe in'Under"od, W4 Supra 
Chalmaersq Sale of Goods 17th ed. at, P-150- 
(6) BenJamin at P-1559 
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b. to weigh, measure, test, or do some other act or thing with 
reference to the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the 
price* 
Here again, the property does not pass until such act or thing 
be done, and the buyer has notice there6fo 
This rule codifies the common"law before the passing of the 
Act, 
(') 
but with the additional requirement (from Scotland) that 
the buyer should have notice. 
The duty to weigh, measure, test, etc. must be one which is to 
be performed by the seller, otherwise this rule will not have its 
effect. 
(2) 
2* When the buyer is bound to do something to the goods: 
a* When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller 
or does any other act adopting the transaction& 
This is the normal case of (Sale or return) contractq This 
contract means: 
(3) 
the purchaser may return the goods within a 
reasonable timet and the option of return belongs solely to the 
purchaser; the other party cannot evenask for the return of the 
goodst and his only right is to sue for the price if the goods are 
not returned*(4) This contract does not pass the property in the 
goods at the moment when the contract is made, but at a subsequent 
(1) Hanson v. --Meyer 
(18 5) 6 East,, 614, 
Z-agua v.. Iýqrnell (1809) 2 Camp. 239- 
(2) NankaýBruce v. Commonwealth Trust Ltd. F'9263 A. C. 77-809 
F118 9r ýj All, (3) Per Lord Esher in Kirkham vo Atterborg. Bgh ). g E JL' 
Rep- 450 at P-451 
(4) Compare the definition of Fletcher Rmltonj L*J* in &= ve 
Winkel E911-171 All EeRe Rep. 910 at P. 911. am 
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time on the happening of certain eventag(l) ioeo acceptance or 
adopting the transaction. "Acceptance" means acceptance of that 
part of the contract which makes him the purchaser absolutely* 
Such acceptance gives the seller the right to be paid, and Eme for 
the. price; that is the only right of the seller, and he cannot ask 
for the return of the goods. The words "does any *,, * act adopting 
the transaction" are difficult to construeo What "transaction" 
is the buyer to adopt? It cannot be the transaction by which the 
goods were delivered to him "on sale or return"* That transaction 
had already been adopted. The words muett thereforeq mean an 
adoption of the transaction so as to make the buyer the absolute 
purchaser of the goods. That will be some act which signifies that 
he intends to be the absolute purchaser. If he does some act which 
would be consistent only if he were the absolute purchaser, that 
signifies an ac ceptance or adoption within the statute; 
It has 'been argued that the buyer must do something Which is 
quite inconsistent with a power to return -the goods. That proposition 
is too wide. The act must be an act whioh'Is Anoonsistent with his 
not being the absolute purchaser of the goodse If a Man has become 
a buyer under a simple contract of I'sale'or return", and nothing has 
been said as to time of payment, the price must be paid within a 
reasonable time, Thtt in a transaction on credit. Tn this caseq 
an act was done by the man who was in possession of the goods'under 
a contract of "sale or return"I he pawned the goodsq He had not 
then the power of-returning the goodej unless he repaid the amount 
Z "a the wumple given 'by Buckley, L, J,, in Germ vt a! 
upra) at P-913* 
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advanced by the pawnee,. That is inconsistent with his free power 
to return the goods. He ought not so to deal with the goods unless 
he means to treat himself as being the absolute purchaser. The 
evident conclusion is that he has treated himself as the absolute 
purehaser, 
be If the buyer does not signify his approval or acceptance 
to the seller but retains the goods without giving notice 
of rejectiong theng if a time has been fixed for the return 
of the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no 
time hag been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time. 
What is a reasonable time is a question of fact., 
Two important questions arise from this sectiong 
First: the meaning of a "reasonable time" 
Secondly: When special circumstances come up preventing the buyer 
from doing anything. 
These two questions are explained in the following Paragrapbe: 
FIrst: The meaning of a "reasonable timeN 
Reasonable time is a matter of faot to be gathered from the 
circumstances of the casee(l) ]hxt, nevertheless "reasonable time" 
can be defined as follows: "It is a sufficient period of time through 
which the buyer is able to decide something concerning the goods. 
The limits of this sufficient period depend completely on the 
evidence of the case, the nature of the goods and the market of the 
goods, " 
-(Balham 
I Ltd. 
E1962] 
2 All F. R., 4821* (1) Poole vo Smithts Car S41em am 
S ; Mlcular, Omerod L. J. at P-486* 
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Secondly: Special circumstances: 
Sometimes the buyer finds himself unable to retain the goods 
for some reasons beyond his control. The case of Re Perrier, ex 
pIrte stee v. Donald(l) is a good example of special 
circumstances: 
On November 12,13t 14,1941 Mrs* Donald sold some antique 
furniture to Mrs, Perrier on approval for one week* On November 
15 the sheriff levied execution on Ws. Ferrierts goods on behalf 
of two of her creditorsq before she had the opportunity to see the 
goods properly. It was held that the property in the goods had not 
passed, and they still belonged to Mrs. Donald, for after November 15 
they were "retained" by the sheriff, and not by MrSe Perriere 
(1) (1944) 60 ToLoR* 295- E94] ChO 295* 
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Second: Unasocrtained Goods 
Although the Act does not distinguish between the types of 
unascertained goods, but it would appear that three categories of 
goods are included* Firstly, goods to be manufactured or grown by 
the seller. Secondly, purely generic goods, and thirdly, an 
unidentified portion of a special whole*(') The property in these 
-types does not pass to the buyer unless or until the goods are 
ascertained (s. 16). Thus Bovill C*J* said in Heilbutt and others 
vo Hickson and others: 
(2) 
"In the case of executory contracts, where the goods are not 
ascertained or may not exist at the time of the contract, from the 
nature of the transaction no property in the goods can pass to the 
purchaser 'by virtue of the contract itself; but, where certain goods 
have been selected and appropriated by the seller, and have been 
approved and assented to by the buyer, then the case stands, as to 
the vesting of the property, very much in this same position as upon 
a contract for the sale of goods which are ascertained at the time 
of the bargain.,, 
(3) 
The effect 7 order in. pAssing; the Rrg erty In. mm--Mý -of 
the deliver 32 
unascertained poods 
The delivery order isnot irafficient to pasa the property 
(1) Benjamin at P. 166. AtlYah at P- 155o 
; (2) (1872)-L. R. 7 C*P**438* 
(3) Tbid at P- 449* 
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without attornment(l) or intimation, 
(2) 
Thus in Laurie and Mornwood 
vo Dudin and Son-s,, 
(3) 
it was held that the mere giving of the 
delivery order by the vendor and the handing of it to the defendents 
by the plaintiffs was not sufficient without more to pass the - 
property in the 200 quarters to the plaintiffs before servance from 
the bulk. 
The attornment or intimation occurswhon the third person 
acknowledges to the buyer that he holds the goods on his behalf. 
(4) 
Unconditional APPLo-2riation 
It is to be noted that s. 16 does not state that the property 
will Wss if and when the goods are ascertained* Property in 
ascertained goods passes when'the parties intend it to pass (8,17)- 
Again, although the passing of property is dependent upon the 
intention of the partieug 'but in the absence of a different 
intentiong the law imputes to them an inten-tion, that property is 
not to pass unless and until the goods have 'been unconditionally 
appropriated to the contract. 
The meaning of unconditional appropriation: 
It is very difficult to give a precise definition for that tem. 
Rule 5*2 s*18 gives one illustration of an unconditional 
(I) Laurie and Mr od Dudin and Sons, [19263 1 K*B* 223, 
r_1925J All E*Re RApp* 4149 
Witehouse vt Fbreýt Roost L*C* Vol, 17 at ppe&ý116. 
(2) NoMwen v. Smi+, h Roset 6C* Vol. n at pp, 6591.60 
(3) (Supra),, 
(4) W&Tdar vo-Iforwood 
. E9683 2 Q*B* 663* 
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appropriation. 
(') 
But apart from that particular instance, the 
meaning of that term has been discussed on many occasions by the 
courts* It may well be that what is necessary to constitute an 
unconditional appropriationwill vary according to the type of 
goods in question and the general circumstances of the case. Therefore 
it was quite right when Parke, 33o pointed out 
(2) 
that appropriation 
may be understood in different senses: "It may mean a selection on 
the part of the vendor, where he has the right to ohooese the article 
'Which he has to supply in performance of his contract. Or the word 
may mean that both parties have agreed that a certain article shall 
be delivered in pursuance of the corrtract 9 and yet the property may 
not pass in either case **9 tAppropriationt may also be used in 
another sense, vize where both parties agree upon -the specific 
article in which the property is to pasag and nothing remains to be 
done in order to pass ito" 
The appropriation must be unconditional, that is to 13ayg 'the 
Party appropriating must intend that the property shall pass by the 
appropriation, if assented to by the other partyg and not upon the 
occurrence of some further event, sego payment or Under of the 
. (3) 
price* Therefore the act of the party appropriating in simply 
selecting the goods which he intends to be delivered cannot pass the 
property in then by appropriationg something more is required* 'the' 
(1) S. 18 Rule 5.2 providest 
Where, in, PUrGUaZC* Of the cOntractl the seller delivers the 
goods to the buyer or to a carrier or other bailee .. (whether 
named by the buyer or not) for the purpose of transmission to 
the IMYer,, arA does Myt reserve the right of disposaig he in 
deemed to have unoonditiomlly. APPropriated, -the goods to t4e, 
contrazte 
(2) In Wait ve-Baker, (1849) 2 Ezoh. 118. 
(3) ? or 4kin, J* in Stein. Forbes & Coo vo C 
(1916) 86 L*J*Koý, 
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selection will have subsequently to be approved by the other party, 
so that both parties are agreed that those are the goods to be 
sold*(') 
The assent of the buyer: 
It has been said that the assent of the buyer is in fact an 
authority conferred by him on the seller to pass the property in 
the goods by appropriation* 
(2) 
This assent which Rule 5 requires 
for the appropriation may be expressed as in Rohde ve Thwaites 
(3) 
.. ON 
or implied as in, PifMataro v, Gilroy* 
(4) 
The expressed or the implied assent may be given before the 
appropriationg e, g., a bookseller orders certain books from a 
publisher; when the bookeg properly packed and addreBsedl are 
delivered to the railway they are deemed to have been iLneonditionally 
appropriated by the seller (R-5.2) and since the buLYerq when placing 
the order,, has impliedly assented to. such appropriationv property 
passes at that time* 
Delivery of the goods to the carrier: 
Delivery of the goods to a oarrierl whether named by thebuyer or not, 
for the parpose, of transmission to the buyer in Prima facie deemed to 
be a delivery of goods to the buyer and property will paset on the 
ground that "the moment the goods, which have been selected in 
pursuance of the contract, a; re delivered to the carrier, the carrier 
(1) Rahde v.. TkLaites (1827) 6 B* & Ce 388o 
(2) jermer vo-smith (1869) 1, *Ro 4 C*P* 270,277t 278* 
(3) Suprao 
plett s Lo Beattie 
EIE1963 I Q*Bv 519,9 
(4) (1919) 120. L*Te 480o E191. 
@ 
I KoBo 459* 
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becomes the agent of the vendee; and if there is a binding 
contract between the vendor and the vendee **& then there is no 
doubt that the property passes by such delivery to the carriero" 
But a mere delivery of the quayrtity of unaseertained goods, 
eoge to a carrier, will not pass the property* 
(2) 
Future goods: 
The question of appropriation has arisen in a rrimber of shipbuilding 
cases, In such cases, as in the case of all goods to be manufactured 
by the seller, the general presumption is that no property is to pass 
until the article is completed* 
(3) 
Finally, it must be mentioned that Pearson, T. , in Carlos 
Feder22iel & Co. S *A* v. -Charles 
TwiZ& & Lo. Ltd. 
(4) 
mmed up the 
law relating to appropriation in the following passage: 
"First, Rule 5 of Sect- 18 of the Act is one of the Rules for 
ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which 
the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer unless a different 
intention appearse Therefore -the element of'oommon intention has 
always to be borne in minde A mere setting apart or selection by 
the seller of the goods whioh he expects to use in performance of 
the contract is not enough* If that is all, he can change his mind 
and use those goods in performance of same other contract and use 
XL Bake (1) Per Parke, B., in Xait r (1849) 2 Exche 1979 
e: (2) Realv v. - 
Zowltt- & Sons, (1917) 116 L*Te 591- D11j] 1 K*B*337* 
(3) Reid V, IStcBeth E9041 A*Ce 223* But see Re BIVth Ship2aill ju 
Co, P 926 
0000 
j Ch- 494 'When it was held by the Court of Appeal that 
the property in the inc2Mlete ship had passed to the buyer 8 6ii 
the ground that the contract provided that on the paymentof 09 
first instalment "the vessel and all materials and things 
appropriated for her should thenceforth become and remain thO 
absolute property of the purchaser*" 
(4) E19577] 1 lacyd's Rep. 240 pp*255-256o 
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some toher goods in performance of this contract* To constitute 
an appropriation of the goods to the contract the parties must 
have had, or be reasonably supposed to have had, an intention to 
attach the contract irrevocably to those goods, so that those goods 
and no others are the subject of the sale and become the property 
of the buyer. 
Secondly, it is by agreement of the parties that the appropriaion, 
involving a change of ownership, is made, although in some oases the 
buyerls assent to an appropriation is conferred in advance by the 
contract itself or otherwise* 
Thirdl, yl an appropriation by the seller with the assent of the 
buyer may be said always to involve an actual or constractive 
delivery. If the seller retains possessioni, he does so all bailee 
for the buyer. There is a passage in Chalmerst Sale of Goods Act, 
12the ed* at P-75 which states: "In the second place, if the decisions 
'be carefully examinedg it will 'be found -that in every ease where the 
property has been held to pass, there has been an actual or 
constructive delivery of the goods to -the buyer*" 
I think that is right, subject bnly to this possible 
qualification, that there may be after such constructive delivery 
an actual delivery still to be made by the seller under the contract* 
Of course, that is quite possible, because delivery is the transfer 
of possession, whereas appropriation transfers ownership. So there 
my be first an appropriation, constructive deliveryl whereby the 
seller becomes bailee. for the buyer, andthen a subsequent" 
delivery involving actual possession, and when I say that I have in 
no2d, in, particular the cases cited, namely AldriýM 
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1 (2) Johnson( 
) 
and 12Won ve Hirdns . 
Pour-thly, one has to remember Sect. 20 of the Sale of Goods Actq 
whereby the ownership and the risk are normally associated. 
Therefore, as it appears that there is reason 
ior thinking, on the 
construction of the relevant documents, that the goods were, at all 
material times, still at the seller's risk, that is prima facie an 
indication that the property had not passed to the buyer* 
Fifthly. usually, but not necessarily, the appropriating act 
is the last act to be performed by the Esellero For instancet if 
delivery is to be taken at the seller's premises and the seller has 
appropriated the goods when he has made the goods ready and 
identified them and placed them in position to be taken by the buyer 
and has so informed the buyer, and if the buyer agrees to come and take 
them, that is the assent to the appropriatiom But if there is a 
further act, an important and decisive act, to be done by the seller, 
then there is prima facie evidence that probably the property does 
nab pass until the final act is donee'!, 
It can be inferred now, from all the circumstances above 
mentioned, that the unconditional appropriation which passes the 
property in the goods to the buyer occurs where the contract has 
become irrevocably attached to the goods In question without 
suspending the passing of Its property on any event* In other wordev 
the term "unconclitional appropriationr means one of the stages in 
the transaction in which tho'goods become ascertained, and the 
intention of the parties to pass the property is clear and vmmspended 
on amy event 
(1) (1857) 7 IS! & Be, 885- 
(2) (1859) 4 He & No 402o 
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t- of DjsRoaal: Reservation of the Rig)j 
The cases which illustrate the reservation of the right of 
disposal by unilateral action of the seller when appropriating the 
goods have mostly arisen in connection with the sale of goods to be 
carried by 3ea. In the light of section 19(1) the seller can, by 
the terms of the contract or appropriation, reserve the property 
in the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled, and-when he 
has done so property does not pass until the conditions are 
fulfilled though the goods might have been delivered to the buyer, 
his agent, or a carrier for transmission to the buyer. The seller 
may reserve the property in the goods until he has received the 
purchase price. Therefore the seller can deragate from the 
presumption contained in section 18. r-5(2) of the Act that such 
delivery is deemed to be an unconditional appropriation of the goods 
to the contract* 
Subsection (2) raises a preswuption in favour of the sellerts 
intention to reserve the property where the bill of lading is to 
order of the seller or his agent, The result of that provision is 
that the property will normally pass only when the bill of lading is 
transferred to the buyer and the price is paid or tendered. 
Subsection (3) applies to documentary bills of exchange where 
the bill of lading is attached to the bill of exclumge drawn by 
the seller on the buyer for the price, and the evident intention of 
the seller is to reserve the property until the buyer has honoured 
the bill of exchange* 
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Transfer of Property in C*T*F. and F*O. B* Contracts 
More co=only, C*I, P, and F. O*Bo contracts for Ithe sale of 
un scertained goods, so that no property can pass before ascerta-Inment* 
(9.16. ) Once the goods are ascertained, the overriding rule is that 
property passes when intended to pass(r--17s, 'j Noreover, the bill of 
lading plays an important role in this respect, because, by 
mercantile law, it is the crjmbol of the goodea(l) The transfer of 
the bill of lading operates as a transfer of the constructive 
possession of the goodeq and may operate as a transfer of the 
property in then if so intendede 
(2) 
Therefore as the question of 
passing of property is one of "actual intention! 's that means the 
property passes when it is intended to pass, and every case must be 
judged on its own meritse 
In order to have a clear idea about this subject in the light 
of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, a distinction must take place between 
two states* The first one is where t. he goods are represented by a 
bill of lading as in the case of Cel*F* contracts and F*O*Bo contracts 
where the seller has undertaken the additional duty to ship the goods, 
The second one is where the goods are not represented by a bill of 
lading as in the case of classic F*O*B* 
(1) Per Lord Wright i Ross To Smyth & Co. -v. 
TO, Bail= & C(5*Ltd 
v03 All E*Ro 0 at p. 
97- rL 1114 
(2) Barber v. - 
Mejerstein (1870) L. R- 4 H. L- 317- 
Sanders v. 4'. býcLean (1583) 11 QoBoDo 327 at P- 341- 
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First,: I&ere the goods are represented by a 'bill of lading 
The goods on board a ship which are represented by a bill of 
lading can be either a cargo to different buyers (bulk shipment) 
or certain cargo to a buyer. Therefore we deal first with the 
bulk shipment and then vie will see the normal case of shipment* 
A. Bulk Shipment: 
In cases of overseas sales involving bulk shipment which are not 
physically split up, it is necessary to see whether the bill of 
lading is a good instrument in ascertaining the goods or note 
The problem stems largely from the rule that property in goods 
cannot pass until the goods are ascertained. In jLaý & Sor vo 
MoLintook(l) Lord Mclaren said: 
(2) 
"I think it must be taken as settled that, although the goods 
are stored, the delivery of bills of lading has effect in all 
respect, whether as a title of property or whether as a security 
to the person to whom it has been indorsed or deliveredg exactly 
as if the goods were on board the ship .. * Bills of lading have 
been long in uset and as far back as we have any knowledge of 
their use they were held to be negotiablee Such billsq expressed 
to be for so many bags of flour or quarters of grain on board a 
particular shipq would pass by blank indorsation from hand to hand 
while the ship was at sea. How is it possiblel consistently with 
such a state of the law, that the goods could be specifically 
(i) igo6-07 S*ce PP-936-953- 
(2) lbid at p, 952. 
-179- 
aseertainedl or that the %-=rious persons who took such bills 
of lading could examine an-d verify the good s while the ship 
was in midocean? We kncn7 that bills of lading axe granted. 
for portions of cargo in bulk- which cannot, of coarse, be 
ascertained, and. where bills of lading are granted in these 
circumstances they must operate as a transfer of an unascertained 
quantity of goods on board the ship, until delivery is made in 
terms of the obligation, " 
In Re Wait(') a ColeFe buyer of 500 tons cut of a bulk cargo 
gh he was not 
bound to do so) of 19000 tons of wheat paid (althoug 
againat an invoice. Tho seller was thus left in possession of 
the bill of lading which he hypothecated and delivered to his 
bank; and he then became bankrupt. At this time the 500 tons 
had not been separated from the bulk, so that no property had 
passed to the buyer* The buyer attempted to evade the effect 
of section 16 and to obtain delivery of the 500 tons Out of the 
bankrupt's estate by claiming specific performance of the 
contract of sale. A majority of the court of appeal rejected 
the claim on the ground that the goods formed at all relevant 
times an undifferentiated part of a larger bulk and were 
therefore not "specific or aecertained" within section 52* 
Akin LeZe said: 
(2) 
"It will be noticed from the above statement 
of facts -that no 500 'tons of wheat have ever been ear-ctarkedr 
identified or appropriated as the wheat to be delivered to the 
(1) E1927] I Ch. 606. (2) lbid at po 6299 
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claimants under the contract. The claimants have never 
received aany bill of lading, warrant, delivery order or any 
document of -title representiAg, the goods&" 
What does Atkin L. J. mean by "The claimants have never 
received any bill of lading"'? It seems to me quite clear that 
he meams: the bill of lading is a good instrument in ascertaining 
the goods for t1he purpose of passing the property* 
But, it must be mentioned that British Jný,: isprvtdence stands 
against this ideat Thus in Benjaming(l) there is a comment 
after the statement of Atkin LoJe in Re Wait(supra)says: 
"It is submitted that receipt of such a document would n0tq in 
fact, have improved his position since-a delivery order or 
warrant cannot pass property until actual ascertainment of 
the 
goodsl and the same is probably true of a bill of lading for ail 
undifferentiated part of a larger bulkf becanse it is inconsiErtent 
with section 16. " 
I think, that will lead us to a strange*result; which is the 
property in the goods of bulk shipment cannot be transferred to 
the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained by 
separating them from the bulk. This separationg usuallyq takes 
place in the port of discharge* Therefore -the bulk shipment can 
only be carried under 11ex ship" contracts where the property 
"does not pass to the buyer until the goods have crossed the 
shipts rail at the port of delivery*" 
(2) 
(1) at 1D& 750o London, 19744, 
(2) Yandsze insurance Asnociation ve jee 
[S I 
1918 Aece 5859 589o 
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Thereforeq the bill of lading must be competent in ascertaining 
the goods. But it is a moot point -that "warrant, deliveI7 
order or any document of title representini; the goods are 
competent in ascertaining the goods for the purpose of passing 
the property in the goods without doing some more acts, We 
have seen that the property in the goods cannot pass until the 
goods are ascertained and generally it will not pass until they 
are unconditionally appropriated to the contracts This 
ascertainment and appropriation will often involve some act on 
the paxt of the person in actual possession of the goods,.,.. 3uoh 
as the a eparation of the quantity comprised in -the delivery 
order from the bulkg and an acknowledgement that the goods so 
separated are held for the person designated in the delivery 
order. In this way attornment and passing of PrCPertY are in 
practice closely linked, though there is no necessary connection 
between theme This attorriment is implied in the I'shiple 
delivery order" by the promising of the shipownerl who issues it, 
to deliver the goods to a certain person or his order. This 
implied attornment makes the I'shipts delivery order" of a higher 
legal quality than other delivery orderse(l) 
Buyers of parts of bulk shipment do sometimes pay against 
delivery orders and even invoices(2) when they are not obliged 
-to do so, but this praotioe exposes them to great risks. 
(3) 
(1) See ante at po qD 
(2) Re Wait (supra). 
?p (3) n-e- IThlon. G*M*B*Ho v. C!, ýqbay Prince SteamshU Co, 
L969 1 Q. B* 219--. 254o 
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The buyer ecan protect himself again-. t this disadvantage by 
stipulating for a giiarantee (from the bank for instance) to 
(1) 
avoid the risky consequences of taking a delivery order*' 
B* Normal Shipment: 
Here we have a certain cargo to a buyerg and this cargo is 
represented by a bill of lading, Inthis caseg the passing 
of property depends or. the inference of an intention drawn 
from the provision of the contract, the form of the shipping 
documents, and the way in which the documents have been dealt 
with,, These matters can be discussed as follows: 
1. The e; xpressed intention: 
The most common intention is payment to the seller shall be 
madeq or adequately assured. Accordingly, if the contract 
so provided, the normal inference is -that no property passes 
until payment is satisfied, There is no doubt whatsoever 
that a reservation of the property in the goods until payment 
does not destroy the nature of a 04PI*F* & F*OeB-P contracts* 
In Ross T. Smyth & Co. v, 
-T. 
De-Bailoy & Co. Ltd 
(2) 
Lord 
Wright said: 
(3) 
"The contract provided for cash or (at 
sellerst option) an acceptance of sellerst draft against 
doouments* That condition for 'the transfer of the documents had 
not been fulfilled* The bills of lading were the symbols of 
the goods, and the appellants, by retaining them, retained as 
_y 
& Christie, Mller- (1) HeilLber. S=ons-& Co. Ltd. v. Harve 
(1922) 12 la. L. R. 455, 
(2) F1940] 3 All We 60o 
(3) Ibid at p. 66o 
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against the regPondentfs title and control over the goods, 
All the respondents had at that stage was a contractual right 
to obtain control, and thereby become owners upon taking up 
the d6miments. "(1) 
IN FoOoBe Contracts, again, where the seller reserves a 
right of disposal, he does so until the conditions of the 
contract as-'-to payment are met; 
(2) 
and before they are met 
the property does not pass. \-J/ 
Difficulties begin to arise where the contract contains 
apparently conflicting provisions, Thus in NiDDon Yusen Kaisha, 
ve Ramjiban Serowgeet(4) the contract provided for payment by 
cash against mate's receipts, and this provision would, had it 
stood alonel have postponed the passing of propertj until such 
payment. But the contract went on to provide that so long as 
the matets receipts were in the possession of the seller, his 
lien was to subsist until payment in full-, and this clause was 
relied upon to show that the property passed before payment as 
the seller could not have a lien over goods which were his own 
property* In Barton, _ 
hoppson & Co. v. _Vij; 2rs 
Bros. 1(5) the 
contraat provided for payment by approved acceptanoe a; t three 
months from the date of the bill of lading, in exchange for 
(1) Also: Sanders Brothers-y. Ihil.. ean & co-, (1883) 11 Q*B*D* 327-344* 
(2) Tames vo The Commonwealth (1939) 62 C*L*R* 339.381. 
(3) Ibid at pp. 384-385- 
Also*. ORR v. hater, (1875) 1 C. P. D. 47. 
(4) E193fl A*C* 429* 
(5) (1906) 19 Com. Caso 175- 
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shipping documents, and continued-O "Properby in goods to be 
deemed for all purposes, except retention of vendor's lien 
for unpaid price, to have passed to buyer when goods put on 
board. " The buyer refased to accept the draft or pay for the 
goods; and the actual decision was that he was not entitled to 
retain, or deal with the shi., pping documents. Dicta in the 
case suggest-that the property in the goods had not pa: ssed to 
the buyer though it does not seem that these dicta were 
necessary for the decision. To the extent to which the 
opinions expressed in these two cases conflict, one can only 
say that the passingr of property is a question of intention in 
each case. 
(1) 
2* The Intention and the bill of ladipg (form and dealing)- 
It it, quite common for the seller to take the bill of lading 
either In his name or in the buyerts name. Thus we will see first: 
(a) The bill of lading is in the sellerts name: 
By section 19(2) a seller is prima facie deemed to have reserved 
the right of disposal where goods are shipped and the bill of 
lading makes the goods deliverAle to the order of the'seller 
or his agent. In such a case the seller may deal with the bill 
of lading so as to "secure the contract price" then "the 
presumption appears to be that the property is to pass only on 
the performance by the buyer of his part of the contract " 
(2) 
(1) Benjamin at P- 715- 
(2) Per L*rd Parker in the Parchim [191fl A*C* 
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or if the jus disponendi has been reserved by the vendor for 
some other purpose that that of securing the contract price, 
the property will not pass until that purpose will be fulfilled, 
Thus in rarabita v. Ottoman Bank(') Cotton, L*J* stated: 
(2) 
"#.. the delivery by the vendor to a common carrier, or 
(unless the effect of the shipment is restricted by the terms 
of the bill of lading) shipment orboard a ship of, or 
chartered for, the purchaser, is an appropriation sufficient 
to pass the property, Tft however, the vendorg when shipping 
the articles which he intends to deliver under the contrack., 
takes the bill of lading to his own order and does so not as 
ag, ent or on behalf of the purchaser, but, on his own behalf, it 
is held that he thereby reserves to himself a power of 
disposing of the property, and that consecrientlY there is no 
final appropriation, and the property does not on shipment pass 
to the purchasers. When the vendor on shipment takes the bill 
of lading to his own order, he has the powerý-of absolutely disposing 
of the cargo and may prevent the purchaser from ever asserting any 
right of property therein. " 
Again, Barke B., said in. Var Casteel v. Booker(3) $too* where 
goods are shipped under a bill of lading making them deliverable 
to the shipper's own order, the property does not vest in the 
consIgnee until the bill of lading has been delivered to and 
accepted by him*" 
(1) (1878) Ex. D* 164-1730 
(2) lbid at P-172*. 
(3) 2 Ex. 699. Revised* 
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Now it is obvious that the taking of the bill of lading in 
the name of the seller prevents the property from passing to 
the lmyer, because there is no unconditional appropriation 
sufficient to pass the property in the goods. Although the 
seller delivers the goods to the carrier, but the property 
does not pass to the buyer if the seller reserves the jus 
disponendi. Therefore the delivery of the goods to a carrier 
does not alone pass the property without the intention of the 
parties to pass it. 
(') 
(b) The bill of lading is in the buyerts name: 
It has been said under the Act thatq if the bill of lading 
makes the goods deliverable to the buyer or his agent, the 
property will pass to the buyer immediately on shipments In 
E. Clemens Horst Co. LrS Biddell Bros. 
(2) 
Kemiedy L*J* said(3) 
that where the bill of lading was made out in favour of the 
parohaser or his agent or representative, the property in the 
goods passed, unconditionally, to the consignee on shipment. 
This attitude is not effective in the Common Law* 
It has been said that if the bill of lading is indorsed in 
blankq or to the buyer's order, and sent directly to the buyerv 
then the property will pass on shipment if there is no intention 
to the contrary which may appear from the provisions of the 
contract or from the circumstances of the case. 
(4) 
(1) Wait v. Baker (1848) 2. &, 1. Revised Reports 76, pp-469-476. 
(2) flol 1 K*B* L 1. -7 
11 
(3) Jbid at P-956. 
(4) Key and others V* Cotesworth and other_s (1852) 7 EX-595w6O8- 
The Revised Reports 99. PP 750-7609 
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Thus when the seller retains the bill of lading, which was 
taken in the buyer*s nane, to Becure payment, the property 
will not pass to the buyer on shipment merely because the bill 
of lading makes the goods deliverable to the order of the 
buyero In the Kronprinsessan YhrMretaj(1) goods had been 
shipped under bills of lading making them deliverable to the 
order of the purchasers. The bill of lading had not been 
taken up until after the capture of the goodso It was said 
in that case: "The passing of property being a question of 
intention is ultimately a question of fact. There is no 
evidence of the intention of these parties beyond the inference 
I 
to be drawn from their situation and interests and from the 
mercantile operation which they conducted*ýýL*e 
Importance 
attaches to the fact that the shippers, having loaded the 
coffee on a general ship -a bailment to the carrier - took 
the bills of lading to the consignees' order. oo. 
(3) 
In these 
circumstances what can be inferred as tothe passing of the 
general property? What is there to show an intention to pass 
that property for anything less than paymentf and what motive 
is there for such an intention? ... 
(4) 
It seems clear that the 
consignors desired to retain an interest in the goods, otherwise 
why should they retain the bills of lading in their agentst hand? ý: ý 
E192ýj I A. C. 486. 
lbid at P- 511- 
Ibid at P- 512. 
lbid at P- 514* 
lbid at P- 515- 
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Certainly no case was found, in which it was held that taking 
the bill of lading in the buyer's name, while withholding 
delivery of it until presentation and taking -up of the 
documents, would not be, as an appropriation, equally 
conditional**. 
(') 
The intention has still to be inferred, 
principally from what was done and from the communications 
made with reference to it, and these point to an intention 
not to past; the property till the drafts were paid* It is 
really rather a reason for intending to get the documents 
presented and taken up as soon as ponsibleg than for an 
intention not to retain the ownership even imtil that could be 
effectede 
(2) 
The claims of Engwall, Bery & Hallgrent Levander and Ofverstorm 
must be dismissed, for their ownership only arises by 
documentary transfer of the goods while afloat, which was only 
effected after seizure, and the goods, when seizedq belonged to 
the owners of the parcel of conditional contraband in the same 
ship, which had an ulterior enemy destination* 
The result of this is that the property may pass on shipment 
when the seller's intention to pass it at this point is clear. 
(c) Indorsement and transfer of thebill of lading: 
It can be inferred from the cases above mentioned that the 
process of passing of property in the goods depends completely 
on the intention of the parties to the contract to be drawn from 
(1) lbid at P. 515-6- 
(2) Ibid at P* 518o 
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the dealing with the bill of lading and its form. Therefore 
the bill of lading has no power- to pass the property in the 
goods without the intention to pass it, Property in the 
goods passes by such indorsement and delivery of the bill. of 
lading, whenever it is the intention of the parties -that the 
property should pass, 
(') 
In Sewell v. Burdick 
(2 ) 
Lord BlackInirn. 
stated: ooe no case was cited at the bar, nor am I aware of 
(3)" 
any in which it has been held that a transfer of the bill of 
lading for value necesaarilyt whatever might be the intention, 
passed the whole legal property. " This decision has made it 
clear that the effect of the indorsement of a bill of lading 
depends entirely on the particular circumstances of each 
indorsement and that there is no general rule that indorsement 
passes the whole legal property in the goodso But it was said 
in Lickbarrow v. Mason(4) that, by the custom of merchantst 
bills of lading, expressing goods or merchandizes to have been 
shipped by any person or persons to be delivered to order or 
assigns, have been, and are, at any time after such goods have 
been shipped, and before the voyage performedl for which they 
have been or are shipped, negotiable and transferable by the 
shipper or shippers of such goods to any other person or persons, 
by such shipper or shippers indorsing such bills of lading with hist 
her, or their name or nameov and delivering or transmitting the 
(1) Sanders v. MacLean (1883) 11 Q*BeDe supra. 
(2) (1884) 10 App. Cas- 74-' 
(3) Ibid, at p. 102, 
(4) English Reports 101 KeB* 382, (1794) 5 TeRe 683- 
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same so indorsed, or causing the same to be so delivered or 
transmitted to such other person or persons; and that by such 
indorsement and deliveryp or transmission, the property in 
-ransferred and passed to such such goods has been, and is t 
other person or persons. And that, by the custom of merchantsv 
indorsements of bills of lading in blank, that is to say, by 
the shipper or shippers with their names only, have been, and are, 
and may be, filled up by the person or persons to whom they are 
so delivered or transmitted as aforesaid$ with words ordering 
the delivery of the goods or contents of such bills of lading 
to be made to such person or persons, andq according to the 
practice of merchants, the same, when filled up, have the same 
operation and effect, as if the same had been made or done by 
ouch shipper or shippers when hev she, or they indorsed the 
same bills of lading with their names as aforesaid. "() 
This special verdict which recites -that "the property is 
transferred by indorsement" must be read "the property which 
it was the intention to transfer is transferredj tj(2) because 
the "particular mode of dealing with a laill of lading must, 
whenever it occurs and in whatever circumstancesq always prove 
a particular intention. t, 
O) 
And "The English cases ,, on which 
the Sale of Goods Act was founded seem to show that the 
appropriation would not be such as to pass the property if it 
appears or can be inferred that there was no actual intention 
(1) rbid at p* 3 9'2,. 
(2) As suggested by Lord Selbourrie (1884) 10 App* Cas, 74 at p. 80. Scmttono 
(3) Per Lord Sumer in the Kronl2rinsessan Yarmreta E921J 1. A. C. 486, 
516-517. Approved in Ross T. SWh, 
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to pass it. "(') 
That means the thing-s to be looked at in Connection with the 
documents are, first : the name to be inserted in the bill of 
lading as the person to whom or to whose order the goods are 
to be delivered at the end of the transit, and, at2ft, how the 
document has been indorsedg forwarded and otherwise dealt with 
in fulfilment of the contract of sale* 
(2) 
Yotice of ýMroj! riation 
The sending of the notice of the appropriationg although it 
will make the goods the =bject-matters of the contract ascertained, 
is not an "unconditional appropriation" so as to pass the property 
to the buyer if the seller retains the bills of lading against 
payment of the price and thus reserves the jus disponendi. 
(3) 
Lord Wright in the course of his judgment saide. 
(4) 
"Tt is 
impossible, in my opinion, to hold that the notice of appropriation 
was, even apart from the express reservation, unconditional. Tt is 
unfortunate that the attention of the Court of Appeal does not appear 
to have been drawn to this aspect of the case, or to the fom of the 
bills of ladingg which were to shipper"s order, and were indorsed in 
blank and transferred to, and retained by, the appellants. In such 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Per Lord Parker in The Parchim [191B A, C, 157 at P-170- 
Janes v. Commonwealth (1939) 62 C, L, R- 339 at P-381. 
Ross T. Smyth & Co. v. T. D. Bail & Coo Ltd, 14 04 3 All E. R. 60 
T-1940) 45 Com- Cas. 292 (H, L. ) 
Ibid at p* 66. 
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circumstances the appellants thus held the jus disponendi, whether 
the goods were shipped by the shipper as their agents or were 
transferred to them after shipment, at least from the time when 
they received the bills of lading. " 
Which sort of property passes to the buyer?: 
In Barber v. Meyersteino 
(1) 
Lord Westbury saidt 
"Unquestionably the bill of lading ** is a living current instrument, 
and no doubt the transfer of it for value passes the absolute , 
property in the goods. ' This statement must be taken as overruled, 
or strictly limited to the circumstances of the particular caseq 
(3) 
because when the buyer receives the bill of lading, heq thereby 
acquires the right of disposal of the goods, but normally he acquires 
only conditional, property subject to the condition subsequent that 
the goods-shall revest to the seller if, upon examination they are 
found to 'be not in accordance with the contract* 
(4) 
As a result the 
buyer has two rights to reject: (1) the documents if they are not in 
order; and (2) the goods if they do not conform to the contract of 
sale"9oo the two things are quite distinct *,. * the right to reject 
the documents arises when the d6cuments are tendered, and the right 
to reject, or the moment for rejecting, the goods arises when they 
are landed and when, after examinationt they are found not to be in 
conformity with the contracto" 
(5) 
(1) (1870) L, R- 4 H*L. 317-337- 
(2) Ibid at P-335- 
(3) See (1884) 10 Appo Cas- 74 at p, 81,104. 
(4) Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd. 
I All - V. -R- 77Q- 
AO9; AI 51 0-'R- Ar%Q AR7 
Ibidt per Lord Devlin, J- at P-790. 
-193- 
3. Intention and the bill of exc-hange: 
It is provided by section 190) that, if the seller sends a 
bill of exchange to the buyer with the shipping documents the 
property does not pass unless the buyer accepts the bill of exchange. 
Moreover, that subsection provieds that "the buyer is bound to return 
the bill of lading if he does not honour the bill of exchange, and if 
he wrongfully retains the bill of lading the property in the goods 
does not pass to him, " Accordingly, if the buyer does not accept 
a bill of exchange, the property in the goods does not pass to him. 
This subsection is based on commercial custom "... when one 
merchant. in this country sends to another ... a bill of lading and 
a bill of exchange, it is not at all necessary for him to say in 
words: We require you to take notice that our object in enclosing 
these bills of lading and bills of exchange is, that before you use 
the bills of lading you shall accept the bills of exchange* Merchants 
know perfectly well what they means when they express themselves, not 
in the language of lawyersy but in the language of courteous mercantile 
communication; and I do not think that any merchant in England 
receiving a bill of Idding and a bill of exchange *., *would feel any 
doubt that he could not retain the one without accepting the other. "(') 
The bill of exchange must be accepted by the buyer in order to 
transfer the property, and if the seller discounts a bill of exchange 
with a bank before it hat; been accepted by the buyer, the property 
will not pass. In The Prinz Adalbert, 
(2) 
it was said: 11.. that the 
(1) Per Lord Cairns in Shepherd v. Harriso_n (1871) L. R* 5 HoLo 116 
pp. 132-133. 
(2) E191fl A. C-' 586. 
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ownership of the goods is to pass to the consignee when he accepts 
the draft. That inference may be modified, or rebutted, by particular 
arrangements between the shippers and the consignee, and is subject to 
the rules which arise out of a state of war existing, or immenent at 
the beginning of the transaction. The transfer of the property upon 
the acceptance of the draft is consistent with the consignee being 
either a purchaser from the shippers or their agent for the sale of 
the goods. " Phren if the seller obtains payment, but he remains under 
a secondary obligation as drawer of the bill of exchange and so 
property remains in him as security for contingencyv on the ground 
that "the sellers were still interested, and not only in theory but 
in fact were very much interested in the final disposal of the goodsý2) 
In the light of this subsection the buyer is not entitled to 
retain or deal with the bill of lading, 
(3) 
or to.. impose conditions 
as to its return: eege repayment of any freight which he may have 
paid., 
(4) 
These rules also applied where the bill*of exchange is drawn on 
a person nominated by the buyer, and not accepted by that person. 
(5) 
Moreovert there is no difference whether the bill of lading and the 
bill of exchange are sent directly to the consignee or indirectly 
(6) 
through the sellerts agent* In other words the transfer of the 
H. M. Procurator-General v. MOCe Spencer 
ý945 ] AoC. 124- 
(2) Ibidq Per Lord Porter at p. 135- 
(3) Barton. 
-Thompson 
& Co. v. Vigers Bros. (1906) 19 Com. Cas. 175- 
(4) Rew ve PN - yne. 
Douthwaite A Co 
,. 
(1886) 53 L*T. 932. 
(5) Brandt v. Bowlby (1831) 2 Be & Ad- 932. 
(6) Shepherd v. Harris2n (supra)* 
-195- 
property by the bill of lading in such a case is conditional upon the 
bill oL V exchange being honoured, and if, for example, the buyer 
should become bankrupt with the bill of lading still in his possession, 
not having accepted the bill of exchange, the seller will be able to 
claim the goods. 
(1) 
Inter. -Lion and the commercial let-ter of credit: 
Special Property- 
When a bill of lading is indorsed to a bank, it is a question 
of fact and intention of parties whether the whole property passes 
to the bank under purchase or mortgage or whether the bank acquires 
a special right of property represented by a pledge* 
In Sewell v. Burdick 
(2) 
it was stated that advances agai net the 
deposit of goods are probably some of the most common transactions of 
commercial life and if there is delivery and there are no terms 
expressed either verbally or in writing, giving any larger effect 
to the contract, the latter is known as a contract of 'pawn or pledgelt 
the legal effect of which is that only a special property passes from 
the borrower to the lender, although coupled with the power of selling 
the pledge ard transferring the whole property in it on default of 
payment at the stipulated timeg if there be any, or non-payment if 
no time for repayment has been agreed upon. " Therefore, where the 
bill of lading is transferred to a bank as security for an advancet 
(1) P. S. Atiyah "The Sale of Goods Act" 5th ed- at P&155* 
(2)(1884) 10 A. 0- 74- 
the bank will normally acquire only a special property as pledgee, 
that being the intention of the parties. 
(') 
Tn, Rosenberg- v. International Banking Corporation 
2ý 
crutton L&Jo 
said: "Bankers' liens or bankers pledges effected in such a way give, 
according to the views of merchants, the bankers a right of sale. 
Whether you talk about it as an e: ipress pledge, or whether, as Lord 
Campbell does, you talk about it as an implied pledge, in my view such 
a transaction gives an independqnt right, or right of property, to 
the bank to secure the amount which they have advanced, and the bank 
are not put on inquiry unless there is something obviously wrong with 
the transaction, " 
Form of bill of lading- 
In order that the banker may exercise his power of sale, 
however, the documents must be in such form as to be capable of 
transfer by delivery and the transferor must have a good title to 
pass* Bills of lading, for example, should be drawn in favour of 
the shipper and endorsed in blank or in favour of the paying banker 
himself where they are in favour of the buyer or of an overseas 
issuing bank, the banker clearly has no enforceable pledgeol whether 
in that case he obtains any property in the documents, as by way of 
equitable charge or assignment, is a question of intention, but if, 
on the instruction of theýbuyerj a banker is authorized to pay 
against documents which include a bill of lading drawn in favour of 
(1) Quaranty Trust Co. of Wew York v. Hannay Egil 2*KIDB. 623,6319653 
(2) (1923) 14 la. L. Rep- 344,347. 
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the buyer, the paying banker has only a lien; he has no power to 
sell, as the documents are not in transferable (merchantable) for. m*(1) 
General Pr22erty: 
Where a special property is, in this way, transferred to a bank 
by way of security, does the general property remain in the seller? 
In this respect a distinction must be made between two stages: The 
first one is when the seller ships the goods and takes the documents 
to the bank., The second one is when the seller delivers the documents 
to the bank. 
In the first stage? the general property must be in the seller In 
order to be able to pledge the documents* Thus Lord Wright saide. 
(2) 
"The general property in the goods must be in the seller if he is to 
be able to pledge them The whole system of commercial credits depends 
on the sellerts ability to give a charge on -the goods and. the policies 
of insurance, " 
In the second stage, there are two opinions: 
(a) The general property remains in seller. 
It was said that the general property remained In the seller 
precisely because the bank had not undertaken a binding obligation 
towards him* Thus it was stated in the Yronrrinsesslnn MarMet a( 
3) 
t 
"The customer applying formally to the bank for the credit was in 
(1) H. G. Gutteridge. Maurice Megrah - The Law of Bankerst Commercial 
Creditse 5th ede Londonj'1976. at p. 169, 
(2) In Ross T* Smyth & Co. v. TO, Balley & Co. Ltd1. 
[1940] 
3 r1l E. Re 60 at P*67- 
(3) E923 1 A*C. 486-520 at P- 513* 
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each case the buyer. There are some expressions in the letters 
of the sellers' agents in the case of the Paranat which suggest 
that they had made some arrangements on the sellers* behalf with 
this bank prior to the completion of the agreement of sale, so as 
to ensure an available credit ready to be operated upon, but no 
such arrangement is forthcoming or is proved, nor is there any 
suggestion of it in the other cases, and it does not ap2ear that 
2n thirr -ýiore 2as2cd bet ! y4 -! 'ween the bank and the consi ors than a 
cabled statement to the effect that "as requested we inform you 
that Lundgren & Rollven have opened a credit with ust out of which 
a draft with bills of lading can be met, " Their Lordships are 
unable to infer that, by English law at any rate, any enforceable 
obligation arose between the consignors and this bank, There was 
no contract of gnarantee,. 11 
(b) The general property vests in the buyer 
According to this opinion the general property vests in the 
buyer where the seller delivers the documents to a 'bank under a 
bankerts commercial credit under which the bank is bound to pay, 
because he has no farther interest in retaining the general property 
in the goods. Thual in Sale Continuation Ltd. ve AustIn TLIylor & Co, 
Md. 
(') 
Paull, J, said: 
( 2) "In such a ease the seller parts with his 
ownership in the documents as soon as he sends the documents to the 
bank, His right is to be paid the draft. The ownership of the 
(1) 
E1968J 2 Q, B. 849-862, 
(2) lbid at p. 861* 
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goods passes to the bq)rer but the bank has the possessory title 
of a pledgee as against the buyer. He has that title until the 
buyer puts the bank in funds in respect of -the draft and discharges 
his liability for interest payable in respect of the draft. If the 
pledgor does not do so the bank has the usual right of a pledgee to 
sell as if he were the owner. " 
This special verdict which recites that "The ownership of the 
goods passes to the buyer" should read "The ownership which it was 
the intention to transfer is transferred" in order -to be in harmony 
with r--17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893- 
Secondly: Where the goods are not represented by a bill of lading 
Under the classic P*O*B* contracts, where goods are not 
represented by a bill of lading, the almost universal rule is that 
property passes to the buyer on shipment* Thus it was said in 
-Tames v. Commonwealth(') "In a F*O*B* contract prima facie the 
property passes to the buyer upon shipment, " And if it should be 
material, the property and risk in each part of the cargo will pass 
as it crosses the ship's rail. Therefore, in Colonial Insurance Co. 
of New Zealand v. 
__ 
Adelaide M%rine Tnmirance Co 
(2) 
where the 
charterers of a vessel were also the purchasers of a cargo of wheai 
to be shipped on board, and the master of the vessel from time to 
time received delivery from the vendors *.. it was held that such 
delivery from time to time was a delivery to the purchasers, that it 
(1) (1939) 62 C. L*R. 339 at P-385- 
(2) (1886) 12 App. Cas. 128* 
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vested in them a right of possession and propertyl and that, 
consequently, they had an insurable interest in such wheat as haA 
been so delivered. 
It was said in that case: "From the ver-j nature of the contract 
to supply a cargo of wheat for a ship of 1047 tons register, and 
which it is admitted would consist of 13tOOO bags of wheat, it couldl 
not have been intended that the whole supply should be completed at 
the same moment or even in a single day- By the obarter thirty 
days were to be allowed for the loadingt and upon a proper construction 
of the contract of sale, in which nothing was stipulated as to the 
time of delivery or payment, the sellers would have a reasonable time 
to deliver it on board. By the chaiterp, -a-ty the cargo was to be 
brought to and taken from alongi3ide at mercharitts risk and expense. 
By vendorst contract they were to put it free on board for the 
charterer, and when put on board the master would receive it for the 
purchasers and hold it for them". 
(') 
In Colley v, Overseas Exporters 
(2) 
McCardie, Jo saidt 'tit seems 
.. 4. 
clear that in the absence of a special agreement the property an& 
the risk in goods does not in the ease of an P, O, Bo contract pass 
from the seller to the buyer till the goods are actually put on 
board. " 
The reason of that is the customary course of business rests 
on the assumption that shipment is an unconditional appropriation 
with the assent of the buyerl which to be inferred from the nature 
of the transaction itself*(3) 
(1) nid at P-140- 
(2) [19213 3 K. B- 302, 
(3) James v. Commonwealth (1939) 62 C*L*R-339 at P-377. 
Saffron ve Societe ffinlere Cafrika (1958) 100 C. L. R. 231 at p*242* 
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That means, the seller seems to appropriate the goods 
unconditionally to the contract by delivering the goods to the 
carrier without showing PnW implied or expressed intention to 
retain the property or the jus disponendi. 
COIýSITNTS 
After this general surveyt the following notes can be recorded: 
1. Sale of Goods Act 1893 has adopted the rules which were prevailing 
at that time in Scotland and, mostly, in England. Therefore there 
is a very strong link between the past and the present in the Act. 
2* Sale of Goods Act 1893 has made the intention of parties to the 
contract of primary significance so that it follows that: - 
(a) The appropriation does not pass the property in the goods to 
the buyer unless it is unconditional* Therefore the delivery 
of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, 
for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is not sufficient 
appropriation to pass the property in the goods, unless the 
parties to the contract intend it to be transferred at that 
time. 
(b) The bill of lading does not pass the property merelybecause 
the seller takes the bill of lading in the buyer's name, or 
indorses, and sends it to the buyer, unless his intention to 
pass the property at that moment is clear* That means: 
although the bill of lading is the symbol of the goods it 
has no power at all to pass the property to the buyer by 
itself but by the intention of the parties to the contract* 
3. We have already seen that the meaning of the intention is the 
will of the partieu to the contract, and it is obvious now that 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893 is influenced by the 11individualism"O 
The ruler. of that Act are basedon the philosophy of laissez-faire. 
which sayst Let every man be free to seek his self-interest as he 
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pleases, and maximum social good will be realized by his 
attention to his own concerns. Therefore if two or more people 
agree, why should you or I or aAyone else interfere? It follows: 
there is no need for Parliament to interfere at all* Granted, 
Adam Smith said, in effect, that nature has implanted in men the 
six motives of sympathy, self. "interest, propriety, -the propensity 
to truck and barter, a habit of labour so schooled as normally, to 
prevent over-production, and a propensity to be freev and human 
wants can be satisfied so long as fraud and violence are punished 
and the nation safeguarded against external aggression* The real 
purpose of government, in a word, is the blessing of security* 
Thus the proptection of property was the main justification 
of law according to Adam Smith, as he said: 1"rhe acquisition of 
valuable and extensive property *a* necessarily : requires the 
establishment of civil government. Where there is property, or 
at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days* labour, 
civil government is not so necessary*" 
Aocordingly-the property became a saorfA right for the 
individual, Thus, Locks argued. 9 no man's property could be taken 
without his consent, and Kant*s argument that a thing is so connected, 
with its owner that anybody who uses it without the ownerts consent 
does the owner an injury* Similarlyt HW1, postulated that 
property was one of those rights of an individual whic- 
upon his being an wrtononons being. 
(2) 
(2) Peter Steinj- Jqbn Shand The, Legal Vaules:, Jn west S00isty *2 ern 
, 0) Harold, Jo Laski. *_ -The Rise of European Liberation 1958 'W79-=ý, 
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ThoBe views accepted the principle "Freedom of contract" 
as an essential le-gal an-pecti, of individual freedom*- This 
philosophy has been changing gradually during thin eentux-Y, 
Modern thoughts look upon the rigbt of property as one e(mditioned 
by Gocial responsibility, 1by the need. s of society, by the 
"balancing of interests" which looms so large In modern 
jurisprudence, and not as a pro-ordained and untouchable 
private right, 
(1) 
'lea* the rift between 'the reality of the 
sale of goods, both in international markets and in the home 
market, and -the legal regulation of that topio in the United 
Kingdom has become wider. " 
(2. ) 
(1) Priedmann "Legal Theory" at p. 376. 
(2) Schmitthoff "The Sale of Goods" at P-46. 
SECTION 
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I Legal Provisions and Criticism'. 
The provisions concerning the transfer of mmer-., 31jjp between 
the seller and the buyer are set out in the Iraqi Civil Code NO-40, 
1951 as follows: 
Section 247! 
"The obligation to pass the ownership or any other real right , 
passes by itself that right if the subject-matter of the 
obligation is an ascertained thing and belongs to the obligatoro"(1) 
Section 248-1- : 
"The obligation to pass the ownership or any other real right, 
does not pass by itself that right if the subject-matter of 
the obligation is unascertained. That right can be passed by 
asoertairmento" 
(2) 
Section 531: 
"Where there is a contract for the sale of ascertained goocls or 
a sale of a lump sum, the ownership is transferrecl by the sale 
itself* And where there is a contract for the sale of 
unascertained goocls, the ownership does not transfer until the 
goocle are ideutified.,, 
(3) 
Section 1126-1- : 
"The ownershipq in moveable and immoveable goods, passes 
a... " 
(1) This section is in hamony withsection 204 of the Egyptian Civil 
Code* 
(2) This section is in hamony with section 205-1- of the Eaptisih 
Civil Code. 
(3) Ye ct( 0* 4 f. C, ft 
We IAite- Simi lcxre titf ic 415 , c, r 
f.. 
-5?, 
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to the buyer by the contract itself&, '(') 
Section 1126-2- : 
"The contract of selling immoveable goods does not come into 
existence unleus it is made according to the way specified in 
the law. " 
It is quite clear when comparing sections 247 and 248-1 with 
sections 531 and 1126-l-, that there is a contradiction between 
these sections concerning the process of passing the ownership in 
the Iracri Civil Code. 
Sections 247 and 248-1- discuss "The obligation to pass the 
ownership", whereas sections 531 and 1126-1- discuss "The contract 
to pass the ownership. " 
Does the obligation to pass the ownership mean the contract 
itself or vice versa? That is to say, are they the same thine. This, 
however, does not appear to be so. It seems that the obligation to 
pass the ownership and the contract are quite distinct things. The 
obligation to pass the ownership, if it exists, must come into 
existence after the contract is made, as in the field of sale of 
seller goods, theAdoes not accept the obligation to pass his ownership to 
the buyer without a prior agreement between them which is called 
"contract'le 
This distinction is not very clear in the light of sections 
247,248-1-1 531 and 1126-1-, This is becausel according to 
sections 247 and 248(l) the contract does not by itelf pass the 
bLt mce'rl Ott ik-- -eaw ,,. " Cc ovie), 113 
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ownership to the buyer, but it creates an obligation ozi the part 
of the seller to pass the ownership to the buyerg and according to 
sections 531 and 1126(l) the ownership passes to the buyer by the 
contract itself. 
It is obvious now that the Iracri Civil Code is a little vague 
in dealing with this subjecte Which of the two means pass the 
ownership to the buyer? Is it the contract, the obligation or both? 
If the ownership passes to the buyer by that obligationt two questions 
can be raised: 
1- What sort of obligation is that? 
This obligation has no root in our legal tradition, and it has 
no similarity with the other obligations set out in the Iraqi 
Civil Code, These are discussed in the following paragraphs: 
Ae In our legal tradition there is nothing that can be compared to 
that obligation, The contract puts certain obligations on both 
parties to the contractf iee. the seller to deliver the goods and 
the buyer to pay the price and there is nothing to be called 
obligation to pass the ownership. 
In Islamic Law, as our legal tradition, the problem concerning 
the passing of ownership can be summarized as follows: 
The ownership in moveable and immoveable goods, passes to the 
buyer by the contract itselfP) The only difference among the 
school of thoughts in Islamic law is whether the buyer is able to 
dispose of the goods before ozý after hepossess the goods. In 
(1) Al-Kasani "Albadaiell V015, at p. 243* 
Al-1-Talikiyah, the buyer is entitled to dispose of the goods 
before the possession passes to him. 
(') 
In AIShafiyah and 
Al-Hanbaliyah, the buyer is able to dispose of the goods after the 
possession passes to him on the ground that the buyer will be 
sure of his ownership after its possession and will be able to 
deliver them to the third party. 
(2) 
In Al-Hanafiyah, if the 
goods are moveablet the buyer is not entitled to dispose of 
them before he comes into possessionv and if -the goods are 
immoveable the buyer is entitled to dispose of them before 
possession, on the ground that the moveable goods might perish 
before delivery which might damage the right's of the third 
party, whereas the destruction of immoveable goods is improbable. 
(3) 
B. There is a lack of similarity between this obligation and the 
other obligations set out in the Iraqi civil Code* This 
obligation cannot be interpreted as an obligation to deliver the 
goods, simply because this interpretation will lead us to a. 
unanimous result that the Iraqi Civil Code is implying by that 
obligation the idea of passing the ownership by delivery. 
This result is not acceptable in the light of Iraqi Civil Code for 
two reasons: 
I- The obligation to deliver the goods is completely different 
from the matters concerning passing of ownership* 
2- The right of ownership and the right of possession are quite 
1 Then Rushdl "Bidayat Almuchtahid" Vol, 2 at P-135- 
2 Al-Shafei "Al-Um" Vol-3 at p. 60. 
3 Al-Tahawi "AlmakhtasEar" PP-84-85- 
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dis-tinct riChtso 
2. What is the need of sections 531 and 1126(l)? 
If the ownership is transferred to the buyer by that obligation 
according to sections 247 and 248(1), w1ky has the Iraqi Civil 
Code provided in sections 531 and 1126(1) that the ownership 
passes to the buyer by the contract itself? 
It can be said, as a compromise, that the ownership passes to 
the buyer by both: the contract and its obligation, on the 
grounds that the contract and the obligation to pass -the 
ownership can be preformed at the same time, as the obligation 
to pass the (nNmership is not the obligation to deliver the goods, 
therefore that obligation comes into existence with the contract 
and must be performed as soon as it emerges, so there is no time 
between its birth and its deathJ') 
If that is so, and since that obligation has no time to live, why 
should we say that there is an obligation'oh the part of the 
seller to pass the ownership to the buyer? Is there any necessity 
for that obligation?. 
To answer this question, a distinction must be made between the 
Egyptian and the Iraqi Civil Codes: 
The EgyTtian Civil Cod. e 
The concept of the sale in the Egyptian Civil Code is defined 
by section 418 which provides: 
"Sale is a contract by which -the seller is bound to transfei, the 
(1) AI-Sanhoori "Alwassitt" Vol. 2 at P- 770 and V01-4 at P-412* 
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mmership or any other financial right to the buyer in retvrn 
for the price. " 
In the light of this section the contract of sale of geods 
does not pass the ownership to the buyer by itself, but it 
creates an obligation on the part of the seller to pass the 
ownership to the buyer,, 
It has been said, 
(') 
that the reason for that concept, is 
the fact that the Egyptian Civil Code is influenced, in a sense, 
by the old civil code of France, which in turn, was influenced 
by the Roman law. In the early stages of the Roman law the 
contract had no effect in passing the ownership to the buyer, the 
only effect of the contractwas to impose an obligation on the 
part of the seller to pass the ownership to the buyer by 
following certain procedure according to "jus civil". 
The judiciary and the jurisprudence in Egypt oppose this 
idea* The jurisprudence tried to justify this idea by saying 
that the obligation to pass the ownership comes into existence 
with the contract itself, and must be performed as soon as it 
emerges* Therefore, the passing of ownership is the direct and 
practical effect of the contract, but in theory the contract 
creates that sort of obligation to pass the ownership, 
(2) 
In the judiciary it was decided in the Court of Appeal, 
(3) 
"The 
(1) lbid VoI2 at P-770, V01-4 at P-413. 
(2) lbid Vol. 2 at P-7702 V01-4 at P-412-413. 
(3) 30-1-1925o 
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sellerts obligation to pass the ownership to the buyer is considered 
to be performed as soon as the sale is made. " 
In another caseO) it was said in the court of first instance 
"The ownership, in the sale of a lump sum, passes to the buyer as 
soon as the Bale is completed. " 
It is obvious now that that obligation is of little importance 
in practice. But it was said, 
(2) 
as a practical side for that 
obligation, that the obligation to pass the ownership could be shown 
when the seller has topresent the necessary documents of the goods, 
or when he confirmed his signature, or when he identified the goods* 
This argument is not an acceptable one, on the grounds that these 
obligations are included in other sorts of obligations eog. obligation 
to deliver the Goods, warranty against, evictions 
The net result is: 
Although the Egyptian Civil Code recognises an obligation created by 
the contract on the part of the seller to pass the ownership, but in 
practice that obligation has no effect. Thus, the ownership passes 
to the buyer by the contract itself, when the goods are ascertained 
and belong to the seller. 
The Iracri Civil Code 
The Iraqi Civil Code was based, originallyt on Islamic law, 
then, on the Egyptian Civil Code and finally on the Ftench Civil Code** 
(1) 22-4-19319 
(2) Drafting Committee Knates VOI-4 at P-43- 
Append: bc One. 
Therefore the concept of sale in the Iraqi Civil Code was derived 
from Islamic law, 
(') 
and was defined by section 506. which provides: 
"rho sale is an exchange of property by property, " The definition 
is too wide and in it can be included: the sale of goods by money, 
the money exchange and the barter. It is out of the scope of this 
thesis to discuss how wide the concept of the sale is in the Iraqi 
Civil Code, but the important thing here is to see that the contract 
of sale does not create an obligation on the part of the seller to 
pass the ownership to the buyer* 
Thus it seems very strange for such an obligation to be 
incorporated in sections 247 and 2480) of the Iraqi Civil Codet 
especially when we know that the Islamic law was the main source of the 
Iraqi Civil Codeq and in Islamic law the ownership passes to the buyer 
by the contract itself* 
It has been saidl as a reason for that confusion in the Iraqi 
Civil Code, that the drafting committee cited section 247 literally 
from section 204 of the Egyptian Civil Code without realizing the 
difference in the concept of sale of goods between the Egypt iar. civil 
Code and the Iraqi Civil Code. 
(2) 
As a result, and since the contract 
in the Iraqi Civil Code is consensual, there is no need at all for 
section 247* Therefore that section must be neglected now in our 
study and it should be eliminated from the code. 
(3) 
(1) Section 105 Majallat Al-Ahkam AI-Adliyah. 
(2) Al-Windawi "The contract'of sale" at p. 12. 
(3) Professor Al-Hakim, his paper in majallat Al-Cadah at p* 
"The judiciary review*" 
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The Process of Pass-illr, r the Otlner, 212. 
nrst: Unascertained goods: 
In the light of section 5311 the ownership of unaseex-tained 
goods does not pass to the buyei: -o-r-less they are identified, that 
means the moment at which the oi-niership, of unascertained goods, 
passes to the buyer is the roment of identifioati-or)s 
The identification of the goods can be achieved by weighing, 
counting, measuring, the goods. or *Ly allocating a certain quantity 
of the goods from the rest, Thus the ownerqhip passes to the buyer 
at the moment when the idetificetion occurs whether the delivery has 
been made or not. 
(') 
As a result, the sale of 200 tons of corn out of 
800 tons lying 
in the warehouse does not pass the ownership to the b-ayer unless the 
goods are separated from the rest. 
In theory the delivery of the goods has no effect in identifying 
the goodsq therefore the goods can be idetified and the ownership can 
be passed without being delivered* But in practice, the identificc-Ition 
of the goods and their delivery are closely connected, thus it seemzj 
sometimes, that the ownership passes to the buyer by delivery on the 
ground that the identificatioia of the goods and their delivery occur 
at the same time. 
(2) 
In this respectj it mast be mentioned, that although the delivery 
of the goods and their identification are closely connected in practice, 
(1) Al-Windavi "The Contract of Sale" at p. 83. 
(2) Al-Sanhoori V61.2 at P-777- 
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.r there is nothing in the Iraqi Civil Code to pre-vent the ovnership, 
in unascertained goods, from passing to the buyer as soon as they 
are identified even before delivery* Therefore the seller can keep 
the identified goods. for the buyer, in his custody as a bailee if 
he accepts to do so. Similarly, if the goods are lying in a 
warehouse, and the warehouse man accepts to keep the goods after 
being identified for the new buyer, the ownership will pass without 
need for delivery* 
The difficulties begin to arise when the seller or the 
warehouse man do not have "space" for separating the goods from the 
rest. In this case the aftornment will not be oufficient in 
-identifying the goods, and the only way to identify the goods, in 
order to pass the Mmership, is by delivering them to the InVer. 
Future Goods 
Future goods and the goods to be manufactured are considered to 
be unascertained goods* Therefore no ownership can be passed to the 
buyer unless the goods are completed and identified, It follows: 
1. The ownership of the materials is the ownership of the 
3o 
manufacturer, and it does not pass to the buyer during the 
course of manufacturing the goods on the grounds that the buyer 
has contracted to buy goods not materials, 
The ownership does not pass at the time when the contract is 
made, but at the moment of completion and identification. 
If the contract has been madeý for manufacturing 100 fridges, 
the ownerehip passes to the buyer as soon as the 100 fridges 
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are completed* But if the factory produces 500 fridges, of the 
same description, the (remership of 100 fridges passes to the 
buyer 'by identifying the goods. 
Pinally it mwt be mentioned that there is no provision 
neither in the Iraqi nor in the Egyptian Civil Codes concerning the 
passing of mmership in fiAure goods* These judgments have been 
decided by the jurisprudence in Iraq and Egypt* 
(1) 
Seennde. Ascertained Goods: 
The ownership in ascertained goods passes to the buyer by the 
contract itself, Therefore if A sells his car to B, the ownership 
of the car passes to B at the time when the contract is made. Thus 
B can. dispose of the car even before its delivery, he can sell the 
car to C who acquires the ownership by virtue of the second contract 
although the car might have been still. 'An the possession of A. 
Since the ournership in ascertained goods passes to the buyer by the 
contract itself, A, in the example above mentioned, cannot sell his 
car to C after he has sold it to B. If A sells his oar to C, B is 
entitled to take the car from A, and B is entitled to claim damages 
from A# If A sells his oar to C and delivers it to him, the 
ownership will pass to C on the grounds: 
1. Good faith. That means, C must be a bona fide purchaser, and 
does not know about the first contract with B. 
(1) AI-Sanhoori at P-418- 
Al-Windawi at p. 108. 
Al-Badrawi, paragraph 178o 
suittang paragraph 16o. 
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2* The possession of the car. 
Under these circumstances the ownership passes to C by possession 
with good faith, not by the contract, because A had nothing to 
sell at the time when the contractwas made with C. Moreover the 
ownership, in this case, passes from B to C by possession with 
good faith and not from A to C. 
(1) 
In the light of the example above mentionedl two conditions can 
be inferred to be required for passing the ownership by the 
contract: 
I- The seller must be the owner of the goods at the time when the 
contract is made: If anyone sells something which belongs to 
another person, that sale has no effect in passing the ownership 
unless and until the owner of the goods permits that sales The 
owner of the goods has a period of three months after his knowledge 
of the sale, to exercise his right in permitting or rejecting the 
salee If the owner of the goods permits the sale or the time of 
three months expires without any sign of rejecting the salel the 
contract must be considered as a valid one and the ownership 
passes to the buyer from the time when the sale is made by 
retrospective effecto If the owner rejects the sale, the buyer 
must return the goods and the seller must return the pricee 
Moreover the buyer can claim damages if he did not know, at the 
time of sale, that the goods belonged to someone else. 
(2) 
The goods must be ascertained: 
The ownership does not pass to the buyer by the contract itself 
(1) This example seems to be a matter of consenses in Iraq and EVVto 
(2) Sections 135-136 Iraqi Civil Code* 
Sections 466-467 Euptian Civil Code. 
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unless the goods are ascertained. Sometimes the law stipulates 
for the contract of selling ascertained goods to be registered. 
Does that registration effect the passing of oiniership by t1he 
contract? This question is discussed as follows-. 
A* The sale of machine: 
Section 2 of the law NO-5ý, 1952 concerning the registration 
of machines provides: 
"The sold, gifted or pledged machine must be registered. " 
The meaning of this section is this: Any dealing with the 
machine (saleg gift or pledge) is illegal unless it is 
registered. 
(') 
Therefore the ownership of the machine, 
although it is ascertained goods, passes to the buyer when 
it is registeredo 
The registration of the machine has no effect in passing the 
ownership* The ownership of the machine passes by the contract 
itself on the ground that the contract of selling machine does 
not come into existence unless it is-made according to the 
method specified in the law (registration)* Therefore the 
contract of selling machine is just like a contract of selling 
estate, as in the light of section 1126(2) the contrac-t- of 
selling estate does not come into existence unless it is made 
according to the method pr ovided by the law. Thus the 
ownership in the estate and machines passes to the buyer by 
the contract itself if the contract is made according to the 
law* 
(1) Cassation Court, 17-2-19669 Majallat Al-Kadhall "Judiciary Review" 
year 21, pp. 66-67- 
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B. The Sale of Cars: 
Any dealing concerning a car must be registered in the 
"Traffic Office". - It was decided by the Cassation Court(') 
that this registration is not a condition for the existence 
of the contract of selling car, it is simply to help the 
Traffic Office to control the traffic. Therefore the 
ownership of the car passes to the buyer. by the contract 
itself before registration, 
(2 ) 
As a result the seller is 
not in breach of contract if he does not attend the Traffic 
Office to register the care(3) And the court has the right 
to order the Traffic Office to register the car in the name 
of the buyer if the seller does not want to do so after he 
entered into contract with the buyer, 
(4) 
It can be said in the light of these two sales above mentioned, that 
the registration of the contract of selling asoertaired goods has no 
effect in passing the ownershipo It seems a matter of interpretation 
whether that registration is a condition for the contract to exist or 
not, and this interpretation is practiced by the Cassation. Court* 
(1) 25-2-1960 Iraqi Civil Judiciary V61*2 at P-5- 
(2) Cassation Court 27-5-1970 Al-Nashrah at P-107t 1971- 
(3) Cassation Court 24-2-1970 Al-Washrah at p. 106,1971- 
(4) Cassation Court 3075-1970 Al-Nashrah at p. 107,1971- 
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Third: SDecial Contracts 
Tntroduction 
In the light of section 286-1- the contract can be made either 
under a suspensive condition or resolutive ones A contract is 
considered to be-made under a suspensive condition when it depends 
on a future event. This sort of contract is performable only after 
the event occurs (section 288). 
A contract is considered to be made under a resolutive condition 
when it does not suspend the performance of the contract; it merely 
obliges the creditor to restore what he has receivedg if the event 
contemplated by the condition occurs (section 289). 
The effect of the condition (event), when it occurs, goes back 
to the time the contract is made, unless it can be shown by the will 
of the contracting parties or by the nature of the contract that the 
effect takes place at the time when the event occurs (section 290). 
Concerning the passing of ownership: 
If the contract is made under a suspensive condition, the ownership 
stays with the seller from the time when the contract is made until 
-the -time when the event occurs& 
If the contract is made undera resolutive conditionj the ownership 
vests in the buyer from the time when the contract is made, 
In the normal courset When the event occurs, in a contract made 
under suspensive condition, it makes the Ownership Pass to the buyer 
from the time when the contract is made by retrospective effect. 
If the event does not occur, the contract, whether it is 'made under 
suspensive or resolutive condition, is considered to have never been 
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made, Bat there is not-hire, to prevent the ownership from passing 
to the buyer at the time when the event takes place. This can 
happen either by agreement or by the na-ture of the contract. 
These matters are discussed in the following paragraphs through 
certain contracts which can be made under either of these two 
conditions. 
Fire Purchase: 
Section 5340) Provides: 
"Where the payment of -the price is deferredt the seller is entitled 
to reserve the ownership until he receives the price even if the 
delivery of the goods has been made. " 
In this case the ownership passes to the buyer on suspensive 
condition which is -the payment of the price, The same is true when 
payment is to be made by instalments (section 534(4))- 
When the buyer pays the price, the ownership passes to him from 
the time when the contract is made by retrospective effeett unless 
otherwise agreed by stipulating in the contract that the ownership 
passes to the buyer when he pays the price 
(section 5340)). 
When the buyer does not pay the price, the sale seems to be 
considered as never having been made. 
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Sale at the oprtion: 
Section 509 provides: 
"The sale at the option within a certain time is validq whether the 
sale is at the option of the seller, the buyer, both of them or 
someone else* This condition does not prevent the ownership from 
passing to the buyer. " 
The sale at the option is considered to be made under resolutive 
condition* It occurs when the sellert the buyer or both of them 
stipulate for themselves or for someone else the right to accept or 
to reject the sale within a certain timee 
In this sort of contract the ownership passes to the buyer by, 
the contract itself under a resoutive condition* The practical 
example for this sale is this: 
Where the seller says to the buyer "I agree to sell you my car if my 
friend Ali agrees", if the buyer accepts this offer, the oontractvf 
sale will not come into existence unless they (the seller and the 
buyer) define a certain period of time for Ali to exercise his right, 
If Ali (or the person who has the right) says no thing at the 
expiration of that period the ownership passes to the buyer at the 
time when the contract is made* If he says "no" within the time 
stipulated in the contraett the sale seems if it had never been made. 
In the case of stipulating rights for both the seller and the 
buyer, if one of them accepts the sale before the expiration of the 
time the other party will not lose his right to accept or reject the 
salel and if he rejects the sale, there will be no sale at all 
(section 510)- 
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Sale on trial: 
"In the sale on triall the seller must enable the buyer to try 
the goods. The buyer must accept or reject the goods within -the 
period stipulated in the contract, and in the absence of special 
agreement the seller must define that times If the buyer says 
nothing at the expiration of the time, and has been able to try the 
goods, his silence is considered to be an acceptance of the goodsn 
(section 5240)). 
"Sale on trial is considered to be made under a suspensive 
conditiont unless it can be shown by the agreement or the circumstances 
that it is made under a resolutive condition" (section 523(2)). 
Sale on trial is of twofold purposes: 
19 To make sure that the goods comply with. -the personal need of the 
buyerl as is the case in buying ready made clothes* In this 
ease the buyer is free to accept or reject the goods after they 
have been triedt because it is a matter of personal desire and 
the seller cannot force the buyer to buy the goods on the grounds 
that they are well made, 
20 To make sure that the goods are fit and competent, as is the 
case in buying a washing machine. In this case the buyer is not 
free to accept or to reject the goods after their trial, because 
it is not a matter of personal desire. The buyer is bound to 
accept the washing machine if it works properly, and lie is 
entitled to reject it if it does not* 
M 
(1) Al-Windawi at p, 70-71 e 
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Passing of =ership: 
Sale on trial is co-, )sidered to be made under suspensive 
condition. Therefore the ownership passes to the buyer when he 
accepts the goods* 
On the other hand, this sale can be made under resolutive 
condition, either by the agreement or by the circumstances. Thus 
the ownership passes to the buyer from the time when the contract 
is made, and not from the time when the buyer accepts the goods, 
In both cases, if the buyer does not accept the goods or if 
they are not, fit for purpose, the contract is considered as never 
having been made. 
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III Transfer of Ownership in C*I*P* and P*Ce]3* Contracts 
There is no section in the Iraqi law of Commerce No. 149,1970 
which makes any provision for the passing of ownership in C,, I*F* and 
F. O. B. contracts. Moreover there is no reported case in Iraqi 
judiciary concerning this matter. Therefore the problem is new and has 
never been dealt with properly in the light of Iraqi laws, 
In this respect, where there is no clear provision to be applied 
to a specific commercial matter, section 2 of the Iraqi law of 
commerce ITO-149,1970 provides some principles to.; solve the problem* 
It states: 
1, "The special agreement between the parties to the contract must be 
applied to the commercial matters. In the absence of special 
agreement, the following rules must be applied: The rules of this 
law. The rules of commercial custom, the local commercial custom 
is preferred to the public commercial custom* 
2. The rules of Iraqi civil code must be applied where there is no 
commercial custom. 
3. The special agreement and the rules of commercial custom can 'be 
applied only if they are in harmony with the imperative legal 
provision*" 
in the light of this section, the commercial matters are governed by: 
1. The special agreement between the contracting parties, 
2, The rules of Iraqi Law of Commerce NO-149,1970. 
3. The commercial custom, local and then public. 
4- The rules of Iraqi Civil Code NO-40,1951. 
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This arrangement is Put in a hierarchial system* As a result, 
and when the dispute arises, the Iraqi judge has to look first at 
the contract to apply its provisions. In the absence of special 
agreement (written in the contract) the judge has to turn to the 
rules of the Iraqi law of Commerce. If that law does not contain 
any provision concerning the disputed point, the judge has to consider 
first, the local commercial custom and then the public commercial 
custom. Finally, the rules of Iraqi Civil Code NO-40,1951 must be 
applied when there is no rule governing the disputed point, on the 
ground that the civil code is the original source of private 
law. 
(1) 
It should be noted that the special agreement and 
the commercial 
custom must be in harmony with the imperative legal provision* 
This section gives rise to a number of problemst which are 
discussed as follows: 
First: The Meaning of Tmperative LeMl Provision 
It is well known that the law organizes. the legal relationship 
among the members of the societya This organization is either to be 
in a strict form and must be followed by the people in their 
transactions, or to be in less strict form by letting the people 
organize their own affairs by themselves. As a matter of factl every 
law contains some certain rules which cannot be avoided and some ather 
rules which can be avoided by expressed agreement, It is obvious now 
In a case where there is no rule in the civil code which can be 
applied on the disputed point, the judge has to apply, first, the 
Islamic Law, and if there is no relevant rule concerning the dispute 
in Islamic Law, the judge has to ap ly secondly, the general 
principles of justice (section 1-(2ý). 
' Thus the : Eraqi judge must 
solve the problem before him and he cannot say: There is no solution 
to this problem because there is no provision. 
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that the meaning of 'imperative legal provision* is this: 
"The rules which are set up in the law in a strict form and cannot 
be avoided by the people in their transactions. " 
Therefore the people must comply with these rules and it is 
incompetent to contract out of their expressed agreement. How can 
we possibly know that these rules. are imperative ones and the others 
are not? 
The best criterion to distinguish between these two kinds of 
rules is the law itself, It is quite often to see the statement: 
"Unless otherwise agreed" at the beginning of the provisions in the 
law, this statement makes the provision a non imperative one, as a 
result the parties to the contract are free either to follow that 
provision or to decide whatever they want concerning their point. 
On the contrary, and at the absence of that particular Statement 
"Unless otherwise agreed" from the provision, that provision is 
considered to be as an imperative one* 
Again, in the light of Iraqi Law, the special "expressed" 
agreement and the commercial custom mast be in harmony with imperative 
legal provisions. Thus the Iraqi judge has to be very careful in 
applying the special agreement or the commercial Custom (local or 
public). 
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Second: The Commercial Custom * 
The commercial custom concerning CeTePe and FO*Bo contracts 
can be found only in Basrah, in south Iraq, which is the most 
important and the oldest poxt at home. 
This commercial custom can be divided into two different 
periods: The first before 1970, and the second after 1970* 
le The first period: before 1970- 
Two features took place during that period: 
A* The vast majority of the contracts had been carried under P*O*Bo 
contracts. The reason for that, so far as I gather, is Iraq 
did not have either a good commercial fleetv or a good 
insurance oompamys Therefore the merchants used to export 
goods under F*O., Bo contracts while importing goods under 
that of ColoPo 
Bo Most of the merchants during that period were representatives 
or agents for other foreign firms abroad* Therefore the 
qaestion of passing the ownership did not appear to be a 
real problem* 
2. The second period: after 1970- 
Two major events have taken place during this period: 
A. The government took control over the trade both foreign and 
internal by establishing now state companies; and organizations 
replaced some-of the individual merchants and the private large 
Tn summer 1976,1 had the opportunity to gather the information 
about the commercial custom concerning C*I*F4, and F4,0*B* contracts from the people who work in this field. 
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companies** 
B* The interpretation of section 7 of the National Insurance 
Company Law NO-56,1950, by Ministry of Justiceo, 
Section 7 of the National Insurance Company Law NO-56,1950 
provides: 
"The government organizations and its corporations, shall 
insure with this company all their transactions concerning 
insurance. " 
This section wan interpreted to be a non imperative provision* 
Therefore it was at the option of the organizations, corporations and 
companies to insure with the national insurance company or with any 
other insurance company. 
At the present time, an opposite interpretation has been given 
to section 7, The Legal Drafting Department in the Ninistry of 
Justice stated in its decision Wo., 106,1972 that section 7 of the 
National Insurance Company Law was an imperative legal provision, and 
the government organizations and its corporations mast insure with 
the National Insurance Company all th6ir transactions concerning insurance. 
This interpretation has changed the situation in the Iraqi foreign trade 
by making the vast majority of the contracts to be carried under co&ope 
Zrm instead of P*O*B. 
It is obvious now that the most important contracts used in 
Basrah before 1970 were F. O, *B,,, while those after 1970 are C. I. p. 
Therefore F*O*Bo contracts were the favomrite in the pastq and CAIP, 
The companies with over one million Dinars as a capital, (-two million 
pounds)o 
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contracts are the favourite at the present time. * This statement 
does not imply that C*I*Fo contracts have not been in use at all. 
C*IoFe contracts have been in use for a long time in Basrah, but 
not as much as F*O*B,, eaid CA Pe contracts. I gathered the commercial 
custom in Basrah concerning the passing of ownership in Cel"Po and 
P*O*B* contracts by asking many merchants and companies about that* 
Two answers were given: 
The first, which had a few supporters, was that the ownership in 
C9I&Fe and F*O*B, contracts is transferred at the time when the bill 
of lading is indorsed and sent to the buyer* 
The second, which was supported by a great majority, was that the 
ownership in C*I*Po and FoOeBo contracts is transferred at shipment 
and the bill of lading is a good instrument to secure payment# 
As far as the first answer is concernedt it is semmingly based 
on section 319 of the Iraqi Law of Commerce Wo. 60, Year 1943 (repealed). 
That section provides: 
"The ownership is transferred by indorsement or delivery of the paper 
of shipment whi6h is signed by the carrier and makes the goods 
deliverable to "order" or to "bearer%,, Therefore the ownership is 
transferred by indorsing and sending the bill of lading to the buyer* 
This attitude has been supported by some of -the scholars in 
At this stage I can forecast the future type of contracts which will 
be used in Iraqi foreign tradeo Quite recently a new state company 
has been established at home, which is called: Iraq Maritime 
Transport Company. This company has about ten cargo ships and some 
others under constructione In the near future the Iraqi merchants 
and companies will find it easier to deal with this company@ As a 
result the existing situation will be changed to make the vast 
majority of the contracts in maritime trade to be carried under 
C*I*Po contracts* 
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Egypt 
(1) 
and Iraq 
(2) 
on the ground that the ownership in C*I*Pe and 
F*09B* contracts does not pass to the buyer at the time of identification 
(shipment) but at the time of appropriation (indorsing and sending the 
bill of lading to the buyer)* They say that there are two requirements 
for the appropriation to be achieved: 
The first is the identification of the goods by which the goods become 
ascertained, This can be done on shipment. 
The second is the will of seller, which must be expressed in a 
definite way, to sell certain goods to a certain buyer, this can be 
done by indorsing and sending the bill of lading to the buyero This 
second requirement deprives the seller from his ability to dispose 
of the goods, which means that the seller expressed his will to pass 
the ownership to the buyero 
Although this opinion seems logical and in harmony with section 
319, but there is no legal ground to support its Section 319, which 
was the legal ground for this attitude, has been repealed; and the existing 
Iraqi and Egyptian Laws do not contain the second requirement of the 
appropriation and it is not reported in any case either in Egypt or 
in Iraq* 
As far as the second answer is concernedl namely: the ownership 
in C#I&F. and F*O*Bo contracts passes to the buyer on shipment and 
the billof lading is a good instrument to secure PaYment, has been 
ad6pted, as far as I gathered, for two reasons: 
1, The merchants and the companiet got used to P. O. B. contracts in 
(1) Professor Awadh "Maritime Law" at P-789. 
(2) Al-Ogaili "The Bill of Ladinel at P-317- 
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carrying out their trade* The ownership, under F&O#Be contracts, 
passes to the buyer on ehipment* This rule has been adopted to 
be applied on CeleFe contracts too, on the ground that the passing 
of ownership is the same under both F*O*Bo and C. T. Fe contracts, 
and the differences between them arise in the duties and rights 
of both the seller and the buyer. 
20 The impact of the. other Arabic countries: Iraq has a great deal 
of trade with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and the other Arabic countries* 
The legal solution which prevails in Egyptv Syria and Lebanon 
concerning the passing of ownership in C. I*F* and PeCoBe contracts 
is that the ownership passes to the buyer on shipments 
E=ja and Lebanon, 
It is well known in Syria and Lebanon that the ownership in 
C*I*Fe and P*O*Bo contracts passes to the buyer on shipmentg this 
was deoided by the Cassation Court of Syria in 10-11-1933, 
(') 
and 
in 30-10-1951- 
(2) 
This judgment has been followed by the Cassation 
Court of Lebanon in 25-5-19371 
(3) 
and by the judge of Beirut in 
8-3-1951 . 
(4) 
These judgments have been aocepted by the 
jurisprudence in Syria and Lebanono(5) It must be mentioned -that 
the judiciary and jurisprudence tn these two countries did not 
justify their judgments in the light of Syrian and Lebanese laws* 
They took them as a facto 
(1) "Majallat Al-Tashrea Wal-Ichtihad" 1935 p. 18. 
(2) t'Majallat Al. -Canoon" 1952 at P-5- 
(3) I'Majallat Al-Mahakim Al-Lubnaniyah Al--Suriyah" 1937 at p. 173* 
(4) "Al-Rashrah Al-yadaiYah Al-Lubnani7ah" 1951 at P*355- 
(5) AI-Sibaee and Anttaki "Commercial Hiritime Rights" V01-5 19659 
pp. 631-633- 
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It was decided in Eg", t by the Cassation Court that the 
ownership in ColeFe(i) and FoO*B* 
(2) 
contracts passes to the 
buyer at shipment, when the goods are placed on board ship, on 
the ground -that CoIeFe and P. 09B. contracts are commonly contracts 
for selling unascertained goods. The ownership of unascertained 
goods does not pass to the buyer by the contract itself but by 
identification. The identification of the goods and the passing 
of ownership to the buyer takes place when the goods are being 
delivered to a common carrier* That moment is the moment of 
shipment. 
(3) 
Third: The Rules of the T Civil Code 
Here we are trying to examine the idea which says "the ownership 
in Colo]? * and F*O*B* contracts passes to thebuyer on shipment" in 
the light of the Iraqi Civil Codets rulest 
We have seen that the ownership passes to the buyer by the contract itself 
when the goods are ascertained and belong to the seller. The ownership 
of unascertained goods passes when the goods are identified., This. 
identification takes place usually, butnot necessarily, on delivery* 
These two rules are imperative ones, as they do not contain the 
statement "unless otheNrise agreed". Therefore the contracting parties 
(1) 19-. 6-1969 The oollftAionq year 20, Xoo2, at p, 1026. 
(2) 27-12-1966 The collection, year 17, at P. 1979. 
(3) Hasrd., Jo "Maritime Sales" at P-143* 
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must comply with these rales: 
Io Ihiascertained Goodsl: 
Mot commonly C*I@P9 and F*O*Bo contracts are contracts for 
sale of unascertained goods. Therefore, the rule that the ownership 
passes on shipment is in harmony with section 531 on the ground that 
the identification of the goods takes place on shipment by which the 
ownership passes to the buyer, 
This rule gives rise to two important questionst 
A* The Bulk Shipment: 
In the light of the Iraqi Civil Codev the ownership of 
unascertained goods does not pass to the buyer unless the goods 
are idenlified by separating them from the rest of the goods and 
specifying them as a certain quantity accupying a certain space* 
It follows, in the case of bulk shipment, that the identification 
of the goods does not occur on shipment, therefore no property can 
be passed to the buyezoon shipment. As a result, if A in Iraq 
ships 30,000 tons of wheat to B in Pakistan, C in India and D in 
Ceylon, - let us assume here that each one of these three merchants 
has made a contract with A for 10,000 tons of wheat - the process 
of passing the ownership will be as follows: 
The ownership will pass to B when the 10,000 tons are discharged 
in Pakistanj as the identification of the 10tOOO tons will take 
place in the port of dischargep 
The ownership will pass to C and D at the same time in the Indian 
port by reason of identifying the goods,, because when the second 
10,000 tons are being discharged in India, ' the third 10,000 will 
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stay on the ship identifiedo Thus, the ownership of D (from 
Ceylon) passes to him neither at the time of shipment in Iraqv 
nor at the time of discharge in Ceylon, but at the time when 
the goods become identified in India* To avoid this result, 
the jurisprudence in Iraq 
M 
and 3ýgypt(2) cane up with an idea, 
that the ownership in the bulk shipment passes to all the buyers 
on shipment. That means that all the buyers own the cargo in 
common, and there is no limitation between -their ownership. 
Special Agreement o. 
Special agrrement means the expressed agreement. In other words, 
all that is written in the oontraot as distinguished from the 
ordinary provision, Therefore the Iraqi Law does not ask the 
judge to go behind the terms of the contract to infer the implied 
intention of the parties to the contract. The task of -the judge 
is only to apply that special agreement if it is in harmony with 
the imperative legal provisions,, 
In our specific subject, which is the transfer of the ownership 
in C*I. F. and F*O*Bo contracts, can the special agreement affect 
the rules concerning this subject? Can the passing of ownership 
be postponed until payment? We have seen-under Sale of Goodil 
Act 18931 that the parties to the contract are free in making 
the ownership pass to the buyer on payment. But in the light of 
(1) Al-Ogaili "The Bill of Ladinet at P-312. 
(2) Ymemi, J& "Yaritime Sales" at p. 164o 
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Iraqi Laws this question needs Airther discussion.. 
In the light of section 161 of the Law of Connerce No. 60,1943 
(repealed), it was open to the contracting parties to postpone 
the passing of ownership until paymento That section has been 
repealed by the Law of Commerce NO-149,1970- Neither the new 
law nor the Tracri Civil Code contain any provision to govern 
this particular state in postponing the passing of ownership 
until payment. 
In this respect it can be said: It is open to the contracting 
parties to make the contract under suspensive condition. In 
this case the ownership passes to the luyer when the condition 
(payment) occurs (section 290), 
This opinion can be supported by analogy with section 534 
concerning hire purchase, on the ground that since the Iraqi 
law accepts the idea, under section 534, of entitling the seller 
to reserve the ownership until payment in a certain type of 
contract, that law will accept the idea of allowing the 
contracting parties in C*I*P* and F*0*B* contracts to stipulate 
that the ownership passes to the buyer when the payment is madeq 
because there is no reason as to why they should not do it, 
On the contrary, it can be said that the idea Of Postponing the 
passiftg of ownership until payment will destroy the nature of 
C*T*F* and P*04PB* contracts as a sales On shipment and the 
ownership must pass to the buyer at that moment, 
2* Ascertained Goods: 
If the goods are aseertainedl the rale that the ownership in 
C*I*Fo and P*O*Bo contracts passes to the buyer on shipment is 
not in harmony with section 531 and 1126-1-, In the light of 
these two sections, the ownership must pass at the time when 
-the contract is made. How can we justify the commercial custom 
which says the ownership in C, IF* and POO* contracts passes 
to the buyer on shipment. and sections 531 and 11260) which says 
the ownership in ascertain(xl goods passes to the buyer by the 
contract itself? 
In this respect, it can be said that since the coods are 
ascertained the ownership mast pass to the buyer at the time 
when the contract is made, whether it is ColoPe contract or any 
other sort. Therefore the commercial custom must be changed to 
be in harmony with this rule, 
On the other hand, it can be said that the preceeding judgment 
destroys the nature of Col. P., and F*OB, contracts as a maritime 
sale* If we said that the ownership in these two contracts passed 
to the buyer before shipment, it would make no difference between 
these two contracts and the home market contracts. Thus sections 
531 and 1126(l) must be neglected and the rule of the commercial 
castom must be followed. 
FInally, a third opinion can be raised as a compromise: The 
jurisprudence in Iraq(') and F gypt(2 
) 
recognizeI3 the case when the 
(1) Al-Windawi at P-115- 
(2) Al--Sanhoori Vol. 4 at P-420. 
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seller and the buyer Wee to postpone the passing of ownership 
until delivery. Therefore, it is easy to assume, by analogy, 
that in C*I*Fo and FoOoB* contractsl there is an implied 
agreement between the contracting parties to postpone the 
passing of ownership until delivery of the goods'which occars 
on shipment* This argument can be rebutted by stating that the 
implied agreement is not efficient in our laws* 
The first and second opinions are very extreme, because there 
is no need to inforce the rules of civil code in commercial 
matters and vice versa, both of them must work in their own 
fieldo 
Pourth: What sort of ownership ]2asses to th2_lLu er? 
It must be mentioned that the whole ownership passes to the 
.. buyer. The distinction between general property and special property 
. does not exist. inthe Iraqi laws* 
The question now is whether the buyer is entitled to reject the 
goods. if they are. not in conformity with the contract description. 
ýA, thisrespect, a distinction must be made between the civil 
code and the law of commerce. Section 5170) of the Iraqi civil 
code provides: 
, "The sale. isat the option of the 
buyer when he buys something without 
, seeing 
the subject matter of the contract at the tim4p when'the contract 
. 
is made, he is entitled to accept or to reject the-gooids if, when he 
. receives 
them, they are not In conformity with the contract desoriPti0n-" 
In the light of this section, it is obvious that the buyer is 
able to exercise that right without being stipulated 'in the contract. 
Therefore there is no need for the parties to the contract to 
stipulate such condition in the contract because it is imposed by 
the law. 
According to section (122)-Iraqi Law of Commerce No. 149,10,70- 
If the goods are not in conformity with the contract description, the 
buyer is not entitled to reject the goods or to breach the contract. 
He must accept the goods and reduce the price* On the other hand, 
the buyer is entitled to reject the goods if: 
1- There is an agreement or custom entitling the buyer to reject the 
contract. 
2- There is a difficulty in marketing the goods9 or they are not 
competent for the purpose of the buyer* 
Concerning C,, I*Po and F. O*B*' contracts, section 122 of the 
Iraqi Lau, of. Commeroe must be applied. 
The importance of this section can be inferred from the following 
example: 
Let us assume. that there is a great need for tea in Iraq. If A in Iraq 
has made a contract with B in Ceylon for 10,000 tons of a certain typ 
of teal A will be bound to accept the goods even if they are not in 
conformity with the contract description, on the ground that the 
public interest of the people must be preferred on the private 
interest of A, but the price must be reduced. 
COMM M 
It is obvious that Iraqi Law neglects the implied intention of 
the parties to the contract and considers their expressed 
intention if it is in harmony with the imperative legal provisions 
which exist in the Civil Code, It is extremely difficult to 
justify the commercial matters in the light of Civil Code rules. 
It is not surprising to see lots of conflicting thoughts trying 
to justify certain commercial matters by-using the rules of the 
Civil Code without reaching any satisfactory result: 
- The conflict in the meaning between "identification" and 
"appropriation"o 
- The attempt to make C,, Io]Fo and F,, OoB* contracts as contracts 
made under a suspensive condition. 
- The analogy between certain cases in -the Civil Code and certain 
cases in the commercial field. 
All of these are striking examples to prove that the legal 
thoughts in the Civil Code cannot respond to commercial matters. 
2- Shipment is the crucial moment in passing the ownership to the 
buyert as it is the moment of identifying the goods. 
The bill of lading is only a good* instrument to secure payment* 
This idea is a moot point as it deprives the bill of lading of 
its other important functions. 
3- The method which depends on the C; vil Code's rules in explaining 
commercial matters-, does not comply with the changing needs of 
commerce. Therefore this method does not explain the passing of 
ownership when the cormercial letter of credit is invelved. 
As a ressult, CeI#F* and F&O*Bo contracts must be free from. 
the Civil Code domain and must be arranged in the light of 
commercial reality which is, in turn, governed by the principle 
'Trotection of property, " 
8ECTION 
.4 
PASSTNG OP Mi. OPP-ITY 
IN C. I. F, & F, O. B. CONTRACTS 
UNDER FRENCH LA14 
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PASSTNG OF PROPPRT"A' TN THE CIVTL CODE 
I The Generpl Rule: 
Section 1583 of the French Civil Code states the general rule 
as follows: 
"The agreement is complete between the parties, and property is 
acquired by the buyer as against the seller by operation of law, 
from the moment when the thing and the price have been agreed upon, 
although the thing has not yet been delivered nor the price paide"(1) 
According to this section the contract, by itself, passes the 
property to the buyer, 
(2) 
although the thing has not been delivered 
nor the price paid. Therefore if A wants to buy a oertain car, 
the property in that oar passes to A as soon as the agreement upon 
the thing and the price takes plaoe regardless of the deliver7l of 
that car or payment of the prioeo(3) 
/ 'F (1) Art. 1583 "Elle eut parfaite entre lee partie96 et la propriete 
est acquise de droit a Itacheteur a ltegard du vendeur, des qu"on 
eut converm de la chose A du prixg quoi--que la chose n9ait pas 
encore ete livree ni le prix payee" 
The translation of the French Civil Code articles is taken from 
"The Roman Law of Sale" by F, D,, 'Zubieta Oxford, 1966. 
(2) La proprie"te"' de la chose vendue estj en general, transmise a J% % Itacquerear, meme a ltijard des tiers, par le seul effect du 
contrat. 
Aubry et Rau et Esmein., Droit Civil Francais. 6th edq 1952 
v*5 at p*21* 
Mazeaud et Mazeaud,. Lecons de Droit, Civil 3rd ed. v-3,2 at 
P. 142. 
0. Hubrecbte Notions essentielles de droit civil., 1970 at 
P. 257. 
(3) Planiol & Ripert "Traite Practique de Droit Civil ftancais" 
V-10-1,1956 at p, 10. 
"Principes et Pratique du Droit Civil" 2nd, ed, 1967 at P-53d, 
This process of passing of the property is different from that 
of the Roman Law where certain things had to be done in order to pass 
the property to the buyer. 
(') 
As a matter of fact, section 1582* is, 
more or less, affected by the old method of Roman Law, but the 
jurisprudence has made it very clear that the property passes to the 
buyer by the contract itself and nothing elsee 
"Ce transfert nlest done pas une obligation qui p'e'se sur le 
vendeur-t le vendeur ntest pas tenu de transferer la propriete a1 
acheteur, car, des ltinstant de la formation du contrat: -et Pas le 
seul effect de celui-ci, le vendeur a perdu ja proprie'te", crai a 
ete" 
acquise par llacheteure 
(2) 
Finally it must be mentioned: 
1- If at the moment of the sale the thing sold has totally perished, 
the sale will be void. If only part of the thing has perished, 
the buyer has the option of either abandoning the sale, or claiming 
the surviving part, causing the price to be assessed by arbitrationo(3) 
2- The purported sale of anotherts thing is void I it may give rise to 
damages when the buyer was unaware that the thing belonged to 
another. 
(4) 
(1) Colin & Capitant I'Le Droit Civil FTancais" v. 2 2nd ed- 1953- 
pp-547-548. 
Pbrandiere "Droit Civil" v,, 3 1958 at P-7- 
Aubr7 et Rau et Esmein at p,, 21* 
It provides: 
"Sale is an agreement whereby the one party binds himself to 
deliver a thing and the other to pay for it. " 
(2) Nazeaud et Nazeaud at P-142. 
(3) Section 1601 Rrench Civil Code. 
(4) Section 1599- 
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II The ! 2pl-ication of the General Pale 
The application of the general rule depends on the agreement 
of the parties to the contract and on the nature of the goods. 
(I) 
These are discussed as follows: 
1- The agreement of the parties to the contract: 
The parties to the contract are free to define the exact moment 
at which the property passes to the buyer. They may agree to 
pass the property when the seller acquires the property or when 
the bityer pays the price or when the handing over of the goods 
takes place or the like. 
(2) 
This kind of agTeement has to be mentioned in the oontract, 
(3) 
otherwise the general rule must be applied. 
2- The nature of the goods: 
The goods sold are either ascertained or unascertained. if they 
are ascertained, section 1583 will govern the passing of their 
property. If they are unascertained, they will be sold either 
lump sum or by weight, number or measure. 
In the following paragraphs we are discussing the passing of 
property when the goods are unascertained* 
(1) Planiol & Ripert at P, 11. 
(2) lbid* 
(3) Aubr7 & Rau & Eamein at P-23. 
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A, Lump sum sale EVente en. bl 
In this kind of sale the measurementt counting or weighing of 
the goods are not necessary to ascertain them, 
(') 
This sale is 
governed by section 1586 which providest 
"If .. the wares are sold for a lump sum, the sale is complete, 
though they have not yet been weighed, counted or measured*" 
According to this section the lump sum sale is considered to 
be a sale of ascertained goods 11une vente de corps certain",, 
Therefore, the property passes to the buyer as soon as the contract 
is made. In other words, at the moment when the thing and the price 
have been agreed upon. 
"La vente est parfaite en ce sens qutelle produit des sa formation, 
tous sea effets, transferant 'a* 1tacheteur des cet instant la proprie"te 
et lea risques. " 
(2) 
Be Sale by weight, =ber or measure 
In this sale the weight 9 number or measure are necessary in 
ascertaining the goods, 
(3) 
Verrto a measure is governed by section 
(i) Planiol & Ripert at p. &372, 
Art. 1586 "Si #oo leg marelmndises ont 'ete vendues en bloc, U vente est parfaiteg cflabiquP- lee marobandisee ntaient pas encore .4 10ý .1 .1 ke peseest comptees ou mesureeso 
(2) Nazeand A Mazeaud at P-147. 
(3) Planiol A Ripert at P*372. 
1585 which providesl* 
"Where wares are sold not for a lump suml bat by weight, mober or 
measure, the sale is imperfect, in the sense that the things sold 
are at the sellerts risk until they have been wedghed. comted-or 
measured-, but the buyer can claim either their delivery or damages, 
if anyq in the case of non-performance of the engagemento" 
According to this section it seems, at first eight, that the 
weight, number or measure of the goods are required only for passing 
the risk to the buyer and not the property, on the grounds that the 
section says 11... in the sense that the things sold are at the sellerts 
risk , *. " But the French judiciary and jurispr-adence do not interprert 
section 1585 in that way* They say the ]2ropertv and the risk are both 
postponed until the goods are weighed, counted or measured. 
(l) 
Thus 
the cassation cowrt stated: 
"Wen vertu de oe 't«rte (Art-1585)t la vente au poidet au COMPte CM 
a. la memre nfest rarfalte. au voint de vue -&z 
tranafert- des rinnen 
,/ j* I 
ou du transfert de propriete,, que lorsque la marchandise a bte peseef 
,e compteeou mesure"e, mais quIelle oblige lee parties awc obligations- 
qatelles ont contractees de's qtxlil ya ea accord sur la chose et, sur 
le prix, 0(2) 
O. D-N-M-Wý 
*' Art. 1585 "Loreque deft marchandiaes ne sent pas vendues en blool 
mais au poids, au compte ou 'a la meenire, la vente nlest point 
parfaite, on ce sens que lee choses vendues sent a= risques du w .4 If verAeur jusquIa ce qutelles soient peseess... comptees ou mesurees; 
mais l9acheteur peut an demander ou la delivrance on des 
dommages - intgrhs, stil ya lieu, en cas dtinexeeution de 
12enge(gemento" 
(1) Nazeand & Mazeaud at P-147- 
(2) Cive Com- 4 die. 1957, Gaz. Pai. 1958.1.218. Ibid. 
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As a result, the property in unascertained goods does not pass 
to the bikyer by the contract itself, but by ascertaining the goods- 
(1) 
The appropriation of the goods can be done in any obvious manner 
which makes the goods attached to a certain buyer. Therefore the 
appropriation of 500 quintaux de ble can be done by putting them 
into sacks with the buyer's name or mark on those sacks, and the 
appropriation of animals can be done by marking them with the buyer's 
mark. 
(2 ) 
Thus the appropriation need not necessarily be concurrent 
with the delivery of the goodse 
C. Future goods 
The sale of future goods is validl and the property in the gooda 
does not pass to the buyer by the contract itselfj but passes: 
1- At the time when the goods have been completed if they are 
ascertained. * Therefore if someone has ordered a machine of a 
certain kind to be manufactured for him, the property in that 
machine passes to the buyer when it is ready to worki 
Fe"tat 
de 
marchi]e. 
2- At the time of ascertaining the goods if they are unascertained: 
The completion of the future goods does not pass the property to 
-the buyer if the goods are unascertained. In this case the 
property passes to the buyer at the time when the goods have been 
(1) Planiol & Ripert at p. 12. 
Go Babrecht at P-135- 
(2) Mazeaud & Mazeaud at P-1469 
Planiol & Ripert at p. 12. 
Si la chose futurevendue est un corps certain, llacheteur on 
acqmiert la proprijte et les. risques de*s son aýblvement* 
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ascertained after their completion. * Therefore if a factory has 
made 10,000 cars for 10,000 buyers, the property in each car does 
not pass to any buyer at the time when it is rea4y, but at the time 
of ascertaining each car to a particular buyer. 
Do Alternative subject matter: 
Where the subject matter of the contract is alternative, the 
property passes to the buyer at the time when he makes his choice. 
0) 
Therefore if A agrees to sell one of his two care to B, the property 
in a car does not pass to B until he makes his choice, 
As a matter of factl this case can be classified under 
"unascertained goods" and there is no need to specialize it* 
Si la, chose ftture vendue eat une chose de genre, son achevement 
ne saffit pas pour que la proprike et lee risques Passent a ltacheteur ilo, faut , en outre, quI elle soit individualiage, cette condition btant 
necessaire au transfert de la propriete et des risques dans toutes lee 
ventes de chores de genre. Yazeaud at P-149. 
(I)Planiol & Ripert at p. 12. 
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III Zypes of Sale 
Sale may be made absolutely or subject to condition, which may 
be either suspensive or resolutivea(i) 
A contract is subject to a suspensive condition when it depends 
either on a future and uncertain event, or on an event which has 
actually happened, but which is as yet unknown to the parties, In 
the first case the contract ma3F7 be executed only after the event. 
In the second case the contract takes effect from the day on which 
it was made. 
(2) 
A resollative condition is one whichv when it is realized, 
produces rescission of the contract and restores matters to the 
position in which they would have been, had there been no contract. 
It does not suspend the performance of the contract; it merely obliges* 
the creditor to restore what he has received, if the event contemplated 
by the condition occurs* 
(3) 
According to these two conditions (susperisive and resolutive) the 
following sales can be made: 
Sale on Trialt Vente a ltessai 
This sale is governed by section 1588 which provides: * 
"S. ale on trial is always presumed to be made', under a suspensive 
condition*" 
(1) Section 1584 French Civil Code. 
(2) Section 1181 French Civil Code. 
(3) Section 1183 Rrench Civil Code. 
Article 1588 "La vente faite 'a llessai est tonjours presumee faite sous une condition easpensive*" 
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In this kind of sale the buyer has the right to try the goods 
to test whether they fit the Purpose designated for them or noto(l) 
The period of this trial is usually agreed upon in the contract, 
otherwise the customary period 
(2) 
or a reasonable time will be the 
period for that trial. 
(3) 
The result of the trial may not be left to the buyer to decideý4) 
The -seller is entitled to appoint an expert to decide the resultipb) 
It has been said that the reason for entitling the seller to 
appoint an expert to judge the result of the trial is based on the 
difference between section 1587 relating to a sale by taste 
(ventes 
A 
a gouterJ6) and section 1588 relating -to sale on trial* Section 1587 
(1) YgLzeaud at PA57. 
(2) "Par exemple, de huit jours dans leis vertes des cheva-ax" 
Mazeaud at p91589 
(3) Aubry et Rau et Esmein at P-13- 
(4) "Wais lfachetear ntest pas souverain juge des reosultats de ltessai" 
Yazeaud at PA59- 
(5) "Le vendeur pourrait provoquer la nomination Vexperts, charge's de 
verifier si la chose est susceptible de servir a llusage en vue du 
qtLel elle a ýte achetee" Aubry ert Rau et Esmein at P-13- 
(6) This sale is governed by section 1587 which provides: 
"In regard to wine, oil, and other things which it is customary to 
taste before buyingg there is no sale so long as the buyer has not 
tasted and approved theme" 
The buyerl in this sale, has a full right to accept the goods or to 
refuse them, and the seller has no right to ask any expert to 
taste the goods. In cnher words, the buyer is the only judge (Nazeand at P*158)o 
According to this section the sale is imperfect until the buyer 
tastes and approves the goods. Therefore the property passel, -to the buyer when he agrees to buy the goods and not beforee As a 
result -the creditors of the seller can take the goods in the event 
of his insolvency, if the buyer has not by then declared his 
approval (Planiol at P-378)* 
says "oe. there is no sale so long as the buyer has not tasted and 
approvedEthe goý]"j and section 1588 says that the sale on trial 
Is madG tfunder a waspensive condition" without adding the words of 
section 1587- 
(1) 
ft, om the difference in the terms of the above mentioned sections, 
the jurisprudence has inferred that the buyer is not the only judge 
for the result of the trial* 
At ary rate "sale on trial" is assumed to be made under 
suspensive condition. Therefore if the result is satisfactory the 
property passes to the buyer at the time when the contract is made by 
retrospective effect. If it is not there will be no contracto(2) 
2- Sale with Repurchaset 
Section 1659 provides: * 
'If .0 04 "The power of repurchase or remere is a contractual pr6vision 
whereby the seller reserves the right to recover the thing Goldl upon 
his returning the original price and making the compensation mentioned 
in article 1673.11 
According to this section the seller has the powerwhioh enables 
him to repurchase the thing sold at the original price* Therefore 
this sale is completely for the benefit of the seller. 
(3) 
(1) Planiol A Ripert at p. 250- 
(2) Colin & Capitant at P-560- 
Nazeaud at p. 158. 
.4 Art. 1659 "La faculte de rachat ou de remere'est un pacte par leqael la vendeur se reserve de reprendre la chose vendue, moyennant 
la restitution du prix principal, et le remboursement dont il eat 
parle a Particle 1673-" 
Utzeaud at P. 160# 
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In this respect two facts must be mentioned: 
I- The right of the se ller ract not ex6eed 5 years-(1) This period 
used to be 30 Years[trente an3 in the old French Civil Code. 
(2) 
2- The third party is protected by sect-ion 2279 which provides. ** 
"so far as movables are concernedt possession is equivalent to 
title 
There, Xore, if the third party has bought ary movables in good 
faith, the original seller will be prevented from exerciaing his 
right to repurchase the goods, as long as the goods are in the 
possession of the new buyer. 
At any rate this sale is considered to be made under a resolutive 
condition. As a resultj the property passes to the buyer at the 
time when the contract is made, and, if the seller exercises his 
right in recovering the thing sold within the specified period-, 
the property goes back to the seller by retrospective effect to the 
time when the contract is made*(3) 
Instalmeirt Sale: 
This sale has been invented by practice, 
(4) 
and it is common in 
buying cars, bicycles, radio, television and the like. 
(5) 
(i) Art. 1660 "La, facalte'de rachat ne pent %tre s+, Jptxle'e pour Un 
terme exc4lant cinq anneeso" 
(2) Planiol & Ripert at p*225- 
* Art. 2279 "En fait do maeubles, la, possession vaut titre. " 
(3) Colin & Capitant at p. 632e 
Mazeand & ýkZeaud at p*162. 
(4) Planiol & Ripert at p. 256- 
(5) Planiol & Ripert at p. 257- 
Mazeaud at p. 163. 
Ripert & Boulanger at p*471* 
Vente a temperament is a sale where the price Is payable by 
instalment after the delivery of the goods*(') 
This arrangement is for the benefit of the seller in ciase of 
the buyer's insolvency, as he is entitled to recover the property in 
that event. 
(2) 
This sale is considered to be made under suspensive condition, 
Therefore if the buyer fulfils his obligation in paying the whole 
price, the property will pass to him at the time when the contract 
is made by retrospective effect, and if the buyer does not fulfil 
that obligation the property will remain with the seller, 
Concerning the third party, he is, again protected by section 
2279 if he possesses the goods in good faith* 
(3) 
Sale with earnest 0. 
Section 1590 provides&* 
"If the promise to sell has been accompanied by earnest, either party 
is free to withdraw from it* 
The party who has given the earnest on the terms of forfeiting it. 
The party who has received the earnest on terms of repaying double, " 
lorsque le prix est payable en pInsieurs e*'che"ances qui, sanf 
J# generalement la premiere, sont posterieures 'a la livraison, " 
Yhzeaud at p. 163 - 
Aubry et Rau at P. 24* 
(2) Planiol & Ripert at p. 257- 
Yozeaud & Mameaud at p. 164- 
Ripert & Boulanger at P-471- 
(3) Planiol & Ripert at p*257. 
*Art, 1590 "Si la promessede vendre a etp faite aveo des arrhes chaun 
des contractants eat maitre de slen departirt celui qui lea a donnees, 
en les perdantt et celui qui lea a requesq en reErtituant le double. " 
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The earnest can be interpreted in three different ways: 
I- it is a sanction of not fulfilling the promise* 
2- it is evidence that the contract hats become irrevocable, 
3- it is a part of the priceP) 
It seems that the first interpretation is in accordance with 
the words of section 1590. Thus the French Cassation Court has 
adopted the first interpretation in the absence of special 
agreement, 
(2 ) 
This interpretation leads to the result that the 
sale with earnest is considered to be made under a resolutive 
condition* Therefore the property passes at the time when the 
contract is made. On the other hand the parties to the contract 
are free to adopt any of the three interpretations above mentioned 
and to change the result by making the sale under a suspensive 
condition* 
(3) 
As a results sale with earnest is considered to be 
made under a resclutive condition in the absence or special 
agreement, andq at the same time, it can be made under a suspensive 
condition ir the parties to the contract so agreed. 
(1) Planiol & Ripert at p. 245- 
(2) "La Cour de Cassation a de"cide'qui 'a dei*faut de manifestation 
contraire de la volonte des parties lee arrhes doivezrt 6tre 
considerees, conformement a 11'art, 1590, cO=e Un moyen de 
d6lit. " 
Aubry & Rau & Eamein at p. 20. 
(3) "mais lee parties peuvent decider de cOnclure une vente amg 
oonsition suspensive tout en donnant aux arrhes le caractere d"un moyen de dedit. ", 
Ibid at p. 20. 
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IV Passing_ of Property in ColoP. and F. O. Bo Contracts 
The French judiciary and jurisprudence consult their Civil 
Code in a considerable number of legal matters. Thus it is not 
surprising to see them seeking a solution to this problem by 
analysing the Articles of passing of property set up in the Civil 
Code* This attitude has led them to three different solutions 
discussed as follows: 
I- The property Passes to the buyer at the time when the contract 
is made: 
This opinion has been stated by Bellote(l) His lrgtm,, t 
depends on Article 1583 of the Civil Code which provides that the 
property passes to the buyer at the time when the thing and the 
price have been agreed upon. According to Bellot this Artiule is 
very obvious and there is no need to postpone the passing of property 
until certain acts are done. And since C*I*F* and P90*339 contracts 
are consensual, the property must pass to the buyer at the time when 
the consent of the contracting partieeg concerning the price and the 
subject matter, takesplacee 
(2) 
Woreoverp and as. far as unascertained goods are concerned, 
Article 1585 does not require weightf number 0r measure for passirl, 
Rene Bellote Traite theorique et pratiqae de la vente. C*A*Fq 
pp- 43-47- Paris 1951-, 
le traneftrt de propriete par le seul. accord de volonte' Oul 
lea parties sont d'accord sur la chose et le prix. tv 
Ibid at p *47 
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the property but for Passing the risk onlye(l) 
Although the appropriation takes plaoe on shipment, it does 
not effect the passing of property, on the ground that if the seller 
does not ship the goods, the buyer will still have his right either 
to "resiliation" the contract or to demand its fulfilment., This 
right cannot be conceived unless the buyer has already got the 
property* 
(2) 
In the light of this opiniont the clausest "Payment against 
documents" or 'Mocuments against payment" have no effect on passing 
of property. They relate only to the time at which payment must 
be made. 
(3) 
(I) "La specialisation permettra seule oe reEmItatg et OfeBt en ce 
sens que lfartiole 1585 de'cide que la vente nIest Paß Parfaitet 
main il n9a jamais dit que le transfert de PropriGýe nlavait Paß 
lieui Il regle simplement oette question de riscluen. " 
Ibid at p947. 
(2) "Qatimporte la specialisation. Elle a lieu, comme nous le *4 bord, ltembarquement de la verrons plus loin, par I& miss a 
Ewchandise. Ella n1a aucune influence our Is transfert de 
propri6te*'* La preuve an est que si le vendeur nta pas embarque, 
Itacheteur peut demander Is resiliation aux torts at griefs de 
ce vendeur mais aussi at surtout poursuivre l9ex4cation du 
in chee 11 conserve un droit direct sur la ruLrehandise dont le 
fondement ne peut se trouver ailleurs que dans le droit de 
propribte". " 
Ibid. at P-47* 
(3) "Musage de la clause "Pajement contra docaments" nfinfirme pas 
notre-raisonnement. De meme pour sa variante 19Paiement contra 
ltacceptation. de la traite des vendeurs. 11 Vacheteur se reserve 
un droit de, rkention our le prix pomr le cas OU' les doc=ents 
no seraient pas conformes aux accords* A Vinverse, avoc la 
clause "Documents contra paiement" le vendeur conserve un droit 
do gage sur la marchandise an refusant de de'livrer a l1acheteur 
la preuve de son droit de propriete tout qulil nta pas acquitte 
le prix. " 
Thid at P-46. 
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As far as a floating C*I*F* is concerned, the property passes 
to the buyer at the time when the contract is nade7 but the risk 
passes to him from the time of shipment by retrospective effects(') 
This opinion can be criticized aa follows: 
1- P4 Bellot has ignored the interpretation of Article 1585 given 
by the Cassation Court. According to that interpretation the 
weightq count or measure of the goods are necessary to pass both 
the property and the risk and not the risk only., 
(2) 
Therefore, 
and although Article 1585, which M, Bellot has depended on, 
requires apparently weightt count or number of the goods for 
passing the risk only, it does not help him In his argmento 
2- There is no decision in the Prench judiciary to support X. Bellot's 
opinion, Th is is obvious after the Cassation Courtts Interpretation 
of Article 1585- 
3- If the property in Ce: r*P* amd P*O*Bo contracts passed to the 
buyer at the time when the contract was made (before shipment) 
that would deprive these two contracts of their maritime 
characteristics by which the contracting parties should face the 
sea and the marine adventure* 
0) 
Therefore, this opinion is 
repugnant 'to the characteristics of CJ. P. ancl F. O. B. contractf, 
as maritime sales. 
(1) "Lleffet. normal du C*A*F* flottant nlest pas de transf" erer 
reitroactivement la proprike' au jour de l9embarquementg maig 
simplement lea risques. " 
Jbid at P-45- 
(2) Anti at, po 
cette veirte est une4ente maritimet otest-e-dire tm-*wAs 
de marohandises destineew9tre transportees par mer. " 
Go Winkelmolen at P*23- 
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2- The property passes to the buyer when the bill of lading is 
transferred to him: 
This opinion has been put forward by M, Renard, 
(') 
He wished, 
apparently, to free CoI*F@ contracts from the captivity of the 
Civil Code on the ground that the acquisition of the property under 
C*I*F* contracts suppose not simply the agreement Of two wills over 
the thing and the price, Irat also a transfer of possession, a 
tradition, 
(2) 
Therefore, it is in vain that One has tried to derly 
the mechanism which detaches the sale C*I*F* from 'the type of sale 
consecrated by the Civil Code on the principle that the property, is 
transferred by the sole consent of the parties. 
(3) 
M, Renard has 
drawn out the conclusion from this explanation by suggesting that 
it is necessary to Imow that in the sale C*I. P. the property is not 
transferred by the sole consent of the parties as Article 1138 of 
the Civil Code requires* A double material element is necessary: 
The material dispossession which is a result of shipment, and 
The Nridioal dispossession which is accomplished by sending the 
doc=entso 
This symbolic delivery of possession is indispensable for the 
(1) Renard, "La venýe caf en droit fran 
. 
paiss" Rewe do droit 
maritime compare 1925, t-34 PP- 
(2) "Pacquisition de Ia proprie'tS' dans un contract C, A,, F,, suppose 
non pas simplement Vaccord de deux volontes sur Ia, chose et le 
prixt mais encore un transfert de possession, une tradition, " 
(3) "Ctest en vain que Iton a essayO *'de nier le me/canisme qui dAache Ia vente C*A*F* du type de vente cOnsacre'par le Code Civil sur le principe que Ia propri6te eat transferere par le smi. consento... 
ment des parties. " 
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perfection of the contraCt-O(l) Farther on he adds "from this moment 
(shipment) the contract is made precise and individually definitive. 
It only remains for the buyer to become owner and the documents to 
be transferred to him. It is by their acquisition that he receives 
not only the possession of the thing but the right to dispose of it 
This opinion can be criticized as follows: 
1- Me Renard seems to disclose some degree of confusion between 
transfer of property which takes place at the time when the 
contract is made or at the time of appropriationy and transfer 
of possession which takes place at the time of delivery* 
Appropriation and delivery are quite distinct things with 
different consequences* 
(3) 
I 
(1) "qu"il faut dono reconnaitre que dans la verte C*A*Po, la propri6te 
ne se transfers pas par le seal consentment des parties o9mme le .1 Vents l1article 1138 du Code Civil. Il y faut un double element 
materiel correspondant a la double face du dePuaillement du vendeurt 
d9"possession ma-te'riel - le qui results de llembarquement - 
depossession juridique gai staccomplit par la tradition des 
documentso Cette remise symbolique do la possession est 
indispensable a la perfection du contrat. " 
(2) "de ce moment (itembarquement), Italiment da contrat eat pro'oise 
et definitivement individualise'. ' 11 no rests plus pour quo 
Itacheteur devienne proprietaire qu* lui. transmettre lea 
documents. Vest par leur acquisition qatil repoit non seulement 
la possession de la chose main le c1roit dven disposer ... " 
(3) "En reý61itet cette theorie de Renard us repose pan our un texts, .. 'e 
main sur une confusion entre Is transfert do la propriee, qui as 
realise de's ltindividualisatioS de la chose vendue, et Is transfert 
de la possession, qui eat Itexecution dtune des obligations du 
vendearl-. 1a livraisone Speoialisation et livraison constituent 
deux, operations juridiques distinctes, ayeýnt chacme des resultate 
diffdrentat ltune transf4rant la propribte, ltautre la, possessiono" 
G* Winkelmolen at po2l. 
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2- The transfer of property by tradition used to be the dominant 
idea in the Roman Law. The French Civil Code has made it clear 
in Article 1583 that the old rule of the Roman Law is no longer 
applied in France. Therefore it is really a moot point to try 
and revive the old rule of the Roman Law under the French Civil 
Code. 
(') 
3- The property passes to the buyer on shipment: 
This opinion is'the most common one in the French judiciary and 
juriepradenceo It, simply depends on the idea of appropriation which 
takes place on shipment* 
(2) 
According to this opinion the documents do not pass the property 
to the buyer but they pass the possession of the goods only. 
(3) 
Moreover the documents are very good instruments to prove that 
appropriation has taken place. 
(4) 
(1) "La these quOil sautient revient en somme 
'a' exiger la remiss de 
la possession pour realiser le transfert de la. proprigteo Et 
olest la' quelque chose de tout a fait inattendu ot contraire a 
nos conceptions modernes eloignees du formalisme antique de la. 
tradition r6elle ou symbolique de la chose vendueo Comment cet 
auteur a-t-il pa revenir a ce systeme romain-et pretendre que la 
transmission de la possession constituait a nouveau un element 
#I necessaire au transfert de la proprike? " 
Benard, Le transfert de propriete dans les ventes maritime at p. 161.. 
(2) "La speeialisation des marchandises vendues slopere par la delivranee 
at la delivrance a lieu par 1'embarquement du lot vendull Ripert at 
p. 816., "Le transfert de propriete slopere a 1'embarquement. Clest 
un point inconteste aujourdhui" Ibid at P-815- "Mindividualisation (an la specialisation) de la marchandise stopere par la delivrance x qui a lieu elle-meme par ltembarquement du lot vendW' Godret pp31-32. 
"Ciest dones a ce moment precis, appele"mise a* Dord au embarquement, 
que la,, marchandise vendue cif est specialiseect. queg partantg Is, 
propri, 6te de cette marchandise passe du vendeur a Vachateur". 
Winkelmolen at p. 22. 
(3) "Nais la remise des documents lut, assure la. possession do la 
marchandise" Ripert at p. 824. 
"Nous avons vu. que Vacheteur caf, repoit la possession de I& chose 
jar la remis des documentsoll Godret at p. 19. 
(4) 
over 
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Thereforet transferring the possession of the goods to the buyer, 
transferring the property of the goods to the buyer, and proving the 
appropriation are quite distinct things and must not be confused with 
each others 
(1) 
In fact it is a well known practice in French jurisprudence to 
divide the subject of maritime sales into two major parts: 
I- the sales on shipment, by which the property and the risk pass 
to the buyer at the port of loading (shipment); as in C*I*Fo and 
P9O#B* contracts, and 
2- the sales on arrival, by which the property and the risk pass to 
the buyer at the port of discharge; like the sale by a designated 
ship (la vente par navire de'signe), 
(2) 
It is obvious now that the appropriation is the major factor in 
passing the property to the buyer* 
(3) 
Cont9d / 
(4) "La preuve de Ilembarquement, et partant de la specialisation qui 
en resulte, eat fournie par le connaissement*" Winkelmolen at p. 24- 
"Ces documents, ces modes de preuve" Godret at P. 36. 
(1) Godret at P-41# 
(2) "11 existe dans les ventes maritime une division fondamental: 
1-les ventes au debarquement avec transfert de la propriete au 
d6barquement- " ltembarquement avec transfert de la , 2-ies ventes a 
propri6te a Ilembarqaement. " 4.4 
Ge Fraikin, I'Du transfert de la propriete et des risques dans la vente 
fob*" D*XeFo 1950 at p. 109* 
(3) X. Bellot has rejected this idea on the ground that the property 
should pass to the buyer by the contract itselfe 
Antel pp 
No Ripert has depfendled this idea and added that if the appropriation 
takes place before shipmentl the property should pass to the buyer 
before shipment. 
"Il pourrait remonter au moment du contrat si la marehandise itait d j# % eja specialisee a ce moment-li. 11 Vol. 2 PP815--816. 
Me Ripert has reached the same result as M. Bellot by using a 
different route* However, the better view is that the property 
does not pass to the buyer before shipment. 
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Appropriation is, simply, an act by which the goods become 
ascertained anc! attached to a certain buyer by marking or numbering 
them. 
(') 
In the words of the French Cassation Court, the appropriation 
is "transformation de'la chose en corps certain, qu*elle est exclusive 
,e/ (2 du transfett de proprieteoll 
) 
Therefore, the appropriation has two 
steps: 
1- Ascertaining the goods, 
2- Attaching them to a certain buyer by marking and numbering them 
This fact is well understood by the judiciary and has been 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
"Il ya a on effet deu, -. choses bien distinotes: une specialisation 
vis4-vis de la marchandisep clest sa transformation en corps 
certain, et une sPecialisation vis-. 1pavis de Vacheteur, o"est 
l9application. " 
Bellot at P. 140* 
Cass. Civ. 4 decembre 1934o 
Chauveau, Heenenq and Ligonie have refuted this argument on the 
ground that the marking or numbering of the goods does not 
indicate the intention of the seller in fulfilling his obligations. 
"Le soul fait de mettre 'a part certaines marchandises dans les 
magasins du vendeurg ou de lee marquer, n1a aucune signification si 
rien. ptindique que le vendeur a 11intention de lee affecter a 
ltexecution de ses obligations. " 
In this respect the seller mast express his intention In such a way 
that he cannot change his decision. This can happen by marking the, 
goods with the buyerts name or mark, or sending him a letter 
containing distinguished marks or numbers of the goods. 
Chauveau ventes maritimes prara, 304- 
Heenen vente et commerce maritime pararag 31. 
Ligonie Le connaiseement et la lettre de voiture maritime PP51-54,. 
The reason behind that is the fact that Chauveaul Reenen and Ligonie 
have said that the property in C*I*P* and PO,, B, contracts passes -to 
the buyer at the time when the bill of lading is transferred to him. 
They have depended onthis element of appropriation to support their 
opinions This opinion has been stated by M. Renard but it is not 
influential in Prance. Ante pp. I-S-1 -Zý1. 
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decided many times*(') Yoreover, the buyer is bound to appropriate 
the goods even if the contract does not stipulate that in order to 
prevent the risk of error and confu3ing with other goods of the same 
nature on the same ship* 
(2) 
As a result, and since the appropriation takes place on shipment, 
the property in C*I*Fo and FoOeBo'contracts passes to the buyer on 
shipment. 
(3) 
(1) "Le vendeur en caf, tena dtindividualiser la marchandise, doit 
., 
goo de la marchandise livrde a llembarqu apposer sur les emballa ement 
des marques et des numeros, de telle fapon que la marchandise soit 
toujours individualisee a Itarrivee an port do destination. " 
Cour dIAppel de Paris 6-6-1952 D, 14*F* 1952 at P-532. 
See also: Cour de Cassation 6-7-1955 D*14P* 1955 at p*647- 
(2) ".,. le contrat impose cependant au vendeur l"obligation esseiTtielle 
de speCilier la marchandise par naxques et numeroog de telle sorte 
gullelle devienne corps certain et puisse'sans risque dlerreur, ou A 
de confusion avec d1autres marchandises de Meme nature et de meme 
consistance chargees dans le me"me navir e**11 
Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine 12-11-1952 DoM*F* 1953 at p. 657- 
(3) "La conclusion dtun marche"'Ifob" limite lee obligations du vendeur '* I an chargement do la marchandise vendue a bord du navire et le 
transfert de propri6te de la marchandise slopere lore du 
chargement*11 
Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine 31-3-1952. D*M*Po 1953 at p,, 292, 
"wee en matiere de vente fob, le transfert de proprie e % 'ý ' 131 opere 
effectivement a ltembarquement"o 
Cour de Cassation 15-5-1972. D*M*Fo 1972 at P-714. 
"La proprie"te de la marchandise veridue on caf btant transferee a 
ltacheteur des le chargement a bord du navir transporteur ... is Tribunal de Commerce do la,, Seine 31-5-1954 D*M,, F. 1955 at p. 627- 
"Le transfert de la propriete de la marchandise vendue oaf fitopere 
au momerrt de ltembarquement. 
Tribunal de Commerce de la S: ine 16-1-1956. D. M. Fe 1957 at P-574- 
"La marchandise vendue caf devenue la propri4te'de l1acque'reur 
par sa mise ai' Ibord du navire e*, " 
Cour dtAppel de Rouen 14-4-1967- D*M*F, 1968 at P-1419 
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. 11 le 0*1 The olauses "nous palan arriveell, "poids delivre" et "qualite 
I"" delivree 9 do not affect this principle on the ground that they are 
"compatibles avec la regle essentielle en la matiere du transfert de 
la propriete au de"part. "(1) 
In the case of bulk shipment, if the cargo is sent to one buyer., 
the bill of lading is efficient to appropriate the goods by stating 
the name of the ship and the date of shipment. But if the cargo is 
sent to different buyersv none of them acquires "un droit de propriete 
privatif" until the arrival, and the bills of lading delivered to each 
buyer have the effect of appropriating the whole cargo to the whole 
buyers in common. 
(2) 
When the appropriation is made, the seller is bound to deliver 
the appropriated goods and the buyer is obliged to receive theme There- 
fore the seller is not allowed to deliver other than the appropriated 
goods, and the buyer is not allowed to claim goods different from those 
which are appropriated* 
(3) 
If the goods are not in conformity with the contract description, 
the buyer will have his right to reject theme But, on the other hand, 
(1) Cour d'Appel dtAix 19-10-1962. D, X. F, 1963 at P-347- 
J* x (2) "Mais si la oargaison set destinee a plusieurs acheteurs, ce=-ci .f%. 
ne peuvent acque'rir, avant ltarrivee a destination, un droit de 
proprifte privatif sur la portion destinee a chacun dlle=, I)nrant 
le transport, ils sont coproprietaires de la cargaison entie're, " 
Reenon para. 164 and 33. 
Ligonie at P. 32. 
Ripert PP416-817, 
(3) "Mapplication de la marchandise vendu leaft, Une fois fait, ne 
pout plus etre modifies par le vendeur sane VaCcord do l"acheteur 
et lie lee parties de facon irre'vocableg le verdeur ne pouvant .4 livrer et l9acheteur ne pouvant reclamer que ce qui est conforme 
a la specialisation ainsi faitee" 
Tribunal do Commerce de Yarseille 9-1-1951,, D, W, 1951 at p. 250- 
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(l/ % 01 if the goods are alightly different egere inferioriter) in their 
quality, the buyer must accept them with reduction of the price. 
(') 
This reduction should be calculated according to the original price 
(2) 
and not according to the value of the goods at their arrival , 
When the bill of lading states that the quantity of the shipped 
goods is not as much as the contracted qmantityl the buyer has no 
right to reject the documents if the "about clause" 
[L% 
clause 
enviro]n is mentioned in the contract. This clause allows the seller 
to ship the goods within 10 more or less than the contracted quantity, 
Sometimeel the custom defines that clause and its percentage. 
(3) 
It has been decided that the seller can correct the information 
sent to the buyer by the 'bill of lading or any other dooument, For 
er-amplel the name of the shipq the weight of the goodal their numbers, 
their marks or the like. The reason is mainly practical, especially 
when a "Received for shipment" bill of lading is involved* In this 
kind of bill of lading the following statement can be found "repue 
A .1 
pour 6tre embarquee a bord de tel navire on llun des saiventse" The 
confusion happens when the seller dispatches the "Received" bill of 
lading to the buyer, and another ship "different from that mentioned 
"La jurýsprtxdence a decide, des 11origine de la vents caf, pus 
la difference de quali-te ne devait pas entrAner la. rei4siliation 
. do la vents, mais une simple r4luotion du prix. " Ripert PP-799400. 
(2) "Le monteont do la bonification doit ttre Oalcule' our le prix de- 
vents et non our la, valeur des marchandises au moment de 19arrivee 
a destinatiom" 
Reenen. at p*234o 
(3) RipertPP-798-799- 
Reenen-at P. M. 
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in the bill" carries the cargoe In this case the seller, by 
correcting the information, is appropriating the goods properly. 
This correction must be done within a reasonable timee 
(1) 
The appropriation can be proved. by many different ways. Ale, 
far as C*I*F* and F*O*B* contracts are concerned, the bill of lading 
is the most favourable way to pr6ve the appropriatione On the other 
hand, the appropriation can be proved by arq "piece certaine et 
probanteg dument datee et signee, apte a servir de titre a ltacheteur 
en cas de contestation. " 
(2 ) 
This includes even the certificate of 
origin and the invoice *(3) 
It is obvious now that the bill of lading is an instrument 
required to prove the appropriation and not an instrument to 
appropriate the goods . 
(4) 
A. The appropriation mmet be done before the opening of the ship's hatches: 
(Spe'eialisation avant ltouverture des panneaux) 
Since the buyer acquires the property in the goods at shipment, 
the goods mast be appropriated at that time, and the bill of 'lading 
should be sent to the buyer before he examines the actual state of the 
.0 "Bien que le connaisement fasse foi entre lea parties inte"ressees 
au chargementl ltacheteur. en "oaf" pr6tend a tort annuler la vente lorsque Verreur matgrielle portee our ce document, concernant 
Vindication du port de destinationt a iite sane retard rectifiee, 
iglegraphiquement, par le vendeur, quo cot acheteur nta subi aucan 0' prejudice 
Tribunal de Commerce do la Seine 1-6-1960. D. M. P,. 1961 at P-6312. 
(2) Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille 25-2-1907, 
(3) "--- certificat d9origine et de la facture" Bellot at p. 147. 
(4) Ripert, para 1630- 
Bellot , para 371 - 
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goods. This rule is called "The appropriation before the opening 
of the hatches@"(') 
The principle has been established by Yarseille Commercial 
Court, and applied by the other French Courts. 
(2) 
It has been said 
that the reason for this principle is to prevent fraud which might 
be practised by the seller. Sometimes a seller ships one type of 
cargo to different buyers, and at the time of arrival he keeps the 
undamaged part of the cargo to himself or resells it again at a 
higher price, leav-ing the original buyers with the damaged part of 
the cargo. 
(3) 
In this case the sale C*19F* will be a premium bond 
in which the buyer has the bad number, 
(4) 
of (1) "Paisque ltacqUereur est proprietaire depuis le moment de 
llembarqnement, il faut que le lot do marchandisesq qdi a bte' 
vendu, soit nettement spe'Cialise. 11 faut done lui donner un 
. 41 connaissement distinct, qui represente exactement le lot qui lui 
a ýrtO venduo La jurisprudence decide que le,, connaissement doit Ure remis avant que llon ait pu verifier lletat de la marchandise. 
Clest la regýe de lao: rcialisation avant Vouverture des panneaux. n 
Rodiere (Precis Dall at P-358. 
(2) "Lý, tribunal de commerce de Marseille a eioitabli la re"gle de la 
specialisation de la marchandise avant l'ouverture des panneaux, 
et cette jurispradence a 4te'suive par lea autres tribimaux fran 
Winkelmolen at P, 23- 
pais. " 
ut bien comprendre, cette regle cMi est destinee a ejouer une "Il fa d 
fraude, Le navire arrive au port de deErtination; il contient deet 
lots semblables de marchandises; slil i4ait permis au vendeur, apres 
dechargementg do faire remettre lee doements, il pOurrait faire une 
remise arbitraire a l'un on 'a Ilautre. D'ou' la ragle quvil doi-t 
specialiser lee marchandises vendues en remettant lee connaissements 
avant que 11 on ait ouvert lee pannea= du navire of eat-41, -dire avant, 
que lton ait pu constater lt6tat des lots. "I 
Rodiere (Precis Dalloz) at Pe358- 
.11% "Cette garantie eat indispensable pour cpie la vente oaf no degenere 
pas en une loterie dans laquelle l2acheteur ritcuvrait que lee 
manvais rnmeros. " 
Heenen. at p. 18i. 
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Marsel3le Commercial Court is very restricted in applying this 
principle. Therefore, the buyer must actually receive the documents 
before the opening of the hatches even if the seller, in good faith, 
has delayed sending the documents, and even if there is only one 
share on board ship. 
(') 
This tendency does not serve the aim of the principle 
"appropriation before opening the hatches", on the ground that this 
principle has been established to prevent the fraud which mijght be 
carried out by the seller, and therefore it is unfair to apply this 
principle when the seller, in good faith, delays sending the documents. 
Fortunately, the French judiciary and jurisprudence have abandoned 
this restrictive attitude of the Marseille Commercial Court. Wantes and 
Havre Courts demand only the good faith of the seller in sending the 
documents diligently, Thereforeq it is in harmony with -the principle 
if the buyer receives the documents after the opeing of the hatches, 
as long as the seller has sent them before that event* 
(2) 
Noreover, the seller is allowed to appropriate the goods even 
after the opening of the hatches in the following cases: 
(1) "La Jurisprudence du tribunal de Marseille consid'ere cette re"gle 
come essentiellej elle exige que la remise des docaments ait lieu 
avan-t ltouverture des panneaux... " 
Ripert at p, 821., 
See alsot Marseille Commercial Court 20-4-1926. 
(2)"Les tribLummx do Nantes et du Havre so montrent moins severes et 
demandent seulement. au vendeur d'6tablir qttlil a fait de borme 
foi toutes diligences pour l1expAition des documents. " 
Ripert at p. 821. 
See also: The Iffavre 18-11-1927* 
I- If he can prove his ignorance of the actual state of the goods 
at their arrival*(') 
2- If he can prove the Force Majeure which prevented him from 
appropriating the goods at -the right time. 
(2) 
A question canbe raised now: 
Can the seller appropriate the goods after the opening of the 
hatches, if he and the buyer so agreed? 
It has been said that as long as the buyer is safe (not under 
the mercy of the seller) this clause is compatible with C. I. P. 
contracts and can be considered as non written olause,, 
O) 
In fact this proposition is not in harmony with the principles 
of French Law. The property passes to the buyer at the time when the 
goods are appropriated, and if the parties to the contract are free to 
postpone the appropriation until after the opening of the hatches, the 
property will pass to the buyer at the time of arrival and that will 
change CJ*P* contract into an "en disponible" saleo Therefore, the 
modern tendency of the judiciary is to oppose -this idea because it is 
repugnant to C*I*Po oontractse(4) 
(1) "*a, * si le vendeur sleet trouveodans 19impossibiliteabsolue de 
specialiser avant llouverture des parmeaux at qulil soit reste 
dans Vignorance du sort de la marchandise, il peut encore attribmer 
valablement celle-oi a ltacheteurese" 
Heenan at p. 183- 
(2) "Aulsi, la jurisprudence nladmet-elle pas la remise des documents 
apres ltouverture, alors make que le vendear aurait ýte empeche par 
force majeure de lee remettre auparavanto" 
Ripert at p9821e 
(3) INLa clause autorisant la, spe"cialisation apres llouverture des 
panneaux nlest done incompatible avec la. vente oaf qua si, en fait, 
elle place l1acheteur al la, discretion du vendeur. Dana c6tte 
hypotheset elle doit Gtre consideree comme non ge'rita. "_ 
Heenen, at P-173o 
(4) "es. et elle decide qalune clause du contrat retardant la. special- 
isation eat an contradiction avec la--nature de la vente oaf*" 
Ripert-at p*821* See alsot Marseille 24-2-1949* D*YoP. 1950 at P249- 
Appel dtAix 7-7-1957. D. W. 1959 at p. 627. 
Finally it mast be mentioned that opening the hatches and 
transferring the goods from one ship into another does not effect 
this principle*(') 
Be The appropriation and specification of the ship: 
Sometimes the contract stipulates that the seller should inform 
the buyer of the name of the ship which transports the goodeq and 
sometimes the name of the ship is mentioned in the contract, In 
this case the seller is bound to fulfil his obligation according to 
the contract, and if he cannot do that he must modify the stipulation 
with the consent of the buyer. 
According to the older decisions of the French judiciary, 
specification of the ship changed the contract from a C*T*Po into a 
"designated ship" sale, 
(2) 
and accordingly the property and the risk 
passed to the buyer at the time of arrival, But the modern tendency 
is to consider this stipulation consistent with the nature of C. I. P. 
contracts, on the ground that the designation of the ship is an element 
of the appropriation. 
0) 
04 
"Mouverture des panneaux en cours de route, pour aerer lea cales 
ou pour transborder lee marchandises our un autre navire, Berait 
done sane consequence. " 
Reenen. at p,, 182* 
(2) "Pourtaryt la designation du navire lie lo vendeur; elle eat 
definitive at la jurisprudence decide quIelle, transforme an 8omme 
la vente oaf an vente par navire designO*" 
Ripert at P*809* 
(3) ffLa stipulation en question ntest nullement incompatible &MM la 
vente oaf **9 La designation du navire eat, an effet, -tM'el4jMt 
de la speeialisation$ qui doit 9tre acoomplie avant lt*VVjV; jj 'a' 
destination dans toute vente oaf*" 
Heenan-at PP-174-175- 
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Some scholars have considered this element to be essential in 
(1) 
the process of appropriation, whereas others take a different 
viewo 
(2) 
At any rate specifying the ship does not really change CeI*F* 
contract into a "designated ship" sale, on the ground that the legal 
consequences of each sale are different, and therefore it seems that 
the intention of the contracting parties, when they stipulate that 
condition, is not to change the legal consequences of their C*I*Fo 
contract, but is simply to help the buyer to calculate the time of 
arrival, or for some other reasons. Were it otherwiset they would 
have made it clear that their contract was a "designated ship" sale, 
Moreover, whether specifying the ship is an essential element 
in the process of appropriation or not depends entirely on the 
nature of the transaction whether it is a bulk shipment or nott(3) 
or whether the seller has sent an equal quantity of the same cargo 
on different ships to different buyers. In these two cases specifying 
the ship is essential in the process of appropriation. 
C. Payment against doements on arrival of the ship: 
It is a well known fact that the price in C,, I*Fo contracts is 
payable at the time when the documents are presented to the buyer. 
(1) Chauveaupara, 6? 7-628. 
(2) Bellotpara- 392-393. 
loreque le connatenement a e/te"ita'bli ä lltorder du vendeur 
et se rapporte a% une portion dlune eaLrgaison chargee en varo. En 
effet, dans ce eas, la designation du navire est le Eieul moyen 
Vindividualiser la marchandise. 11 convient done citexaminert 0 dans chaque casq si oette designation est neceseaire pour 
speCialiser la chose vendue. 11 
Reenen, at p. 181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The above mentioned clause has the effect of postponing the 
presentation of the documents and then payment of the price until 
the ship reaches her destination. On the other hand this clause 
has no effect on passing of the risk on the ground that the buyer 
is bound to pay the price against documents regardless of the 
arrival of the ship as long as th e documents are presented to him 
at the expected time of the arrival of that ship. 
(') 
D. Payment after examining the goods at their arrival: 
This clause modifies the rule of payments But it does not 
modify the rales of risko Tt has the effect of making the price 
payable only after examining the goods. 
(2) 
(1) "Cette clause a pour objet de retarder la presentation des 
documents et le payment jusqu'a Parrivee du navire, alors que, 
normalement, le vendeur caf peut reclamer le prix contre lea 
documents des ltembarquement de le. merchandise* Mais elle ne 
permet pas a l1acheteur d'examiner les marchandises avant de 
payerl elle ne le dispense pas non plus de payer le prix en Dag de perte on dfavarie. " 
Reenen-at p, 191, 
Bellot-Para- 438. 
Ripert-para. 1897. 
(2) "Son seul obiSt owk d0autoriser 19achateur 'a retarder le 
I% payment Jusqu a ce quOil ait pu verifier si les marchandises 
sont conformes aux conditions du contratt alore qua, normajeamt, 
Itacheteur caf doit payer avant toute verification, deiis que lea documents lui sont presenteS. " 
Heenen. at P*191,. 
Chauveausparae 1408* 
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COMý 
French pride in their legal system is founded on the history 
and traditions of France itselfl particularly since the Napoleonic 
codification of 1804, This codification has created a conflicting 
state between the restrictions of legal rules and developing facts 
of commercial life, which have forced the Prench to modify their 
legal rules to suit modern changes in society* 
As far as the legal rules which govern passing of property are 
concernedl they have been subject to many modifications until they 
reached their present state. These rules were originally enacted to 
govern home market saleal but the French have applied them to COIOF, 
and P*O*Bo contracts as well. 
The result of their application is that the property in Col, P, 
and P*O,,, Bo passes to the buyer, generally speakingt on shipment, on 
the ground that the appropriation takes place ut that time* 
This result can be criticized as followst 
1- According to the French Civil Code the property in unascertained 
goods passes to the buyer. at the time when the appropriation 
takes place. 
The logical result of this rule is that the property passes to 
the buyer as soon as the appropriation takes places and it does 
not require any moment or place for the appropriation, Therefore 
the property in C. I. F. and F. O. B. contracts passes to the buyer at 
the time of appropriation whether it takes place on shipment or 
before shipment* This result is logical in the light of the 
French Civil Codet but is not consistent with the nature of CeI*F9 
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and FoO9B* contracts as maritime sales. Thus the French judiciary 
and jurisprudence have rejected this result by modifying it to 
suit modern, practice, and they have criticized Ripert and Bellot 
for adopting that approach. 
In fact, the French have either to agree with Ripert and Bellotp 
or must find a more convincing argument to support their opinion. 
2- The intention of the contracting parties has been totally 
neglected and even criticized by the French@() 
The clauses 
[payment 
contre documents a ltarrive, 
]ee 
and 
Lpayment I 
% le % 
apres verification de marchandise a destinati OE have been 
interpreted in Frach a way as to avoid their effect on passing of 
property on the grcnmd that payment of the price has nothing to 
do with the passing of property (Article 1583)9 
The modern practice of commercial letters of credit prevents the 
property from passing to the buyer on shipment, because the seller 
usually takes the bill of lading in his name and not in the buyer's 
name* In these circumstances the property in the goods does not 
pass to the buyer on shipment. Moreover if the property had 
passed to the buyer on shipment, the seller would not have been 
able to pledge the documents with the bank on the ground that he 
would not be the owner of the goods any more. 
(1) "Riende plus arbitraire que cette distinction fonde"e' ear un 
criterium psychologique? " Sur la plus secrgte intention du 
vendeur et qui met ltacheteur absolument entre lea mains du 
vendeur et a sa discretion, " 
Bellot at P. 49* 
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It has been said that the special agreement between -the buyer 
and the bank is the legal basis for the bank pledgee 
This argument is a moot point because it leads to the result 
that the bank will have the pledge as soon as the property passes 
to the buyer, and since the property, according to this opinion, 
passes to the buyer on shipment, therefore the bank will have the 
pledge from the time of shipmentl and nobody has said that before* 
At any rate the solution of the French Civil Code to the 
problem of passing of the property in Col@Fe and P, O*Bo contracts 
does meet the modern practice. 
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CONCL13SION 
We have seen in this chapter many thoughts striving for mastery 
in the matter of passing of property. These thoughts can be classified 
into two main theories: the objective theory and the subjective one,, 
which are discussed as follows$ 
I- The Objective Theory: 
This theory, which has been adopted by the French, the Iraqi and 
the Egyptian Lawst depends or, the idea of "appropriation" which exists 
in the civil code and has great influence on it. The moment, according 
to this theory, at which the property in C*I*F* & F*O*Be contracts 
passes to the buyer is the moment of "appropriation"* 11ore commonly, 
C*I*Pe & F*O*Bo contracts are contracts for a sale of unascertained 
goods, so that no property can pass before ascertainmento Then it is 
necessary to know the moment of appropriation in order to be able to 
define the exact moment at which the property is transferred. In this 
respect two differing points of view have been stated: The first one 
says that the moment of appropriation is the moment of shipmente The 
second says that the moment of appropriation occurs at the time of 
indorsing and sending the bill of lading to the buyer. 
The difference between these two opinions is the meaning of 
"appropriation"* First of all, both agree that the appropriation 
has two elements: the first one is the identification of the goods 
by which the goods berome aseertainedl the second, the declaration 
of the seller's will to sell certain goods to a certain buyer. The 
first opinion considers 'the moment of shipment as a crucial moment 
for achieving the two elements of appropriation, so the property 
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passes to the buyer at that moment. The seconrl opinion considers 
the mcment of indorsin g and sending the bill of lading to the buyer 
or his agent as a aracial moment for achieving the two elements of 
appropriation, so the property in transferred at that moment. This 
second opinion (although it is not the favourite either in France or 
in Iraq or in Egypt) has been adopted by the Old Soots law through 
the idea of delivery. According to the Old Soots Law the property 
used to pass to the buyer by delivery, and since the bill of lading 
represents possession of the goods, therefore the property passed to 
the buyer at the time when the seller endorsed and sent the bill of 
lading to the former. 
At any rate the opinion which states tha; t the prope rty passes to 
the buyer on shipment is difficult to justify when the seller takes 
the bill of lading in his own name or in-his agentts name. Moreover, 
the property does not pass to the buyer on shipment when a commercial 
letter of credit is involvedl because the seller should be the owner of 
the goods when he pledges the documents with the bank* 
The second opinion which states that the property passes to the 
buyer at the time when the bill of lading is indorsed and sent to him, 
is the more practical and achieves the principle "Protection of 
property", but it should be based on the idea of "correspondence" and 
not on the restricted ideas of a civil code "appropriation" or "delivery"s 
2- The Subjective Theory: 
This theory looks at the intention of the parties to the contract to 
define the moment at which the property Passes to the buyer, an it is 
theoretically presented in the Sale of Goods Act 180.3, Section (17-1)- 
In the light of this theory, the moment at which the property passes 
to the buyer is entirely a question of Intention to be gathered from 
the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the 
circumstances of the case (Section 17-2), and since the parties may 
have had no intention, or expressed no intention, the Act has stated 
a number of presumptions which must be applied unless a different 
intention appears (Sections 18-19). 
Because of these presumptions the subjective theory can be said 
to be presented theoretically in the Sale of Goods Act 1893. That is 
to say, the Act does not leave the matter of passing of property 
unfettered, the intention of the parties to the contract must be drawn 
through these presumptions. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that all these presumptions 
have formulated the intention of the parties to the contract after that 
intention had been extracted from dealings. They are just like d light 
guiding us to the real intention, when the parties may have had no 
intention, or expressed no intention. Thereforo, the presumptions 
are subjective rules as well with the exception of rule 1 and rule 
5ý-l of Section 18t because they depend on the idea of appropriation 
to define the moment of passing of property. 
At the present time it is very difficult to Justify the 
"Subjective theory" by insisting on saying that the question of 
passing of property depends on that invisible idea% the Intention of 
the parties to the contract., The methods of 'buying and selling in use 
in the last century were in many respects very different from those 
employed today. This is particularly true of the domestic retail 
market where the advent of the supermarket and s'elf-service, of new 
synthetic materials and goods of great technical complexity, of the 
mail order business and sophisticated advertising techniques have 
produced almost revolutionaz7 changes* 
In international sales such as ColeFe & FeO*B# sales, intention 
plays no important role in the process of passing of the property* 
Payment, in the vast majority of these sales, must be made by commercial 
letter of credit, In this respect, intention does not appear at all, 
simply because the seller must follow certain procedures which have 
been already arranged. He must first put the goods on board a ship 
in conformity with the contract description* Secondly, he must take 
the bill of lading in his own name. At this stage the property must 
be vested in the seller so that he may be able to pledge the documents 
with the bank, and he cannot say that he intends to pass the property 
on shipment* In the third stage, the bank acquires the pledge and 
the property passes to the buyer when the bill of lading is honoured 
by the bank. 
Now, in what respect may intention operate in these procedures? 
However, the two theories seem to be illdesigned to modern practice, 
and a new basis of law is required ýo suit commercial changese 
As a matter of fact mercantile transactions are, generally 
speaking, governed by the principle "protection of property" which 
consists of two elements: 
A- Protection of the buyer*s property in receiving the goods in 
conformity with the contract's description, 
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B- Protection of the sellerts property in receiving the price. 
In the matter of passing the property between the seller and 
the buyer, the general principle can be achieved through the idea 
of "correspondence". In other words, the property of the seller 
and the buyer is protected when the actual goods correspond (go in harmony) 
with their descriptions in the contract, because at this moment the 
buyer will be sure that he is receiving the contractual goods, and the 
seller will be sure that he is receiving the price as this correspondence 
obliges the buyer to pay the price in the normal circumstances. 
Therefore the property passes to the buyer at the time when the 
correspondence between the actual goods and their descriptions in 
the contract takes place. 
'"he moment of correspondence differs from transaction to L 
transaction am follows: 
1- In the normal case of a contract for ascertained goods, the 
correspondence takes place simultaneously with the time of 
concluding the contract. When the contracting parties agree upon 
the goods and the priest the buyer is sure that the subject-matter 
of the contract satisfies the descriptions of what he wants, and the 
seller is sure that he is receiving or will receive the right price, 
2- In the light of the idea of correspondence there is no need for 
-the two conditions, namely: 
resolutive and suspensivee, 
in the sale on trial for instance, the correspondence takes place 
at the time when the buyer realizes that the subject-Catter of the 
oontract meets his requirements, and the property should pass to 
him at that time without being suspended, 
-282- 
3- In the supermarket sale the property passes to the buyerg 
regardless of payment of the price, when he takes possession of 
the article, because at that tiem, the actual goods and their price 
correspond with their description in the buyer's mind. 
4- If the goods are unascertained the property passes to the buyer when 
the goods are separated from the rest and marked with the buyer's 
mark. In other words, the property is transferred by the normal 
method of appropriation* 
5-- When the goods are kept in a warehouse the property passes to the 
buyer when their owner issues the delivery order, 
6- In C*I*Fo & P*O*B. contracts, when a commercial letter of credit() 
is involved, the buyer usually completes an "application foTW1 which 
contains his instructions to the issuing banker as to the docaments 
to be tendered by the sellert the descriptions of the-goods in these 
documents and the type of credit to be opened., The issuing banker 
notifies the seller, either directly or through a "correspondent 
banker" of the opening of the documentary credit in his favour. 
The correspondent bankerg if required to do so by the issuing 
banker, adds his "confirmation" by whioh he gives the seller an 
undertaking of his own in terms similar -to that of the issuing banker. 
(1) There are various types of documentary credit, e. c. revocable and 
irrevocable, confirmed and unconfirmed, transferable and non- 
transferable. The irrevocable and confirmed letter of credit is 
the most widely accepted form of payment in international trade* 
Four parties are involved: the buyer, the issuing banker, the 
correspondent banker and the seller* 
Benjamin pp*1025-1029* 
Sa, ssoon at P*399* 
&G, Gutteridge. Yaurice 1bgrah. The Law of Bankerst Commercial 
Credits. 5th ed# London, 1976. 
When the seller ships the goods and acquires the documents 
specified in the documentar7 credit, he tenders these doc=ents 
to the correspondent bankerP) 
If the documents comply with the terms of the documentary credit, 
the correspondent or issuing banker is obliged to accept the 
tender and to perform his promise to pay the specified amount or 
to accept or to negotiate the seller's draft. A set containing 
faulty documents will be rejected by the correspondent banker or 
by the issuing banker* 
In Erp_lish, 
_Scottish 
& Australian Bank Ltd. v-Bank of South Africa(2) 
Bailhache J. said: 
"It is elementary to say that a person who ships in reliance on a 
letter of credit must do so in exact compliance with its terms. it 
is also elementary to say that a bank is not bound or indeed 
entitled to honour drafts presented to it under a letter of credit 
unless those drafts with the accompanying documents are in exact 
accord with the credit as 'opened., #(3) 
The moment at which the bank is sure that the nature of the goods 
mentioned in the bill of lading correspond with their descriptions 
stated in the instructions, is defined when the banker acquires the 
pledge over the goodst arA the buyer acquires the Property, because 
at that time the right of the buyer to acquire property in the 
contractual goods and the right of the seller to receive the price, 
(1) In certain cases the seller asks his Own bankers to handle the 
documents and to present them on his behalf to the issuing "banker. 
(2) (1922) 13 LI, L*R* 219 24. 
(3) Article 7 of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits* U*C*Po 
and the right of the banker in securing his money will be 
protected. 
When the actual goods are not in conformity with the contract 
description, there will be no correspondence and consequently 
there will be no property to pass from the seller to the buyerg 
and therefore the seller will not be entitled to the price. 
According to this argument it can be said that "Lack of correspondence" 
is the legal basis of the buyer's right to reject the documents and 
the goods if they are not in accordance with the contract's 
description. Lack of correspondence entails that no property can 
pass to the buyer. This interpretation helps us to avoid the 
complexity of general property and special property. 
Psychologically speaking, the seller in C*I*F* & F*O*Bo contracts 
seeks, at the first place, his own protection, he wants to get the 
price. In order to protect his own property, the seller will fulfil 
his contractual obligation in shipping the contractual goods properly. 
Therefore, when the commercial letter of credit is not involved, the 
correspondence takes place when the seller endorses and sends the 
bill of lading to the buyer. In other words, the property, in this 
case, is transferred at the time of indorsing and sending the bill 
of lading to the buyer and not at the time when the buyer receives 
the documents. The reason is based on psychological assumption that 
if -the seller wants -to protect his property in getting the price, 
he must protect the property of the buyer in getting the right goods., 
Thus the correspondence occurs when the seller indorses and sends the 
bill of lading to the buyer. 
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These facts, above mentioned, explain why the property in olassic 
F*O*Bo contract passes to the buyer or, shipment* 
CHAPTER 
PASSTNG OF THE RTSK IN 
C*I*Po & F, O, B. CONTRACTS 
THEORY M PRACTICE 
Passing of the risk from a seller to a buyer differs from 
country to country. It passes with property according to Sale 
of Goods Act 1893 section 209 and the Prench Civil Code Article 
1138- 
(1) 
It passes at the time when the contract is complete 
according to Old Soots Lawo 
(2) 
nnally it passes with the delivery 
of the goods to the buyer In the light of Iraqi Civil Code, Sections 
5470) and 1790-22). 
(3) 
These matters are discussed in the first section, whereas the 
second section is devoted to the passing of the risk in CeI*F* and 
F*O*Bo contracts. 
(1) Also Section 138, Soviet Civil Code 1964- 
(2) Also Section 185, Swiss Civil Code of Obligations. 
(3) Also Para 3801 Czechoslovak Code of International Trade (1963)- 
Section 446, German Civil Code (1896). 
Dre Stojan Cigoj "Transference of risk under comParative and 
internationally unified law*" 
Lloydfs Yaritime and Commercial Law Quarterly PP56-64. 
February 1978* 
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SECTION ONE 
I fassing of the Risk in Home Market Sales 
Sale of Goods Act 1891 
The General Rule 
As a general rule in a contract for the sale of goods the property 
and the risk pass at the same timeg(l) thus section 20 provides: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the sellerts risk until 
the property therein is transferred to the buyerg the goods are at the 
buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or not. " 
In other words, the effect of the property passing is that from 
that time the goods are at the risk of the buyer* 
(2) 
(3) 
In Underwood Ltd* v. bLrZh Castle Brick and Cement -Syndicate, 
while the main engine was being loaded on a railway tmckl part of it 
was aecidentally broken. The Court of Appeal held that the property 
had not passed at the time of the acoident and that the engine was 
still at the sellerts risk* 
(4) 
In Healey v. Howlett & sons, 
(5) 
the defendant ordered twenty 
(i) Following the rale in Marltineau ve Xitching (1872) L. R- 7 Q-B* 
4369 454- 
(2) 'BenJamin at P-513* 
it is submitted that the benefits should normally be regarded as 
belonging to the owner of the goodsl rather than to the person who 
is in possession of them or who bears the risk. 
Mirabita v. TmPerial Ottoman Bank (1878) 3 Rx. D. 164,169* 
Seath v. Moore (1686) 11 App. Cas. 350,380. 
(3) -[lý23 1 KoBe 3439 
(4) Alsog &cramm i£. Xo£Uee (1849) 8 C*B* 449- 
(5) [191g7 1 K*B. 337. 
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boxes of mackerel from the plaintiff, a fish exporter carrying on 
business in Ireland, The plaintiff disptched 190 boxes and instructed 
the railway officials to earmark twenty boxes for the defendant and 
the remaining boxes for two other consignees. The train was delayed 
before the defendantts boxes were earmarked, and by the time this was 
done the fish had deteriorated. It was held that the property in the 
fish had not passed to the defendant before the boxes were earmarkedl 
and that they were still therefore at the seller's risk when they 
deteriorated. 
In Sterns. Ltd. ve Vickers Ltdol(l) the defendants sold to the 
plaintiffs 120,000 gallons of spirit which was part of a total quantity 
of 200,000 gallons in a storage tank belonging to a third party* The 
plaintiffs obtained a delivery order which the third Rarty acceptedg 
btrt the plaintiffs decided to leave the spirit in the tank for the 
time being for their own convenience. The spirit deteriorated in 
quality between the time of sale, and the time when the plaintiffs 
eventually took delivery of the 120,000 gallonse It was hold by the 
Court of Appeai that the risk had passed to the Imyerse* 
Delay of Deliverys 
The second part of section 20 provides: 
"Provided that where delivery has been delayed through the fault(2) of 
(1) E923ý1 I K. B- 343o 
In this case, it can be seen that the acceptance of the delivery 
warrant was regarded as the crucial factor in the case,. since it 
was this which gave the buyer an immediate right to possession. 
(2) Fault is "wrongful act or default" S. 62. 
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either buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the party in 
fault as regards any loss which might not have occurred but foi such 
fault a" 
In DeM]= Hamilton & Co., v. BardenP) an agreement for sale of 
30 tons of apple juice to be delivered weekly on buyerts instruction* 
Buyer fails to give instructions for last 10 tons, which seller has 
put in casks ready for delivery. The juice goes putrid as a result* 
Although property remains in the sellerg the loss was the fault of 
the buyer and is at his risk. 
Daties of Baileel: 
The last paragraph of section 20 provides: 
"Provided also that nothing in this section shall effeet the duties 
of liabilities of-either seller or buyer as a bailee Eir custodie: r] 
of the goods of the other party. " 
The duty of a bailee is to take reasonable care of the goods, 
and to have them available undamaged for delivery up when agreed or 
recluired unless he is prevented from doing so without any fault on 
his or his servantst part. 
(2) 
(1) E19ý1, ]9 I All., E*Ro 435- 
(2) jgghland vo RoRo Law Ilu=rv Coaches) Ltd., 
F196 
C*Ae 
]2 1 Q-3- 694, 
See also Treatise on the law of sale. We Brown at P-367-1821. 
Bell's Comm* V#I at p. 488. 
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Exceptions: 
1- The risk does not normally pass to a potential buyer where goods 
are delivered on sale or return* In Head v. Tattersall(') the 
plaintiff bought a horse from the defendantl warranted to have been 
hunted with the Bicester houndst and the Plaintiff was given a week 
in which to return the horse if it did not answer the description. 
The horse was accidentally injured before the week was upq and the 
plaintiff claimed to return it, having discovered that it had not been 
hunted with the Bicester hounds. It was held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to return the horse and recover the price. The risk was 
thus held to be on the seller although the property had probably 
passed to the buyert subject to the possibility of being divested. 
Today, the property does not pass until the expiry of the time fixed 
in accordance with section 18t rule 4(b). However, the decision may 
well illustrate that the risk always remains on the seller when the 
buyer has a right of rejectione 
(2) 
2- The general rule to not an imperative one* Therefore it to open 
to the contracting parties to avoid the general rule expressly or 
impliedly. 
(3) 
(1) (1870) L, R, 7 Eko 7* 
(2) Contrast BeInrington v. Dale (1902) 7 Com. Cas, 112, where a 
trade custom to the contrary was proved, 
(3) See the opening words of section 20. 
and 
Castle v*- Pla-vford (1872) _1,, 
R 5 Ex 165- 
Horn v. Minister of roodl 2 
1119 
EeR, 1036* 
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11 Old S cot a Law 
The General Rule: 
In Scotland the separation of the risk from the property was 
established at least as far back as the seventeenth century, 
(') 
the 
risk of the thing sold is, by the common law of Scotlandt on the 
buyerl according to the maxim, "Periculum, rei vanditae nondum 
traditae est emptori B"n(2 
) 
The rule being that as soon as the 
contract was complete, specific goods were at the risk of the buyer? 
Thus in Hutcheson v. McDonald 
(3 )a 
parcel of spirits in the Kines 
warehouses was sold, and a bill given for the price, but the spirits 
not deliveredl and next day the warehouse was broken, and the spirits 
taken away; yet the buyer was found liable for the price* 
(4) 
Justifications 
0ý 
The reason for this says Mr. Erskine (inste 11: 1-3-7-) is "that 
the property, which contirmes in the seller until after deliveryt is 
but nominal; he is truly no better than the keeper of the subject for 
behoof of the purchaser, and so he is debtor for its deliveryl and no 
debtor for the delivery. of a special subject cang in equity, be 
(1) Richard Bzxwnl Sale of Goods Act 1893 at p. 6.1895- 
(2) Bell* Princio vI at p*42* 
(3) 3rd- Jan- 1744- Elch Sale TO-5* 
(4) See alsot. Campbell M. j= I 5th Julv, 1748- I(ilk 377# 
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answerable for the causal misfortunes to which it may be exposed. " 
Another equitable consideration in. support of this rule is, 
that the purchaser receives the whole benefit arising from the 
improvement of the subject sold, and ought, thereforeq to run the 
risk of its deterioration; cujus est commodum ejus debet ease 
periculum. 
0) 
The Time of Coppleting the Contract: 
As we have seen, the risk, according to Old Scottish Law, passed 
to the buyer as soon as the contract was complete. A question can be 
raised concerning the time of completion of the contract, In other 
words, when is the contract complete? _ 
In the light of Old Soots Law, two conditions were required to 
complete a contract: 
I- The price mast be certain, and 
2- The goods must be specific* 
These are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
I. The price mmst be certain: 
In this respect the word certain can be iiTterpreted in two 
different wayal it either means -the price must 'be fixed (absolutely) 
or discoverable (it mast be made capable of being ascertained), The 
first interpretation was adopted in Hansen ve Cr%JR which wag critioized 
(1) Transference of risk in sale* Article in the Journal of 
Jurisprudence for May 1859 at pe250. 
A compendium of English and Scotch Law, Jo Paterson a; t p. 187. 
Richard Brown 4Lt P*107 
X. P. Brown (more dertails) at P. 355- 18219 
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by jurisprudence. 
-e. and os _g and 
20 e. In Hansen's. Enk I others. vs Crej the defendants 
having agreed to purchase from the pursuers all the merchantable oil, 
the entire cargo of the ship "Polar Bear" then lYing in a boiling-yard 
at Borrowstounneset bought and sold notes were exchanged, in which the 
oil was described as of two kindog boild and pale, and as consisting 
of "about" T28 : 11 :0: 9 of the first, and T54 :3: 3t 24 of the 
second, and the price fixed was C44- 5s- overhead per tone The 
boiling-yard where the oil was stored was made the place of delivery. 
At the date at which the bought and sold notes were exchanged the oil 
had been prepared and put into casks, its quantity had been ascertained 
by the sellers, and tickets stating the weights Put on the casks; and 
no operation remained to be performed in regard to the oil, either by 
seller or buyer, which was necessary, according to the practice of 
trade, to make it ready for delivery. 
By the custom of the oil trade, however, the purchaser was entitled 
either before or after delivery of the oil, to check the weights 
previously ascertained and stated in the tickets attached to the casks, 
and also to search for 'Ifoots' or sedimentg and claim a reduction from 
the price on account of 9footst, if the amount turned out to be 
considerable. It was also arranged at the time of the sale (as appears 
to be usual in such transact ions), that a written statement or 
specification of the weights corresponding with the weights marked on 
the casks should be furnished by the seller to the purchaser, and that 
the oil might be searched by him on a certain deq following, After the 
(1) 31 So. Jur. 236 121 D*432o 
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bought arA sold notes had been exchanged, but previous to a search 
having been madel or the weights having been checked by the purohaser, 
-the oil was destroyed by accidental fire in the boiling-Tard, 
The present action was brought to ascertain with whom, in the 
circumstances, the risk lay, whether it remained with the sellers, or 
was transferred to the buyers., 
The purchasers pled that the sale was not rendered complete by 
the mere interchange of the bought and sold notes, in respect thýt 
several things remained to be done before the contract could be 
implemented, to ascertain the quantity of the oil, its merchantable 
quality, and the total amount of the contract price; and that, 
therefore, the risk was not transferred from the seller to them. 
The Court repelled this plea; holding that the fact, of the 
quantity having been ascertained by the sellerst and stated in the 
contract, removed all uncertainty as to the prioel and -that the 
m%bject being a specific corpus (the cargo of a certain ship), and 
the cumulo price being ascertainable by a simple arithmetical process 
from the data furnished, - the number of tons, and the price per ton 
there wast consequently, no uncertainty either as to the Erabject or as 
to the pricee They therefore held the personal contract to be complete, 
and the risk to be transferred to the purchaser* 
The right to check the weightst and to search for tfootst or 
sediment, was regarded as not a condition suspensive of the contracts 
although it might, in the one case (if a material deficiency was 
found to exist), entitle the buyers to rescind the contract, orl in 
the other (if the amount of sediment was considerable), to claim a 
corresponding abatement from the price* It being within the option 
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of the 'buyer to make his examination either before or after delivery, 
and to take delivery when he pleased, the were postponement of delivery 
to suit his convenience, and enable him to exercise his right of check, 
was held not to affect the transference of risk, the contract being 
othen-rise complete. The use of the word llabout"q which might in other 
circumstances have been important, was held to be explained by that 
usage of trade which entitled the buyers to check the weights as 
ascertained by the sellersi, 
The Lord Justice-Clerk, although regarding its settlement as not 
absolutely necessary for the decision of the case before the Court, 
delivered an opinion on the important general questionj whether the 
sale of a certain and known mass of fungibles, by general desoriptiont 
but of unascertained amount, at a rate_of price according to measure, 
weight, or number, is such a complete personal contract as to transfer 
the risk to the buyer, previous to the mass having been measured, 
weighed, or counted, and the camulo price so ascertainede He held 
thatj in such a case, the uncertainty of the price rendered the 
contract incomplete, and prevented the risk passing. 
(') 
On the other hand, the jurisprudence stood against this idea, 
The price, according to jurispradencel is necessary to complete the 
personal contract of salej but it is not absolutely essential that a 
defirite price be presently fixed., It is sufficient if means be 
afforded for ascertaining the price. 
Professor Bell says (Princ. 92) "The price must be certain-, or 
referred to such standard or criterion as to fix it beyond cplestiong 
(1) See also: &MM ve Parnell, 2 Compli 240. 
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as to the sheriff-fiars fixing the price of grain; or the award of 
a third party-, or even of one of the parties subject to the control 
of equity; or the market or current price at a particular time or 
place. " For instance, where no price has been fixed at all, and 
delivery has been made, the contract is not void for want of a price. 
The law of Scotland presumes that. the goods were sold for their 
reasonable or fair markert value, Therefore, '"11he price may be either 
a sum for the whole subject sold, or rateably at so much per ton, or 
pipe, or hogshead, or quarter of grain; ancl then the only question 
that can be raised will relate either to the denomination of wrong 
specifiedt or to the rate of exchange between one country and another, 
or to the measurement of the_ goods to-which the stilMlated rate of 
2=ent is Mlicablee, but the degree of uncertainty depending on 
these circumstances does not unfix the-pIfteet or enable the party to 
withdraw from the contract (Bell. The Contract of Sale P4,19)0 
The subject being specific, if the price is not unfixed 'by the 
uncertainty attaching to the amount, the contract in complete, and 
none of its essential elements are awanting, 
Accordingly the rational criterion for determining the passing 
of the risk is the, possibilitZ of ascertaining the amount of the corpus 
destroyedt and thus fixing the price, No essential element 'of the 
contract of sale is awanting where a specific M"s of fungibles is 
sold at a fixed rate per weight or measure, and means exist for 
ascertaining the quantity* As a result the undoubted principle of 
law "There is no sale without price" has some exceptions.: 
I. An exception to this rule occurs where, in a sale of a speoifio 
subject at a rate per measure, delivery has taken place, and the 
subject has accidentally perished in the hands of the purchaser. 
before the cumulo amount has been ascertained. The property 
wouldl in such a ease, be at the risk of the purobaser, and the 
seller would have his claim for the price* The amount of the 
subjeett and consequently the cumulo price due, would fall to 
be ascertained by the ordinary legal methods of proof. 
2- Where also the rate of price has been referred to a standard, 
its non-ascertainment prior to the loss of the subject does not 
necessarily avoid the contract. 
An example offers in the sale of a specific heap of grain of 
known quantity at fiaxts prices, where the destruction of the 
grain before the fiars have been struckg would not affect the 
(1) 
completion of the contract, or the transferance of the risk. 
This attitude seems similar to the one which has been adopted by 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Thus section 8 provides: 
"(I) The price In a contract of sale may be fixed by the contract, 
or may be left to be fixed in manner thereby agreed, or may 
be determined by the course of dealing between the parties, 
(2) Where the price is not determined in accordance with the 
foregoing provisions the buyer mast pay a reasonable price. 
What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent 
an the circumstances of each particular case. n(2) 
(1) M*P- Brown PP148-152- 
Transference of risk in sales Article in the Journal of 
jV#sprudence. Ifty 1859 v-171 pp, 248-254- 
(2) : rn -the Prench Law, the ascertaiment of the price is as foLlowas. 
Art-15910- "Le prix de la vente'doit 9tre dke--Mine et, designs' 
par lea parties*" 
The price must be fixed and specified by the parties* 
Art*1592: "11 peat ceperAant 6tre laisse a l9arbitrage dfun tierml, 
si. le tiers ne veat ou ne peut faire Itestimation, il nty a pointe 
do vente. " It mayt howevert be left to thwarbitration of a third 
person: if that person will not or camot make the valuations there 
is no sale* 
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2- The Goods Mist be Specifies. 
In order to transfer the risk to the buyer, the thing nrast be 
specifically appropriated as under the contract: i9e, the thing sold 
mast be ascertained and identified so that the buyer is creditor for 
delivery of a specific thing. 
0) 
In other words, the transference 
or non-transference of risk depends upon natural possibility viz. 
where the subject is specific, there is a determinate corpus to 
which risk may attach, where, on the other hand, no specific subject 
has been agreed upon, the risk cannot by possibility be transferred, 
there being nothing to which risk can attach* 
(2) 
Excerrtionso. 
The general ralel that the risk of the thing sold lies upon the 
vendee, from the time when the contract is completed, is to be 
received under the following exceptions and qualifioationst 
1- The subject is no longer at the risk of the vendee after the 
vendor is in moraq by not delivering it when he was bound to 
deliver it* 
2- Another exception to the rule takes place when the loss has 
happened by the fault of the vendort because, although the 
subject is at the risk of the vendee from the time of the sale, 
the vendor is nevertheless bound to take care of it as long as 
it remains undeliverede 
3- A third exception to the general rule, in regard to pericalum, 
is that the lots falls upon the verAor, if the subject perishes 
(1) Green v. &4horng I Starkie 447, 
HodgEon v, Le Bret, 1 Camps 233* 
Anderson & Crompton vo Ykils I LO*t 18709 9 lboph 122* 
(2) Transference of risk at p*250 
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from a vice of such a nature that the vendor would have been 
liable under his obligation or warrandice, had the subject 
perished from the same cause after delivery. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that the general rule is not an 
imperative one, therefore when it has been agreedt either 
expressly or by implication, thatl contrary to the general rule, 
the risk shall continue with the vendor until delivery, such an 
agreement will be effectual., 
(') 
As a resultj the following rule can be formed: 
Where there is an express or implied undertaking of the risk by the 
seller, as to deliver at a certain place, or where anything remains 
to be done in completing, ascertaining, or identifying the thing to 
be delivered, or fixing its pricee The matter may be stated tbus: 
Under the former low of Sootland, the risk passed to the buyer when 
he acquired by the contract a jus ad rem, or special right to have 
delivery, as against -the seller, of a specific thing, and it passes 
to him with transference of the property, unless it is continued 
with the seller either (I)by mora or other fault on his part or 
(2) by the intention of the parties expressed in the bargain, or 
implied in its terms, 
(2) 
(1) XqPe Brown pp. 366-387. 
(2) Bell Prime voi, 1899 at P-43, 
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III Iraqi Law 
The General Rale: 
The risk passes from the seller to the buyer at the time when 
the goods are delivered to the buyerP) Therefore the risk is 
transferred with the delivery of the goods to the buyer, and not 
with the passing of property* As a resultt although the property 
may pass to the buyer by the contract itself (when the goods are 
ascertained) or by the identification (when the goods are not 
ascertained) - Seo-531 - bat the risk lies with the seller before 
delivery. 
This general rule can be explained as followet 
The risk, before the delivery of the goodol can be caused either by: 
I- Action of the seller. 
2- Action of the buyer. 
3-- Force majeure. 
These reasons are discussed in the. following paragraphat 
I- When the risk is caused by the action of the sellers 
Tz this case the seller mast bear the risk and the buyer is entitled 
to olaim damages wA to reclaim the prioe if it las been paid, 
Sootions 5470) ad 17904) Iraqi Civil Wise 
Sootion 437. Fovtian Ciyil Code* 
Seoticm 405- SYrUm civil Oddeo 
This general- rao Is bas4 on Islamto Law* Thus Seajgm., 293.., QS, 
. 
Nlkjallat AI-AhlcýA 
-A3. -AdIllyW provided-. "The risk mut- be bome by -the s4ller Imfore the dq 
,ý gmäe, to the bvj«, um'ý , 
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2- When the risk is caused by the action of the buyer. - 
In this case the buyer must bear the risk, consequently he must 
pay the price if it has not been paid yet, and he is not entitled 
to reclaim the price if it has been paid@ (Sectioil 547-2-). 
3m- When the risk is caused by Force Majeure: 
In this respect a distinction must be made between the partial 
loss and the total loose* 
A* The partial loss: 
It is obvious that the partial loss makes the goods less 
valuable. The buyer, in this case, is entitled either to 
breach the contract or to accept the goods having reduced the 
price to that amount which mist be relevant to the remaining 
goods4, It should be noted that when the risk occurs by the 
Force Kajeure, the buyer has no right to claim damageog as the 
loss is not caused by the action of the sellero(l) (Section 
547-l-)* 
B" The total lose: 
The total lose of the goods before delivery must be borne by 
the seller. The obligation to deliver the goods is the sellerts. 
Since the seller is not able to deliver the goods after their 
total lose, the contract will be repudiated. As a result the 
buyer is entitled to reclaim the price if it has been paid, and 
* LebaneseCivil Codeq does-not have this distinction. 
(1) The fluctuation of the price is not a Poroe Majeuree Therefore 
when the value of the goods deteriorates duýe to economical reason before their delivery, the seller is not liable. 
Al-Windavi "Contract of sale" at p. 154. 
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he is not bound to pay the price if it has not been paid* 
Moreoverl damages cannot be claimedP) (Section 547-1-) 
Exceptions: 
The general rule that the risk passes to -the buyer with the 
delivery of the goods has some exceptions which can be summarized 
as follows: 
I- The risk passes from the seller to the buyer, yet the goods are 
still in the possession of the sellerl when the seller notifies 
the buyer to receive the goods, although the buyer delays in 
receiving themo(2) (Section 547-1-)- 
Similarly, when the time of delivery is defined either by the 
agreement or by the seller himself (which must be adequate) and 
the buyer neglects to receive them at the defined time, the risk 
passes to the buyere 
2. When the buyer does not pay the p; -Joeg the seller is entitled to 
exercise his right of "Lein" over the goods. The risks after the 
"Lein" has been exercisedt passes to the buyer, on the grounds 
that the buyer has committed a cývil wrong by nore-paymento 
(3) 
(Section 428). 
It is open to the oontracting parties to stipulate in the oontract. 
(1) In the light Ot Syrian arid EgYPtian Civil Codes the buyer is 
entitled to breach the coixtract only when the goods have suffered 
"severe dam! %es", otherwise he unat accept the goods aner 
reducing the price,, 
Section 406. S. C. Code, and Section 438 E*C. Code. 
(2) Sections 335 and 437 Egyptian Civil Oode* 
(3) Section 460 Egyptian Civil code. 
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that the bayer should bear the risk from any time they agreel 
regardless of the delivex7 of the goods, because the rules of 
risk are not imperative legal provisions, 
(') 
Passing of -the Risk before the Contract is Made 
I- When the goods are received by someone with no intention of 
buying them, but merely to have a look at them or to show them 
to someone else, the possessor in this ease is not liable if the 
loss occurs by Force Majeure, whereas he is liable if the lose 
occurs by his action. (Section 548-2-)# 
2- Vlhen the goods are received by someone with the intention of 
buying them: in this case, if the price is fixedq the possessor 
will be liable, no matter how the loss has occurred; either by 
his action or by Force Majeure. 
If the price is not yet fixedq the possessor will be liable when 
the lose occurs by his action only (Section 548-1-). 
(1) Al-Windawi at P-157* 
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IV The F%, ench Civil Cod. e: 
The General Rule: 
. According to the French Civil Code the risk passes to the buyer 
with the property. TIras section 1138 provides: * 
"A contract to deliver a thing is made complete by virtue of the 
simple consent of the contracting parties* 
Such a contract makes the creditor owner and puts the thing at his 
risk from the very moment that the alltv of deliverz arige , even 
though the handing over has not taken placel unless the debtor has 
defaulted in delivering, in which case the thing remains at his risk. " 
The duty of delivery arises at the time when the contract is 
made, as an obligation on the part of the sellerg and since the 
property passes to the buyer at the time when the contract is made, 
therefore the risk and the property pass to the buyer simultaneously, 
namely at the time when the contract is made* 
It has been said that the reason for that rule is the fact that 
thebuyer has the benefit and the fruits of the thing sold as soon as 
he acquires the propertyg therefore it is fair to let him bear the 
risk as soon as the property passes to him, 
(') 
Art-1138: "Llobligation, do livrer Ia, chose est parfaite par le 
seal consentement des parties con-tractazrtes. 
Elle rend le creancier prqprigtaire et met la, chose a ses risques 
des 11instant ou", elle 
'a 
d4 6tre livree, encore que la tradition n1en 
ait point bte faite, a moins que le dibiteur ne soit en demeare de 
la livrerl auquel cas la. chose reste a= risques de ce derniere" 
(1) Ripert & Boulanger at p94729 
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II The Application of the General Rule 
There are certain facts which have to be taken into consideration 
in applying the general rale. There facts are discussed in the 
following paragraphs: 
1- If the things sold are unaseertained, the risk does not pass to 
the buyer until they are ascertained. 'Section 1585, This rule 
applies to future goods and goods to be manufactured. 
(') 
This rule does not extend to govern the lump sum sale where 
weight, number, or measure of the goods are not necessary in 
ascertaining the goods. Section 1586. 
2- When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, the thing 
forming its ffabject-matter remains at the risk of the debtor, for 
he has engaged to deliver it only in the event of the condition 
being realized* If the thing has perished in entirety without 
fault of the debtor, the contract is discharged* If the thing 
has deteriorated without fault of the debtor, the creditor has 
the choice of either rescinding the contract or claiming the thing 
in its actual statet without reduction of the price. 
If the thing has deteriorated through the fault of the debtor, the 
creditor has the right of either repudiating the contract, or of 
claiming the thing in its actual state, with damages. Section 1182. 
According to this section, the riskj when a contract is subject to 
a suspensive condition, passes to the buyer at the time when the 
(1) Yazeand at P-149* 
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condition occurs. 
('ý 
In this respect, it must be mentioned,., 
A. This section is considered to be an exception to the general 
rule, We bave seen that the property in this type of contract 
passes to the buyer not at the time when the condition occurs 
but at the time when the contract is made by retrospective 
effect. Therefore the risk in such a contract is not subject 
to "retrospective effect", and passes to the buyer at a 
different time to the passing of propertyo 
Bo According to section 1137, the buyer, in a sale on triall for 
instance, must take care of the thing sold while it is in his 
possession* It provides: 
of *eel the obligation of safeguarding the thing imposes on 
the 
party on whom it lies the duty of exercising in the matter all 
the care of a prudent man. " 
3ý- Delay in delivering the goods at the agreed date, imposes the risk 
on the party in defaulte Thus section 1139 provides: 
"The debtor is put in default either by means of a mimmons to 
deliver or other equivalent document, or, where the agreement 
provides that the debtor shall be in default without need of WW 
document and by the mere arrival of the due date, by the operation 
of the agreement. " 
Therefore if the buyer, in a sale on trial, for instance, does not 
return the thing sold at. the agreed date, the risk will pass to 
him after the expiry of that date. 
(2) 
(1) Planiol & Ripert at p. 248- 
Mazeaud & Mazeaud at p. 158. 
(2) Nazeaud & Mazeaud at P*158- 
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Finally, the general rule is subject to modification by contrary 
agreement* Therefore, in a sale on trial, the parties are free 
to let the buyer bear the risk while he tests the thing sold, and 
so one(') 
Evaluation 
As we have seen, the risk passes to the buyer with the property 
according to Sale of Goods Act 1893 section 20, and French Civil 
Code Art. 1138. In the light of Cid Scots Law it passes at the time 
when the contract is complete (certain pricef specific goods). 
Finally, it passes with the delivery of goods to thebuyer according 
to Arabic Laws. 
In fact the practical results of these rules are quite similar, 
on the ground that the seller is bound - in all these laws - to take 
reasonable care of the goods until their delivery, that means he must 
bear the risk when it is caused by him. On the other hand, the buyer, 
also, must bear the risk when it is caused by his action before 
delivery* The real difference between these laws is when the risk 
is caused by the Force Majeure. Who bears the risk of the Force 
Majeure? 
In the light of S*Ge Act 1893, French Law and Old Scots Law, 
the buyer does* 
In the light of Iraqi, Egyptian and Syrian Lawsl the seller does. 
(1) Ibid at P-170* 
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The rpoblem of passing of the risk depends, as I see it, on its 
cause* In other words the risk must be borne by the one who created 
it* Therefore the seller is responsible for the safety of the goods, 
by taking good care of them, until their delivery, and the buyer is 
liable for the risk if his action is the reason* 
In the ease of Force Majeure the seller must bear the risk on 
the ground that this solution prevents the fraud and makes the 
seller do -his beat in taking real care of the goods. 
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SECTION TWO 
-Pasqina of 
the Risk in Cjs'Pe and P. O. B* Contracts 
I The General Rule 
"The risk passes to the buyer on shipmente" 
The almost universal rule in this respect is that: 
"The risk in C. I. P. and P9O, B9 contracts passes to the buyer when 
the goods are shipped. " Therefore, the goods are normally at the 
buyerts risk during transit, and the seller does not in.:, practice 
agree to deliver them (actual delivery to the buyer) at his own 
risk, so that he is not responsible for the risk of transit* This 
rule has been adopted in the following laws: 
U*K9 (Scotland and %cland): 
The convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International 
Sale of Goods provides thatq as a rule,, the risk shall pass an 
delivery of the goods. Thus Artiole 97 states: 
I- "The risk shall pass to the buyer when delivery of the goods is 
effected in accordanoe with the provisions of the oontract and the 
present law*" 
The Hague, 1 July 1964 - 31 December 1965- 
Treaty Series No*74 0972), 
The Uniform Law on Sales deals only with the obligations of the 
seller and buyer arising from a contract of sale, and not with 
related matterst such as the validity of the contract itself or 
its provisions or any usage, or the effect which the contract may 
have on the property in goods *sold, such qtLel3tions fall to be 
determined in accordance with the appropriate governing law, as 
determined by the normal principles of the conflict of laws. 
Benjamin at P-17- 
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The Uhited Kingdom in-strwnent of ratification was deposited 
on 31 August 1967 and the convention entered into force on 18 August 
1972. 
(1) 
This rule has been applied in Scotland and Migland for a long 
time* 
(2) 
on the ground that the buyer's normal assumption would be 
that the goods are at his risk when his insurance cover begins, as 
the rules concerning the risk are not imperative* 
(1) On depositing their ins-trament of ratification the government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made the 
following declarations: 
(a) In accordance with the provisions of Article III of the 
convention, the United Kingdom will apply the Uniform Law 
only if each of the parties to the contract of sale has hie 
place of business or, if he has no place of business, his 
habitual residence in the territory of a different contracting 
state. The United Kingdom will in consequence insert the word 
"contracting" before the word "states" where the latter word 
first occurs in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Uniform Law. 
(b) In accordance with the provisions of Article V of the convention 
the United Kinglomwill apply the Uniform Law only to contracts 
in which the parties thereto have, by virtue of Article 4 of the 
Uniform Law, chosen that law as the law of the contract. 
(2) A. F. O. B, contracts: 
Carlos Federspiel-& Co. S*A., v Charles Twigg & Co. Ltd. 57] 
1a; 7ts Repo 240* 
119 
Stock v Inglis, (1884) 12 Q*B. D564,573,5751 577- Ynglis v St . ock (1885) 10 App. Cas. 263,273. 
The Parchiq77L918: 3 A. C. 157t 168. 
Brown v YeTre 
%58) 
3 H. & N. 484 (1859) 4H&N 822* 
Broome v ardess Co-operative Society of Orange G owers F194ý1 
I All E, Re 603- - Je Raymond Wilson & Co. Ltd. v Norman Scra-tchard Ltd. (1944) 
77 Ll. L. R- 373,374* 
212nMrnock Tron and Steel Co. Ltd. v Cooper & Co, 
-Ion) ee it kcT. oi sesr,. 
B. ColoP, contracts: 
Julia LD42J A. C. 293y 309. 
Be Clemens Horst Coo Ltd. v Biddell Bros. E91] 1 K-'B-'934v 
959o 
Bovden Bros & Co. Ltd. v Little (1907) 4 C. L, R, 1364, Shij)ton Anderson & Co. v johve ýWeston & Co. (1922) IOLI. 110' 
762o 
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Old Soots Law: 
A conclusion can be drawn from Old Scots Law about the transferral 
of the risk, which is as follows: 
The risk in Cel*F, and P, O, B, contracts passes to the buyer on shipment, 
because C*I*F. and F*O*B* sales are, more commonly, sales of 
unascertained goods and in order to transfer the risk to the buyer, 
under Old Scots Law, the goods must be specifically appropriated as 
under the contract "must be ascertained and identified" and because 
the appropriation takes place on delivery of the goods to the carrier-, 
this means that the risk passed to the buyer on shipment. Thus in. 
Rat_ton X Solomonson(l) Lord Alvanley saide. "to be a proposition as 
well settled as any in the law, that if--a tradesman orders goods to be 
sent by a carrier, though he does not name any particular carrier, the 
moment the goods are delivered to the carrier, it operates as a delivery 
to the purchaser, he alone can bring an action for arW injury done to 
the goods, and if any accident happens to the goods it is at his risk. 
Irs4l 
Section 183 of -the Iraqi Law of Commerce No. 60.1943 (now reps 
12) 
&led 
and sections 149 and 158 of the Iraqi Law of Commerce No. 149,1970, 
(3) 
(1) 3B and P, 582* 
Accordingly, in an earlier case, it had been decided by the court of 
Kines Benchy that if the consignor of goods delivers them to a 
partieftlar carrier by order of the consignee, and they be afte- ards 
lost, the consilMor cann6t maintain an action against the carrier 
for the loss* The action can be brought by the consiAmee only, 
Dawes v Peck, 8 T-R- 330- 
jgý See post PP7 r 1- 7- 
3 See post pp. r ?_ re - 1ý0, 
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have made it clear that the risk in C&I. F. and F*O*B* contracts 
passes to the buyer on shipment. 
Egyptian Courts have mentioned this rule as a law ill Several 
occasions. Thus Alexandria Court saidNIn C*I*Po contracts the 
property passes to the buyer on shipment and the risk en route in on 
him. " 
Prance: 
It is a well established rule in FTance that the risk in C. I. F. 
and P*O*Bo contracts passes to the buyer on shipment* This rale has been 
justified on the ground that the property and the risk pass to the buyer 
simultaneously (Article 1138)9 and since the property in C*I*Fo and 
FoOeB, contracts passes to the buyer on shipment, therefore the risk 
should pass at that time as well* 
(2) 
This justification is a moot point 'because -the property in the 
goods afloat passes to the buyer at the time when the contract is made 
whereas the risk passes to him from the time of shipment by retrospective 
effecte(3) 
However, this rale has been enacted in Article 32 of the law 
W% 
Wo. 69-8 du janvier 1969, (Relative a Itarmement et a= ventes M&ritimes) 
(1) 30-11-1958 Ykjallat Al-Iblamah (Advocacy Review) Wo. 2 Year 39- 
(2) "La vents avazrt lien "a 1'embarquement et., le transport etant effectue' 
pour le oompte '* 
de l2acquefreur, cet acquereur supporte lea risques de 
route ... La regle est tout simplement la consequence du principe du transfert de propribte, " Ripert at p. 825- 
"Oest dono an moment de I& specialisation clue lea risclaes neront % pas a Itachetear. " Bellot at P-125- 
(3) Post at P- "14- &- 
which provides: 
"The sale on shipment puts the risk of the thing sold at the buyer 
from the day it io delivered according to the conditions of the 
contract. 
(')* 
(1) I'La vente au depart met la chose vendue w= risVes et a la charge 
do ltacheteur, a compter du jour OU elle a bte livree dans les 
conditions du contrate" 
We wish to point out that Article 33 needs to contain the phrase 
"to the carrier" in order to be more specific when it talks about 
delivery. The problem of delivery and whether it takes place on 
shipment or at the time when the buyer receives the documents has 
not yet been settled down. Therefore, and after the suggestion, 
Article 32 will be read as follows: 
"The sale on shipment puts the risk of the thing sold at the 
buyer from the day it is delivered (to the carrier) aocordingto 
the conditions of the contract*" 
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11 Limitation: 
The risk of transit and accidental loss should not be confased 
with the risk of deterioration of the goods in transit. The seller 
must pack the goods in a reasonably careful manner having regard both 
to the nature of the goods and of the transit, because there is an 
implied warranty on the part of the seller that the goods will remain 
merchantable during normal transit and a reasonable time thereafter. 
Thus rule 11 of (Warsaw-Oxford Rules) providest. 
Duties of the seller as to condition of goods: 
I-The goods contracted to be sold must be shipped or delivered into 
the custody of the carriert as the case may beg in such a condition 
as, subject to risk of deterioration, leakage or wastage in balk or 
weight inherent in the goods (and not consequent upon the goods 
having been defective at the time of shipment or of delivery into 
the custody of the carrier, as the case may be, or incident to 
loading or transit) would enable them to arrive at their contractual 
destination on a normal journey and under normal conditions in 
merchantable conditione In allowing for ordinary deterioration, 
leakage or wastage in bulk or weight due regard shallbe had to any 
usage of the particular trade*" 
This rule has been recognised by the following Laws: 
M=K. (S cot IlMd mid Da lgnd) 
Uhder these two laws the seller,. in C. I. F. and F*O. B. contracts, 
in under an obligation to ship the goods in such a condition as would 
enable the goods to arrive at their destination on a normal voyaget 
and under normal condition, in merchantable condi-bion, 
(1) 
In Yask &- Tfurrell Ltd. y joseEh 1. Dranual I Ltd. 
(2)Diplook 
Jo said: 
"when goods are sold under a contract such as a Col. p. 
(3) 
or r-*OoBo 
(4) 
contractst which involves transit before use, there is an implied 
warranty not merely that they shall be merchantable at the time they 
are put on the vessel, but that they sball be in such a state that 
they can endure the normal journey and be in a merchantable condition 
on arrival; and for a reasonable time thereafter to allow for disposal, 
or use, as the case may be. " 
The sellerls undertaking of fitness for a particular purpose will, 
when it arises, have a similar scope, In A*B* KeMR Ltdl, --v 
Tolland(5) 
Devlin J. said that the effect of this implied undertaking was that 
"the seller warrants that the goods, at the time of sale, are in such 
a condition thatt unless that condition is unnaturally changedg they- 
will, at the end of the normal period of journey ... be still fit for 
human consumptione" 
Old Soo-to Law: 
It was made very clear under Old Soots Law that the seller must 
deliver the goods in the proper and usual manner, and with the usual 
(1) NoCardie Jo in EZaýnelinos v Leslie & AndersM (1920) 4 U. L* Repo 
(2) 
ýllqa6l]pl* It$* 
,. R. 862f 865 at p. 865- 
i w.. T 
Gardano and Giamoieri v Greek Petroleum Geor; +, e Yanidakis-A Co* 
9621 1 WaL. Re 40. 
Broome v PgdjM 2_sTgRaratin Sooietv [1940 1 All W* 603# 
5 -LI95ýj 2 Lloy&'Ws Repo 681-685* 
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precautions to inm,. re the safety of the goods and the claim of the 
vendee agaiml. the party ineared with them. Thus Loxd Ellenborough 
said: 
(') 
"The plaintiff camot be said to have deposited the goods 
in the usual and ordinary way, for the purpose of forwarding them 
to the defendant, unless he took the usual and ordinary precautions 
which the notoriety of the carriers general undertaking required, 
with respect to goods of this value, to insure them a safe conveyances. 
that is, by making a special entry of theme He had an implied 
authority and it was his duty to do whatever was necessary to secure 
the responsibility of the carriers for the safe delivery of the goods, 
and to put them into such a course of oonveyanoeq as thatj in case of 
a loss, the defendant might have his indemnity against the oarrierse" 
Ir Law 
There is no clear provision dealing directly with this problem* 
Oar task now is to discuss this obligation in the light of the 
provisions of Iraqi Law of Commerce WoO149,1970* 
Section 122 provides: 
(2) 
"If the goods are not in conformity with the contract description, 
the buyer is not entitled to reject the goods or to breach the contract. 
He =at accept the goods and reduce the priceo On the other bandl the 
buyer to entitled to reject the goods ift 
i. There is an agreement or custom entitling the buyer to reject the 
contract* 
(1) Cla3+, e v Hutchins 14 Easts 475. 
(2) This section is similar to section 182 of Iraqi Law of Commeroe 
Noi, 60,1943 (now repealed), 
2- There is a difficulty in marketing the goods, or they are not 
competent for the Inirpose of the buyer. " 
It can be inferred from this section that the seller in C. I. F. 
and F. O. B. contracts is under obligation to ship the goods which must 
be, at the time of delivery: 
1- In accordance with the contract description, 
2- Fit and competent to the purpose of the buyers 
3- Easy marketing. 
Otherwise the buyer is entitled to reduce the price in case 
No. 1 and to breach the contract in the cases Nos, 2 and 3. 
Moreover section 206 of the Iraqi Maritime Law(') provides: 
"The carrier is not responsible for damages of the goods caused by: 
hidden defecti, special nature of the goods, inherent vice or unproper 
package. " 
The net result of this discussion is that the seller in ColoPi, 
and F*O*B* contracts is boundl under Iraqi Laws, to ship the goods in 
a way which enables them to endure a marine voyage and to be fit for the 
purpose of the buyer at the time when they arrive at their destination. 
rgWian Laws 
Egypt, has adopted Brussels Conveirtion of bills of lading*. by +, he 
law Wo. 189 1940. This obligation can be inferred from Article 4(2) 
(1) It has not come izrto force yete 
International convention for the tLnification of certain rules of 
law relating to bills of ladingg signed at Brussels an A: ugmst 259 
1924* 
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which states: 
Meither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or 
damage arising or resulting from: 
(i) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent 
or representative, 
(m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising 
from inherent defect9 quality or vice of the goods. 
(n) : Insufficiency of packing* 
(P) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence* 
Fý-ance: 
According to the Rrench judiciary the seller in C*I*Fq and F*O, B, 
contract is bound to deliver the goods in such a condition which enables 
them to endure the whole journey until the port of destination. 
(') 
Moreover the seller is responsible for any damage caused to the goods 
because of bad packing. 
(2) 
This 'bad packaging has been held to be an 
inherent vice in the goods, and, of course, that will hold the seller 
responsible on the growA that he knows the nature of the Products and 
their destination and this knowledge obliges him to pack the goods 
properlyeW 
(1) "Le verAeur en caf eat term do deliver des marobandises de qaalits' 
saine, loyale et marchandet aptes a parvenir an cot otst au port do livraison. " 
La Seine 21-1-1954 D*JLP* 1955 at p. 244. 
(2) 1'*** le vendeur reste responsable de sa negligence a soigner ltemballage de la marchandise vendue est il est tenu des avaries dues au maivais kat des saose" 
Cour de Cassation 30-7-1951 DX*Fo 1951 at P-535- (3) "Bien, que le contrat de vente naritime ait prow quo les marohand- ises e 'iaient vendues depart Paris, le veladeur nlest pas degage'de 
sa responsibilite par la livraison, des lore qtLtil est 6tabli clus 
/Cvwer 
Conttd 
01 Ne% les avaries constatees a llarrivee a destination ne, sont pas 
consecutives 'a un accident surverm au cours du transport maritime, 
mais sont dues au vice propre des emballages, fournis par leclit 
vendeur, qui btait au courant de la nature du produit vendu et do 
sa destinatione Il lui appartenait de fournir un emballate 
repondant aux conditions d"itancheite et de solidite exigees. La 
.1% vente doit en consequence Stre resiliee a see torts ot griefs*" 
Tribunal do Commerce do la Seine 17-6-1954 DeMeP. 1955 at p. 691. 
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III The Legal Basis of the Transferral of the Risk on ShiRment 
Under this title we are trying to find out the answer 'to the 
following question: 
Why does the risk pass to the buyer on shipment? 
In other words, What is the legal'basis of the rule that the risk in 
C*T*Po and F*O*B, contracts passes to the buyer on shipment? 
In this respect, mary theories have been proposed which are discussed 
in the following paragraph: 
I- Deliver, -l of the Roods: 
In the light of this view the legal basis of the rule that the 
risk is transferred on shipment can be found in the civil codes The 
risk, in the civil oodev is attached to the delivery of the goods to 
the buyer, and since the delivery of the goods in C91sFe and F*O&B. 
contracts takes place on shipment, the risk, in turn, is transferred 
on shipment with the delivery. 
0) 
This view can be criticized from the following points of viewi 
I- The risk in Iraqi and Fgyptian Civil Codes passes to the buyer when 
the goods are delivered to him, and there is no indication that the 
carrier is the buyer or his agent* Thereforet delivery of the goods 
to the carrier is not delivery of the goods to the buyers 
2. The delivery of the goods means th&t the goods become under the 
power of the, buyers 
(2) 
whereas the delivery of the goods t ,o 
the 
(1) Hasni Je "The Ybritime Sales" pp 186-187. Cairo, 1972. 
(2) Section 1604 Prench Civil Code. 
Section 435 EgyPtiall Civil Code* - Section 402 Lebumse Civil Code. 
Section 5380) Iraqi Civil Code, 
carrier does not put the goods under the power of the buyert as 
the seller is still holding the documents which enable him to 
dispose of the goods* 
It has not been settled yet at what exact moment the delivery in 
ColoPo and P, O*B* contracts takes place, whether when the goods 
are delivered -to the carrier or when the documents are tendered 
to the buyer. 
As a result this view cannot be taken as a correct legal basis 
for the rule that the risk is transferred on shipmento. 
2- PassinR of the Property 
.I 
According to this view the legal basis which 9OVems the 
transferral of the risk in C*I*Pe and FoOeBe contracts is the passing 
of property and since the property passes to the buyer on shipment, 
the risk, in turn, is transferred on shipment with the property. 
(1) 
It may be said that this view is in accordance with section 94 of 
Egyptian Coomercial Law which providem. 
'Wess otherwise agreed, the risk of the goods whioh leave the 
warehouse of the seller is on the buyer. 
(2) 
This section can I)e criticized easily by mentioning the fact 
thal the property does not always pass on shipment* 
If 40 (1) "Macheteur quig an droit franpais, aoqaiert la, propriete des 
marchandlises vendues 'a 1'embarquementf rmpporte ausse les risques 
a partir de ce moment*" 
Benard at p., 217 -- 
Ripert at p*825- 
Bellot at p. 125,, 
(2) This section is very general and leads -to -_to say tbg* the risk 
passou to-the buyer after leaving the waxelmse, 
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3- C*I*Fe is an Aleatory (aleatoireY-Cont_ract(l) 
This view says that the CI,, F, contract is a sale of goods 
which the seller is bound to ship within a certain timeq or it is 
a sale of goods afloat, In both cases the buyer is not entitled 
to reject the goods after the appropriation, 
(2) 
even if they are 
lost or damaged. Thus the risk passes to the buyer on shipment on 
the ground that the seller is not aware of the physical situation of 
the goods at the time. of appropriation, and the buyer is bound to 
accept the goods after appropriation bearing the risk between the 
time of shipment and the time of appropriationo 
This view cannot*be taken as a good interpretation for C*: [*Fo 
contracts, simply because C*I*Fo contracts cannot be classified 
under aleatoire contractso 
Hiring Adventure and the AbilijX to Pass the L3=eýy- 
We think that the legal basis of the rule that the risk In 
091*Ft and F*O*Bo corrbraats passes to -the buyer on shipment, is a 
combined one. It depends on two elements: 
1- The marine adventure: 
ColoPo and FoO. Bo contracts are maritime contracts which implies 
that the seller, carrier, buyer and the goods are facing the sea 
andl its dangere Therefore the marine adventure is essential in 
these two oontractso The marine risk in the maritime contracts 
(CoIoPo and FoOoBo) begins when the marine adventure beginsq and 
ý1ý J, Heenen. Vente et commerce maritime* PP149-150, Brussels, 1952* 
2 According to Heenen's view the appropriation taken place at the 
time when the documents are tendered to the buyer* 
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since the marine adventure begins on shipment, the riskj in turn, 
is transferred to the buyer on shipment* 
2- The ability of the seller to pass the property to the buyer. 0 
The second element is that the seller must be able to pass the 
property to the buyer (to correspond actual goods to the 
descriptions of the contract) because the buyer usually accepts 
the risk of the goods which either belong to him or will belong 
to him, when they are actually in the possession of the carrier. 
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IV The Exapt Yzmerrt of Shipment 
As we have seen, it is well established that the risk in C*IeFe 
and F*OoB# oontracts passes to the buyer on shipment with an implied 
warranty, on the part of the sellerg that the goods can endure normal 
voyageo But what is the exact moment of shipment? 
In this respect, many opinions have been heldl azA we can classify 
them into two groups. The first one is the traditional viewt and the 
second one is the modern*(') 
First: The traditional view 
There are two arguments in the traditional viewl the first one says 
that the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are actually put on 
board a shipe The second one says that the risk passes to the buyer 
at the time when the goods cross the ship's rail., These two arguments 
are discussed in the following paragraphst 
I- The goods are put on board a ship: 
In Treglles v Sewell(2) plaintiffs bought of deft. "300 tons old 
(1) It should be notedl that our discussion about the risk is in the 
absence of special agreement, In PýTene Co, Ltd. v Scindia, 
Wavietion Coo Ltd* 11954 Rer wh3-; E @2 Q*33* 462* a Fire t65 
been Sold foo*bo rondon was damaged through the fault of the 
carrier while, being lifted on board* The damage occurred before 
the tender had crossed the sbip9s raile The problem arose 
between the sellerAM'L the carrier and it was hold that "the 
operati I on of the FHagu2j rules is determined by the limits of the 
contract of carriage by sea and not by any limits of timeg, " that 
the parties were free to define their respective obligations as to 
"loading" and that in this case the carrier's obligations in this 
respect began before the. tender crossed the ship's rail, 
(2) (1862) 7H& & W* 574* Revised cases 125 at P*558- 
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bridge rails at CL5 14s 6d per ton, delivered at Harburgh, cost 
freight and insurance; payment by net cash in London, less freight, 
upon handing bill of lading and policy of insurance; a dock Co. ts 
weight not or captain's signature for weight to be taken by buyers 
as a voucher for the quantity shipped. Held: according to the 
true construction of the contract, deft* did not undertake to 
deliver the iron at Harburgh, but when he put- it on board a ship 
bound for that place and handed to pltfs,, the Policy of insurance 
and other dooments, his liability ceased and the goods were at 
the risk of the purchaser. 
Similarly in Collery v Overseas Fbmorter(l) NeCardie J. said-. 
(2) 
"It seems clear that in the absence of special agreement the property 
arA risk in goods does not in the case of an F*O*Bo contract pass 
from the seller to the buyer till the goods are ad3jally mt- Qn 
, 
board*" As a result the seller must tender a shippedt or an on 
board bill of lading and he does not satisfy the contract by 
furnishing a "received for shipment" bill* 
(3) 
Lloyd's Polio_yt 
In the ligM of standard Lloydts Policy the risk passes to the 
buyer at the time when the goods are put an board a ship. it provides, 
beginning the advezrture upon the said goods and merohandiseg Cron 
-the loading thereof on bosid the said ship, " That meMS "Where goods 
(1) E92] 3 ý*B- 3029.307o 
(2) lbid at P-307. 
(3) Xglg x &gWo -& Co. L-td 2 . 
E195] 
1 Iaoydttj Rep, 183. 
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or other moveables are insured from the loading thereof" the risk 
does not attach until such goods or moveables are actually on board 
and the insurer is not liable for them while in transit from the 
shore to the ship. 
(1)* 
Inagi Law (the repealed one) 
This attitude has been adopted in Iraqi Law of Commerce Wo*60, 
1943. Thus section 183 providea: 
"The risk in C*I*Fo contracts is on the buyer from t he moment at 
which the goods are loadede" 
This section did Act provide that the risk passes to the buyer 
when the goods are actually put on board, bat this was implied by 
the word "loaded"* 
2- The Goods Cross the ShJI2*s Rail 
According to this argument the exact moment of shipment occurs 
when the goods cross the shipts rail, as the duty of the seller with 
respect to loading ceasesq or is performed at that point, and the 
buyer's interest normally commences since the risk normally passes 
to him at that point* The ship's rail is the legal frontier between 
the seller9s 'and buyerts I&zA* 
(2) 
(1) Chalmerel 1krine, Insurance Act 1906. E. R. 
1krdy Ivany. 8th ed. 1976 at P-147 arld 152. 
This policy hasbeen. followed by Iraq ifational Insurance Co. 
(2) Sohmitthoffo Legal Aspects of Export Sales (1951) P-43. 
Schmitthoff. The Export Trade 5th ede 1969 at P,, 70* 
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Thus section A. 6 of 111nooterms 1953" provides: 
"Subject to the provisions of Article B. 4* 
Ehe 
selleýbear all 
risks of the goods until such time as they shall have effectively 
passed the shipts raillat the port of shipment. " 
Similarly, section B-3 provides: 
_]r 
"bear all risks of the goods from the time when they shall 
[The 
buye 
have effectively passed the ship's rail at the port of shipment. " 
Accordingly, it has been decided in R: -ance that the buyerts 
action against the carrier, in ease of damage happened to the goods 
at the port of shipment and on the day of shipmentv is acceptable on 
the ground that the buyer is the one who bears the risk as soon as 
the goods cross the ship's rail* 
(1) 
This rule has been followed by the new : Iraqi Law of Commerce 
NO-149v 1970 which has made it clear that the risk in Co: [*Fo and 
P*O*Bo contracts passes to the buyer when the goods cross the shiple 
It provides: "In case he he buyer may have reserved to himself th 19 
a period within which to 
k 
the goods shipped and or the right 
'to choose the port of destination, and he fails to give instructions 
in time, bear the additional costs thereby incurred and all risks of 
the goods from the date of the expiration of the period fixed for 
shipment, provided always that the goods shall have been duly 
appropriated to the contractl that is to sayqý clearly set aside 
or otherwise identified as the contract goods*" 
(1)"An cas d"avaries survenues an port de charge, le lendemain du 
chargement do la marchaMise, Itaction on reeponsabilite do 1fachotour 
en caf contre le transporteur maritime est re 
i 
cevable, puisquItil 
egpporte tous lee risques de la marchandise a partir du moment 
elle a passe le bastingwe du navire au port de charge. " 
Tribunal de Commerce de Rouen 23-6-1958- 
1D. N. Fe 1959 at P-5474o 
rail, thus section 149 states that the seller in P,, O*Bo contracts 
is bound to pay all the expenses of shipment and to'bear the risk 
until the moment that the goods cross the shipts rail* And section 
158 provides that the seller in C91*P* contracts bears the risk of 
arq damage until the moment that the goods cross the ship's rail and 
the responsibility of the goods passes to the buyer after that pointý') 
It is obvious that these two sections are based on Incoterm 53, This 
attitude is not exactly identical to the first one(iee pat on board 
a ship)9 therefore, a contradiction can be inferred between the 
provision of the new Iraqi Law of Commerce Wo*1491 1970 and the form 
of Iraq National Insurance Co. which says that the insurance begins 
when the goods are put on board a ship. 
(2) 
It can be said to justify 
this contradiction that : 
I- There is no difference between the terms (shipts rail) and (put on 
board a ship), both of them mean the same thing* 
2- In practice, the form (from warehouse to warehouse policy) to more 
common in uie, therefore this point will disappear in practice, 
These arg=ents are moot pointm 
I- There in a huge differencebetween the (shiPts rail) and (but on 
board a ship),, The difference appears when the problem of loss or 
damage to the goods arises during the actual process of loadingt say 
as a result of an accident while still in mid-air after having crossed 
the rail* 
(1) This attitude has been : followedby Egyptian Jurisprudenoe. 
Hasni Je "Maritime Sales" pp. 188-189. 
(2) Following the Lloydts policyo 
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2- It is a matter 6f principle and not of practice, therefore the 
practice is of some importance in relating to this point, 
The net result is that the contradiction still exists between 
the provisions of the new Iraqi Law of Commerce No-149,1970 and the 
form of Iraq National Insurance Co., This can be solved by amending 
the new law to adopt the term used by the old law which is "loaded". 
Secondly: The Modern Views 
In practicel it seems very difficult for the traditional view 
to be applied@ Therefore the modern views have come to moderate the 
rigidity of the traditional view, and they are as follows: 
1- The risk in F*09B* contracts passes to the buyer when delivery is 
completed: 
In the light of this view the risk should pass, not when the goods 
pass the shipts rail, but whenevertthe seller's duty with respect 
to loading is performed, and where, for example, the buyer agrees 
to accept a "received for shipment" bill of lading there is a 
strong implication that delivery has been performed as soon as 
the goods have been taken into the custody of the shipowner on 
shore*(') 
This view certainly looks less arbitrary than the traditional view., 
Bat it may also be lose convenient since it may lead to a situation 
in which the risk'can pass to the buyer before he is likely to be 
(1) David Bassoon O*l*F* and P*O*; Bo Contracts at p. 3849 
Londont 1975* 
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covered by insurance, or at least to considerable uncertaintk 
as to which of the parties should insure against lose or damage 
during that part--of the process of loading for which the carrier 
is entitled to the protection of the Hague Rulea. 
(1) 
In addition, the point at which delivery occurs may be the only 
distinguishing factor between F*A., So and P*O*Bo contracts in 
many cases* 
2- The risk in C. I#F* contracts passes to the buyer when the 
responsibility of the carrier starts: 
In the light of this view, the risk in C*IePe contracts passes to 
the buyer at the moment when the responsibility of the carrier 
starts according to the bill of lading and charterparty, on the 
ground that -the transferral of the risk is a result of the sellerlef 
acquiring the rights against the carrier., Therefore the C*: E*Fo 
seller is Wt free in making the contract between himself and the 
carrier, but is restriotedl by the provisions in the contract of 
sale between himself and the buyer* Moreover if there is no 
provision in this respect, the contract between the C*I*F9 seller 
and the carrier is governed by the custom of the port, 
Usually the responsibility of the sorrier starts when the carrying 
sling tightens around the merchandise, either the shipping is =40 
at the blue'stone of the quay or by transhipmait of barge. 
(2) 
(1) Benjamin at p, 891. 
(2) Qmel est le moment exact ou' se produit le transfert%des risq'ne-ef 
Ct est 
. 
dit-(m, "It embarquement" des marobandises. Faut-il eMVROO, 
par 1ý. le, placement des sarchandises dans lee cales du navire? 
Nullement* Le moment determinant est celui ou commence la, respons- 
abilite'du tran2gorteur maritime, en vertu de connaiesgent. Cleat 
/O"r 
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The result of this at. titude is inconsistent with main features 
of C*I*F9 contracts, because the C*I. F, seller cannot compel the 
InWer to bear the risk before shipment on the ground that the cuatom 
of the port provides so, unless there is an express or implied term 
abo-xt that e. g. an insurance of the preshipment risk* 
The common element, which can be inferred from these two 
attitudes is that the risk in C. I*Fo and FoOeBe contracts passes to 
the buyer when the delivery of the goods is complete accordiM to the 
provisions of the contract, This attitude has been adopted in TJLIS. 
Thus Article 037 provides: 
"I- The risk shall pass to the buyer when delivery of the goods is 
effected in accordance with the provisions of the contract and 
the present law,, "(') 
This view gives rise to certain problemst 
It is obvious that this attitude deals only with the passing of 
the risk when there in a special agreement in the contract about it- 
Therefore this attitude does not solve the problem when there is no 
ContIde 
.0 le moment determinant., pnisque le transfert des risqueel dans la vente 
caft stexpliqme par le fait qae celle-ci comprend lea droits et actions 
contre le transporteur et contre 11assurear maritimes de la, marchandise. J. lea oonditions du contrat d"affreatement ne sont pas abandonnees au 
libre choix du vendeare Elles doivent ttre celles prevues par Is 
contrat de vents; et ei oelui--ci est mmet sur ce point, lea conditions 
du contrat dtaffretement _Mae_ 
doit conclure le- vendear' sont celles 
-&wi resultent des usages et des possibilit6s de t ransport existant 
au ]2ort dreM&Mement . le Rabituellement la responsabilite du transporteur commence au moment 
ou Ite'lincme as serre autour de la marehandise, cme le chargement 
se fasse sar la ]2ierre blene du quai. - m -Dar transbordemerýfdlgae ; 1116Re* 
77 ýHeenene Vents st Commerce Maritime* Bruxelles, 1952. at P9187-188o 
(i)"The present ism" refers - to other articles concerning passing of 
the risk& 
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special agreement on this subject, As a result three solutions 
can be given: 
I- The risk passes to the buyer when the delivery of -the goods 
is complete regardless of amy agreement* 
In the Old Scottish Case(') Lord Ellenborough saidt 
"A delivery of goods to a carrier or wharfinger, with due 
care and diligence, is sufficient to charge the purchaser; 
but he has a right to require thatl in making this delivery, 
due care and diligence shall be exercised by the seller*" 
It can be inferred from the paragraph above mentioned that the risk 
passes to the buyer as soon as the delivery of the goods is 
complete either to the carrier or to the wharfingere 
2- In the absence of special agreement the custom of the port must 
govern this point 
3. In the absence of special agreement the risk passee to the buyer 
when the goods are actually put on board a ship, Thus Rule 5 
of (Warsaw-Wcrd Rules) provides: 
"rho risk shall be transferred to the buyer from the moment the 
goods are loaded on board the vessel in accordance with the 
provisions of Rule 2 or, should the seller be entitled in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 7(111) azA (10 in lieu 
of loading the goods on board the vessel to deliver the foods 
into the oustody of the carrier, from the time such delivery 
him effectively taken -place. 
(I) Bug! M v Wv-i -3 CamPb * 414 
(2) J4, Reenen at P. 188. 
Benjanin at P-859- 
This idea was rejeoted in Henderson and Glass v Radmore & Coo (1922) 10 Ll. L. Re 727, where no suoh custom was proved* 
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The Orthodox 22inion 
In fact the rules concerning the risk are not Imperative, 
thereforet the Lloydts policy (from warehouse to warehouse)01s more 
common in use than -the standared one, 
(2) 
as a resultt the exact moment 
of ishipment is not important when the goods are covered by (from 
warehouse to warehouse policy)q but the exact moment of shipment is 
still important as a matter of principle to be applied when the goods 
are covered by normal policy and in the absence of spebial agreement. 
In this respect the orthodox opinion can be stated as follows: 
"The risk in C. T*F. and F*O. B* contracts passes to the buyer when -the 
delivery is complete according to the provisions of the contract. In 
the absence of special agreement the local custom of the port of 
shipment must 'be applied if the buyer is aware of that custom, 
otherwise the risk is transferred when the goods are actualll put on 
board a ship or lighter. "(3) 
The reason wby the local custom has to be applied when the buyer 
is aware of it, is the fact that the rules of the risk are not 
imperativee Therefore when the buyer knows the local custom the 
(1) See the form in Charlmers Wrine Insurance Act 1906. H. Ivamy 
at P-171 (F. P*A. ) London 1976* 
(2) It is out of the scope of this research to discuss the question 
whether the buyer hag any insurable interest on the goods before 
shipment or not* But you can see Je Aron and Co. (Incorporated) 
v Mall (1928) 34 Come Case 18, where It was held that by virtue ; -f the assignment of the policy the assignee became entitled to 
use on any claim of the assignor thereunder, whether or not he had 
an interest in the subject-matter insured at the time of lose. 
(3) Go2Wn. Ferreira v IgMort-&-Holt 34 Lloyd L. R. 192. 
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inference is of acceptance of it unless rejection is intimated. 
The reason why the risk shall pass to the buyer when the goods 
are actually put on board a ship or lighter is the fact that the 
marine adventure begins at that time* 
This opinion seems very practical, taking into consideration 
the local custom of the port of shipment when'it is known by the 
buyer, and it can fit easily into different legal systems, as the 
rules of risk are not imperative. *reover it is in harmony with 
the provisions of Lloydts policy which has been followed by many other 
countries including Iraq. 
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V The Parts of the Rule that the Risk Passes to the Riyer on 'Shipment 
It is a matter of consensust as we have seen, that the risk is 
C*l*F* and F*O*B. contracts passes to the buyer on shipment, This 
rule can be divided into two main parts which are as follows: 
First: The risk is attached to the delivery of the goods to the 
carrier*(') 
This part has many consequencese 
(2) 
These are discussed in the 
following paragraphs: 
1- The delay of the delivery is at the risk of the party in faultt 
Sale of Goods Act 18931 
Under section 20 of the Sale of Goods Actl. "Where the delivery 
has been delayed through the fault of either buyer or sellerg the 
goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards any lose which 
might not have occurred but for such fault, 
(3) 
The reason for that is this: if goods perish in the hands of the 
seller when they ought to have been in the hands of the buyer, it ? nay 
be impossible to prove that they "would" not equally have perished had 
delivery taken place*(4) 
(1) In -this respect, the delivery of the goods m-dst be made by isming 
any considered kind of bill of ladinge Therefore the acceptance 
of the goods by the shipowner on the shore, does not relieve the 
seller from the risk, 
British Columbia and Vancouvers Island Lumber and Sawmill Co, Lt tdo 
v Nettleship (IE 3r L9R9 (N. S. ) CoP*235- 
(2) The consequences number 1 and 2 are common both to the Cojopo and 
F. O. Be contracts. The consequence Wo-3 is related to classic 
P*O,, Bo contracts* 
(1829) 859 1 (3) land'v NaLKa 8 
IYembv Hamilton & Cc 194 1 All E*R9 
-9 v 
Barden, 
t 
9j 
ULIS Article 98-1- 
(4) Richard Brown at P-1059 106o 
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It may be observed that -this section differs from the proviso 
to section 32(2)(1) which is in certain respects parallel to this 
provision* Under section 32 (2) it appears that the bnyerl's remedies 
for the damage to or lose of the goods operate whether or not the loss 
or damage was the consequence of the seller's failure to make a 
reasonable contract with the carrier, whereas under section 20, if 
either party is at fault in taking delivery of the goods the goods are 
at the risk of the party in faultj but only in respect of damage which 
might not have occurred but for such fault. 
(2) 
Under a classic F. O. B. contracts the buyer is bound to nominate 
a ship and to give notice of the nomination in good time to enable the 
seller to have the goods ready for shipment by the nominated ship,, 
(3) 
The seller is then obliged "to load in a reasonable time and in the 
customary manner. "(4) Therefore a failure to load within the contract* 
time because of the sellerts fault is a ground for rejectionv(5) and 
vice versa. Alternativelyq the party who is not at fault can affirm the 
contract and claim damages for loss occasioned by the delay. This may 
include demurrage which the buyer has to pay to the carrier in 
consequence of the delay. 
(6) 
(1) This provides: "Unless otherwise authorised by the Irttyer, the seller 
must make such contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as 
may be reasonable having regard to the nature of the goods and the 
other circumstances of the casee If the seller omits so to do, and the goods are lost or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline to treat -the delivery. to the carrier as a delivery to himself, 
or may hold the seller responsible in damages. " 
2ý P*S* Atiyah. The Sale of Goods 5th ed. at p. 223* A 
Harlow & Jones Ltd, v Peneic Unternation591- Ltd., E1967 Lloydts 
Rep- 509,526* 
] 
.1 4 Einar Bugg A*S* v W. Ho Bowater Ltd. (1925) 31 Com. Cas-. 1., 9. 
5 Telo v SeMo Wchado L19523 1 Lloyd's- Rep. 183. 
6 J. and J. VGGingham Ltd. v Robert A. Nomro, & Goe Ltd. (192, 2) 
28 Com: C; - 429 
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This proviso to section 20 is not directly applicable to C*I*F* 
contracts* For the "delivery" referred to seems to be delivery of 
the goodsq(1) and the C*I9F* seller is not under any obligation to 
deliver the goods at the agreed destination; while delay in shipment 
normally justifies rejection and so makes the question of risk 
academic* Where tender of documents is delayed through the fault of 
the sellert he may be in breach of contract; and the result of this 
breach may be to entitle the buyer to reject the goods or only to 
claim damages, These remedies do not necessarily lead to the same 
results as the proviso, Thus, on the one hand, a buyer could reject 
a late tender even though it caused no loss at all; and on the other 
hand, he could only claim damages for a loss which was caused by the 
breach (and not for one which merely might not have occurred but for 
(2) 
the breach) . 
Old Boots Lawt 
According to Old Scots Lawl the subject is no longer at the risk 
of the vendee after the vendor is in moral by not delivering it when 
(3) 
he was bound to deliver it* 
(I) 41ton &-Co. Md. 
- v 
Bard-en [1949] 1 All E*R* 435- 
(2) Benjamin at p,, 812* 
Also: Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders & Shipptre Ltd, [1954] 
2 Q-B; 4599 480- 
Jo Ar n& Co. (Ince) v Cqpptoir Wegimont 1921 3 K. B. 7%R- 
-T-0.4 T -T-Pe w 
James Finlay & Co. Ltd. 'v Kwik Roo Z= E9219 -I''k*B*4009414o 
U) 3ee Brown at p*3bb, for More detaile, 
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Iraai Law: 
This tendency had been adopted in the Iraqi Law of Co=erce 
Wo, 60,1943. Thus section 165 providedt 
"In exception of Force Majeure, if the seller does not ship the 
goods at the defined timet the buýer will be entitled to breach the 
contract and must notify the seller immediately. " 
The new Iraqi Law of Commerce No-149,1970 has adopted the same 
principle* Thus it provides in sectionst 
145: "The seller (in P*O*B* contracts) is under obligation to pack 
the goods, transport them to the port of shipment and ship them 
at the defined ship by the buyer at the date or during the 
defined time for shipment*" 
155t "The seller (in C*I*Po contracts) is under obligation to pack 
the goods and ship them during the stipulated time or the time 
defined by custom*" 
It is obvious now that the seller in CaleFe and F*O*Bo contracts 
is under obligation to ship the goods at the stipulated time or at the 
time defined by the custom on the growA that the custom must be applied 
in the absence of special agreement (section 2)e 
Moreover, the bmyer in F*O*B* contracts in liable for the risk 
when the seller is ready to ship the goods: 
I- if the ship does not come to the port during the defined time or 
she left the port before the defined time expires (section i5O)i` 
2- if he (the buyer) does not notifýr the seller of the nume of 
ship or he does not define the time of shipment (Bection-151). * 
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Similarly, if the buyer in C*14, F, contracts has a certain time 
to define the time of shipment, and he does not instruct the seller 
within that time, he will bear the additional expenses of the goods 
and he will be liable for the risk if the goods are ascertained 
(section 163). 
The word "ascertained" in section 163 may raise an important 
question: 
Does section 163 mean that the buyer will not bear the additional 
expenses, and he will not be liable for the risk if the goods are not, 
ascertained? 
Apparently: yes, on the ground that the risk must attach to the 
ascertained goods* I think it is fair to say that in the case of 
unascertained goods the buyer mast 'bear the additional expenses rather 
than the risk, as he is in breach of duty to define the time. 
Mrances 
The goods must be shipped within the stipulated time. The buyerl 
in the case of delay, has the right to annul the sale whether this 
delay has caused the goods any damage or not beeause the buyer is in 
fault as soon as the period of shipment expires* Moreover, if the 
(1) "Le vencleur en cafg reaponeable envern ltacheteur du de , fant 
d9embarqtt«ent ý la date inezactemeM indicluee, commet une faute Jutlifiant la reiosiliation de la vente a-a profit de ltachetear en 
Mmcifiant dann le contrat "embarquement chargeant chargg"t alors 
qtte la marchandise btalt GimPleMent Prke al itre charg4a sur le, 
navire transporteurg atteMu au port dt«barquemente, ýUne telle 
marchanclise nIest en effet paaL. Ilchargeante" mais simplement a 
chargeroff 
Ccmr d#Appel d#äUx 21-3-1950 D*N*P* 1950 at P-541- 
seller has delayed shipping any part of a bulk cargo sent to 
different buyers, those buyers will be, individually entitled to 
amml, the contract. 
( 1) On the other hands the buyer is not entitled 
to annul the contract if a Force Majeure has prevented the seller 
from fulfilling his obligation in the right time* 
(2) 
Furthermore, 
the sellerv as long as he ships the goods within the contemplated 
period, is not responsible for any damage which might happen to the 
goods because of the late arrival of the ship. 
(3) 
A question can be raised now: Is the buyer entitled to annul the 
contract if the seller ships the goods before -the stipulated time? 
The majority of jurisprudence answer affirmativelyl 
(4) 
but M. Ripert 
says that the buyer, in this easel does not have his right to annul 
the contract unless he proves damages. 
(5) 
In fact Ripert's opinion is practical and protects the interests 
of both the seller and the buyer, 
(1) ffDlautre part, il a ete' decide" "a bon droit que loregalune oargaison 
destinee a kre repartie entre plusieurs acheteurs eat embarquee 
en vrac, at qutune partie en a Ae mise 'a' bord tardivement, tons 
lea a, oheteurs sont en droit de se prgýaloir de oe retard pour 
refuser la, marchandise .. *" Reenen at p. 213- 
(2) "Si celui-ei eat provoqu8 par un ove"nement de force majeure, le 
contrat eat dissous et chacune des parties eat degagee de sea 
obligations*" 
Thid. at p*213- 
(3) Tribunal de Commerce do Narseille 1-7-1957 D. X. Fq 1958 at P-197- 
(4) Godret at p*26q, 
(5) "An cas do tardivete"'de ltembarquement, llacquereur peut toujours .1-- tý -It -.. L 2 -- -1 -"- --- -- ---%-.. 4 cLvmanuer,. La& reu3. jja; 5jon ae la VeIrge, sa renonciation a ce ýrovt 
no se preewsani pas* r 
An cas dtanterioriti de ltembarcfaementl ltacquereur ne pourrait demwAer la resiliation qtLIen dimontrant 19 prejudice, ". 
Ripert at p, 804- 
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2- A Term Puttina the Vnole Risk on the Seller 
C*IeF* and F. O. B. Contracts 
is Tneonsistent with 
A contract putting the whole risk(of deterioration as well as 
of loss) on the seller until actual delivery is probably not a C*I*F4, 
or F*O*Bo contract, 
U-K--ýScotland and Enpjandj 
It is theoretically possible for a seller expressly to agree to 
deliver the goods at his own risk, Bat if he did so, the contract 
would not, properly speaking, be a CeI*F* or F*O*Bo contract at all; 
and for this reason such provision in the contract is restrictively 
interpreted. Thus in Law & Boanan v British American Tobacco Co. T d, 9 
Rowlatt J. rejected a printed clause in these terms as repugnant to 
the nature of a CeT*F* contracte On the other hand, effect is 
o6mmonly given to clauses which putt not the whole risk, but only the 
risk of lose, on the sbllerl e. g. by providing that part of the price 
is to be paid only on deliveryq or that any quantity which cannot be 
delivered is to be written off the contract quantity, 
(3) 
Contracts 
containing such clauses are considered to remain C. I. F. or F*o*B, 
contracts, though with variation*(4) 
1 163 2 KoB* 605- 
2 Calcatta. etc. Steam ITaviRation Cos I-De Mattos (1863) 32 L*J* 
QeBe 214 -a 31Z-, T -a-1? 1 Lv - 2=tont v British South Africa Co. (1901) 18 T*L*Re 24* 
HwIder Bros* & Coo- Ltd. v Commissioner of Public Works Elq(ý] A. C. 276. The Gabbiano L1940J P. 177 
pnv 4 Produce Brokers New Coma ý1924).. Md. v Wrav. Sanderson & C' Ltd. (1931) 39 T*L*Ro 257, 
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IrMl Law: 
According to Iraqi Law, the risk in Col*Po and F. O. B. contracts 
passes, generally speakingg to the buyer when the goods cross the 
shipts rail (seotions 158 & 149). In other words the buyer must bear 
the risk after that moment. The agreement to put the whole risk on 
the seller, during the transit -turns the contract into the 11sale on 
safe arrival condition*"(') 
The conditions which have given effect in British judiciapy 
can be justified in the Iraqi Law by (section 2) and go in harmony 
with the nature of C*I*Ps and F,, O*Bo contracts* 
France: 
it is very rare for the contracting parties to stipulate that 
the seller should bear all the risk of the voyage, but if they dog 
(2) 
that will be against the nature of CeI. P. and F*O*Bo contraorts, 
and will change the transaction into a "designated ship" sale* 
However, the following stipulations are considered to be 
inconsistent with CeIeFe and FeO*B* oontractst 
I- "If the goods do not arrive due to loss of the vessel# the 
contract shall be void. " 
(3) 
(1) Section 164 New Iraqi Lew of Commerce, 
Section 203 the repealed one. 
(2) "La clause mettaut a*' charge du vendeur t(mg les risques du 
voyage maritime est incOnciliable aveo la clause oaf., " 
Comm. Marseille 31-8-1937 D*M. F* at P-307. 
(3) "Eft Cas dO Perte du vaPeur, la. vente est annuleifee" 
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2-1"rhe existance of the sale depends on the safe arrival of the ship 
to her destination where the delivery Bhould take place*"(') 
3-I'The buyer shall receive all the goods which are damaged by the 
water of the sea or whatever, and the seller shall reduce the 
price*" 
(2) 
4-111n case of non-oz-rival due to a war the contract shall be void. "(3) 
There is no doubt that the clauses above mentioned are repugnant 
to ColeFe and PeO. B. contracts where the risk should pass to the buyer 
on shipment* But Professor Heenen has stated that some of those clauses 
can go in harmony with the nature of C9I. F# and P*O*Bo contracts on the 
ground that they do not pat the whole risk on the seller. 
(4) 
Bellot 
has redected this idea because those clauses cannot be classified 
under any type of matritime sales. 
(5) 
I% If (1) "Vexistence du marche" est subordonnee a la bonne arrives du 
navire transportew at la livraison aura lieu a' ltarrivee. 11 
(2) "Vacheteur recevra toute marchandise endommagee par ean de 
mer am autrement, mais le vendeur an bonifiera la moins-valuell ' (clause "Rye terms")* 
(3) Ma cas de non-arrivae de la marchandise . par faits de guerre, la 
vents sera annulee*" 
Heenan at p., 169. 
Ripert at p*828, 
(4) "En. effet, lea clauses an question ne mettent 
I 
charge du vande-ar 
qtLe certains risques dlkermineseo* Elles ne d6o ant donc qua 9 
Partiellement a la regle de la vente caf, d1apres laquelle tous 
lee risques maritimes incombent a llacheteur. " 
Heenan at p, 169-170- 
(5) "En lletat de telles irtipulations, on ne peut plus, "a vrai dire, 
, soutenir qatil slagit encore 
de ventes caf, WOM8 avons affaire 
a des ventes maritimes qui n1entrent dans aucune classification, " 
Ballot at P*139. 
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3- A DelivejZ of the Goocls to Unnominated Carrier is not 
as a Deliver7: 
Considered 
Uhder Classic FeO*Be contractst if the buyer names a particular 
carrier, there is no delivery if the seller ignores the direction mid 
gives the goods to another carrier and the risk remains with the 
seller. 
(') 
It is a universal rule that the seller in classic F*O*B* contracts 
is under obligation to ship the goods on the defined ship by the brqer, 
otherwise the risk would remain with hime 
Secondly,: The Risk is Separated from the Propertyt 
This second part of the rule that the risk passes to the buyer 
on shipment, has consequences which are as follows. 0 
I- The risk in bulk shipmeirt passes to -the buyer regardless of the 
propertys 
The Sale of Goods Act 1893: 
The risk in C*I*F9 and F*O*B* contracts, unlike the property, 
may pass to the bmyer although the goods are unascertained goods which 
have not been appropriated, 
(2) 
so that it would not Ibe surprising if 
risk in part of a balk shipment could Pass to the buyer before the 
goods had been ascertained 
. 
so as to pass the property in themo(3) 
(1) Harle v Ogilvie (1749) M- 10095o 
wmý Ullock v Reddelein (1828), 5 LoJo (oov ) IIC*Be 208. 
(2) Croom-Johnson Jo, in ComiDtoir d'achat 
; 
bais de Ridder 
[1947] 
2 All EaRe 443,453. . - 
(3) Ster-im d. v Ttak ro L+, d w, d 
[1923] 1 K*Bo 78* 
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Thus it appears that the risk in part of a bulk passes at the 
normal timet that is on shipment. 
(1) 
Old Scots Lawt 
In the case of a sale of a oommodily in bulk, it would seem that 
the risk is not transferred until a quantity corresponding to the 
agreement has been measured or set apart for the parchasere(2) 
It is obvious now that the risk in balk shipment does not pass 
to the buyer on shipment, This result can be altered to make the ridc 
in bulk shipment pass to the buyer on shipment an the grourA that the 
contracting parties were free to define the moment at which the risk 
passes to the buyer* Moreover the modern practice of insurance makes 
the insurance co"w begin, in the case of colope and P*O*B# contracts, 
from -the time whom the goods are actually put on board a'ship# This 
repr sezrke a strong indication that the parties agreed for the risk 
to be passed on shipment whether it is bulk br normal shipmente 
Irat Law: d 
In the light 'of the Iraqi Civil Code the risk has attached to 
delivery qf'tho goods* Th other i! ords,. thqre. itj no comectim 
I)etween fte,,, the, passing'of proper I jy. ý 
p"ning of the risk andl 
Therefore. . tb1s-, 4udgm6n* a iogical. result'of the rule 
(1) Inzlie >X ý 
(2) Brat Uiv 31 `79ý 
Polift Prbu 80-m. - Emmen I gWjS-&-RpM 21 Dq 43ý* 
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which separated the passing of the risk from the passing of property* 
France: 
It is not very clear if passing of the risk in bulk shipment 
has been separated from passing of property. We have seen that the 
property, in bulk shipmentv passes to the buyer on shipment on the 
ground that the bill of lading can appropriate the goods. Therefore, 
and since the buyers own the whole cargo in common while the goods 
are at sea, the risk passes to them on shipment* 
At azW rate the risk in bulk shipment passes to the buyer on 
shipment, although the goods are not being weighedt counted or 
measured. 
(1) 
This rtae is obviously against the requirements of section 1585, 
and that to wby Khreeille Court rejeeted it* 3kt Marseille decision 
was altered by Aix Appeal and the rmle (the risk in balk shipment, 
Passes to the buyers an shipment) has been sirttled ever sinoe. 
(2) 
(I) Ante at p. 7 
(2) "Pour lee derwees chargees en greier ... lee tribunaux de commerce 
ont 6to asses embarrasses pour admettre la. speoialination, le 
oootage at In mevuxage no, Be ý 
fai sane qul 11 arriVO*. 11 *at 
asses gendraliftent adn1s"qd6-16 connalsefftent d6livre vaut 
speci4ioatiw4 bien Ve les marchandisen no sojent pas- 
separees duý reftant Ao I& 
epargaison. 
. 
Le. tribwml. Aw, Narsaille, aindt'dt abord ditidd'cVle le 6cjjjajjjw**ý ý no speoWisait pas suffisamairt lee marchundises in grwder (4, eAt 18WL . Ykia 1e. 4ugeMnt aA e- rif mi; -(Aj3*t. to L im) I I&-, oour ayant admin In droit do coproprjj*_jF Los 
&4618i6m tv 
Ripert at p*817* 
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2- The Risk in the Goods Afloat Passes to the Buyer "as from shipment" 
by Retrospective Effects 
In the Julia, 
(') 
Lord Porter said that risk, under a C*IeFO 
contract, generally passes "on shipment or as from shipment". 
(2) 
This statement contains two rules, where the goods are sold and then 
shippedv the risk passes on shipment (the normal time); *but where they 
are already afloat at the time of sale it is more apposite to refer 
to the risk as having passed as from shipment* The second rule means 
that the sellerts undertakings as to quality being referred to the 
time of shipmentO) viz# the risk passes "retrospectively" to the 
moment of shipment* 
This urAertaking relates to the deterioration of the goods and 
the partial lose which leads to a mere shortage, would be treated in 
the sam e way as deterioration. 
(4) 
Therefore where goods are shiPPedv 
lost and then soldý51here is no+ way to apply the role that the risk 
passes as from shipment, because this rule does not relate to a total 
lose in. the sense of a total destruction of the commercial character 
of the shipment, 
(1) [1949 A*Oi 293,309. 
(2) Also*., & Qgmens pd Go kj. 
.jZ 
11 1911] J. K. & 
9349'--956,959- 
iMfil E 
Bowdw- lb! oss & Coo- TAdo v Liftle (1970) 4 C*LeR* 1364e 
(3) Oleificio Zw achi SeP*A* v Northern Ealee Ltd, AOA C4R- 
[1965] 2 Lloydto ROP 
Cordona Land Coe Ltd. v Ylator Bros, 119661 1 W*L*Rq,, 793# 
Hamm d-n e-- LBaA -i IQ. 
(5) cmtSAer vikeltil (1856) 5 H*L*Co 673o 
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Old Soots Iaw and Iracri Law 
In the light of these two laws the general principle is that the 
risk passes to the buyer on shipment, no matter which form the 
contract takesq ioes normal C*I*Fe or float, and there is no indication 
to that "retrospettive effecto" 
On the other hand, it must be mentioned that the general principle 
does not apply in the case of totitl lose, simply because the buyer 
undertakes to bear the risk when there is a contract between the 
seller and himself, and the contract requires a subjecrt-Catter (goods). 
Therefore when there are no goods there will be no contract and 
consequently there will be no risk to pass to the buyerg As a result 
the general principle governs the case of partial loss in the case of 
goods afloate 
Prmoet 
The distinction between passing of the risk and passing of the 
ty appears so clearly in this oasse Despite the fact that the 
property and the risk are transferred on WApment, but In anoa; t goods 
the risk and the property pass to the buyer in different times. The' 
property pamm to *, he buyer at the tiaw, whft the contract is mades 
and the, 'risk pass" to ý him from the time of shipment by retrospective 
offe0to(l) 
4 
(1) "Peftet uivtal-dix CAP florhant n0est pas do transf4ror 
rAroactivement I& proprike ýu jour do Itembarquementf 
mais simplement lee rinques*" 
Ballot at P*45,, 
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This is a strong indication that passing of the property and 
the risk should be separated even in the Prenchlaw, and that is why 
passing of the property cannot be a legal basis for passing of the 
risk. 
3- 
(')The 
Risk Remains with the-Seller, - even 'when 
the Propertl has 
Passed to-the 2mer before ShiPm 
It is submitted that, in the rare cases in which property passes 
before shipment under C*I*F* contracts, the risk should nevertheless 
prima facie remain with the seller until shipment* In Wiehe v Dennis 
IIXOQ- 
(2) 
where a Shetland pony which had been sold C*I*P* Rotterdam, 
was paid for and injured before shipmentl the actual decision was that 
the seller was liable for the injury as he had broken his jut as baileel, 
These daysp under ULIS, this justification has to be as follows: 
the seller is liable for the injury as he has not delivered the 
goods yet to the carrier. 
(1) The consecinences Wo-3 oamot be raised under Old Soots Law and 
Ir"LLawl as the passing of the risk is separated from the 
Passing of property. This consequence oannot be raised under the 
Rrench Law either, because the property passes to the buyer on shipm4mt, 
and since the risk to attached to the propertyq therefore the, pre. 
eldpment risk is on the seller* --wLes risqmes anterieures 
Itembarquopnentsont & I& charge du vendeure" 
Winkelmolen at p, 25* 
Upert " at - ýMG' 
Ibremer, according to Article 32 Of the Law Wo. 69-8 year 1969, the ýbuyer Wmll- bear all the risk from the time of delivery and 
(2) (1913) 29 TAX* 250* 
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4- There is no Relationship Between the Tranaferral of the Risk 
and- the Dealings with the Documents 
It is submitted that the risk would also be on the buyer 
between shipment and the issue of the bill of lading, in accordance 
with the statement in Inglis v Stock, 
(') 
and the mere retention of 
the bill of lading by means of which the seller reserves the right 
of disposal of the goods until the contract terms of payment have 
been performed, or he only endeavours to protect himself against a 
hypothetical defaultl cannot therefore lead to the conclusion that 
the risk of loss or damage to the goods has not been transferred, 
(2) 
the risk should again be held to pass at the normal time (that is 
on shipmezrt)o British jurisprudence does not reject this notion, 
The loest destruction or enemy seizare, of the goods does not relieve 
the buyer or his obligation to pay the price where the proper 
documents are tendered to him, even if the goodis are at the bottom 
of the sea. 
(3) 
Riccertion: 
Is the seller entitled to recover the Price from the buyer, if 
at the of'tender of dooments he has known already that the, ghl, 
(1) 08851) ib 
St6ck v I=Iio ý(1884) 12- Q. B. Do 564 
151 f Wio'316. 
Mthej Gre J. kZ_T_a. *. L eneLL_.! JEo=, q&jn 
i X-2- 495t, ýVoý 
'Ross 
3 All E*R* 60o 69o 70o 
lav and Dm Ltd, v->It-Ish Amim T d% d% -n £: d%" 
00-0 lAde 
4 V40DO 'OV. 70 
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has been sunk? 
It can be said that the physical situation of the goods 
themselves and the knowledge of such loss by the vendor at the time 
of transfer of the documents are irrelevant. 
(1) 
"If" said McCardie Tý 
2) 
"the vendor fnlfils his contract by shipping the appropriate goods in 
the appropriate manner under a proper contract of carriage, and if he 
also obtains the proper documents for tender to the purchaser, I am 
unable to see how the t-ightis and duties of either party are affected 
by the loss of ship or goods or by knowledge, of such loss by the 
vendor prior to the actual tender of the doc=ents*" 
The reason for this as McCardie Je said is that the contingency 
of loss is written and not outside the contemplation of the parties. "(3) 
Bmt the balance of convenience to that the seller cannot appropriate 
generic-goodo to I a: C*T*Fo contract after loss, 
(4) 
and if each a seller 
wishes to proteort himself against the risk of such losof he can 
ezpressly Oovide against this'in his contract -with-the buyere(5) 
1 Vhiibre Saccharine Co'* Ltd*'v Corn Products Coo- Ltd* 
2 lbidogig] 1 K*B* 198* 
3 This terAency to the one applied in Nance. The property and the 
risk pass to the buyer on shipment regardless of the awareness of 
the seller: as long as the latter has appropriated the goods properly, 
"Le vendeur zxeýsera pas , responable I as lipeftitotiLIe de la marchandise 
objet dii corrtrat , qd' elle Oloit dne 
**& ýdh , incident 'de la'navigation, 
risque de merg incendie "a' bordl torpillige, qtýe le, pert Ie soit 
matAriellw oiame -dans'les cgs pro'cidents on l4gaIe, lorsque la 
'I, marchandlij'sa&jfAnt 4 destinat ov n *at PlAis libre entre 108 mains 
10 1ý-. 1, OV 'w" ., du propri-6taire W mite dwune reordistilbui 
Bellot k ýpi"'-12TV"and the oases cited at the same page. 
(4) "The seller must be in a position to pass the property in the goods 
by the bill of lading if the goods are in existence, but he need not 
have appropriated. the particular goods in the particular bill of 
lading to the particular buyer until the moment of tendert nor need 
he have obtained any right to deal with the bill of lading until 
the moment of tenders" 
Per Atkin J. in C. Groom Ltd. v Barber F-191ý3 I K-Be-324y- 
(5) Re 01: ympla 2L1 amid, Cake Coo and P-rodu--ce Brokers Oo, 
-* 
1191 qI X*B*233* 
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Thus in the absence of clear authority to the contrary, it is 
submitted that a C*1*F* seller of generic goods cannot claim the price, 
if the goods have been lost, unless at the time of loss he had 
appropriated them to the contract in the sense of binding himself 
contractually to deliver, or tender documents relating to the 
particular goods which have been lostq or the particular bulk of which 
they form a parte 
(1) 
This attitude has been adopted in UIZS., Thus Article 100 
provides: 
"If9 in a case to which paragraph 3 of Artidle 19 
(2) 
appliesl the 
seller, at the time of sending the notice or other documents referred 
to in that paragraph, knew or ought to have known that the goods had 
been lost or had deteriorated after they were handed over to the 
carrier, the risk shall remain with-the seller until the time of 
sending 'such notice or document. " It is quite clear now that the 
balance of convenience is against allowing appropriation after lose 
(1) Benjamin at p- 799-801* 
(2) Article 19(3): 
"Where the, goods havdýA over to the carrier are not 
olwxly appropriated to performance of the contract 
by Ibeing marked with an address or by some other 
agans,,, the seller shall, in addition. to handing 
over the goodef send to the buyerýnvtioe of the 
consigrneut ud if necessaryt some document specifying, 
the goodso" 
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as a general rule under Col*Po and F*O*B, contracts*(') 
(2) 
Rowlatt J. pointed out that to allow appropriation after 
lose might lead to some strange reBultso "ftshed to its logical 
conclusion, this wculd involve that the person in whose hands the 
ship was lost could afterwards enter into a contract to sell a 
cargo, and, if the price fell, buy a cargo and tender it and pocket 
the difference; and, if the price rosel tender the lost ship and 
escape from the speculation without losso" 
We think that this problem can be solved as followst 
We have seeNhat the legal basis of transferral. of risk in Color* 
and P*O*Bo contracts is the marine adventure and the ability of the 
(1) In this respect the Scottish case: Woodburn v Andrew Motherwell Ltd. 
1917 S-C-533 cannot be taken as an authority because: 
I-It does not relate to C*I*F- or FeOeBe contracts* 
2-It was decided In the Sale 
;f 
Goods Act 1893 (the risk passes 
with; the, property). 
The facts of the case can be stated as follows: 
Ricks of hay were purchased from a faruer at a certain price per 
'Long but the total weight was not ascertained. The contract between 
the parties provided that the bay should-be placed at the disposal 
of the purchasers in the seller's stackyard, in order that they 
might pack it, for their own conveniencet into bales of a certain 
size., It waB further provided that the seller should cart the 
bales to a railway-sidingt and'tha;; t-the w6ight ascertained there 
by the railway-oompamy for carriage should be accepted for the. 
purpose of determining the total purchase price. The hay. was 
baled in the sellerts stackyardf but before it was all removed 
a number of ý the bal6s were . d*stroyed by firpo_, . 
Tný. an- aotýj on 
' 
at ' 
the instance of the seller for payment of the purchase price ' 
heldt 1hat the contract disclosed an Intention that the property 
In the hay should pass to the purdmers when it was placed at 
their dispiosal1a bo bia6d; and accordingly that the riskvV, 
lose by fire being with them, the seller was entitled to recover 
the price-, of th6'. hay1hxt-wae destroj*sdow 
(2) 0a Oil 
-. 
[1915: 1 1,, KoB*,, at p*239. 
Ante at P-: rL3. 
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seller to pass the property to the buyer, Therefore, if the seller 
takes the bill of lading in the buyer's name, and he keeps it until 
the contract terms of payment have been performed, but meanwhile the 
ship has been sunk and the seller is aware of it, in this case the 
buyer is bound to pay the price where the proper documents are 
tendered to him and it does not matter whether or not the seller 
knows about the lossq because the risk has already passed to the 
buyer: Firatt the goods had faced the marine adventure by being 
actually on board a ship. Secondly, the seller was able to pass the 
property to the buyer and he fulfilled this by taking the bill of 
lading in the buyerts name* Converselyt if the seller takes the bill 
of lading in his own name and he reserves the right of disposal of 
the goods, but in the meant ime the ship has been lostj in this case, 
if the seller to aware of it and sends the documents to the buyer after 
the loss of the shipq the buyer in not bound to pay the prioeq because 
the seller in not ablo, to pass the property to the buyer when he knows 
that the goods are at the bottom of the seal and vice versa* 
After all, it is easy to decide that the buyer does not bear the 
risk of the goods where they are shipped, lost and then sold whether 
'the proper documents are tezAerecl to., him or not,,, or whether the parties 
have already known, aboutý the lose - or not. I In Cout? irjer v 1hatie(l 
)ýa 
cargo of oorn on-&ý-nsmed ship was sold on C. I. F. terms I)ut hadt unknown 
to the parties, ceased to exist as a oomercial entityt 'before -the 
time of the sale, It was held that the bVer was not in these 
circumstances bound to pay the price, 
(1856) 5 H*LoC* 673e 
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CONCLUSION 
After the proceeding discussion about the passing of the risk 
in C. I*P* & P. O. B. contractst the following rules can be stated: 
I- The risk in home market sales should pass to the buyer with the 
delivery of the goods, 
2- The risk of goods (in bulkq ascertained or afloat) passes to the buyer 
on shipment and not before* 
3- Shipment takes place at the time when the delivery of the goods to 
the carrier is complete according to the provisions of the contract. 
In the absence of special agreement the local custom of the port of 
shipment must be applied if the buyer is aware of that custom, 
otherwise the risk is transferred when the goods are actually put 
on board a ship or lighter. 
4- The goods must be shipped in such a condition as would enable them 
to endure normal journey and to arrive at their contractual 
destination in merchantable oonditiono 
5- ArW delay on shipment is at the risk of the. party in fault. 
6- The whole risk must not be borne by the seller after shipment. 
7- Theknowledge, by the sellerr-of loss of the, goods during the 
transit does not affect the trar*erral of the risk if the property 
has already Wqed to the 1myer. 
I 
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FINAL CONCLUSION 
After the Second World War mercantile methods used in the 
context international trade have been developing very fast* The pace 
of this development requires a new look by the law, because it affects 
existing legal rules either where they are too restrictive or unsuited 
to modern transport. 
The container revolution has challenged the classic rules of 
bills of lading. Should we abandon the classic rules and create new 
ones, or should we compromise? In the light of contemporary practice 
the idea of establishing an international body which undertakes to 
organise maritime transport on an international scale seems to be the 
preferred response. 
Passing of property in C*I*Fo & P*O*Bo contracts requires a fresh 
assessment as a consequence of the involvement of and reliance on the 
commercial letter of credit as the usual methods of payment. The 
correspondence idea has given us a now interpretatione. 
Finallyt the shipts rail is not as important as it used to be. 
Generally speakingg law is the science of legal rules to be 
invented, interpreted and applied to achieve justice according to the 
surrounding circumstances. This implies that legal rules are subject 
to change, but the general principle of justice is eternal, 
In the field of mercantile transactions, Justice is achieved when 
the property of both the seller and the buyer is protected. This 
protection should take different forms according to the mercantile 
methods being used at the time to suit modern practice. In car 
time the international conventions can play an important rol*. te 
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bring harmonisation between the international practice and 
domesiie laws& 
APPENDIX 1 
A GENERAL OUTLTNE OF THE 
Mqj LEGAL SISTEN 
-360- 
LEGAL DEVELOPENTS 
I- Constitutional DeveloRments: 
After the First World War, Iraq emerged as a monarchical state. 
Due to 'the political circumstances of the time, a constitution to the 
new Iraqi State was not declared till March 21,1925* That 
Constitution, or the Iraqi basic law (al-qanoon allasaai al-Iraqi), 
provided that the sovereignty of the Iraqi kingdom is for the people, 
and entrusted it to King Feisal ibn al-Axssein, and after him, to 
the direct male descendants succeeding him according to the law of 
succession (Arts. 19 and 20). The form of the government was said 
to be monarchical and representative (Art. 2)o 
Since 1958 Iraq has entered a new*epoeh of political history. 
On July 149 1958, the Hashemite moratrohioal regime collapsed as a 
rem lt of a revolution* Three other major political events followed 
on February 8,1963, November 18,1963, and July 171 1968. It is not 
untrue to assert that great instability has been the dominant feature 
Of 'the constitutional de"loPments in Iraq since 1958* So fart five 
oonstitutional instruments have anearedwý These are: the Interim 
Constitution of July, 271 19599 the law of this National Comoil Of 
the Revolution's Command No*25,1963 (the Constitution of APril- 4, t, 
1963)s the I&W ofAhb National Council of the Revolutions& CommarA 
Wo. 61j 1964 (Jko Coustitution of April 22,. 1964). the Interi 
Owstitution of Aps4l 299 1964, and, the Interim cqmstjtutj4M., Vr. -- 
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The main features of these Constitutions are the following: 
1. The form of the State has been changed from a monarchical into 
republican regime as from the Constitution of 1958- 
2* The element of permanency existing in the monarchical Constitution 
of 1925 has been lacking within the constitutional framework set 
up since 1958. No political regime has ever since issued a 
permanent constitution to the people* 
3. ITo clear line of demarcation exists between the exercise of the 
legislative and the executive authorities in the riew constitutions. 
2- Ordinary Legislations Developments Since-1917 
When the British forces of occupation landed in Traqq it was 
subject, like most of the Arab countriesl to the Ottoman laws. The 
Briti . sh authority'of occupation promulgated in August 1918 a law for 
the organization of criminal and civil courts'in the occupied regions 
of tBe country, Some thirty four Statutory Re&lati-ms vere annexed 
to that law, all of which were taken from Indian law. By the end of 
1918, six appendioes to it had been promal Ited, and tta 'ji hue h 
application of all the Ottoman laws was suspended. 
How ever a 11 tho so le gislative ena atub nt a were' itp . pli . ed in the 
Baerah region oky, ý'arA no attempt for their aI PPlication was made in 
the Regidvi of . badh6do 'When theý occupatioti of ý the whole cmititry was 
eventually coftletid, tbi 'Ottoman I*wflremMn'ýd in foroe in t6 
r6jions in 'the *Msh authority msAe no &ttebiplt Uý'iii I fbill" ý. 0% 
1'ýgislidive enab-t After the . ofetti ng up of the fjwjj :t te 
authority under t6 070'nstItUtiOn of Narch- 21, 
enactments began to appear. But the Ottoman laws were not 
immediately replaced* 
The most important Ottoman legislative enactments which 
remained in force for a considerable time werei 
I. "Majallat al-Ahkam al-Adliyah" (The Review of Just Judgments or 
the Ottoman Civil Code). The judgments of this law were derived 
completely from "Al-Hanafiyah" which is one of the school of 
thoughts in Islamic religion., 
2. The law of Civil Procedure of 1880. 
Those were eventually replaced by the Iraqi Civil Code, 1951, 
and the law of Civil and Commercial Procedurel 1956, which in 
turn was repealed recently by the law of Civil Procedure No. 83,1969. 
Similarly, legislation of the British occupying authority remained 
applicable. The outstanding example of the British legislations 
enforced until 1970 is the Baghdad law of Criminal Procedurej 1919., 
A third legislation emanating from the same authorityl namely the 
Companies Law, 1919, remained applicable till the promulgation of the 
law of Commercial Companies, 1957- 
The Iraqi Legislative Authority set up under the Constitution of 
March 21,1925, assumed its legislative function and has naturally 
promulgated as time went on, an enormous number of laws in various 
fields* It is impossible to refer to all these laws in this 
c=ection* But among them the Iraqi Civil Code, 19511 stands out 
as the most important piece of legislation, Next follows. those ofs 
the law of Commerce, 1943, repealed by the new law of Commeroe,, ý'jqToj' 
the law of Civil and Commercial Procedure, 1956; the 1wof Comeroial 
Ccupanies, 19571 the Commereial law, 1970. V&rjoujs. vtjWr. 
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acts of legislations? dealing with the various activities of 
individuals and state officialsl the military and the police, 
commerce and transportation, the judicial system, the corporate 
bodies, etc. have been applying in Iraq since its independence, 
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Sources of Iraqi Law: 
The division of sources of law into formal and informal sources 
is the most important, and will accordingly be adopted in our study. 
If we look at the various branches of the Iraqi legal system, we find 
that the legislation and principles of Islamic law are the formal 
sources in matters of personal laws while religion as represented by 
the "Shariall, is the historical source of provisions in such matters. 
Legislation also, is the sole formal source of Criminal law. But, 
the law of labour has internal sourcesl both formal and informall and 
international sources, Again, Commercial law states its sources to be: 
agreements sanctioned by law, legislative provisions of the commercial 
law, commercial customs and usages, and, finallyg the provisions of 
the Civil Code, 
In arw case,, it is possible to say that the general basis of 
gradation of sources in the Iraqi legal, vywtem is that adopted by 
the Iraqi Civil Code, beemse civil law seems to indicate a unity 
between the totality of sources, to which the sources of the other 
legal branches of the system could be referrede Section (1) of the 
Iraqi Civil Code No-40t 1951, provides that the formal sources of law 
are the followingi 
I- Legislation 
2- Custom 
3- Islamic Law 
4- Equity 
Informal sources provided for by the same section are 
following two: 
1- Judicial Decisions 
2- Juristic Opinions* 
All these sources will be briefly discussed in the following 
pageso 
FTRST,., Formal Sources of Tracri Lawt. 
1. Legislation 
A. Definition: 
Legislation is the formulation of law by the appropriate organ or 
organs of the State, in such a manner that the actual words used are 
themselves part of the lex, The lex which has its source in 
1ýgislatlon is called "statute law". It includes the making of- lawq 
and the alternation o: O repeal of eiisting law* 
B. Kinds of Legislationt 
In the sense of the definition of legislation adopted at the 
MtBet Of Our inquiry, it is possible to oonceive three kinds of 
. 
legislation! There, are: - 
i- Constitutional ýegislvtion* This is the most 811Preme kind 
, 
It regulatee'the constitution of the statee 
2-r Ordinuy Legislation. This category inoludes all the lepl 
rales. enacted by the, lagislature in a0cordance with the 
oonatitution. 
3ý- Subordinate legislatiom, This kind degoribos jhe I 
rules onact ad by the executive aatbwjVq wa& 
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regulations, and executive orders. 
It is important to note that the strength of these three 
kinds of legislation is not the same in the legal ordere 
Constitutional legislation is the stringest kind and ordinary 
legislation is stringer than subordinate legislation. 
Por example, if there is anyoontradiotion between the 
Constitutional Law and the Criminal Law (ordinary legislation) 
the Constitutional Law must be appliedg andl again, if there is 
any contradiction between the Commercial Law (ordinary legislation) 
and the Regalations of Commerce (subordinate legislation) the 
Commercial Law must be applied* 
In Iraq, the constitution of September 21,1968, provides in 
Article (58) for entrusting the legislative authority 'to the Council 
of the Revblutionts Command, till the -time when -the National Assembly 
be convened* This assumes that this Council is the legislative, 
authoritye But the Article (44) of the constitution seem 'to assign 
a wide range of executive functions to the council as well* This would 
seem to mean that ordinary and subordinate legislation could emanate 
from the same authority, namely, the Counoil. of the Revolution's 
Command* Yetv Articles (60), (64)(A)(3), and (64)(A)(4), collectively 
give to the goverment the execative authority in the country, 
with the powers of putting into effect the general Policies of the 
state, issuing administrative and executive orders in accordance with 
ordinary and idbordinate legislation, and consenting to the draft 
laws and regulationeo All this means, in fact, that no clear line of 
demarcation between the legislative and executive autharitles exists 
within the constitutional framework in Iraq for the +. jag beingo 
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2* Custom 
A. Definition: 
Custom is a usage followed by individuals in society in their 
affairs and dealings, and believed by them to be obligatory. It 
must be remembered that when we speak of custom in legal studies, 
we mean "legal custom" as distinct from other social customs. A 
legal custom is a rule of lawl and its obligatory character appears 
in its legal sanction. 
Bo Kinds of Custom: 
All custom which has the force of law may be of two kinds, The 
first kind is "legal custom". which is the custom operative per Be 
as a binding rule of law, independently of any agreement on the part 
of those subject to it. The second kind is "conventional custom" 
which in the one operating only indirectly through the agreements 
of the parties. 
. 3e lplamic Law: 
Islamic Law is the third formal source of law in the Iraqi 
legal system. It, is the law of the religion of Islam. 
It is iWoitaut to remember that religions differ in the 
of regulating matters of law. 'In facts Islam does not only inclvAe 
matters of purely religious flavour - that is, regulating the 
relationship of the individual to God, such as prayers, fastiýW. j 
pilgrimage and the like - but also legal rules for the regulstiM Of 
human conduct between the individuals themselves* SMh M" the rules 
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regulating marriage, divorcel inheritance, civil transactions, crimes, 
matters of public law, such as the doctrine of government and the 
state, and the principles to be observed in international relations. 
The main traditional source of Islamic law are the following: 
1- The Qurlanj which includes the revblations of God unto the Prophete 
2- The Sunna, which is the traditions of the Prophet, be it his spoken 
words or aatione 
3- A1-1jma, that is consensus of opinion* 
4- Al-Akil, that is human mind* 
5- Al--Qiyasj that is reasoning by analogyo 
Howeverl there are other subsidiary sources recognized only by 
some schools of thougIrt. Thus the Rianafis recognize the source of 
"istihsan" (juristic preference), and the Maliklo know the source of 
"iftislah" (consideration of publio Interest),, 
49 Equityr 
This its the final source bf law' in IrA49 toý wbich resort -should 
be made when-the Judge finds no rule of law to apply in the previous 
sources* 
34mity- to an ideal ISM wblxlhý CM CnlY-I* khmn through reasom 
It to that- wbtvh, justice I- gpod, faithl , ard , good conscience requijjý in & 
certain cassil; i 
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Secondly: Informal Sources of IrEi Law: 
Section 1(3) of the Iraqi Civil Code specifies two informal 
sources Of lawl namelyl judicial decisions arA juristic opinion in 
Iraq and other countries having laws approximating those of this 
countrye 
I- Judicial Decisions-. 
The normal function of the courts is the application of the 
law- When they apply the law to a case, they issue a judgment 
embodied in a judicial decision* 
In some countries, like UeKe and U*S*A9I courts' judgments have 
a binding force upon all judges sitting in various courts in 
accordance with special and highly technical rules. This system is 
called "the system of the binding f orce of judicial precedentelle 
In Iraqt howeverg . this syst6m is not-Iollowede A Judgment, or 
a judicial precedentl has no binding authority upon the various courts* 
The judge in rendering his decision do I es' not legisiate'ar make a new 
lawq bmt 8111ply applies the law. 
Teti ocurts in Iraq usually take Judicial decisions into 
oonsiderstion, and parties, generall: ý'invdke them in support of their 
claimst efMeoially when they *r'e d6oj6jotg of, a higher oourt,, 
weans thtt' jidicial detdsionio &To Wdy a gaide in the process" of the 
applicAtift of law$ aIA nof''A Souroa ftom whiýh ruibi ý#' 1a; w ocftlh, "i's 
low. olytalned* `: 'Tiab 14 ilso wby they are an mouroG of 
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2- Juristic Opinionst 
Law is not the concern of courts only* It is also discussed by 
jurists and particularly by law teachers in universities, The opinions 
of jurists in the field of law can be a helpful guide to the legislature 
in legislating and reforming the law, and to the courts in the 
application of law. But such opinions are not bindingl neither the 
legislature, nor the courts are required to follow them. This Is 
why this source of law is considered to be informale 
Tracri Civil Code: 
Introduction 
We have mentioned already that the Ottoman Civil Code "Majallat ' 
al-JUm al--AdliyW applied in Iraq until 19511 and this codt derived 
completely from the judgments of one of the schools of thought in the 
Islamic religion which in. called "Al-HanafiyW. In 1951 -the 
legislative authority in Iraq enaoted the Irsi4i-ftvi 1 Code to replace 
"majallat al-Abkam. al-Mliyah"o The dhairman'df the drafting committee, 
was Professor "U. Sanhouri" (died 1970), who was influenced'in his view 
by the opinion of his French professor "lambert" who, in turn, was 
imfluenced. by-tbo. rales of-Womoh law* Professor "Al-Sanhouri" caýe 
frm EMptt arA tried to make the Iraqi Civil Code a oopýr of the 
Egyptian and Prench Mvil C; od*SJL but, the other the 
drafting committee objected to this attempt on the grounds that they 
wanted to t&k&---tkA* judgments from all -the sohoolt-, 4 4W0Q1fitAVi -ibe 
rsiamio religion and to adopt Imitable Judgmesits for tb* #ms being* 
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After that they came to a compromise which was to use the same 
method of presentation in French and Egyptian Civil Codes, but with 
the provision that the judgments of the Iraqi Civil Code must be 
drawn, first: from Islamic Law, secondly: from the French and the 
Egyptian Civil Codes, 
Thus, after eight years, 1943 to 1951, the Iraqi Civil Code 
came into existance., 
Definition 
In its wider sensel civil law is "the body of rules which 
regulate the private relationship of individuals in society, whether 
these relationships appertain to the family or to ordinary transactions. " 
In Iraq, Civil Law to the original source of Private Law, Thus, 
Commercial Law, ' the lawýof Civil Procedureq Private International Law, 
Labour Law, Agricultural Law, arein fact nothing more than aspects 
of civil law regarded as special branches merely to emphasize their 
importance, either because they relate , to a speoial: class of persons 
or affairs, or because they can be distinguished by certain 
oharactieristios which necessitated'i 4epirate treatment, This is 
wby it in always poosil)lg to fall tack on the pysoýsjons of the Civl 
Code in all "tiers not co4bred'by a fjp66fýl rule in the other 'Oýeq 
of civil Aaw* 
Ordinarl-, ', ' 66aes reigalate the kinds 6f relationibipso' 
These arei 
Fmily relMlai&Jp8ý'wbich are. in Iraq regal&+. ga'ly tM law of 
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personal status No, 1889 1959v as amended by the law Wo. 119 1963. 
2. Ordinary transactions, which are in Iraq regulated by the 
Iraqi Civil Code No-4091951- 
The best way for exposing the subjects of civil law is to 
illustrate the topics regulated by the Iraqi Civil Code. The code 
is divided into an Introductory Part, and two main parts. 
The Introductory Part includes General Provisions concerning 
-the application of lawg conflict of laws in time and placeg persons, 
things, property and rights. The first part deals with Personal 
Rights (obligations) as follows: 
(1) Book 19 concentrates on "Obligations Generally". This is 
sub-Aivided into six chapteraq as follows: 
1- Sources of obligations which encompass: 
a- Contracts. 
I>- Unilateral Undertakings. 
4>- Uhlawful Aotse 
d- Airichment without just Cause,.. 
e- The Law. 
2- The effects of obligations, which deal with: 
a- Obligatory: performanceo 
1- Means of securing the Rights of Creditorso 
1- Conditions modifýlng the Effects of Obligational which are: 
ap- Conditional obligations and Time Clauses. 
b- PIxo*11ty of Parties to an Obligation. 
4- Transmi9sibb, of an'bbligationi, the two means of which gret 
mdgnbmt ý- of a Right 
I)... Thio- Asd4mmt of, ; &. Debt. 
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5o- The Extinction of Obligationsl by means of: 
a- Payment* 
b- Methods of Extinction Equivalent to Payment. 
o- Extinction of Obligations without Payment. 
6- Proof of Obligationsl which deals with: 
a- General Maxims of Evidence* 
b- Documents. 
c>-- Admission. 
d- Oath* 
e- Evidence by Witnesses* 
f- Presumptions. 
(2) Book IT, deals with Speoifio Contractsl and it is sub-divided 
iixto five chapters as followst 
i- Contracteas regards Ownership, such as: 
a, - Sale. 
b- Gift, 
o- Partnership. 
d- leans and Annuities. 
a- Compromise* 
2- Contracts relating tathe use Gf: &+AiMgj which includes 
b-ý-, -14am -for Use. 
3- ftirtraas-tor *M Hire of Services, which are: 
so- OmstroAts for Work and Conoesetone for Pub3. to; Utllit, *,,. i$ervices. 
bi.. Contriat a 'of Setvi 
o.. 
d. Deposit& 
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4- Aleatory Contracts, such as: 
a- Gaming and Betting. 
b- Life Annuities. 
o-- Contracts of Insurance* 
5- Suretyship. 
The second main part of the code, entitled real Rightsq includes 
Books III and IV, which are set up for dealing with these rights as 
follows: 
(3) Book III provides for the principal real rights; it is sub- 
divided into two chapters, as follows: 
1- The Right of Ownershipj which is dealt with as follows: 
a- The Right of Ownership in General. 
1>- Acquisition of Ownership* 
2- Rights derived from the right of ownership,, which include: 
am, The Right of "Hekr", 
b- The Rights of Ustifrual, of the Usiair, of. 0comp4tion and of 
Masatahae 
0- Servitudes. 
(4) Book : Mgorverniracoessory real Righle or real securities. 
This book in divided into thre a chaptere, as follows-. 
Imp Mortoges. 
2-- PlWgegb 
3-- Privileged Rights,. 
Ira#, cim, EýAt It 10ýP0111% out that the 
containeg 9Mhk.. br. sIds with eivil law proVisi. onis I 
persoml status, -1 swýh'aw those **noel-nj1W,, tbp,, A I 
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personality, nationality? the familyq the name, the title, domicile, 
ýhe age of majority and the like* 
Commercial Law 
Rules of commercial law regulate legal relationships between 
merchants and all commercial business activities* It is thusl like 
civil law in dealing with financial relationships. But the difference 
between them is that the financial relationships which are governed by 
commercial law are determined either in accordance with the 
characteristics of a certain class of individuals, or on the basis of 
the nature of transactions. Thus, it may be the case that the 
Provision of commercial law apply to transactions commercial by 
nature, although the individuals concerned in it are not merchants. 
The separation of commercial law from the rest of the civil law 
is convenients It is convenient to group together the rules which 
have particular reference to matters of trade* The nature of 
commercial activity requires speed in transacting itj and special 
principles to be developed in consonance therewith* Great hardships 
will ensue if we insist on the application of the more strict and highly 
formal rules of civil law In this respect. 
Commercial law-includes the rules applicable to the determination 
of the characteristics of commercial activity, It specifies the 
criteria which establishes the status of a merchant, such as capacity, 
professional character, legal Personality in the case of corporate 
entities* Connercial law also deals with the duties jVoged vM= 
merchants, , sNL04, as tho dut; r to keep, oertajjý 
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and to assume a commercial address. Moreover, it is in commercial 
law that students come across the study of the various kinds of 
commercial association like corporations, companies with limited 
liabilityl partnerships, and the like, in addition to the rules 
governing bankruptcy and commercial paper like cheques, bills of 
exchange, bonds, notes and shares* 
Finallyl side by side with commercial lawl there is the special 
branch of 'maritime lawt, This branch deals with the carriage of 
goods by sea, marine insurance, and all that relate to the sale of 
sea vessels their gear, and provisionse(i) 
(1) Dro Riyaal. Al-Qaysie Elementary Study of Law, Bggbdsds ý1970,, 
Dr. Malik Doban., Al-&Aans Souroes of. Lw. ýBagbdadl:. 1965. 
APPMOIX 2 
MITIME ASPECTS OF 
RAxwRar uus 
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The Code of Hammarabi is one of the most important monuments 
in the history of the human races Containing as it. does the laws 
which were enacted by a king of Babylonia whose rule extended over 
the whole of Mesopotamia from the mouths of the rivers Tigris and 
Euphrates to the Mediterranean coast* 
The great ruler Hammurabil the sixth king of the first 
Babylonian dynasty, flourished about 2250 B. Co His long reign of 
fifty-five years was celebrated for its brilliant achievementst high 
civilization, and extensive literature# 
The Code of Hammurabiq though written in Babylonian script and 
languaget strange as it my seem, was discovered not in Babylonia or 
Assyria, but in $usaj Persia* Susal the Shushan of the Bible, was 
for a long time a royal residenoee Its location made it a central 
'battlefield of the nations; this accounts for the fact that it was 
captured and recaptured repeatlodlY* 
Elan and Babylonia bad fraMent warse The Elamites conquered 
Babylonia more than once* It was probably during one of these 
invasions that the Hanwrabi stele was. tranaferred irk triumph to the 
Elamite capital, azA placed in one of its great Assiples as a trophy 
of war, 
The stole, or stones- (m whiah thans laws ýwere written, Orra-kher 
cuts ia a, rude pisoo, pf. Ulack diorite, slightly rounded at the top, 
nearly OW. - feet high, and rather more than seven feet in width, 
Both sides, of Ahe . womment are owqý with -the ingoriptAos. 
Xammarabi in as -starAing before Shamash, the Sunwigod of 
Sippar, the ancient seat of ýhe E4Hansurabi dynartye The ýgqd-, ** seated 
upon his throne, and is in the very act ()f JLOIivsring this 00&6, toýt 
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king, who humbly and reverently stands before him. Shamash is clad 
in loose-flowing robes, and so is Hammarabi, his representative on 
earth* Both god and king wear long beards* The former holds something 
in his hand, which many have regarded as a soeprtre, while others call 
it a stylus, symbolic of 'wisdom. 
Dir ectly under this pictorial. representation, on the obverse, 
follow sixteen columns of cuneiform writing, making 1114 lines. 
It is much to be regretted that five columns on this side have been 
erased, so that no one can indulge in a happy guess at the meaning, 
Nothing but the discovery of another copy can replace these lost lines. 
Why and when the erasure was made can be a matter of conjecture only. 
The reverse has twenty-eight columneq which make a little more than 
2500 lines, The code as we now have it contains 247 distinct laws* 
The number is sometimes given as 2829 but from this latter nuaber we 
mnat deduat 35, -the supposed number of laws erased. The laws are 
umbered 1 66 to the erased portion, then 100 - 282 to the end. Of 
these 247 laws, by far the greater n=ber*ha; v: e been correctly deciphered, 
and the correct meaning has beent without dotLbtt ascertained. 
The mo==mt itself now stands in, the. Louvre Weeam, (paris), 
Our main voncern bore ., is to state-Vie Arti6les which deal with 
maritime aspects. as: follixmt' 
Article 234-1 
wir a bostan b": havigmted a iddp- ce- mitt am rol. a 11mm, dMal 
give hi's tW *%iitlw fýr bits tees" 
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Article 235: 
"If a boatman has navigated a ship for a man and has not made his 
work trustworthy, and in that same year that he worked that ship 
it has suffered an injury, the boatman shall exchange that ship 
or shall make it strong at his own expense and shall give a strong 
ship to the owner of the ship*" 
Artible 236: 
"If a man has given his ship to a boatman, on hire, and the 
boatman has been carelessl has grounded the ship, or has oaused 
it to be lost, the boatman shall render ship for ship to the owner, " 
Article 2371 
"If a man has hired a boatman and ship, and with corn, wool, oil, 
dates, or whatever it be as freight, has freighted her, that 
boatium has been careless and gromAed the shipq or has caused 
what is' In her to, ýe lost, -the boatman shall raAer-baok the ship 
w1dch he has gromAed and whatever in her he has caused to 'be lost., 
P) 
Artiole 2381 
"If a boatiman Me grounded the ship 61%, ai iý wA h" refloat e& her, 
he slall give money to wr her pri'040* 
(1) COMWO Arta 3-6 -of Brussels COMMOiM 1924t. conowming, thg M I's ior leaug Wiwi qbý provius I 
_W 
14us&t' -00wengut op. ag"Outut in a oontracrt of oa=4 "U"141be ý CW*W Of , the -4hip. 'A*M 
IjAility for lqqM i4s, #A=W-Itql or, in 
I 9n ý-Vith 9 9*odx ý va-stag ft I g] I IR*"*, fW" -t or- : r4u=G in't 440 4um ox -404. OGligut i one it 
article or lessening such liability ctherwise t ýýtla " han as provided in this coxvention, shall be rmll and void and of no effect &A benefit of irumranee in favour. of the carrier or Gn,, lsr GUUse 
shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the oarrier, fto 114bility*", 
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Article 239: 
"If a man has hired a boatman, he shall give him six GM of corn 
per year. " 
Article 240: 
"If a ship that is going forward has struck a ship at anchor 
and has sunk her, the owner of the ship that has been mmk, 
whatever he has lost in his ship shall recount before God, and 
that of the ship going forward which sunk the ship at anchor 
shall render to him his ship and whatever of his was lost, ln(') 
Article 2759. 
"If a man has hired a (boat? ) per diemy her hire is three 
NE 
of silver. " 
Article 276: 
"If a man has hired a fast shipq he shall give two and a half SE 
of silver per them as her hire. " 
Article 277: 
"If a man has hired a ship of sixty GM, he shall give one-sixth 
of a shekel of silver per diem as her hire*" 
. (1) ComPar'a Art* I Ot "'0 COlliBiOng C4m"'ýtiOn 1910, which providess 
"Where . &, ooLjjsj= oocurs-between, sea-going vessels or between sea, going vessels and vessels, of inland navigation, the compensm- 
tion ýfte f*r 4amages afteed 'to 'tbe 'O*seels 9 or Io or, 
peroqm 04,15(mad -, therea; AF, sWaj be soMed in acoordep 
follw4ng provisional in whatever waters the oolliglia'U tjjms 
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It is a matter of surprise to know that some of the maritime 
aspects like collision, charter-party and the like were known-in 
simple form-at Hammurabi time 2250 B*Co This fact may indicate that 
A 
the human bein&%mind works in the same methodq using the available 
materials and inventing the legal rules to achieve justice at his 
time and his place. 
(') 
(1) WW. Davies. The Codes of Hmmurabi and Moses, 1905# 
C*H*We Johnse The Oldest Code of Laws in the world. lKiabiml 
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APPENDIX 
THE BILL OP'LADTNG USED BY 
I&AM MARITTME TRANSPORT CO, LTD* 
0 na conaliv, 1 0. Lzi (I i-. g with ý1'4u-tcd lo ""C 1 ýOr , 
ý,., jjSTTIU 0. 
I,., [ vp )n thcir roods. ', hirw. -% are 'a'1601led agaills! va 1ý1, 
jf, Id, I bc-com, c., l ... nýible 
for 
q dvcrous ()r n-tuic, ai ýy so oin-, t icy 
drnlasc ft"d also rendcr tliernscives liAk to I C. 1"Itin inlýosed 
by Statute. 
IN, AQ) 1 1,1 N F, 
(-) 
Bill of Lading No. 
Shipper's Ref. 
Consignee (If 'Order' state Notify Party) 
Notify Patty (ONLY if not stated above; otherMse leave blank) 
IA>-.; a vessti 
ocean vessel 
Nm t of dischup 
Marks and 
N=berz 
V.: 
0 From (Local port of loading) 
Port of loading 
0 Final destination (ifon-ArriRge) 
Number and kind of pulages 
, 
JAI 
F/Agcnt's Ref. 
0 
IP,,, AQI MARITIME TRANSPORT CO., LTD 
BAGFIDAD-REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
Cables: BAWAKMR 
The freight re4eived is inclusive of the cost of on-carriage by rail to Daghd3d, 
Mosul or Kirkuk, if stated opposite, which will be arrin&cd through the pre,, cnt carrier 
acting as Agent for the shipper andlor consignees of the goods without any iiaH:! v 
whatioever, the conditions of such forwarding to be covered by tha current la fu'i 
forms of contract. 
To avoid the tendering ofseparate documents at each stage ofthe journey, dcUvery 
at destination unto the consignee mentioned herein or to his or their assigns w::! be 
&iVCJJ Only On due presentation of one of this set of Bills of Lading and noti-c to jzis 
effect shall be included in the oncarrier's ficight contract. 
0 Applicable Cidy when document used =a Through Bill of lAding. 
Freight 
payablo 
at 
Description of goods 
Nwnber of ori&al Bs/L. 
Gross Wei& 
ý, 
c I Z)j 
ji 
Mc,. 
. .; ct 
;I IT, MEASUREMENT, INIAPaS, NUNJEERS, QUANTITY, CON'TENTS, BP-kND, QUALITY AND VALUE UiNK.. "O%N'N TOTHE CARRIERS 
it at the 
........... . .................. 
.................................. 
.................................. 
.................... . ............ 
; es .............................. 
................................ 
................................ 
................................ 
........................ 
................................ 
................................ ........................... 
: ting Charges . ........ TOTAL 
SlUPPED in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise st,, ttd hercin) on board the above named ves: 41 at or off cee pert of loading tamed above, the go ri 
wcijbt, qu2ntity, brand, contents, moads 
s ii)od hcr-in (tbd Particulars r: vca being supplied by the Shipper and the m'=UrMcnt 
rk 
esc 
numorrs. quality and value being unknown to the carri. r) ii. ýd to be delivered in th6 L-', o j; ocid order and condit: oa at the po; t of di; -liar24 rimmed above or so near thercunto as sh-3 sifily go unte) the above. 
tr. -ritiomd c4DnSi7, aeccr to his or their as'igns su*: t to the terms, conditions and exemptions of th1i; 
n13aAcfLadin3. 
Fre: ýht for t; jc 
said goods with priwar.. if any to become du- and to ba paid on shipment in cash without deduction %t-wl of car-o lost or not lc5t. In occe, "int, this bill of Lading, the Stdr, ý. rs. ComiratesaadOwimers ofth* goods expressly accept aridcgrze to all its, s"pu! a. tions and ciauses whether vizitten, printed. stamped or o rwise incorporated. Sao Clauses overlew'. 
IN VJITNESS whereof the Mister or Agent of the said - vessel has signed the number of Original Bills of Lading Number of Packagn (in words) stated above, all of this tcaor and date, one of which being 
accomplished. the others to stand void. If required by tho Catrier or his Agent, one of the Bills of Lading must be even up. fully endorsed in exchange for the goods. 
Dated M ............................... . ............................................................. 19 F- aa - khW Qr the Mw: cj, 
- CAP " TERMS Or IrIVIIAGE 
1)!:; ýINITIOVS: In this Pill c, ' bcth on tLt or on the back the 
c_-- h., e the , bi-c I, , -i-d to I I- -i "I v, ly, that is to say: 
-r- mcl. do the M- ,, ,7,11ý AIwl of!, She C""v. -, -, I: S C)w.. cr cf the goods. 
ýn V. t End, --d I P. 11 crl_-, ý, 
wch: & I the Cc,, - .. a -I xýi 0-- of 
il: t sit. the Endorsee 
'r ,fI he V; ll of J. ý ýi-. 2 OF C, '3141n_CT: 71. , llýý! o(L.,!: rp is Ila, . I, % on J! ill. of 
Lýadi,, ; t,, -3 t 2$th Aýsi.,! t. 1ý- 0,1 , 11 cor,, ý, jso, y r-I i, io,, Oft to -hich -d 0. t If tl., ,, _! -- of his IfIll of tjaý 11,;,! " be Ilt, 1% 11 t-9 -4 c"", I. IS It'll of I ad;,. 'htI LAI, rv Ie %hr, J , or rarity c., nirrD i'ý : -. 
itual riý Lm 
a, cý, <týc ; I,. y I-, -o eo,, "o. 
be lead a, If 
3. Ili re ,- ýý W, ty ortile CArrier sýjjj corijoilote only when 
IM 1, cf,! c If it,! CrIT"I'l, li"p or, i 14 rarmio for Jc"u,, t and cave-', absolutely 
ril I., to, . Plc.,,, It d-ha, 3. r,. 
-1 tl: C--r el h-1 --- 1, Fr, l-::, - And 0,, di, cl,.,,. 
whctl, tr be Ii fojv,; 
ýrd to of I 1ý, at ip or výtlhrr a-mog snir-nt, lao,: cd or 
stated, or 11-ý 
ipto h,,: k or craft brl-Iz. n; to 1!; c Call or rot or r -i 
!, nq transhipirint 
At A, st ý! r cf file hclc ere 
io S- 11 rulojy at 6 C Sol, ::, k cC Co sh. ppcr nJ 
Su the cýl let lhell not ISa ao , for lo: Ii or U-1130 at: sinz or 1. lt: r,; Irora any cause 
4. SCOPE OF VOYAGE: The CatriT, liýs the lihe, ty her,,, or anf,, risaldirts: 
to-, j, or -- i, i t it,? poll to fal! _ ,, y eu:, Oil to rfc,,. j to and stay 
At any roils or rj: ýý, S %ratwvcr a10 
in a comrs. d. fcctwn to Or out cf 0, beyond 
she r ., 1, :;, id So I, tart o'c' I, Iny 
-1 kr a" s- n"a"iairý Iý l"I'l or lh, rloe I. ý 1- ! ýý ,, cr. fa I, !IV.; I OR care., -iog bilriken-g, ýr J, r any pur-sý .! -W croneet 'I(" "'I or 
oý,. 
to ri, locwl' 't All such roll, Wa, te in -i 
j 
eJ i, r; O ihe r, -nt 
Voylge-Such JJ-t1Y 113t to be Cr`- IC ! SýIVUICICJ IS 
0, b, ,y irn, -l: r, lOOn lihich 011err- mic t I-a draw ify, 
any -rd ý ii. i th, 10i of 
L. dials, 
-m! this h. Ia or from 
J1. XNJ [IF-S: Loss or damage a, fo, h 
k"I 
Q. I ly d jy m-: ýTd-o ýh 'I. he 
or chars. In 
torn. th. F-d , 
LI , Ii ur-ýIobu Of I- i- In -"crc, ýJ and, or urit -I J 
, f,, l: ton "o, ir'. $, I.; o 'et" rz, :r bjý, i or cantons. Irons Is!, or othir 
L, 
c, irlo-': 
""no ., C. "'t on -y palt a- 1-11 -, "1 it rac, Ils or --,; S hi, ls _Oc or 
base 
f,, ra, 
c", 
b-n r-'t ., bci. Il, III ,ýI.. r. ", ac 1, I-Ior tcý, Or d, 'a 
b or no, I'! Iii "-1o 01 star It li', co if t1tey do vo, k on oa. d mr, on W"It. 
of ths 1h. " -1 V., from -oY c: -1 11 laAmitt ., ill -kle, 
ý'. 
Jl, 
-r, ilcl. is 2rJ'nr c-ling plart oLolhrr r; pua, aanzes at all be &-d 1. he due IV s. b up 110 told i. cluJLIIZ P'Of 11-6 
1% 
1; 
. 
c", 
bin -.,. cd h-in is Out -Ilod by 'I l1ali Co, op'ny. LisoitiT 11.3 li 11 It ',. all : atc c: ': ct 3ý a contrat a,. [% with the ow.. er oftlic said ship. 
as pri-ciral. IS ýr throuFli the av, -y of " Irr, jj ljrtjt_'jra,,, cn C ...... any. Lirritcd " 
, fiach . 
'a I, A-t oli ILI hall bc n. I-, bil,, y AS hr_f. it. fic--r, 
it . 1, _ be x ill 
d 'hat any PJ ncr 1ý cirrier st. nd or bLj; ce of the r-os, 
Ili,: 'Ors foreseen by Law III the terms lliercof shall b.. -; I. hjv I. Such 
6. LIF LAN' IN 
9ELPI 
ERY: Th, C-ierix not FaIA! for arv loss or damage caused to Vilt Sl, ipýrr ill CýWqucnirc of any 4ýlrly In Ilia Worry of 
ilic 
cargo wisirs if g con 
any ca--. 
Oclocry us originally mis%in, c ; O, o can take place rt all limeq. 7: 
'. 
1 ARKS: G-Ods are not Oý be 
d"tin ,, I iI 
Ocr-d marked UOlitsl the part or 
on bý lh, I Shirpe, Lýf. j. in I. jjr, a at ]cast 5 cos. 
lhlý,, 
" I'll Ia in In ki, bllf larall dl,. r,,. C_; " cxpt for dcl:, cry to otlirr than lading roarks. 
Is Or I 
&. 
I 
ILEAVY II PI S: Aný onc itcni of carý:, a %i-h s, c: rbý 1,66ý I. I',, or Or , vd, Or 
ul I bl!, thm is is too aI,,, *srd I, r the ciýi:, 's tackle to hi. ndir. n-ust to marked m Ili 
She *cight are. ,r dt. lin, i'an, c1ra, l 
lo., dird 
y io'j bo! jý, by Sh . iN_' a, O""r, ý;, j will I 
it, ,0 or ,,, . Ind 
ds, t by rsne or I ;: sr. I ýt S Pllco. at lh,, ri, k and rispcnwe ,e ýo -ý 'or Holdcr of [L., 0,; I .(I ding. If any to!, b0ay 1. if e iilip, Li; ur. %hrof. quay, crdne%. no, t:,.; tac;. 1, or prorcrty 
a or t! 
"'hornsce's, 
_-' . -g to ,, incorrect %cight or o, cssurchicni. or no 
-Cht W no ineasuremsoit hn, ing been . iarkti. Il, c 
Sý, ýP. r. Coasig, -. Owner of the 
or lril): ýCE Of this ikilof La,!, ng sliallbe stapur. -bic 
for s-s uamije. loss of 
INCORRrcrsiAIFNIENTS! Incorrect U219ments from thcShippZrI shall in all 
Class be ell s: 11 : fed As wilfully ulilcsn the contrary 1% pro, ed. 
It 
. 
RýDLKCARGO. AS has 1. the weiFlit 
Of bulk "; 93, an) reference; to such sscig; it'lij . lie 
Bill Of Lading Sliall be deemed to be tisr 
tire coraNcrience of the ýhippcr only but a 1211 COT. SWUC in no us/ c%. Jence against the 
CA, I ter. I 
If. CAIRIAGEANDSTO%%'%Gr! The Carrier has the right to accept cargo of all kinds davilicrous or othicrwiIii, for carr; age on or uo"r deck, including corstr2band, 
C. Plo, i "C' niuO. Orns a, , , *like 
if ;I connection -13 aosi Fort regulation. dangerous or objectionable cargo is 
submitted to any calls hnitnt, en route or at Anai dicitioaion, A l1expens. 's thc:. 01710 be for 
scratiost of the road,. 
The Canwr is at liisýenv to stow the lionds In Poillp, Forecastle. dcclt,, uw, shellor-d"k. 
sparebuotrn. tonnage open; n,, 
-cr 
any other cowieu. in Space and linods so slowed hall 
it purposes to be slowed linderdeck: -! I- to C-r4 to. goods below dc,; k be 
too; 0CCr`o`n`dm, 
ýk An 
connecting ships and m lighters and or soy craft wit Oine%er. 12. DEC K CARGO. IXvL SICICK AND PLANTS-- Larqap- deck and Ilse stork 
&Is M.., ed , 
liandled. stowe. l. cart, ed. kept and ullrh4Cird At StOrritt"S IISK and the C-icr il .h not be liable for loss thereof or damage_ one, clo. ccn though rejulting from 
wo-11 fill. ship or firms the fl-IttEct. " of the Carricr, his scri, cisits or Agents. 
3. no or the sl,, r. 
13. CLIF: Freight to be paid in ad%itnzý is clut on shipment together with 
V, Jilrs'n. -d II., , _., and 
hall in no sa-e - W-III&d. .., the, lot. 11, nor p,,. Iy, -hal, -r 
may befali slop mid or cjcgo. If not prcriiJ. thjul, la stipulated, It-. Ire, gh I* fioiiag and 
ibirlta increased by thtccq orad-c ofisiso-raýmern must he pa: 1 lie R -sr. 
IS 
ftiejl. ý ostanic it destination IS di. ai on artival I-19crIker %ith pri: iiage a led charges and 
Also I", :J bef, . ;., Ol, i-, ý OF 'he c4110. SMIria. 1ale I he condition of -. 
1 nM-vju-fanm. tIle hipria remains responsible forthe freight, prinlact and charges 
until it,, a o. I -e been P-l. 
I be I c, 
zi 
It be compute I, either upon the basis or the particulars in the Bill of 
I-Aclind or I",. file g. ass eight. stersureMirrst. % al, le or nurotacr slacermuird at the port or dud_Ei. at " .1-. or he car,.,. .. I_ ... lie i" 
14. PENAL1 Y FREIGHT; I he Carrier 
Zs 
thý'r`i`ghdt*tc, ha, Ic the v2ltm estimated or 
to lifto c the coo, -,. mease; rement or se'llIt %trified by experts and if toc, particulars 
; ...... !. rj L, 
I,, 11, n" turn out to tv itloerrect lis Carrier is chtal, cl to harge double the 
with tt. e cost 
fiýiýb, Ilb, --h h, 3 t.. a,. been chargers had th. cargo coca. cotte. Ely JewribW, together 
15. 
In 
is 
the -lar or his Afcsts %: iall have A lien on I gordl. and the right 
gi: 
7z he 
to u:: sare. y 'l. b:,: &Wt. as their option for freight (Includtog Additional 
f"'ght O! a on primage, c. ad ficight. demurrage. Or 
t%pn.!. firs., I S` , , age dep. s. 1, ., 4 
far th. -11'. 4,11 
'J'at" Arx. o; a;.. 5 S_h 
L... and cle rn; $,, all I, hai. A lien fu A It 
. cvsrI unsatisP. 
0 debts at th,, abol, c SIA-uh; due to them by the Consignees or 
0. _a c, , . it" ad., 16. D&HARGE AND DrLIVERY: Discharge may comý, ncc without previous 
notice. 11"' Carrier shall be .; Ltclty at say Urns, to send Lk ga-ls to shore by shilos, 
lighters 0, any .! her , art at his option. inji " to store this goads an %hruf or qpayý 
et Ortr; sla"s, open or custincil, or in lightols or other craft, &! I at the risk and 4XISCAM at 
the Kc. 
. "Cir. I 1w., ciesla may be di! ci! arr: d and must be taken mccirt orsither ashere or cossrside at 
Lhec". 9f 6001 ia%, hCShIPI6 NZ-) to -'ojdAIjd.,, i jss%c is ablc todischarSe. 
in aný *! &to of Sitather. cuntinuously day Ara mal Sundays and bolidj)s irazlisdad, any 
c., to. aftlIc front not., thstandmil. 
I he saahe conditions and cxm. tions Apply correspe-Idip. gly also to iclistry of cargo 
lisibit"', mcr as %c3 u to loading cl "me. If the Resolver fists to takc igi of the, cargo Is stipulated abel- e. the contract of 
ca;:: jgt al,. 311 Ire cc isidervill 14 liI-Ing trial fulfilled and the Urner shall ha-, c the riant to Caurn demorrast, anu, or to dischar. c and oilirc I" cargo as son out sa-c 3nJ, or to carry on 
tig ia:! zo to kom . ýr. t wn%cnK-t Plitt, at it's aiscittion. to, al; wb4t&j at ::, at port all at the risk 
&ad C. - riase or & R_-r. 
% trar%cr it It coinrulloflf Of C'Jst0r. a'Y at any port to deliver the carria to the Custom 
or Port autioraic, or to ari, rcrwn. corromiran Or body isf thA C. e,. s, . 1.11 1'. 3. t V%e r; ght to Appoint th, s -, -0-1. cc, resrAtSrSn, or early or at! niioistration and delivery 
so wadi Iýzl " considered As final dch%try, the Rccc! %rr to pay 1.11 it"Pen! cs consaicmd 
ti Art. - ah jo,;, udirij; qx3y oues. 
And As 
Ariy stiattstrportersat to be V. oliarmej by tt a rally ap; oiatcd i; y the Carrier at the It" 
Mis. 5e of the liteccocir. 
Urifr r. ý at -q ýf 11-hAt71. 
%,. gýmg a. board du-q di, hme is Vly ai! o. %J by pirmissionolithaShip'b All. atu 
It pcrvission lie S, crk at! a4dition,! vrýnws ancu-d by t;, c Wp in eor. ýqucnc* of s, 4ch 
r. ; ihi,,; n bo,. -d ht, h., nf c-a ch-z,, a, ---c &hall be ýr 
-ouht of kvc-m. not%tths! artý'Af AnY Lustom, to the car. u. ity. N, rn-ion may be 
by t!, S. up% AS-IS At 41Y Uý! I. 1.. h., rc -tho. t prejudice to bhi, - 
., roed. O*r. 1, Spl; 1 I to ý, J, a, "A. C-pen- .!,.. ,ý 'n. 
it It, Car,, is Wt , akcn receipt of. the CArrwr is as l, bcc: y to -cU same %1: h of without 
IgSAI aulhurity; of me pta,, zeds should not CoNer tlas total arnount due disShipptr -haft be 
&able fer ux d01,11-e. 
17. EXPENSES, DUTIrS. 177C.: The exp,: nses conmcled, % ith disch3rge and dtlkety 
to be raid by t, x Rc, ei%er &% per diouic 16 Ste 110J to 
imludc all expcnws for mauunna, 
sic-11-uts. 
-sorainy. 
%tackirc. tjýmz samrlcý SWIU-1 -.. $*. AMP$ and all other sim,! ir 
04,69s. Fuv"tr-re the Receiver to PAY -'y d, &, % t2%. scrtax Cr tmN-. L levied, under any 
Panic and for ulate%cr Peters on t:; c lgaous or usi 
ihe 
shit by'scason of IQ*ir. g them goo" 
On t-d. alain if lc%sed by ria, - o( the goAL 
ha%, ni been t. An, J,. pXd Juring " voyage 
of cattad cr d. u; izTt, rJ under cl-ram. i. c. 
18. FURWARDI%(jAý, L)IltAý-SitiFNir-. N'T- lbec4trooranyportthcrmi'may, 
M the vj tion, of the Carrier and I vften as may 1re,;, Lny %-c t. dwined -P-Qwnt, be 
CSeri9d in a substituted sh, or I. W1.1cred anU., i, r landed amil er storc. 1 fur J. he purpos, r of 
sm'.. mitc in the same at oLr shu, or by any o1her ni-ans ofcaa%cyamv. 
The respomsbilicy a( the Cattorr ihall be lueuwd to the part of the transport performed by 
All txpcrs-conmc; cJ uith dixharge and deti%wy to be paiJ by tt-o Rcýchvr as per 
hirý)Drl the ship undr. i lk manytrement and can tl;,; m-%ill be acknowledyed b it "c C. rr*, zr for dramage a ri In, a it: iI ibid lir: nt; zny c the. pit t of transport, even Jboui; 
rI 
tt, fxýuht for the h. le It,, L-o -11,, ted by flo. 
. 
The S! lipi, - a, s the Curritr I-) cottr 1: itn , bw ra. I on his 1, thalf for Cie It. tclriare andlear -c3-ar. c',,, f 0I and t; r storlag, transporting or cthciw- dcalinit 
with such. r, i, r 1. - ,, I --.. of or . o-, -1 ,, it,. eteri. ire I. I's -1, p ., Ihoat -pnol. bdity fit arly ti7l. or Jifitaft on Ili. p,,: of illeC-ii, ir yin Ill.,.: % 11 , tzrints of , lath contracts i, li, % f-w. al It: in any resp-,; t vi, il -cr to theS%ir;, er tlan Oc L-mit 
of th: s Hill of I'd,,, - "f:, c -ivo to ýc carried on is soon as poss'Hebta! IhcCarr; cr not tote li, b: c r', r e-, Y. 
tlhe Irl Me Cf(! C! 3Y Or 01' in, ircren-t in the wit t! - to any cause b, -.., nd c=trol of the CArrier. tht adlit, onal charges must be paid by flitRecti- before cf 
the 
Ir the goods nor Urwarde, i by more than one conveyance, the Recciscr must like ee! ive. y 
.. 'each roawn i-, J: -l, afw 
19. VILOIS. ICAVAGL. CRYDOCKING. ARMAMENT. CONNOY: 'III, 
1". ), liz, e liberty to Sit, -. l c' 'ilhcut pilots, to low ;, clraviot vcsiria urJer all clr"m, iarco, % 
and in all 34-tior! or I(pancript to do so. in be w-J, to c!. ydocg It any time f. o, any 
P-, P-- wtou"'C' -1th or cargo on board, l, ha to ýa, i a; ricd or. 3, riar-J. ia,, ý. r 
co'lloy. not. 
: 0. NOI ICE: (V CL AI MS: Notice of I a; ms rising under this Bill ct 1,34ini; or I. Ral claims must bi 110ýt, ] -1 later than d4red to t1w Haeoc Rules. 
7he Cbrt; cr tl, ill not bc liable to pay any wirip-sation ifthc nature Or 1111 va'uz of die good; h,, It- ril- '4d. 21. Fit IDENCE * Tht shirl's PrOtelt anitfor a true copy of the ship's ! cý shill be derated coll -i-ze of th= farts and circurr, lances stated th, pl. n. In case tf;, 1.: L! I- of liý -hip a,, ] or IhcCalF,, ind also it, c-, sI crabwnc or tj, 'Ina it ;, I'll -rl' ay is ptovLd that tht 1-1 of the itio ard'or th- -- ras 
ji bo, I ý-rd by t" Or by the 8,1ý11 f4u; t Of rri., ity of thcCa! -r or by 
the flat, 'L Or nCll. I ý` th- ai; -(y ýl, 1-ants ofthe Carrier. 
: 2. INOI MM 1Y. Any clain, for Ins' of dan,, ', c under this Bill of to 
lidi-tl on the of li - i'll-c -11c 01 the 91161 at the port and tinit roent 
(.; Ih 't, l'pinq "r., ,,, the, ". ) .,. due proportion ýz n 
the d,, 1--d I. lu, (Cl! IP,, is. ýl shall ote lc, %: prov, dej also tliat the shot, 'th-A in on 
, a,, Lz Ixld Intbl: I`- v. n,, J; ol Illy cle-trtior, exceeding in %alc one hor- J 
I -,,, 
p, rk, vý or -, , unl- ckJtrýta . in it. I On this Bill Of L,, 1, ri; ,1 
I I'C'Em is ill'y he ty, -I upon be 11-1. ri in ally iv, for any cmnmls: 0b. profit. 
mr-r. d, ty. Volarl. -l -e. finding or Other 61.1olar charges, nor for any loss or 
Otani,? capýhlc .1 lw; ' " fly Insurance. 
btýlij to It the , it ,, r., pl. cing any lost or ilamiged 50ods, 
23. nI'(-OND! lpy%JNU OF CAkCO; Ali cost ot mending, repAirilit, bI; il, Z, 
coopef'r, 't, to be r, account of the F "J'. 
21., K i: G U L, ý`rf 0 urc.: IlIslorperand Flacel,, rare tabligedt. 
comply -! h Lt rc_olation. a-d rcluireni-is of --. --n or any . 1hil, audit, ;: - an I 
to pay and or ly the Carrir and or tile ()ý,, is of thý cafgo un board for . 11 
ý'l'n'stgr". 
Icun- 
or for, ; l'u, 
'1a(c, 
cr -ture in-roed Or sutlerid in co-juc-c 
a n' in' Itaf If th' ý-Jt are net I,, be c""'. 
-I or i otrort"J. I!, v ý' 
"" 
blily to Co"n thancor. "in by Latricr flittl te at I 
it. to t, irg, bra., or to wiýiv such goods to tl, c purl of load,., S Or by et, -, SOrt sit at It.. 
ri, k ao, I c., rn,. Zrvi, 
21. (iI: N. I,, KA 1, A URAGE: General A-rafe shall bc adjusted at 112s%dad or at on-, 
cI' otber is he p Ill. Cirpil by v-; -! 1, li-teot t', h- arrinom', I by It t, z 
t I- 'or 10 (-lh t!,: idhý;;.,,., 
, 
dj-,. lcn to b--, dlao. or, fing to she Y., l, An, - Kid- 191 
hit in ý! j c, -.,, h- the Sit, ,I -c ra, horo, all ex-nditure, nlo: I and damage sulija, jcý by it,, '11, in wj ....... bit to rictiost he( -I? b, 4ilo-d in G-tral A,, eraipi). ;; ", Recro, c; isb, -il WI en Will 1-1-iry cafthe cargo the G,.., ai Alrer3c, Rýnd its 
use -tl' the Carrier ind to rllý a "'i-at to the atioint fi-I by the Carrier as a for 
th- contribution ulti-714111) ult file 1, be d, it -th --yd-b4 it, Ive r-nz. or 
I h. - p are of alio-t- I to - h, LJJ 0II ( all- -Slat hiye -1, -, h 
uoihe-riters ý1 -pIct thercof. the Carrior being a .1 
to ha,,, ta, he dIpo-s 
coolcltcU llot, ý: iim, the curre-y 
in , hich, ý, I',. c', StatIrittal a! 'All 
he ! ri, vn ip, 
if tile R-i%cr f. ill, to rosts (it, 
Citric, -ith tilt 
' 
req regarding in. .: ue 
0 'o, 1,,. or the , .. 
ijc ., ect-i -- 
in Ilia C-, r, of-ton in-rect. the vante of g-42 
, halli Ir, io, d by st --ýIai - u-, om appitoo--d by Ire Cari,, r,., the io, tralý- 
1h, C, o., c: s are ý'J tý, is sair-la, to ,, o, -e 
he kilr of the ar (, A. 
L; 
g. 6. n p-iw; 
S 
Illi p., po-, u, h I, odt, . 
, ht. 
SALVA', F. 11" L! 1zl In catc of salvage, accident or tt littr 
special cirruinianot, : tir a. caores and abroo3cmir- ul tt,. c Corr- in rc; irl to sh., and or 
thiall be c ju. 'ý I the 
27. LANV (, 'ý A 'Ai ION: In so far Is ar, thitir, has not been dealt iv: th by tLe 
provision of this Bill I' t-loi, thi Law of th, Villubic f Iraq s. lal! aPPiY. 
Ail a, wns unde, this ell of Shall be b-lant 29. JUKIý 
befiallitte Coops of kiaghdat rlrJ uttiothr Ccnarýthall la. %; i-idalt, .1 with ret3rd M A,. y 
su. 'h a. tic., vitless the Ca-er arrial. to another full or volunlarily submits hLIIs:, r 
I h. r. t.. 
: 1. Anythinl! done or rot done by reason or or ; it ronrla4anza with th. f-gohl 
shall be clcm. d to Uc within PaI CoAlract NOPirl Jd It& ( 0iijigibeir 0Ampr of 'he &. )ads 
, hall pay all call ard c . 1-tes : ocurr! d bý "a Cairlir anti th. ýh., ) all'MiOrtil tý Us which cold otiýrýiw hi,. c cereal inal"llicil. 
ADDITIONAL CLAUSES 
A. SPECIAL CIRCUNISI'ANCES: If according to the or,. ros r: ' the (%; 1-. r1 ! hc 
be, risivuea ird-lcii. t1h. 
loading. felt on Or el-thcre by the inimincrice or cluiteni us - or ýadika a; iliratior,. 
ci%il Ar. tiols or cots -m :, jhons. or by blockade or se share ý, f or cm1buio on %%&. ) and or 
cargo, or sooh, bit- cf inirort Or exp, ft or va-it or oth- measures tak, - tv A-/ 
Go-stincat or ot- a, 111,1-ty or body or nrialnution purpttrij or -irinril t, : xerc- 
the r-er, of a G., ýr, ocrtt or autho. ay or by quararaing. stinaary. Cslorr, s or ur 
legulat, ont or distur- -%, or 1, y týv or k-! --th, r ,ý by to I.; P anJ or 
or by coripstion or at-tri. 'to I Ariv cause of faciiii `1 for -J, rf, d,, 02, j_. " uti; ýe, y. 
or bi, tire onmarience us . c! ., tissr to ship and or crew and or cireo it, J or pas,:. -rs aid 
in at circumstan, -- ulýtn; 
h in me opini- of Cie Masier arc s-lir v) anv of the 't'o. es, d, 
the Carrier is at hbrly to uts. h. u4c into -1k or craft -ad'o, Ul lairs; -ý r state ln, 
c, ther at or off fix port -!. ere it.: ship is it at city ofh,. r rirt: 31 hit - , ý.,; n an., - 
andors, I-waird the All& to little isisticlaw-h., ts fair-d... vIu. Jan. -j- 
the conjolons of trin-;, irt in force for the means at conveyanze ;, Mpicting the trj, -,: t_ 
? to return the floofs to tire port of Waii or to sit - of the goods or any PA ý, ffaisy 
Ii; A, way. all -1 the -k end -p- -, ' Ihe 'thirr-. Th. an,, &., If zitriles, 
thcmurvn be consjdcicJ co-, 101ýlcd aid ths Carrier to hzve comP,; ed sj, tk AU bull Oblilia%crics 
full r,,,, ht terms --led -J r"A01c. 
H. WAk RISK CLAUSL: 
41) No bilk of Lading to he sicneJ fnr ary blockaded poa and if the port or di,, hL,,,,, 
be declared biricka, litcl after thlis of Lading ha, c t-, cn stilneJ, of ;f the Port_to h_h toe 
ship ;- be,. ordered to J., el-ae either on , geo,, lot% of L., lons 11 C1.11a. t. r a, ,;. e to 
%hic% the hip I% or ihiall te promkined fro-, ssý, in'! 1h) t'.. G. 'e. -ý;. nt A hý N. Att- . "i-r 
whow liag the ship isih or 
li-y 
Any ash, Uc-rnrnent. the Owilt r sha! j d W, Ilec 111, at,,, 
at any other port co-ed 1, the Bill of Lan. 11111t. 311 rWvf%: d Its ! 'it Shii., ler, 
"Wrl"'W'd 
1114 
oth. r rort is lot a bt,, "jjcJ or oro! libited rOfL IS a, jovc mentior. idl anr shall bj en-j; lstj 
to ficikht as if the strip Into at she port or ports or dischl, ". 1t to W'iicl she "s 
orijsihtslý 01,1411J. 
II The ship shrill ha%e libtrty to corarly , ith any ordLrs or directions As to departure. 
arri%af. routes. Puts% at' 431. stoppage& destination. dcli, ery ýr Othe' , sa hav, - cr IM11 by tht: irimernatent of tile Nition under whosir ; 119 :: 4 %C%,, 'i 14.1; or ... -Pacroiin- t; -x of 
" any per- acting or Pirrorting to act not me -, hoir, j) If such ., 
dcpa4tnlCnt hitalief. Of by An, loln Inter of r- ni ha, nj, V 
a. 0. any 
rider tic terms at C- - Risk Insurance on th, r thin. tt.. ve. n. to ui,, s-h a' ý- 
I" vi a d 1.1-1 And If by re- . or and in compitatics: %ltr ý ., %. tell ordicti or direction% Ai dors, r '. net done. the 
same Sýiall not he dtie., i, i a -iation. And delivery in azc,,;; 1jo, c .,: r scýh orders ir directions shall be a of th, consfalt o), gs, and the fatit. it st, 11 c Y"j. 
ac,,, o, dv +, 
It Pa 
C. MW WON CJLAýIJISE AND BOTH TO 81-4,10E. COLLISION CLAUSE: 'Ne, v J-Son Clan"a, and &111 !0 Wqn! e Cl! iis; on Clause will apply. I he lanes, to sc, "a it. giracg c, en W-ifýtf late "I it.. U. S. I A. i-n;.,. 
V. STRME CLAUS, `, If tile hl,, is pievented or is likely to be prevcrted from enterinic 
the port or -Ittse ofL-, tiy n djj, hAfgc or cdlýyed th, r,., to 5t, _s, t, &aft 
shsvý-- of -) kind th, ý -l*,, - par,, tj I, no, 0, it opit- '"it, of l4s; jur from cautif. the ship sr,,! j t4i At ii-: y to proýsczd to anotrer Port of Par" afthenstsh in Car Zrai, I! "'h, 1.1 to Of out cf or bev-i Inc route t3 the S314 pýn or 
piace of del, cry or , vas-. -ch he C, rr,,,, , 01, soie chwattort MAY C. 1c. 11c. : ad there 'ýIrtd sn4 or transtup ttýc goods of 2r, 7 par, a, And ar store let her ariost or 
atharv, and, or ir-tst, )r., an, at forward %Arac to in,,, try v-, b, land or -t, rn. At this -I. fis", 1, f the L: C-91iiii. .1 0--, at ! -c A! a, too Is. at wil HiH if 
Lada. -., V-tIv $hall PAY 211 cvfA Vc , it chArs; e:, 
A 
con, d by this CItuce. vic t. irritr to h3% A An At) . jolu'. hir, for .. ", Isn't. fit rt, And 
"xPAMaM 
Ird the `011P'S rctPon,, ibifity isý33 cease at tn. sh; p's fait 11, m t!, A goods are so ixrirsL,, d, full fici - 'or Item, ý,, A_l-:, 
' dar, %;, .. in tner Sol of Lading. I!. CLAUSE FOll. IRAN: Ints it'samon at St, , 
in a. cor 
r. J. Ar Ftelah-er, is dra., v to t_a. cisiliarig d! l11CUl: it,; of dlf_ýsllc as K-11amill, h, al, d Wri -1-h try nece-sitioc oncharg:.. . 
To 
d 
ng cl'', l! e cargo at calitt, Kt-ran,. lA. nr or Bandar Sriallpstur. Sata 
fischarlin, 
sfall on -o'! I Muo-; of Cs. tics s rl,:, jA:: on% under I! - tovrt! act. 
. 
EXEMPTIONS ANr INIMUNITILS OF ALL SLRVANIS AND AGENTS OP 
e%cry indepent! urvt contractor from time to Unite catp]F,, ýcd by file Cv:, 61) se. ý! I in stay circit-tainces w;;, %: sOcss; r be under y !: ability what-er to t: ic Shipstor. Cons. stam or 
f L., Iss. dant or dtlay 
Owner or the lt, itlid. or to any Ho; 
zr 
of this Bill 0 ailing lot any Is, 
of %ft. 111caver kind brisir, or , cj, djmZ dirce4ily at nisdir"VY from any A= trustees or default 
On It's Put %bile a"ll"111 
L, 
the : Oý of of in connection with his emPloymelt and, but 
% ithetit prejudic. - t., she inocialily of this forIzoing PrQVIIHOrys in this Cý41il. -. City ticunp- 
1, -_ lintItAtiOn. cOn&; i4i,, M 3, ýd liberty hemin coolaiiad and c-ty rijht. cuMptuln from 
I; abtl; tY. defence Asia immunity aj what-, sair r, atuic ap., t-We to th4 Czrrscr Or to wb; zh iýj Carrier is citt; tlcJ heivu. idgr isball also be mailahle Anti shall catead to VfO! -. t c, cry 
such Als, ant or ASCII of [list Ca,: kr Acting As aforesaid finJ 
for the Pu(: )-)Se at WI the fQr,. 
to; ag provisi., ns .f this Ll, uýc ibst Carrier is or jhý. lj he deoviel to be ricial 
trustee cri Lzi, ilf ol'ar. d for she ticassfit at IR persons . 1na ale of might be 
Ft 
apsin. s from. t. aýe to film (Imiedistat isideparident contractual, as atorgirsid) and XtI suýh 
chalint lhall to this exacht be of be disewd to be parties to the contract in or sio. ders"d ty 
an. Bill or ". 1ig. 
Pointed by WilkiAllm 3106. Ull.. 12*16 I'llt'll S1,16% Woodo". LCA 
APPE-nlx 
MARINE 11MURANCE POLICY (CARGO) TISED BY 
IRAU NATIOTTAL MURANCE COe 
; I*i. N: ))! St. 
DA I) 
. "ATNAIIN- 
PO L. IC -ly 
F-U! : TO. 
) 
It TX 
C)ý all an,! evvrý, Otlý, ýr Pt I ýon r, v to tiv, 30 111a 
AL TNý. (, 0,. TT, AXY 
! I' to 6c, : ýssuiod. loý-I or mot lcýt, it', aad from 
or C: I. Ped Ow 
V, 'h`Cf(; f Undcr God. for this ncs,, nt Voyage Or ý: hMl fc, " Afastei il'i -! aid Shij, - (,, I- h. v Okh, -T ";; wkO or k C'. ' sh, Ill Ki. I- i upoii t I! -' : ýaid ds and thc -ild 6hip 
onntini:, ý ý! Ild onýlurt, lier "')l)C"Jt. ýIwre' up"n the -ýIid &C.: ; in(] ljjjtjýfý'-. uIltil tjjp S-ýid ship. d! ta rL i-, vd it 
thon, A NMI S0 ly hmd"O no A QQJ h yl fm- M, FAd Eby alv,! alld toxwh and mg at any p" or Wa" "n"Y" willaut MMwli-e W IFIN Aymnn&n TKI, . am! Wrowncp-, &". ' .: lcý- ý"- -ý '' ý- '' :f-ý--t tlý" .ý-.. ý1N, ý,, I. III,,,, ý.: II 
'Ti "''i t : i. ( ry or h, 
01, 
!::, I:, F, t ý, 1, ý ., ýý 
, -4 ý,. - ýAt-"' 
p' 
.I. -.. I- .I. '. I. ý. -, -I'T'. ., --ý., - -ý -I.,. '. 
I. ýT V 
nt. P, k. I; Ix "'ria ,t I* tý %%', ý 1ý IýI-,!.: E7,1 . () I- tt It IýIf! -I ý *'I -, 1 1A,,, .., !: ". .. 
on(, r Cr-ri-, D-! n-i i's pcr-(, ý,., 
*,, 
,, jj 
'c,, r hý I'lit. tlllýCSS GOM-ral, ov lhe Ship' t, e 
if -ttly, nt 
.ý iý "; 
&T! O; r i: u 
11'arranfed free of capture, Acizure, arrest, rest-, aint or detainment and the consequenccs thereof or of any attempt thereat; also/rom th* 
consequences of hostilities or war-like operatio5m, whether there be a dedaration of war or not; but this warranty shall not exclude, collili('n, 
contact with any fixed or ' 
floating obita (o, 4r than a irnine or torpedo), stranding, heuvy weather or firr u-, dess caused dirr. ctly ýand 
independently of the nature of the. voyage or service wItich the vessel concerizcd or, in the case of a collision, any other vessel involved 
therein is perloming) by a hostile act by or against a bcl! igetert power; and for thr. purpon of (his warranty "Power" includes any 
authority maintaining ttaval, military or air forces in association with a power. 
Further warranted free from the consequences of civil war, revolu tion, rcbelljon, insurrection, or civil strife arising ths. -reftom, or piracy 
Warranted free of loss or damage : 
rj) Caused by strikers, locked-out irorkinen, or persons (aking part in labour disturbances, Tiots or civil commotions. 
b) Resulting from strikes, lock-nuts labour disturbances riots or civil conirnotions. 
I 
I. 
(a) 
(Ii) 
Should the, risks excluded by Clause I (F. C. & S. Claime) be 7rinsfated in this Policy by deletion of the said Clause or should thý risks 
or any of them mentioned in that clause or the risks of mines, lort, rdoes, bombs, or other engines at war be insured under thi. j j)r"i('y. 
Clause (b) MOM shall become operative and anything contained in this contract which is inconsistent with Clause (b) or which offordii 
more extpnsive protection against the aforesaid riiks than that at'joulrd by the Institute War Clause rclerant to the particular loyin of 
transit covered by this insurance. is nuil and void. 
This Policy is warranted free of any claim based upon loss of, or 1rustration of, the insured voyage or adventure caused by arrests 
festraints or detainments of Kinys, Princes, Peoples, UnsurpeTs or persons attempting to usuip porver. 
INSTITUTE DANCEROUS DRUGS CLAUSE 
Is understood and agreed that no claim under this Policy will be paid in respect of drugs to which the various International Con- 
ntion relating to Opium and other dangerous drugs apply unless, 
The drugs sliall be expressly declared as such in the Policy and the name of the country from which, and the name Of the country 
to which they are consigned shall be specifically stated In the Policy; 
I. and 
The proof of loss is acconipanied either by a licence, certificate or authorization issued by the Government of the country to which 
the drugs are consigned showing that the importation of the consignment into that country has been approved by that Govern- 
ment, or alternatively by a licence, certificate or authorization issued by the Government of the country from which the drugs 
are consigned showing that export of the consignment to the destination stated has been approved by that Government. 
F 
and 
The route by which the drugs were conveyed was usual and customary. 
*-*-a 
-388- 
BIBLI OCL'tRAPHf* 
In Arabi c: 
AIATAJAFT "The International Sales". Baghdad, 1973. 
AL--OGAILI "The Role of the Bill of Lading in Performance 
C, I*F, Contracts"o Cairo, 1971. 
AL-SAITHOORI "Al-Wassitt" Vol. 2-4. Cairo, 1968. 
A1, -SIBAEE and ATITMI "Commercial Maritime Rights" Vol-5- 
Damasbus, 1965- 
AL-WnTDAITI "The Contract., of Sale". Baghdad, 1973* 
AWADH "The Maritime Law". Cairo, 1970- 
IMNI "The Maritime Sales% Cairo, 1972. 
In Engli sh, *. 
ATIyAH9 p. S. "The Sale of Goods" 5th ede 1975- 
BELL "Principles of the Law of Scotland" V0111@ 
', Commentaries on the Law of Scotland" V01010 
BEUJAIMTts Sale of Goods@ London, 1974- 
BRO'V, 11.1), "Tre, %tise on the Lau, of Sale". Edinbarghl 1821. 
CARVERfs Carriage by Sea. Vol. l. London, 1971, 
CHAIJOUS "Sale of Goods" 17th ede 
GLOAG and ]HENDERSON "Introduction to the Law of Scotland". 6th ed. 
GORDW, W*14@ "Studies in the Transfer of Property by Tradition". 
GOW, JoJ& "The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland% Edinburgh, 
1964- 
MJTTERIDGEt H. G. and 110MAH, Maurice "The Law of Bankers' Commercial 
Credit" 5th ede London, 197" 
XMTEDYfs C, T*P* Contracts- 3rd. ed. 
LORD CHORLEY and GILE39 O*C. "Shipping Law" 6th ed. London, 1970- 
PAM and IVAIE "Carriage of Goodaby Sea". London, 1976. 
SASSMT, Do 11C. I. Fe & F*O*Bo Contracts" 2nd. ed. London, 1975- 
The cases and other references are mentioned at the 
appropriate place* 
-389- 
SCIBUTTHOFF, C4,1% "The Sale of Goods" 2nd ed. London, 1966. 
flThe Export Tradelt 6th ed. London, 1975- 
SCRUITON on Charterparties 18th ede 
STEINt Po and SHAND, J* "Legal Values in Western Society'14, 
Edinburgh, 1974- 
WTALKERt DeMe "Principles of Scottish Private Law" Vol. l. 2nd ede 1975- 
In French: 
AIJIMY et RAIJ et ESTM IrDroit Civil Franpais". 6th ed. 1952. 
BALTIRt So "Valeur Probante du Connaissement". These, 1933, Paris. 
BETIOT "Traite The-oricrue et Pratique de la Vente CAP. Le Credit 
Documentaire". Paris, 1951- 
CHATREAU, P, "Trait; de Droit Mwitimelle Paris, 1958. 
COLIN and CAPITAPT "Le Droit Civil Franpais". 2nd ed. V02. 
GODRET, P, "Le Contrat de Vente Cout, Assurance, Fret"cafff 
These* Paris, 1925- 
1953. 
it 4, 
HE11UN I'Vente et Commerce lbxitime". Bruxelles, 1952. 
LIGOITIE, JeAs"T I'Le Connaissement et la Lettre de Volture Nbritimell. 
Paris, 1962. 
INIAMLM et =EDID I'Lepons de Droit Civil" 3rd ed. V. 312. 
RIPERTj Go I'Droit Maritime" Tome II. Paris, 1952. 
RCDIER9 Re "Traite General de Droit Maritime" Tome iio Paris, 1968. 
IqDroit Maritimell 6th ede 1974- (Precis Dalloz). 
WIMUIDLEN, 0. "Les Principes de la Vente C. I*P*II Bruxelles, 1926. 
Tnternational Rules and Conventions: 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law Relating to Bills of Ladingt signed al Brussels on August 251 
1924o 
Rules for ColeFe Contracts (Warsaw-Oxford Rules), adapted by the 
Word Conference of August 12,1932. 
Incoterms 1953- 
-390- 
The Draft Convention of the Carriage of Goods by Sea, adopted 
by (IJITICITRAL). 
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale 
of Goods (UIZES), 1967- 
Draft Convention on the International Combined Transport of 
Goods (T*C*1,1. ), Genevet 1972. 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, Revised 
1974- 
Periodicals: 
1- Lloydts Maritime and Commercial Law Quvxterly. 
2- Journal of Maritime Lavy and Commerce* 
3- Droit Maritime Franpais (D, I,. I*P*)* 
GLASd'u-Mý-9 
UNIVE*ifty 
WRARY 
xlýýl 
